SECT. IV. The farther Divisions of Mode.

II. THE second division of modes is into absolute and relative. An absolute mode is that which belongs to its subject, without respect to any other beings? whatsoever; but a relative mode is derived from the regard that one being has to others. So roundness and smoothness are the absolute modes of a bowl; for if there were nothing else existing in the whole creation, a bowl might be round and smooth; but greatness and smallness are relative modes: for the very ideas of them are derived merely from the comparison of one being with others. A bowl of four inches diameter is very great compared with one of an inch and a half; but it is very small in comparison of another bowl, whose diameter is eighteen or twenty inches. Motion is the absolute mode of a body, but swiftness or slowness are relative ideas; for the motion of a bowl on a bowling-green is swift, when compared with a snail; and it is slow when compared with a cannon-bullet.

These relative modes are largely treated of by some logical and metaphysical writers, under the name of relation; and these relations themselves are farther subdivided into such as arise from the nature of things, and such as arise merely from the operation of our mind. One sort are called real relations, the other mental; so the likeness of one egg to another is a real relation, because it arises from the real nature of things; for whether there was any man or mind to conceive it or no, one egg would be like another; but when we consider an egg as a noun substantive in grammar, or as signified by the letters e, g, g, these are mental relations, and derive their very nature from the mind of man. These sort of relations are called by the schools entia rationis, or second notions, which have no real being but by the operations of the mind..

III. THE third division of mode shews us they are either intrinsical or extrinsical. Intrinsical modes are conceived to be in the subject or substance, as when we say a globe is round, or swift, rolling, or at rest; or when we say a man is tall or learned, these are intrinsic modes; but extrinsic modes are such as arise from something that is not in the substance or subject itself; but it is a manner of being which some substances attain, by reason of something that is external or foreign to the subject; as, this globe lies within two yards of the wall; or, this is beloved or hated. Note. Such sort of modes as this last example are called external denominations.

IV. THERE is a fourth division much akin to this, whereby modes are said to be inherent or adherent that is, proper or improper. Adherent or improper, modes arising from the joining of some accidental substance to the chief subject, which yet may be separated from it; so when a bowl is wet, or a boy is clothed, these are adherent modes; for the water and the clothes are distinct substances, which adhere to the bowl or to the boy; but when we say the bowl is swift or round; when we say the boy is strong or witty, these are proper or inherent modes, for they have a sort of inbeing in the substance itself, and do not arise from the addition of any other substance to it.

V. ACTION and passion are modes or manners which belong to substances, and should not entirely be omit-ted here. When a smith with a hammer strikes a piece of iron, the hammer and the smith are both agents or subjects of action; the one is the prime or supreme, the other the subordinate; the iron is the patient, or the subject of passion, in a philosophical sense, because it receives the operation of the agent; though this sense of the words passion and patient differs much from the vulgar meaning of them*.

Agent signifies the doer, patient the sufferer, action is doing, passion is suffering: agent and action have retained their original

VI. THE sixth division of modes may be into physical, that is, natural, civil, moral, and supernatural. So when we consider the apostle Paul, who was a little man, a Roman by the privilege of his birth, a man of virtue or honesty, and an inspired apostle; his low stature is a physical mode, his being a Roman is a civil privilege, his honesty is a moral consideration, and his being inspired is supernatural.

VH. MODES belong either to body or to spirit, or to both. Modes of body belong only to matter or to corporeal beings; and these are shape, size, situation, or place, &c. Modes of spirit belong to mind; such are knowledge, assent, dissent, doubting, reasoning, &c. Modes which belong to both have been sometimes called mixed modes, or human modes; for these are only found in human nature, which is compounded both of body and spirit: such are sensation, imagination, passion, &c. in all which there is a concurrence of the operations both of mind and body, that is, of animal and intellectual nature.

But the modes of body may be yet farther distinguished. Some of them are primary modes or qualities, for they belong to bodies considered in themselves, whether there were any man to take notice of them or no; such are these before mentioned, viz. shape, size, situation, &c. Secondary qualities or modes are such ideas as we ascribe to bodies on account of the various impressions which are made on the senses of men by them, and these are called sensible qualities, which are very numerous; such are all colours, as red, green, blue, &c.; such are all sounds, as sharp, shrill, loud, hoarse; all tastes, as sweet, bitter, sour; all smells, whether pleasant, offensive, or indifferent; and all tactile qualities, or such as affect the touch or feeling, viz. heat, cold, &c.. These are properly called secondary qualities; for though we are ready to conceive them as existing in the very bodies themselves which affect

and philosophical sense, though patient and passion have acquired a very different meaning in common language.

our senses, yet true philosophy has most undeniably proved, that all these are really various ideas or perceptions excited in human nature by the different impressions that bodies make upon our senses by their primary modes, that is, by means of their different shapes, size, motion, and position of those little invisible parts that compose them. Thence it follows,

that a secondary quality, considered as in the bodies themselves, is nothing else but a power and aptitude to produce such sensations in-us. See Locke's Essay on the Understanding, Book II. Chap. 8.

VIII. I MIGHT add, in the last place, that as modes belong to substances, so there are some also that are but modes of other modes: for though they subsist in and by the substance, as the original subject of them, yet they are properly and directly attributed to some mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body; but the swiftness or slowness of it, or its direction to the north or south, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of man or of a beast but walking gracefully implies a manner or mode superadded to that action. All comparative and superlative degrees of any quality, are the modes of a mode, as swifter implies a greater measure of swiftness.

It would be too tedious here to run through all the modes, accidents, and relations at large that belong to various beings, and are copiously treated of in general in the science called metaphysics, or more properly ontology; they are also treated of in particular in those sciences which have assumed them severally as their proper subjects.

SECT. V. Of the ten Categories.-Of Substances modified.

WE have thus given an account of the two chief objects of our ideas, viz. Substances and modes, and

their various kinds; and in these last sections, we have briefly comprised the greatest part of what is necessary in the famous ten ranks of being, called the ten predicaments or categories of Aristotle, on which there are endless volumes of discourses formed by several of his followers. But that the reader may not utterly be ignorant of them, let him know the names are these: Substance, quantity, quality, relation, action, passion, where, when, situation, and clothing. It would be mere loss. of time to show how loose, how injudicious, and even ridiculous is this tenfold division of things; and whatsoever farther relates to them, and which may tend to improve useful knowledge, should be sought in ontology, and in other sciences.

Besides substance and mode, some of the moderns would have us consider the substance modified, as a distinct object of our ideas; but I think there is nothing more that need be said on this subject than this, viz. There is some difference between a substance when it is considered with all its modes about it, or clothed in all its manners of existence, and when it is distinguished from them, and considered naked without them.

SECT. VI.-Of Not-Being.

As being is divided into substance and mode, so we may consider not-being with regard to both these.

I. NOT-BEING is considered as excluding all substance, and then all modes are also necessarily excluded, and this we call pure nullity, or mere nothing.

This nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a philosophical sense; so we say there is nothing in the cup, in a vulgar sense, when we mean there is no liquor in it; but we cannot say there is nothing in the cup, in a strict philosophical sense, while there is air in it, and perhaps a million of rays of light are there.