and leave their most important rights as much in dispute as ever. Such, we cannot believe, was the understanding.

This disposes of the case. The Richmond company is in no condition to dispute the validity of the Eureka's patents for the At Last and the Margaret because the end lines of the surveys are not parallel, as it has agreed with the Eureka, for a consideration, not to work in the limestone to the south and east of the compromise line. Upon the face of the patents the United States has granted to the Eureka the right to all veins, lodes, and deposits the tops or apexes of which lie on the inside of its surveys as patented, throughout their entire depth and wherever they may go, provided it keeps itself within the end lines of the surveys. The finding that the ground in dispute is within the end lines and that the apex is within the surface lines settles the rights of the parties between themselves as well under their patents as under their compromise agree

ment.

Judgment affirmed.

INDEX.

ACCOUNT. See Church Property.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEED.

See Mortgage, 7.

ACTUAL BIAS, CHALLENGE FOR. See Criminal Law, 3.
ADMINISTRATOR. See Minors, Property of, 4.

ADMIRALTY. See Practice, 21, 22.

1. A ship-owner who, on the trial of the issue as to the cause of collision,
contests all liability whatever, is not thereby precluded from claim-
ing the benefit of the limitation of liability provided by sect. 4283
of the Revised Statutes. The "Benefactor," 239.

2. After such trial, a decree declaring his ship to be in fault, and fixing
the damages which the respective libellants sustained, is res judicata,
and, until reversed, must stand as the basis for determining their
pro rata share of the fund substituted by stipulation for the ship
and freight. On filing his petition for limited liability, the libel-
lants, until final action shall be had thereon, should be restrained
from enforcing the decree. Id.

3. Semble, that the stipulation on filing that petition should be for the
value of the ship after the collision, with the addition thereto of the
freight then pending, it not appearing that her value was subse-
quently diminished. Id.

4. Proceedings for a limitation of liability, if not instituted until after a
party has obtained satisfaction of his demand, are ineffectual as to
him. A return of the money should not be compelled, nor, in
general, should relief be granted, except upon condition of compen-
sating the party for any costs and expenses to which he may have
been subjected by reason of the delay of the ship-owner in claiming
the benefit of the statute. Id.

5. The court, in reversing the decree of the Circuit Court, directs that
court to proceed upon the petition for limited liability, and promul-
gates a rule that such a petition shall be hereafter filed in the
Circuit Court when the case is there pending. Id.

6. The rule requiring a steamer to keep out of the way of a sailing-
vessel is equally imperative upon the latter to keep her course; and

ADMIRALTY (continued).

where, by her unnecessary deviation therefrom, a collision is ren-
dered unavoidable, the steamer is not liable therefor. The “Illi-
nois," 298.

7. A steam-tug making between seven and eight knots an hour was tow-
ing a ship by a hawser leading astern two hundred and seventy feet.
The course which they were sailing crossed that of a schooner mov-
ing at the rate of from two to three knots an hour at a point just
ahead of the tug, or between her and the ship. The schooner had
a competent man at her wheel, and a lookout, both of whom did
their duty faithfully. Her lights were properly set and brightly
burning, and she kept her course about northeast. There was a
pilot upon the ship, to whose orders the tug was subject. He,
however, gave none. The tug did not slow her engine until the
schooner was up to her, nor stop it until the schooner was about
to strike the hawser. The course of the tug and the ship had then
been changed about a point to the south. The ship struck the
schooner on her port side, at about the fore-rigging, and sunk her.
Held, that the ship and the tug, being in contemplation of law but
one vessel under steam, were bound to keep out of the way of the
schooner, and are liable for the damages which she sustained. The
"Civilta" and the "Restless," 699.

8. The form of decree sanctioned in The Alabama and the Gamecock (92
U. S. 695) approved. Id.

9. The court, upon the facts set forth in the opinion, holds that two
vessels were in fault, in a collision whereby a boat towed by one
of them was sunk, and affirms the decree of the court below appor-
tioning the loss between them. The "Connecticut," 710.

10. The court promulgates a rule declaring what matters the record shall

contain in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, where the
reviewing power of the court is limited to questions of law. The
"Adriatic," 730.

AFFIRM, MOTION TO. See Practice, 26.

AGENT. See Principal and Agent.

AMENDMENTS. See Practice, 1, 2, 15, 16.

ANTE-NUPTIAL SETTLEMENT.

An ante-nuptial settlement of lands, though made by the settler with
the design of defrauding his creditors, will not be set aside in the
absence of the clearest proof of his intended wife's participation in
the fraud. Prewit v. Wilson, 22.

APPEAL.

1. Upon a petition filed by A., alleging that he was the owner of an
undivided half of certain real estate which was not susceptible of
division, and praying for a partition thereof by sale, the court be-
low decreed that he was entitled to one-half of the property, and
referred the case to a master," to proceed to a partition according

APPEAL (continued).

to law, under the direction of the court." Held, that this is not a
final decree, and that an appeal does not lie therefrom.
Green v.
Fisk, 518.

2. No appeal lies from the decree of the Circuit Court entered in accord-
ance with the mandate of this court. Humphrey v. Baker, 736.
3. Where salvors united in a claim for a single salvage service, jointly
rendered by them, the owner of the property is entitled to an appeal
where the sum decreed exceeds $5,000, although the Circuit Court
deemed it proper to apportion the recovery among the salvors accord-
ing to their respective merits. The "Connemara," 754.

APPELLEE, ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS BY. See Practice, 28.
ARKANSAS. See County Warrants; Railroad Companies, Subscriptions to
the Capital Stock of, 3.

ARMY, OFFICER OF THE. See Officer of the Army or the Navy,
Removal of.

ASSETS, EQUITABLE MARSHALLING OF. See Partnership, 1, 2.
ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY. See Bankruptcy, 1; Partnership, 3.
The right to sue for and subject to the payment of his debts, effects
fraudulently transferred by a party who was subsequently adjudi-
cated a bankrupt, is vested alone in his assignees, and their failure
to enforce it within the time prescribed by the bankrupt law does
not transfer that right to his creditors. Moyer v. Dewey, 301.

ASSIGNMENT. See Partnership, 1, 2.

ASSISTANT TREASURER OF THE UNITED STATES. See In-
ternal Revenue Stamps, 1.

ASSUMPSIT. See Practice, 15.

ATTACHMENT, WRIT OF. See Jurisdiction, 16.

AUDIT, BOARD OF. See District of Columbia, 2.

BAILMENT. See Pledge.

BANKRUPTCY. See Assignee in Bankruptcy; Limitations, Statute of, 1;
Partnership, 1, 2.

1. In order to render a mortgage of real estate made by an insolvent
debtor void as a preference and a fraudulent conveyance, within the
meaning of the thirty-fifth section of the Bankrupt Act of March 2,
1867, c. 176 (14 Stat. 534), it must be affirmatively shown by his
assignee in bankruptcy that the grantee had reasonable cause to
believe that the grantor was insolvent at the time he executed the
mortgage, and that it was made with intent to defeat the bankrupt
law. Barber v. Priest, 293.

2. Grant v. National Bank (97 U. S. 80) approved.

Id.

3. A discharge in bankruptcy is personal to the party to whom it
granted. Moyer v. Dewey, 301.