They reported to Congress: "It was evident that this court, while it treated us privately with all civility, was cautious of giving umbrage to England, and was, therefore, desirous of avoiding open reception and acknowledgment of us, or entering into any formal negotiations with us, as ministers from the Congress." The treaty which Congress had drawn up they soon found was an impossibility. As a purely commercial treaty it was, in great part, unobjectionable, but if France was thereby to recognize the independence of the United States, it would by that act incur the hostility of England, and, hence, would require the United States to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance. Besides, matters in America were going badly for the Colonies. Diplomacy can do little in the face of military reverses. The winter of 1776-77 was a gloomy one for the cause of the Revolution. The authority of Congress was not respected, the forces were depleted by desertions, the officers dissatisfied, and new levies came slowly. The spring of 1777 opened with the British arms everywhere triumphant; Howe in Philadelphia, Clinton in New York, and Burgoyne moving down from the north with an apparently irresistible army. In France the tone of the government was changed, supplies did not come with freedom, privateers were seized in its ports, and even Beaumarchais became alarmed for his safety. "My government," he said to Franklin, "will cut my throat as if I was a sheep."

The year wore on towards its close with nothing but gloom and discouragement for the American envoys;

1 2 Ib. 283.

but one night early in December a dinner party in Franklin's home at Passy was interrupted by the arrival of a courier with important news. Bourgoyne and his entire army had surrendered to the Continental forces. Beaumarchais, one of the dinner party, rushed off with such precipitation to carry the news to the court at Versailles that he upset his coach and dislocated his arm. As the news spread throughout Europe, a great change came over political circles, especially in France. Within a few days the king's minister, M. Gerard, waited on the American envoys, and informed them that his Majesty had resolved to make the treaties which had been discussed, and their terms were easily agreed upon, but from military considerations they were not signed till February 6, 1778. The one was a commercial treaty, following largely the draft prepared by Congress, but the other was in direct antagonism to the views of Adams already quoted, and not authorized by the instructions of Congress - both a military and political alliance with France. It recognized the independence of the United States, and declared the object of the alliance to be the achievement of that independence; provided for combined military movements; made the negotiations for peace conditional on joint consultation and approval; stipulated for the division of probable conquests; and mutually guaranteed the possessions in America of the respective parties.

This treaty has importance and interest in that it was the first celebrated by the new nation; but it has the added importance and interest that it was both the first

and the only treaty of alliance ever negotiated by this country. It is an interesting speculation whether without it the independence of the United States could have been achieved. Assuredly it shortened the contest, and saved much bloodshed and treasure; and, under the circumstances, its wisdom cannot be questioned. But its subsequent history and early abrogation or repudiation have made of it a red beacon of warning against similar conventions in the future. We shall see that in the peace negotiations with England its spirit had to be violated, and that in the administrations of Washington and the elder Adams it brought us to the verge of another war with Great Britain, which we only escaped by denying its binding obligations in a manner little creditable to our international reputation. It would be hazardous to say that its lesson is that no future treaties of alliance should be made, but it does teach that such compacts bring future embarrassments, and that they should be entered upon only in times of extreme necessity.

At the ceremony of signing the treaties, it is said that Franklin donned the "spotted Manchester velvet suit" which he had worn at the session of the privy council in London when he was so severely censured. The celebration of the treaties was followed by the public reception of the American envoys by the king and the court; they were entertained at dinner by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and in the evening of the same day they attended a fête of the queen, where the plain Republicans found the royal family and nobility seated at play round a large table, with, as the contem

poraneous account says, "A considerable heap of louis d'ors between each of the players, and from the number of these, which, from time to time, were shovelled by the losers to the winners, the gaming appeared to be high." Dr. Franklin was specially honored by being called by the queen, and stood beside her chair as the game went on. The month following the treaty the king dispatched as his minister plenipotentiary to America, M. Gerard, the Minister of State, who had negotiated the treaties with the American envoys. The king, in his letter of credence, addressed to his "Very dear, great friends and allies," the Congress, said: "He is better acquainted with our sentiments towards you and the more capable of testifying the same to you, as he was intrusted on our part to negotiate with your commissioners, and signed with them the treaties which cement our union." 1

The coming of the first foreign minister plenipotentiary was an important event, and Congress appears to have been fully impressed with its gravity, for we find that the subject of the ceremonial to be observed in the reception of M. Gerard was regularly referred to a special committee composed of such eminent men as Richard Henry Lee, Samuel Adams, and Gouverneur Morris, who presented an elaborate report which was discussed five days by Congress. The matter was finally arranged with uncommon care, as is shown in the lengthy resolution adopted and formally entered upon the Journal, prescribing the order to be observed on all such occasions. Every step to be taken, from the

1 2 Dip. Cor. Rev. 521.

moment the envoy lands till he reaches the place where Congress is in session, is carefully indicated. As to further proceedings, I extract from the resolutions of Congress: "Two members of Congress shall then be deputed to wait upon him, and inform him when and where he shall receive audience of the Congress. At the time he is to receive his audience, the two members shall again wait upon him in a coach, belonging to the States, and the person first named of the two, shall return with the minister plenipotentiary or envoy in the coach, giving the minister the right hand, and placing himself on the left with the other member on the first seat. When the minister plenipotentiary or envoy is arrived at the door of the Congress hall, he shall be introduced to his chair by the two members, who shall stand at his left hand. When the minister is introduced to his chair by the two members, he shall sit down. His secretary shall then deliver to the President the letter of his sovereign, which shall be read and translated by the secretary of Congress. Then the minister shall be announced, at which time the President, the House, and the minister shall rise together. The minister shall then bow to the President and the House and they to him. The minister and the President shall then bow to each other, and be seated, after which the House shall sit down. The minister shall deliver his speech standing. The President and the House shall sit while the minister is delivering his speech. The House shall rise and the President shall deliver the answer standing. The minister shall stand while the President delivers his answer. Having spoken, and being answered, the min