of this clause. If Congress were to become partly filled with appointees of the President to other offices under the United States, or by holders through election of other offices, the independence of the Legislative Department which the Constitution undertook to safeguard would soon be undermined.

The Constitution of Georgia of 1777 declared that “no person shall hold more than one office of profit under this State at the same time." The Constitution of Maryland had a similar provision.

It was forbidden by the Articles of Confederation (Art. V) that any delegate in Congress hold "any office under the United States for which he, or any other for his benefit, receives any salary, fees, or emolument of any kind."

So this clause, like many another in the Constitution, took rise from colonial experience.

Section 7. All bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; 37 but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other bills.

37 That is, money bills must originate in the body then elected directly by the people. Senators have been so elected (Note 183) since 1913. One of the almost irrepressible conflicts between the King of England and the Houses of Parliament was respecting the power of raising money for the support of the King and the conduct of the government.

In a Congress (called the Stamp-Act Congress) composed of delegates from the Colonies a Declaration of Rights was promulgated in New York on October 19, 1765, which said:

"That it is inseparably essential to the freedom of a people and the undoubted right of Englishmen that no taxes be imposed on them but with their own consent,

given personally or by their representatives; that the people of these Colonies are not, and from their local circumstances cannot be, represented in the House of Commons in Great Britain ;( that the only representatives of the people of these Colonies are persons chosen therein by themselves, and that no taxes ever have been or can be constitutionally imposed on them but by their respective legislatures; that all supplies to the Crown being free gifts of the people, it is unreasonable and inconsistent with the principles and spirit of the British constitution for the people of Great Britain to grant to His Majesty the property of the Colonists."

In the Declaration of Rights of October 14, 1774, the delegates from the several Colonies in Colonial Congress assembled protested against acts of Parliament passed in the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth years of George III, "which imposed duties for the purpose of raising revenue in America", and they condemned them as measures "which demonstrate a system formed to enslave America."

In the early times in England the House of Lords and the House of Commons made separate grants of supply to the King for the maintenance of the government and himself. Later, as the Commons' proportion of the taxes · was greater, that House made the grant with the assent of the Lords. In the reign of Henry VIII they joined in the grants. But in the last Parliament of Charles I the grant recited that it was made by the Commons. Since then that House originates money bills.

The Kings of England always found need for more money than they got from Parliament. Some of the early kings, Henry III (1216-1272) and Edward I (12721307), for example, introduced the scheme of granting to their military tenants the privilege of knighthood; but those who wished to decline the honor (costly to maintain) could excuse their absence by a moderate fine. Once in

the reign of Elizabeth (1558-1603) and often in the time of James I (1603-1625) this ancient method of raising money without the aid of Parliament was employed.

Another lucrative plan of those two monarchs was to grant exclusive or monopolistic privileges. A monopolist in the making of soap, for example, agreed to pay the King eight pounds in money ($40) on every ton of soap made, in addition to ten thousand pounds ($50,000) for the charter or grant of the monopoly. Almost every necessity was under monopoly, but in 1639 the grants were revoked because of public displeasure. Enormous revenues flowed to the monarch from such sources.

Another device of resourceful royalty was to borrow heavily from wealthy nobles and never (or seldom) pay. It was not often that a wealthy man had the temerity to refuse. Elizabeth always discharged such obligations. In the reign of James I a forced loan of this kind was frustrated by the declaration of the House of Commons that no one be bound against his will to lend money to the King. While such practices were believed to be in violation of Magna Charta (1215), signed by King John, Parliament made the matter certain by requiring James' successor, Charles I, to assent((1628) to the Petition of Right wherein it was said that "no man shall be compelled to make or yield any gift, loan, benevolence to or such like charge without common consent by Act of Parliament) that none be called upon to make answer for refusal so to do." And in 1689 William and Mary accepted the Declaration of Rights, which prohibited the levying of money for the use of the sovereign without the grant of Parliament) Could the King raise money (which provides armies and navies) without the consent of Parliament there might soon be no Parliament. A dispute between Charles I and Parliament involving this money question and some others was carried into civil war and the sovereign's head was severed by the executioner.

Mentioning that in (Tudor and Stuart times "the crown was always tending to bankruptcy and always requiring help of Parliament' an English writer (Jenks' "Constitutional Experiments of the Commonwealth", p. 39) states: "It might almost be said that the development of the English Constitution is due to the fall in the value of money. It is certain that many of the constitutional crises of English history were brought about by that fact." It has been stated that the value of money in the time of Elizabeth, whose reign ended in 1603, was about twelve times what it is to-day.)

The foregoing references to historic facts show why the framers of the Constitution so carefully entrusted the raising and expending of the public treasure to the representatives elected by the direct vote of the people. It was the desire not only that public funds should not be wasted, but also that they should never be diverted to uses dangerous to the government.

A "bill for raising revenue" is one for levying taxes in the strict sense of the word and not one which incidentally brings in money. Thus a currency act of Congress which, to meet expenses, put a tax on notes of banking associations in circulation was held by the Supreme Court not to be a revenue bill which should have originated in the House of Representatives.

Under the Canadian Constitution bills for raising revenue originate in the House of Commons, but not before recommendation by the Governor General. The Australian Constitution forbids that the Senate either originate or amend money bills.

In Brazil the Chamber of Deputies (elected by the people) originates all bills for raising revenue, and so does the House of Deputies in Chile.

The Constitution of France permits the Senate to originate all but revenue bills, which must first pass the Chamber of Deputies.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.38

38 That paragraph was designed to prevent any question as to how and by whom a bill may be passed into a law. Could the House of Commons enact a law without the concurrence of the Lords? Could it do so without the signature of the King? Could both Houses ignore the King and make a law? Could the King prevent at will the taking effect of a bill passed by Parliament? Those were questions which had often stirred England deeply.

A bill returned by the President "with his objections" to the House in which it originated is said to have been : vetoed, but the word "veto" does not appear in the Con