| 1805 - 558 Seiten
...contradiction; — it is fuppofing a being to be capable, and yet incapable of diilblution at the iam* lime. " Whatever has parts, cannot be immaterial ; and what has no parts, can never lofe them. To fuppofe an immaterial fubftance to have parts, deftroys its immateriality; for it is... | |
| 1803 - 562 Seiten
...contradiction;— it is luppoling a being to be capable, and yet incapable of diiiblution at the lame lime. • " Whatever has parts, cannot be immaterial; and what has no parts, can never lofe them. To luppofe an immaterial fubltance to have parts, dellroys its immateriality; for it is... | |
| David Holmes - 1855 - 296 Seiten
...dissolution is necessarily excluded, is a flat contradiction : it is supposing a being capable and incapable of dissolution at the same time. Whatever has parts cannot be immaterial ; and whatever has no parts can never lose them. To suppose an immaterial substance to have parts, destroys... | |
| James Woolcock - 1883 - 192 Seiten
...it ; and where nothing can be taken away, that being must necessarily be incapable of dissolution. An exclusion of all parts is necessary to the existence...necessarily follows that it cannot perish by dissolution."* If the material die and dissolve, it can be worked up into other forms and substances. But spirit,... | |
| Miles Grant - 1895 - 478 Seiten
...Samuel Drew, a very able writer on the subject, says : "The soul is a simple, immaterial substance."2 " Whatever has parts cannot be immaterial; and what has no parts can never lose them. To suppose any substance to have parts, destroys its immateriality."3 "The soul is ... a simple substance, . .... | |
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