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To suppose the privation of Being to be that act through which the soul is reduced to nothing, while the perfect nonentity of the soul is necessary to the existence of the act of privation and is that, from whence both privation and annihilation are denominated; is to make the idea of the act of annihilation to exist antecedent to that perfect nonentity of Being, from whence alone annihilation can be denominated; which is an evident contradiction. And to suppose the soul to be annihilated by an action which is not an annihilating one, is to attribute to that action an effect which is precluded by its very name and nature; the soul to be annihilated by an action, which is not an annihilating one, is a plain contradiction in terms. Can any effect result from an action, before that action has a Being? If there can, an effect. must be produced by that which has no existence; if there cannot, no act of annihilation can destroy the soul; and that which cannot be destroyed by an act of annihilation, must necessarily be immortal.

If, then, the soul cannot be annihilated, either by what is supposed to be an annihilating act, or by an act which is not an annihilating one, nor abstracted from either, the plain consequence is--that no such thing as annihilation (according to those modes of reasoning which God has placed within the reach of human intelligence) can possibly take place; and, therefore, the soul can never perish by it. And that which is not placed within the reach of annihilation, must necessarily be immortal

I am well aware, that to this mode of reasoning it will be objected-" that if the mode of reasoning "which I have adopted in the preceding pages, be “admitted, it will amount to a total denial of all

possible action." This, however, I conceive, upon a more minute survey, will be found to be an erroneous conclusion. Confined as we are within the circle of compounded bodies, a strange association

of ideas has led us to apply the modes of dividing compounded bodies to the annihilation of simple substances, though the actions, which are peculiar to each, can have but little or no relation to one another. That all human actions include progression in their very nature, is a truth, which, I believe, no one will attempt to deny ; and the admission of this principle will prove to us a decisive difference between those actions which apply to the division of compounded bodies, and those which apply to the annihilation of an immaterial substance.

Let us suppose, for instance, the action of my hand, with which I am now writing,—it is an action which includes progression; but the action through which I am now writing, though it may be said to exist, yet it cannot be said to be a complete bookwriting action until the book is completed; for it is the completion of the book which can alone denomi nate it to be a complete book-writing action. But if, in the midst of my writing, the action of my hand. be suspended, the action is only complete in an exact proportion to the quantity which I have written; and it is from this partial completion of the book alone, that the action can then be denominated. But where the subject under consideration is so simple in its nature, that the idea of progression must necessarily be excluded from the action,-there these actions will not apply, there no medium can possibly exist between perfect annihilation and perfect existence.

If we again suppose the existence of an action, hrough which an apple is divided into two equal parts, the action can only be complete in proportion to the quantity divided; but it is the total separation of its parts, which can alone denominate the action to be a complete apple-dividing action. But whether we admit the progress which this action has made, to be partial or complete, it is the progress of the division alone, which can determine the specific quan

tity of the action which exists. In an action which applies to the division of compounded bodies, the action may be said to exist before it is complete; but in an action which is supposed to annihilate an immaterial substance, there can be no medium whatever between existence and completion. And as, in the order of nature, the action must exist before the soul can be annihilated by it; and as the annihilation of the soul can alone denominate it to be an annihilating act, certain it is, that if the soul perish, it must perish by an action which is not an annihilating one. But in admitting the soul to be annihilated by an action, which is not an annihilating one, we admit a palpable contradiction; and attribute to the action, an effect, which must be excluded from it, both by its name and nature.

An Apple may be partially divided; this Book may be partially written; and in either case the action may be suspended in this partial state; but when we apply any action to the annihilation of the soul, no such medium of suspension can possibly be admitted. Between existence and nonexistence there can be no medium, because there is nothing which can be divided; and where there is nothing which can be divided, there the action which applies can know no distinction between beginning, progression, and end. Simple existence must comprehend and

encircle all.

If the action, through which an immaterial substance is supposed to be annihilated, be of the same. nature with those actions through which compounded bodies are divided, it is certain, that such an action must include progression, unless this be ad-· mitted, the actions cannot be alike. But if an annihilating act be admitted to include progression, I would ask,-If in the progressive state of this annihilating act, God were to suspend this action, would the soul be annihilated or not? It is very certain, in

this case, that it could be neither. It is certain, that the soul cannot be in existence, because an action has so far passed upon it, as to be denominated an annihilating one; and it is equally certain that the soul cannot be reduced to a nonentity, because that action has been suspended, through which its perfect annihilation could be alone accomplished; and how a simple Being, which has no parts, can be partially annihilated, and partially in existence, I must leave for those to decide who can reconcile contradictions.

It may, perhaps, be said" that in compounded "bodies, there can be no medium between division "and no division, that an apple must be either "sound or injured." The truth of these positions I readily admit; but I still contend, that the action which produces an injury, must include progression. Unable, as we are, through the want of acuter organs, to penetrate the minuter parts of compounded bodies, we must content ourselves with that evidence which analogy supplies.

If the division of two particles, in any given portion of matter, can be accomplished by an action which has no progression, four may be divided in the same manner, and for the same reason; and we inay extend the same principle, even to the division of the Globe. In the division of larger bodies, progression becomes visible, because it is more suited to our perception; but the progression of all actions which divide compounded bodies, must be in exact proportion to the quantity of matter which is divided. As an action which divides a world, includes progression, progression must be included in that action also which divides an apple; and progression must continue, so long as parts are included in the thing divided. But where there are no parts, there can be no progression; and where there is no progression, there can be no action; and where there is no action, nothing can suffer by it. An action, there

fore, which includes progression, cannot apply to an immaterial substance; and an action which does not include progression, is a contradiction in terms. I therefore conclude;-that since all those actions with which we are surrounded, must include progression, because they apply to compounded bodies; and since an action, which includes progression, cannot apply to an immaterial substance, because it is uncompounded; the soul can never perish by any such action as those with which we are acquainted; and must, therefore, be immortal.

SECTION VII.

The loss of Existence is necessary to the Idea of the Privation of Being-The extinguishing Act cannot be Privation. It is absurd to suppose the Pre-existence of the Actor that destroys the Being of the Soul-There can be no Evidence of the fact of Annihilation-From the Mass of Evidence, the Author is fully satisfied that the Human Soul must necessarily be IMMORTAL.

NOR will it be of any avail, to exclude the term "annihilation." The same reasonings which preclude the term, will equally apply to any action, which includes within it the loss of Being. Nothing that is in existence, can be said to be deprived of existence, while that existence remains-it is a contradiction to suppose it. And if nothing can be deprived of Being while it is in existence, the loss of existence must be necessary to the idea of that privation. And if the idea of privation can have no existence, until the utter loss of Being denominates privation of Being to exist; that extinction of Being, which is supposed to be effected by privation, must necessarily precede the exist

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