question as to how far subjects were bound to obey their princes. Furthermore, if the property of the subject belonged to the prince, might he not lawfully take it as his own. In discussing the great question "whether it be lawful to depose an evil governor and kill a tyrant," Ponet proved himself to be one of the earliest English advocates of tyrannicide. In the examples given as illustrations, he showed his familiarity with Italian, and particularly Venetian, history.

Scattered through the pages of Elizabethan literature can be found hundreds of references to Machiavelli,1 whose name passed as a synonym for treachery and tyranny, used even by many who had never seen his works. At the same time, in a less known direction, his influence made itself felt in English political philosophy. His method and ideas were reflected particularly in the writings of William Thomas, John Leslie, Thomas Bedingfield and Charles Merbury, while even Bacon was influenced by him.

The theory generally adopted by the English writers of the sixteenth century, as to the form of government which would present fewest dangers to the welfare of the state, favored absolute monarchy. Machiavelli had argued for this in The Prince. To the great Florentine, who elsewhere advocated a republic, the mere form of government mattered little in comparison with the methods employed for attaining and holding power. Inasmuch as these means were best suited to abso

1 Vide E. Meyer, Machiavelli and the Elizabethan Drama, Litterarhistorische Forschungen, 1897, passim.

hús, bús ideas seemed like the apology and defence of the absoite mier Friend and foe alike, then, regarded him, not in the modern light of an Italian patriot, but as the exponent and advocate of a strong rule, regardless of the methods employed to obtain power. Absolute government was the goal to which his ideas led; the Italian political philosophy of the age was all in the direction of absolutism.1 This influence can be traced likewise in England, where it provided the theoretical foundation for the doctrine of the divine right of kings.

The English arguments in favor of the absolute monarchy were generally reached after supposedly impartial investigations into the different forms of government. Democracy and aristocracy were both discussed, and the advantages and disadvantages of each were weighed. In the ordinary division of every country between the nobility and commons, it was recognized that the desire of the one was always to rule, of the other not to be ruled. The question, therefore, at issue was whether the nobleman, endeavoring to maintain his position, or the commoner, seeking to attain power for himself, was the more prejudicial to the welfare of the state. Or, to describe it in another way, whose desire was the greater, he who feared to lose what he already possessed, or he who, having nothing, had everything to gain? The desire of both was thought equal, although the effects were unequal; for the man of property could easily obtain more, while

1Cf. Castiglione, Courtier, p. 312.

he who had nothing could not acquire more without much labor. If, however, the one could grow rich without toil and the other found no ease in his riches, the world would become barbarous through lack of work. In labor, therefore, lay the foundation of all "civil policy." It was necessary both to force the needy to labor, and maintain the rights of those possessing property. As long as neither nobleman nor commoner overstepped their bounds, so long were both of benefit to the state. If either should do so, the party of the commons would certainly prove the more dangerous on account of their ignorance and inconstancy. Moreover, it was impossible for many individuals long to preserve the same opinion. They might agree, but it would only be for a short time, and if once they lost their heads, no peril could be compared to the frenzy of the multitude. Their occasional success had come rather from good fortune than wisdom. In Thomas' mind, if the commons once attained power, they would destroy both the nobility and themselves.1 Others likewise shared this view of democracy. Its advantages, however, were also considered. Democracy observed perfect equality and reduced the constitution of the state to the law of nature. Just as nature gave riches, honor and office to one man no more than to another, so popular government tended to make all men equal without privilege or prerogative. The avarice of the rich and the insolence of the great were supposed alike to be done

1 Works, p. 157 et seq.

away with by democracy. It fostered friendship and equality in human society, and permitted every one to enjoy liberty and equal justice without fear of tyranny or oppression. In spite of all this the faults of democracy were said to outweigh its advantages. No true equality could be observed under any system of popular government, since it was contrary to the law of nature, which made certain men wiser than others, decreeing that some were to command and others to obey. General equality, moreover, seemed impossible so long as there were magistrates and forms of government.1 The characteristic of a democracy was that "handicraftsmen" and the "baser sort" of people should manage public affairs. Its main drawback was that with it went envy of the rich, and an intense conceit accompanied the feeling it possessed of its own infallibility. To describe democracy in a sentence, it seemed a "horrible monster of many heads without

reason." 2

After the popular form of government had been removed from consideration, the question of aristocracy was approached. It was observed that the greed of the nobility resulted frequently in the oppression and suffering of the multitude. So long as the commons were in power, magistrates were careful to restrain the excesses of the nobility and advance public welfare. This condition would prove most beneficial if order

1 Bedingfield, Florentine History of Machiavelli, preface,

2 Merbury, Brief Discourse, 1581, p. 11.

could always be maintained, and laws remained ionolate. What popular state, however, could point to freedom from sedition, violence and faction for thirty years, during which time the state had never been in danger of overthrow? The tendency to faction, was among the greatest dangers of an aristocracy as well The greater the number of rulers, the more factions and disputes there were, while another peril lay in state secrets being often disclosed.

The idea of government by parties is a comparatively modern one. Even to the framers of the American Constitution the presence of party government appeared as one of the grave dangers which was to beset the young republic. Its presence in the mind of William Thomas made him incline toward possible tyranny in an absolute ruler, in preference to the danger of an overthrow of government through factional contests. His argument in favor of absolute monarchy was that a good prince, even though he diminished the power of the commons, preserved them, at the same time, from the tyranny of the nobility, acting toward the latter in the way they did to the multitude; he was as much interested in governing well one class as the other. Contrariwise, even if he were a tyrant, yet his tyranny was preferable to that of the nobility. In the one case there were many tyrants, while in the other a single one would suffer no one but himself. The prince's tyranny was,

therefore, to be preferred to that of an aristocracy,

1 Thomas, op. cit., p. 166.

2 Bedingfield, loc. cit.