and sufficiently appears so from things conceded by the adversaries themselves: and therefore the objection wholly falls to the ground.

There are various kinds of identity and oneness, found among created things, by which they become one in different manners, respects, and degrees, and to various purposes; several of which differences have been observed; and every kind is ordered, regulated, and limited, in every respect, by divine constitution. Some things, existing in different times and places, are treated by their Creator as one in one respect, and others in another; some are united for this communication, and others for that; but all according to the sovereign pleasure of the fountain of all being and operation.

It appears particularly, from what has been said, that all oneness, by virtue whereof pollution and guilt from past wickedness are derived, depends entirely on a divine establishment. It is this, and this only, that must account for guilt and an evil taint on any individual soul, in consequence of a crime committed twenty or forty years ago, remaining still, and even to the end of the world, and forever. It is this that must account for the continuance of any such thing, anywhere, as consciousness of acts that are past; and for the continuance of all habits, either good or bad: and on this depends every thing that can belong to personal identity. And all communications, derivations, or continuation of qualities, properties or relations, natural or moral, from what is past, as if the subject were one, depends on no other foundation.

And I am persuaded, no solid reason can be given, why God, who constitutes all other created union or oneness, according to his pleasure, and for what purposes, communications, and effects, he pleases, may not establish a constitution whereby the natural posterity of Adam, proceeding from him, much as the buds and branches from the stock or root of a tree, should be treated as one with him, for the derivation, either of righteousness, and communion in rewards, or of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt.*

As I said before, all oneness in created things, whence qualities and relations are derived, depends on a divine constitution that is arbitrary, in every other respect, excepting that it is regulated by divine wisdom. The wisdom, which is exercised in these constitutions, appears in these two things. First, in a beautiful analogy and harmony with other laws or constitutions, especially relating to the same subject; and secondly, in the good ends obtained, or useful consequences of such a constitution. If therefore there be any objection still

I appeal to such as are not wont to content themselves with judging by a superficial appearance nd view of things, but are habituated to examine things strictly and closely, that they may judge rightvas judgment, whether on supposition that all mankind had coexisted, in the manner mentioned beoe, any good reason can be given, why their Creator might not, if he had pleased, have established such a union between Adam and the rest of mankind, as was in the case supposed. Particularly, if it had been the case, that Adam's posterity had actually, according to a law of nature, somehow grown But of him, and yet remained contiguous and literally united to him, as the branches to a tree, or the members of the body to the head; and had all, before the fall, existed together at the same time, though in different places, as the head and members are in different places in this case, who can determine, that the author of nature might not, if it had pleased him, have established such a union between the root and branches of this complex being, as that all should constitute one moral whole; so that by the law of union, there should be a communion in each moral alteration, and that the heart of every branch should at the same moment participate with the heart of the root, be conformed to it, and concurring with it in all its affections and acts, and so jointly partaking in its state, as a part of the same thing? Why might not God, if he had pleased, have fixed such a kind of union as this, a union of the various parts of such a moral whole, as well as many other unions, which he has actually fixed, according to his sovereign pleasure? And if he might, by his sovereign constitution, have established such a union of the various branches of mankind, when existing in different places, I do not see why he might not also do the same, though they exist in different times. I know not why succession, or diversity of time, should make any such constituted union more unreasonable, than diversity of place. The only reason, why diversity of time can seem to make it unreasonable, is, that difference of time shows, there is no absolute identity of the things existing in those different times: but it shows this, I think, not at all more than the difference of the place of existence.

lying against this constitution with Adam and his posterity, it must be, that it is not sufficiently wise in these respects. But what extreme arrogance would it be in us, to take upon us to act as judges of the beauty and wisdom of the laws and established constitutions of the supreme Lord and Creator of the universe! And not only so, but if this constitution, in particular, be well considered, its wisdom, in the two forementioned respects, may easily be made evident. There is an apparent manifold analogy to other constitutions and laws, established and maintained through the whole system of vital nature in this lower world; all parts of which, in all successions, are derived from the first of the kind, as from their root or fountain; each deriving from thence all properties and qualities, that are proper to the nature and capacity of the kind, or species: no derivative having any one perfection (unless it be what is merely circumstantial) but what was in its primitive. And that Adam's posterity should be without that original righteousness, which Adam had lost, is also analogous to other laws. and establishments, relating to the nature of mankind; according to which, Adam's posterity have no one perfection of nature, in any kind, superior to what was in him, when the human race began to be propagated from him.

And as such a constitution was fit and wise in other respects, so it was in this that follows. Seeing the divine constitution concerning the manner of mankind's coming into existence in their propagation, was such as did so naturally unite them, and made them in so many respects one, naturally leading them to a close union in society, and manifold intercourse, and mutual dependence. Things were wisely so established, that all should naturally be in one and the same moral state; and not in such exceeding different states, as that some should be perfectly innocent and holy, but others corrupt and wicked; some needing a Saviour, but others needing none; some in a confirmed state of perfect happiness, but others in a state of public condemnation to perfect and eternal misery; some justly exposed to great calamities in this world, but others by their innocence raised above all suffering. Such a vast diversity of state would by no means have agreed with the natural and necessary constitution and unavoidable situation and circumstances of the world of mankind; all made of one blood, to dwell on all the face of the earth, to be united and blended in society, and to partake together in the natural and common goods and evils of this lower world.

Dr. Taylor urges,* that sorrow and shame are only for personal sin: and it has often been urged, that repentance can be for no other sin. To which I would say, that the use of words is very arbitrary: but that men's hearts should be deeply affected with grief and humiliation before God, for the pollution and guilt which they bring into the world with them, I think, is not in the least unreasonable. Nor is it a thing strange and unheard of, that men should be ashamed of things done by others, whom they are nearly concerned in. I am sure, it is not unscriptural; especially when they are justly looked upon in the sight of God, who sees the disposition of their hearts, as fully consenting and concurring.

From what has been observed it may appear, there is no sure ground to conclude, that it must be an absurd and impossible thing. for the race of mankind truly to partake of the sin of the first apostasy, so as that this, in reality and propriety, shall become their sin; by virtue of a real union between the root and branches of the world of mankind (truly and properly availing to such a consequence), established by the Author of the whole system of the universe;

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to whose establishments are owing all propriety and reality of union, in any part of that system; and by virtue of the full consent of the hearts of Adam's posterity to that first apostasy. And therefore the sin of the apostasy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to them; but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that ground, God imputes it to them.

By reason of the established union between Adam and his posterity, the case is far otherwise between him and them, than it is between distinct parts or individuals of Adam's race; betwixt whom is no such constituted union; as between children and other ancestors. Concerning whom is apparently to be understood that place, Ezek. xviii. 1-20;* where God reproves the Jews for the use they made of that proverb, The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge; and tells them, that hereafter they shall no more have occasion to use this proverb; and that if a son sees the wickedness of his father, and sincerely disapproves it and avoids it, and he himself is righteous, he shall not die for the iniquity of his father; that all souls, both the soul of the father and the son, are his; and that therefore the son shall not bear the iniquity of his father, nor the father bear the iniquity of the son; but the soul that sinneth, it shall die; that the righteousness of the righteous shall be upon him, and the wickedness of the wicked shall be upon him. The thing denied, is communion in the guilt and punishment of the sins of others, that are distinct parts of Adam's race; and expressly, in that case, where there is no consent and concurrence, but a sincere disapprobation of the wickedness of ancestors. It is declared, that children who are adult and come to act for themselves, who are righteous, and do not approve of, but sincerely condemn the wickedness of their fathers, shall not be punished for their disapproved and avoided iniquities. The occasion of what is here said, as well as the design and plain sense, shows, that nothing is here intended in the least degree inconsistent with what has been supposed concerning Adam's posterity's sinning and falling in his apostasy. The occasion is, the people's murmuring at God's methods under the Mosaic dispensation; agreeable to that in Levit. xxvi. 39, " And they that are left of you, shall pine away in their iniquity in your enemies' lands; and also in the iniquities of their fathers shall they pine away with them:" and other parallel places, respecting external judgments, which were the punishments most plainly threatened, and chiefly insisted on, under that dispensation (which was, as it were, an external and carnal covenant), and particularly the people's suffering such terrible judgments at that day, even in Ezekiel's time, for the sins of Manasseh; according to what God says by Jeremiah (Jer. xv. 4), and agreeable to what is said in that confession, Lam. v. 7, " Our fathers have sinned and are not, and we have borne their iniquities."

In what is said here, there is a special respect to the introducing of the gospel dispensation; as is greatly confirmed by comparing this place with Jer. xxxi. 29, 30, 31. Under which dispensation, the righteousness of God's dealings with mankind would be more fully manifested, in the clear revelation then to be made of the method of the judgment of God, by which the final state of wicked men is determined; which is not according to the behavior of their particular ancestors; but every one is dealt with according to the sin of his own wicked heart, or sinful nature and practice. The affair of derivation of the natural corruption of mankind in general, and of their consent to, and participation of, the primitive and common apostasy, is not in the least intermeddled with, or touched, by any thing meant or aimed at in the true scope and design of this place in Ezekiel.

Which Dr. Taylor alleges, p. 10, 11, S.

On the whole, if any do not like the philosophy, or the metaphysics (as some perhaps may choose to call it) made use of in the foregoing reasonings; yet I cannot doubt, but that a proper consideration of what is apparent and undenia ble in fact, with respect to the dependence of the state and course of things in this universe on the sovereign constitutions of the supreme Author and Lord of all, who gives none account of any of his matters, and whose ways are past finding out, will be sufficient, with persons of common modesty and sobriety, to stop their mouths from making peremptory decisions against the justice of God, respecting what is so plainly and fully taught in his holy word, concerning the derivation of a depravity and guilt from Adam to his posterity; a thing so abundantly confirmed by what is found in the experience of all mankind in all

ages.

This is enough, one would think, forever to silence such bold expressions as these "If this be just--if the Scriptures teach such doctrine, &c., then the Scriptures are of no use-understanding is no understanding-and, What a GOD must he be, that can thus curse innocent creatures!-Is this thy God, O Christian!"

It may not be improper here to add something (by way of supplement to this chapter, in which we have had occasion to say so much about the imputation of Adam's sin) concerning the opinions of two divines, of no inconsiderable note among the dissenters in England, relating to a partial imputation of Adam's first sin.

One of them supposes that this sin, though truly imputed to INFANTS, So that thereby they are exposed to a proper punishment, yet is not imputed to them in such a degree, as that upon this account they should be liable to eternal punishment, as Adam himself was, but only to temporal death, or annihilation; Adam himself, the immediate actor, being made infinitely more guilty by it, than his posterity. On which I would observe, that to suppose, God imputes not all the guilt of Adam's sin, but only some little part of it, relieves nothing but one's imagination. To think of poor little infants bearing such torments for Adam's sin, as they sometimes do in this world, and these torments ending in death and annihilation, may sit easier on the imagination, than to conceive of their suffering eternal misery for it. But it does not at all relieve one's rea

There is no rule of reason that can be supposed to lie against imputing a sin in the whole of it, which was committed by one, to another who did not personally commit it, but what will also lie against its being so imputed and punished in part. For all the reasons (if there are any) lie against the imputation; not the quantity or degree of what is imputed. If there be any rule of reason, that is strong and good, lying against a proper derivation or communication of guilt, from one that acted, to another that did not act; then it lies against all that is of this nature. The force of the reasons brought against imputing Adam's sin to his posterity (if there be any force in them) lies in this, that Adam and his posterity are not one. But this lies as properly against charging a part of the guilt, as the whole. For Adam's posterity, by not being the same with him, had no more hand in a little of what was done, than in the whole. They were as absolutely free from being concerned in that act partly, as they were wholly. And there is no reason to be brought, why one man's sin cannot be justly reckoned to another's account, who was not then in being, in the whole of it; but what will as properly lie against its being reckoned to him in any part, so as that he should be subject to any condemnation or punishment on that account. If those reasons are good, all the difference there can be, is this; that to bring a great punishment on infants for Adam's sin, is a

great act of injustice, and to bring a comparatively small punishment, is a smaller act of injustice, but not, that this is not as truly and demonstrably an act of injustice, as the other.

To illustrate this by an instance something parallel. It is used as an argument why I may not exact from one of my neighbors, what was due to me from another, that he and my debtor are not the same; and that their concerns, interests and properties are entirely distinct. Now if this argument be good, it lies as truly against my demanding from him a part of the debt, as the whole. Indeed it is a greater act of injustice for me to take from him the whole of it, than a part, but not more truly and certainly an act of injustice.

The other divine thinks there is truly an imputation of Adam's sin, so that infants cannot be looked upon as innocent creatures; yet seems to think it not agreeable to the perfections of God, to make the state of infants in another world worse than a state of nonexistence. But this to me appears plainly a giving up that grand point of the imputation of Adam's sin, both in whole and in part. For it supposes it to be not right, for God to bring any evil on a child of Adam, which is innocent as to personal sin, without paying for it, or balancing it with good; so that still the state of the child shall be as good, as could be demanded in justice, in a case of mere innocence. Which plainly supposes that the child is not exposed to any proper punishment at all, or is not at all in debt to divine justice, on the account of Adam's sin. For if the child were truly in debt, then surely justice might take something from him without paying for it, or without giving that which makes its state as good, as mere innocence could in justice require. If he owes the suffering of some punishment, then there is no need that justice should requite the infant for suffering that punishment; or make up for it, by conferring some good, that shall countervail it, and in effect remove and disannul it; so that, on the whole, good and evil shall be at an even balance, yea, so that the scale of good shall preponderate. If it is unjust in a judge to order any quantity of money to be taken from another without paying him again, and fully making it up to him, it must be because he had justly forfeited none

at all.

It seems to me pretty manifest that none can, in good consistence with themselves, own a real imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin to his posterity, without owning that they are justly viewed and treated as sinners, truly guilty and children of wrath on that account; nor unless they allow a just imputation of the whole of the evil of that transgression; at least all that pertains to the essence of that act, as a full and complete violation of the covenant which God had established; even as much as if each one of mankind had the like covenant established with him singly, and had by the like direct and full act of rebellion, violated it for himself.

CHAPTER IV.

Wherein several other Objections are considered.

DR. TAYLOR objects against Adam's posterity's being supposed to come into the world under a forfeiture of God's blessing, and subject to his curse through his sin :-That at the restoration of the world after the flood, God pronounced equivalent or greater blessings on Noah and his sons, than he did on Adam at