the manufacturing districts. It was estimated that a half a million of working people were dependent upon public charity. The cry of distress reached to all parts of the British Empire, and from Canada, India, and Australia came relief contributions. At a hint from Bright that a little aid from America would have a favorable effect, three ships were dispatched from New York laden with provisions. It is estimated that twelve millions of dollars were distributed among the cotton workmen to avert starvation. Relief began to come in 1863 from the increased production of cotton in other countries; but we must confess it was natural that the British public cried out for the end of a war which brought them so much distress and so disorganized their trade.

There was, however, a noble and gratifying feature of this famine. The working classes, the operatives, who were most affected by the Civil War in America, were the best friends of the Union even during this trying time. They understood, what the ruling classes refused to believe, that our Civil War was to decide the fate of slavery. They also understood, what the aristocracy clearly saw, that the fate of democratic institutions was involved in the deadly contest. Their great advocate, John Bright, at an immense meeting in London of the trades unions, in March, 1863, called to send a message of sympathy to Abraham Lincoln, voiced these sentiments: "Privilege has shuddered at what might happen to old Europe if this grand experiment [of democracy in America] should succeed. But you, the workman, -you striving after a better time,

you

struggling upwards towards the light with slow and painful steps, you have no cause to look with jealousy upon a country, which, menaced by the great nations of the globe, is that one where labor has met with the highest honor, and where it has reaped its greatest reward. . Impartial history will tell that, when your statesmen were hostile, when many of your rich men were corrupt, when your press was mainly written to betray, the fate of a continent and its vast population being in peril, you clung to freedom with an unfaltering trust that God in his infinite mercy will yet make it the heritage of all his children.'

The foregoing review shows that the prevailing sentiment in Great Britain was friendly to the Southern cause. It is also plain that from the beginning the British government was prepared to recognize the Confederacy, whenever it could assure itself that its relations to the American continent would not thereby be more seriously embarrassed. With a knowledge of the resolution of the British and French governments to act in concert, and after the recognition by them of belligerent rights in the insurgents, Secretary Seward realized that the greatest danger which threatened the Union was from this unfriendly coalition, and he bent

1 1 Bright's Speeches, 248, 253. For details of cotton famine, Charles Francis Adams, by his son, C. F. A., chap. 14; Dip. Cor. 1862, pp. 118, 122, 189.

A great change has occurred since our Civil War in the influence of the working classes of Great Britain. In the general election preceding the war the votes cast amounted to 370,000. In the general election of 1895 the number cast was 4,200,000. In 1863 about one person in twenty-three of the population had a vote; and in 1895 about one in six.

all his energies to frustrate its designs. As soon as he received notice of this intended concert, he notified our ministers at the European capitals that he would not recognize any combination or understanding of the powers having relation to our domestic contest, and that he should insist upon dealing with each government separately.1

An

He soon had occasion to put this resolution into practice. On April 15, 1861, the French and British ministers came together to the department to make a joint representation on some subject connected with the war. It afterwards developed that their purpose was to offer their mediation to bring about peace. interesting account of this event is given by Assistant Secretary F. W. Seward, which he justly characterizes as more influential on the fortunes of the Union than even an important battle.2 As the Secretary of State was sitting at his table reading dispatches, a messenger announced the arrival of the British and French ministers, and that they jointly desired to see him, an unusual diplomatic proceeding. He directed them to be shown into the room of the assistant secretary, where he found them seated together. Smiling and shaking his head he said: "No, no, no! I cannot see you in that way." The ministers rose to greet him. "True," said the one, "it is unusual, but we are obeying our instructions." "At least," said the other, "you will allow us to state the object of our visit?" "No," said Mr. Seward, "we must start right about it." "If you refuse to see us together," - began 1 Dip. Cor. 1861, p. 225.

This will never do.

2 2 Life of Seward, 580–582.

the French minister, with a courteous smile and shrug. "Certainly I do refuse to see you together, though I will see either of you separately with pleasure, here or elsewhere." So the interviews were held severally, not jointly, and the papers they were instructed to jointly present were handed to him for his examination. A brief inspection enabled him to say courteously, but decidedly, that he declined to hear them read or to officially receive them.

Writing to the United States ministers in London and Paris, he said: "We shall insist in this case, as in all others, on dealing with each of these powers alone, and their agreement to act together will not at all affect the course we shall pursue. This government is sensible of the importance of the step it takes in declining to receive the communication in question."1

The courteous but positive treatment by Mr. Seward of the two envoys put an end to further joint action on the part of the British and French representatives in Washington, but the efforts for concerted intervention did not cease in London and Paris. Russell, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in a public speech delivered in October, 1861, doubtless expressed the views of the ministry, when he said the war in America was not about slavery, but the two parties were contending, "the one for empire and the other for independence;" and he announced that the separation of the two sections was the only logical and permanent settlement of the controversy. No positive step was

1 Dip. Cor. 1861 (to Adams), p. 106; (to Dayton), p. 224.

2 London Times, Oct. 16, 1861. The almost universal sentiment of

taken, however, until a year later, when the cotton famine was at its worst. On September 14, 1862, when the news of Lee's invasion of Maryland and the imminent fall of the federal capital was received, Palmerston wrote Russell, asking if the time had not arrived for England and France to "address the contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the basis of separation." Russell replied: "I agree with you that the time has come for offering mediation to the United States, with a view to the recognition of the independence of the Confederates. I agree, further, that, in case of failure, we ought ourselves to recognize the Southern States as an independent state."1 Arrangements were made for a meeting of the cabinet, with a view to proposing to France and other powers a joint intervention.

But two important events occurred to modify the views of the Prime Minister and his Secretary for Foreign Affairs. While Russell was writing his letter just cited the battle of Antietam was being fought, and soon thereafter news came of the retreat of Lee's army back into Virginia. Mr. Adams's vigilant eye had detected that the plot for intervention was rapidly ripening, and he wrote to Mr. Seward for instructions

the English people at that time was that the Union was permanently divided. Cobden did not believe the North and the South could "ever lie in the same bed again." Morley's Cobden, Am. ed. 572. Darwin, who was friendly to the North, wrote Professor Gray: "How curious it is that you seem to think that you can conquer the South. I never meet a soul, even those who would wish it, who think it possible." 2 Life and Letters, 174.

1 2 Walpole's Life of Russell, 349, 350.