BIAS, CHALLENGE OF JUROR FOR. See Criminal Law, 3.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.
Payment of a promissory note, executed at New Orleans March 26, 1862,
will be enforced in lawful money where payments on account of the
principal and interest were in that medium, and where, before the
commencement of the suit, no claim was made that, by the agree-
ment or the understanding of the parties, the term "dollars" was
to be construed as meaning "Confederate dollars." Cook v. Lillo,
792.
BOND. See Contracts, 4; Mortgage, 8; Municipal Bonds; Supersedeas.
BOUNDARIES. See Monuments.
BRAIDS. See Customs Duties, 3.
BURDEN OF PROOF. See Bankruptcy, 1.
CALIFORNIA. See Constitutional Law, 28.
CAPTURED AND ABANDONED PROPERTY. See Suit against the
United States.
CASES EXPLAINED, QUALIFIED, OR OVERRULED.
Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 168.
County of Moultrie v. Savings Bank, 92 U. S. 631. See Railroad Com
pany v. Falconer, 821.
See Wolff v. New Orleans, 358.
See Railway Company v. Sprague, 756.
See Pennock v. Commissioners, 44.
Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472.
Parsons v. Jackson, 99 U. S. 434.
The Kansas Indians, 5 Wall. 737.
CAUSES, REMOVAL OF. See Injunction.
1. The second clause of the second section of the act of March 3, 1875,
c. 137 (18 Stat., part 3, p. 470), construed, and held, that, when in
any suit mentioned therein there is a controversy wholly between
citizens of different States, which can be fully determined as be-
tween them, then either one or more of the plaintiffs or the defend-
ants actually interested in such controversy may, on complying with
the requirements of the statute, remove the entire suit. Barney v.
Latham, 205.
2. The right of removal depends upon the case disclosed by the pleadings
when the petition therefor is filed, and is not affected by the fact
that a defendant who is a citizen of the same State with one of the
plaintiffs may be a proper, but not an indispensable, party to such a
controversy. Id.
3. A final decree of the proper court dissolved an insolvent life insurance
company of Missouri, and, as provided by the statutes in force,
vested, for the use and benefit of creditors and policy-holders, its
entire property in A., a citizen of that State and superintendent of
her insurance department. Held, 1. That the statutes being in
force when the charter of the company was granted, are, in legal
CAUSES, REMOVAL OF (continued).
effect, a part thereof. 2. That a suit having been previously insti-
tuted in a court of Louisiana by citizens of the latter State against
the company, A. was, on being admitted a party thereto, entitled, by
reason of his citizenship, to remove it to the Circuit Court of the
United States. Relfe v. Rundle, 222.
4. A., a citizen of Louisiana, filed a bill in a court of that State, pray.
ing for an injunction to restrain B., who had recovered judgment
against C. in that court, and sued out thereon a fieri facias, from
levying the writ upon a tract of land whereof A. was the owner and
actual possessor by a good and valid title from C. The judgment
declares that an authentic act of mortgage, executed by C. and
oovering that and other tracts, was rendered executory, and that all
the lands should be seized to satisfy it. The act was not reinscribed.
A. was not a party to the judgment, nor was any demand made of,
or notice given to, him. B. was a citizen of Mississippi, and filed a
petition for the removal of the suit. Held, that the amount in con-
troversy being sufficient, the suit was removable, under the act of
March 3, 1875, c. 137, 18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 470. Bondurant v. Wat-
son, 281.
5. The citizenship of the parties need not be averred in the petition for
removal where it is shown by the record. Id.
6. A., a citizen of Massachusetts, commenced a suit, in a court of that
State, against the executors of B., two of whom were citizens of
Massachusetts and one a citizen of New York, to enforce a liability of
the testator. The executors appeared and filed a joint answer.
Held, that the controversy, not being divisible, nor wholly between
citizens of different States, could not be removed into the Circuit
Court of the United States. Blake v. McKim, 336.
7. The presumption that a State recognizes as binding on all her citizens
and every department of her government an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, from the time of its adoption,
and her duty to enforce it, within her limits, without reference to
any inconsistent provisions in her own Constitution or statutes, is
strengthened and becomes conclusive in this case, not only by the
direct adjudication of the highest court of the State of Delaware
that her Constitution had been modified by force of the amendments
to the Constitution of the United States, but by the entire absence
of any statutory enactment, since their adoption, indicating that she
does not recognize, in the fullest legal sense, their effect upon her
Constitution and laws. Where, therefore, a negro, indicted in one
of her courts for a felony, presented a petition alleging that persons
of African descent were, by reason of their race and color, excluded
by those laws from service on juries, and praying that the prosecu-
tion against him be removed to the Circuit Court of the United
States, Held, that the prayer of the petition was properly denied.
Neal v. Delaware, 370.
8. Had the State, since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, en-
acted any statute in conflict with its provisions, or had her judicial
CAUSES, REMOVAL OF (continued).
tribunals repudiated it as a part of the supreme law of the land, or
declared that the acts passed to enforce it were inoperative and void.
there would have been just ground to hold that the case was one em
braced by sect. 641 of the Revised Statutes, and, therefore, remova-
ble into the Circuit Court.
9. A party to a suit, who, under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137 (18
Stat., pt. 3, p. 470), was entitled to its removal from the State court
wherein it was brought, filed in due time his petition and the requisite
bond, and prayed for such removal to the Circuit Court of the United
States for the proper district. His petition was denied. Held, that,
on his entering in the Circuit Court, within the period prescribed by
that act, the transcript of the record, that court acquired jurisdiction
of the suit, and that all subsequent proceedings of the State court
therein are absolutely void. Kern v. Huidekoper, 485.
10. A sheriff, to whom was directed a fieri facias sued upon a judgment
against A., levied the writ upon certain goods and chattels, for which
replevin was brought in a State court against him by B., a non-resi-
dent of the State, claiming to be the owner of them. Held, that
there is nothing in the character of the suit which precludes its re-
moval by B. to the Circuit Court. Id.
11. A suit instituted to try the title of a party to a State office, whereof
he is the incumbent, and whereto he was, by the constituted authori-
ties of the State, duly declared to be elected pursuant to her laws,
cannot be removed from one of her courts into the Circuit Court of
the United States on his petition, setting forth that, by reason of
bribery and threats, colored persons who were qualified to vote at the
election, and who would have voted for him, were deterred from
voting, and that the returning board rejected the votes of the par-
ishes where such illegal practices prevailed. Dubuclet v. Louisiana,
550.
12. A township in Illinois and a taxpayer thereof, on behalf of himself
and other resident tax-payers, filed their bill in a court of that State
against certain State, county, and township officers and the "un-
known owners and holders" of certain township bonds, each pay-
able in the sum of $1,000. The bill prayed for an injunction to
restrain the levy and collection of a tax to pay the principal of the
bonds or any interest thereon. A., a citizen of another State, was
the owner of all of them. Held, that he was entitled, under the act
of March 3, 1875, c. 137 (18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 470), to remove the suit
to the Circuit Court of the United States. Harter v. Kernochan, 562.
13. A decree was rendered by the State court against A. by default, al-
though he was not summoned, nor served with a copy of the bill or
any notice of the pendency of the suit. On his application within
the prescribed period the decree was set aside, and he thereupon
filed his petition to remove the cause. Held, that it was filed in
due time. Id.
14. Under the act of March 3, 1875, c. 137 (18 Stat., pt. 3, p. 470), a writ
of error is the proper mode for reviewing here the order of the Cir-
CAUSES, REMOVAL OF (continued).
cuit Court remanding an action at law removed thereto from a State
court, and it lies without regard to the value of the matter in dis-
pute. Babbitt v. Ciark, 606.
15. The removal should not be granted, if the petition therefor be not
filed in the State court before or at the term at which the action
could be first tried, and before the trial thereof. Where, therefore,
a cause, by the practice of the State court, stood for trial upon the
issue raised by the petition and answer, the rule-day having expired
without filing a reply, and the plaintiff then filed in the clerk's office
a reply, without leave or notice, and the cause was continued until
the ensuing term, when, before the cause was called for trial, the
defendant presented his application for its removal, — Hela, that the
application should not have been granted, and the order of the Cir-
cuit Court remanding the cause was proper. Id.
CAUSES, SUBMISSION OF. See Practice, 1–3.
CHARTER. See Municipal Bonds, 17; Taxation, 1, 2.
A final decree of the proper court dissolved an insolvent life insurance
company of Missouri, and, as provided by the statutes in force,
vested, for the use and benefit of creditors and policy-holders, its en-
tire property in A., a citizen of that State and superintendent of her
insurance department. Held, that the statutes being in force when
the charter of the company was granted, are, in legal effect, a part
thereof. Relfe v. Rundle, 222.
1. Pending a suit brought to control the affairs of a church and obtain
possession of its property by a portion of the congregation against
its founder and another portion, each claiming to be the lawfully
elected trustees, every member who desired to worship at the church
was permitted to do so, and it was kept exclusively for church pur-
poses. A decree passed for the complainants. Held, that they
were not entitled to recover for the use and occupation of the church
premises, as no claim therefor was made in their bill, and the de-
fendants derived no pecuniary advantage therefrom. Bouldin v.
Alexander, 330.
2. The referee having found that money had been collected on behalf of
the church by the pastor, who held a deed of trust on the church
property to secure notes payable to him, this court directs that he be
allowed by the court below to produce them in order that the money
be applied as a credit thereon, or, upon his failure to do so, or to
satisfactorily account for them, that a decree be entered against him
for the money. Id.
CIGAR RIBBONS. See Customs Duties, 3.
COLLATERAL SECURITY. See National Banks, 1, 2.
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE. See Internal Revenue
COLLISION. See Admiralty.
COLORED SCHOOLS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
TRUSTEES OF. See District of Columbia, 1.
COMITY. See Louisiana, 4; Minors, Property of, 1.
1. Letters-patent granted by the United States do not exclude from the
operation of the tax or license law of a State the tangible property
in which the invention or discovery is embodied. Webber v. Vir-
ginia, 344.
2. A statute of Virginia requires that the agent for the sale of articles
manufactured in other States must first obtain a license, for which
he is required to pay a specific tax for each county in which he sells
or offers to sell them, while the agent for the sale of articles manu-
factured in that State, if acting for the manufacturer, is not required
to obtain a license or pay any license tax. Held, that the statute is
in conflict with the commerce clause of the Constitution of the
United States, and void.
3. Commerce among the States is not free whenever a commodity is, by
reason of its foreign growth or manufacture, subjected by State
legislation to discriminating regulations or burdens. Id.
4. Welton v. State of Missouri (91 U. S. 275) and County of Mobile v.
Kimball (102 id. 691) cited and approved. Id.
COMMERCIAL PAPER, LIABILITY OF, INDORSER OF. See
· Florida, 3.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE. See Internal Revenue,
2; Internal Revenue Stamps, 1.
COMPLAINANT, DEATH OF THE. See Practice, 3.
CONDITION PRECEDENT. See Municipal Bonds, 19; Railroad Com-
panies, Subscriptions to the Capital Stock of, 10.
CONGRESSIONAL TOWNSHIPS. See Constitutional Law, 15.
CONSENT DECREE. See Railroad Companies, Subscriptions to the
Capital Stock of, 5.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Commerce; Florida; Municipal Bonds,
19; Railroad Companies, Subscriptions to the Capital Stock of, 11.
1. A contract between a State and a party, whereby he is to perform cer-
tain duties for a specific period at a stipulated compensation, is
within the protection of the Constitution; and on his executing it he
is entitled to that compensation, although before the expiration of
the period the State repealed the statute pursuant to which the con
tract was made. Hall v. Wisconsin, 5.
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