a healthful operation. From such a view has been the national public business placed under one responsible head, the president. I wish to be understood, that all I have said on the better organization of the municipal business, is but abstracted from that system which has been initiated by the federal constitution. If the constitution of the state of New York is to be amended, this article, and one on the local officers, will, probably, receive a different shape, provided the framers of a new constitution will carry out the "American public business system," all that I and, I am sure, the public desire. The subject is full of interest for all thinking citizens. And, happily, we have plenty of such.

Some may object that I carry my veneration for the federal constitution too far, and that, while a secretary of state may be safely trusted to an election, this officer of the federal government should rather be appointed. I admit that these gentlemen have different business spheres, still that is not the reason why the one should be appointed and the other elected; they resemble each other for being mere clerical functionaries and not representatives, and, therefore, to be carefully selected for the function. Whether the framers of the federal constitution acted upon these special grounds, or simply imitated other governments, has no influence upon the merits of their policy.

This policy is a settled fact. People have submitted to it for almost a century, because it is similar to the business order in their households, factories, mercantile establishments, and other well-organized business concerns, and, therefore, plain to their understanding, while the universal elective policy, adopted by this constitution, is a republican extravagancy.

The political offices may be divided into two classes, viz., representative and clerical. To the first class belong the just-mentioned head-officers, and the aldermen or selectmen, supervisors, and members of legislature. These should be always elected. To the second class belong all clerks, treasurers, inspectors, collectors, surveyors, police, &c., who should all be appointed. I have pointed this out before, as the policy of the federal constitution.

After we have elected our ruling officers, we must allow them to appoint the officers, clerks, or assistants, needed for the business. We may have reason sometimes for grumbling that they did not

appoint this or that party-man; still we must, for the time being, submit to that rather than spoil the whole fabric, by reversing the natural order. And if each public district acts in this respect, independently, under the constitution, there never will be more patronage in one hand, than is unavoidably necessary.

"2. The state engineer and surveyor shall be chosen at a general election, and shall hold his office two years, but no person shall be elected to said office who is not a practical engineer."

"3. Three canal commissioners shall be chosen at the general election, which shall be held next after the adoption of this constitution, one of whom shall hold his office for one year, one for two years, and one for three years. [The commissioners of the canal fund shall meet at the capitol on the first Monday of January, next after such election, and determine by lot which of said canal commissioners shall hold his office for one year, which for two, and which for three years;] and there shall be elected annually thereafter, one canal commissioner, who shall hold his office for three years."

All these officers should be appointed. Canals, windmills, and similar works, when drawn into the sphere of political business, should be managed by special acts, and not by the people directly, otherwise they will become political party concerns of the worst kind.

"4. Three inspectors of state-prison shall be elected at the general election, which shall be held next after the adoption of this constitution, one of whom shall hold his office for one year, one for two years, and one for three years. [The governor, secretary of state, and comptroller shall meet at the capitol on the first Monday of January, next suceeding such election, and determine by lot which of said inspectors shall hold his office for one year, which for two, and which for three years;] and there shall be elected annually thereafter one inspector of state-prison, who shall hold his office for three years; said inspectors shall have the charge and superintendence of the stateprisons, and shall appoint all the officers therein. All vacancies in the of fice of such inspectors shall be filled by the governor, till the next election." Those officers also should be appointed.

"5. The lieutenant-governor, speaker of the assembly, secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, attorney-general, and state engineer and surveyor, shall be the commissioners of the land office.

"The lieutenant-governor, speaker of the assembly, secretary of state, comptroller, treasurer, and attorney-general, shall be the commissioners of the canal fund.

"The canal board shall consist of the commissioners of the canal fund, the state engineer and surveyor, and the canal commissioners."

"6. The powers and duties of the respective boards, and of the several of

ficers in this article mentioned, shall be such as now are or hereafter may be prescribed by law."

The provisoes from one to six, contain matter for special laws.

"7. The treasurer may be suspended from office by the governor, during the recess of the legislature, and until thirty days after the commencement of the next session of the legislature, whenever it shall appear to him that such treasurer has, in any particular, violated his duty. The governor shall appoint a competent person to discharge the duties of the office during such suspension of the treasurer."

The suspending and removing power should be alike in regard to all officers.

"8. All officers for the weighing, guaging, measuring, culling, or inspecting any merchandise, produce, manufacture or commodity whatever, are hereby abolished, and no such office shall hereafter be created by law; but nothing in this section contained shall abrogate any office created for the purpose of protecting the public health or the interests of the state, in its property, revenue, tolls or purchases, or of supplying the people with correct standards of weights and measures, or shall prevent the creation of any office for such purposes hereafter."

The offices abolished by this clause are all town (city, village) offices, and should, therefore, depend upon town by-laws. In a good judicial system they are superfluous, because there all fraudulent dealing, which it is the aim to prevent by such officials, will be effectually checked by the judiciary. Honest men are not in need of them. George Washington's brand was considered at home and abroad sufficient guaranty in regard to quality and quantity. But if in a certain town the corruption of the people and remissness of the judiciary should be alarming (which can only happen in over-large, uncontrollable towns or cities), the better class of business men may insist upon the appointment of such officials by the magistrate, to keep up the appearance of honesty. Congress have appointed steam-boiler and drug inspectors. They seem to be also superfluous, provided the judiciary be competent to resent culpable carelessness of captains, engineers, importers, dealers in drugs, &c. It would be as wrong to appoint such localtrade inspectors by the state government, as it would be absurd to appoint judges of the court of appeals or state-prison inspectors by town governments. The correct distribution of the functional affairs of society is a main duty of our law-makers. They must follow their own logic and judgment and not English precedents.

Those have, up to this time, hindered the full development of our simple political business-system. We must try to walk alone, as the federal constitution has made us stand up firmly.

LETTER VIII.

Judiciary. - Impeaching. - Court of Appeals. Supreme Court. — Judicial Districts. Salary.- Election. - Testimony. - Removing. - Vacancies. Modes of appointing Judges.

YOUR attention will now be devoted to the judiciary, the most important part of the state institution.

ARTICLE VI.

The Judiciary.

"1. The assembly shall have the power of impeachment, by the vote of a majority of all the members elected. The court for the trial of impeachments shall be composed of the president of the senate, the senators, or a major part of them, and the judges of the court of appeals, or the major part of them. On the trial of an impeachment against the governor, the lieutenant-governor shall not act as a member of the court. No judicial officer shall exercise his office after he shall have been impeached, until he shall have been acquitted. Before the trial of an impeachment, the members of the court shall take an oath or affirmation, truly and impartially to try the impeachment, according to evidence; and no person shall be convicted, without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend farther than to removal from office, or removal from office and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under this state; but the party impeached shall be liable to indictment and punishment according to law."

This is plain.

"2. There shall be a court of appeals, composed of eight judges, of whom four shall be elected by the electors of the state, for eight years, and four selected from the class of justices of the supreme court having the shortest time to serve. Provision shall be made by law, for designating one of the number elected, as chief judge, and for selecting such justices of the supreme court, from time to time, and for so classifying those elected, that one shall be elected every second year.

"3. There shall be a supreme court having general jurisdiction in law and equity."

The judiciary is, as I have observed often, the very offspring

and grand purpose of the state organization. We may have plenty of salt springs, roads, canals, telegraphs, railroads, trades, churches, fireworks, illuminations, etc., without a state institution, but no judiciary. It is against the nature of the state to make its child, the judiciary, elective. It is a political monstrosity, especially in a republic, which depends entirely upon the laws and their execution.

"4. The state shall be divided into eight judicial districts, of which the city of New York shall be one; the others to be bounded by county lines, and to be compact and equal in population as nearly as may be. There shall be four justices of the supreme court in each district, and as many more in the district composed of the city of New York as may from time to time be authorized by law, but not to exceed in the whole such number in proportion to its population as shall be in conformity with the number of such judges in the residue of the state, in proportion to its population. They shall be classified so that one of the justices of each district shall go out of office at the end of every two years. After the expiration of their terms under such classification, the term of their office shall be eight years."

Why not give the business, designated for the supreme courts, to the county courts?

"5. The legislature shall have the same powers to alter and regulate the jurisdiction and proceedings in law and equity as they have heretofore possessed."

Is matter-of-course and superfluous.

"6. Provision may be made by law for designating, from time to time, one or more of the said justices, who is not a judge of the court of appeals, to preside at the general terms of the said court to be held in the several districts. Any three or more of the said justices, of whom one of the said justices so designated shall always be one, may hold such general terms. And any one or more of the justices may hold special terms and circuit courts, and any one of them may preside in courts of oyer and terminer in any county." The words oyer and terminer mean criminal court. And again, why not assign all important civil and criminal business to the county court? The clause, itself, belongs rather to the statute book.

“7. The judges of the court of appeals and justices of the supreme court shall severally receive, at stated times, for their services, a compensation to be established by law, which shall not be increased or diminished during their continuance in office.

"8. They shall not hold any other office or public trust. All votes for either of them, for any elective office (except that of justice of the supreme court, or judge of the court of appeals), given by the legislature or the people, shall be void. They shall not exercise any power of appointment to