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to nothing beyond their change of fortune. May CHAP. we not rather believe that a feeling of concern at the separation, hitherto suppressed in terror, was now first freely avowed that in New Jersey, and not in New Jersey alone, an active and bold minority had been able to overrule numbers much larger, but far more quiescent and complying?

Another remark, by the same historian, might, as history shows, be extended to other times and other countries besides his own. The men who had been the vainest braggarts, the loudest blusterers in behalf of Independence, were now the first to veer round or to slink away. This remark, which Dr. Ramsay makes only a few years afterwards, is fully confirmed by other documents of earlier date, but much later publication — by the secret correspondence of the time. Thus writes the Adjutant-General: -"Some of our Phila

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delphia gentlemen who came over on visits, upon "the first cannon went off in a most violent hurry. "Your noisy Sons of Liberty are, I find, the quietest in the field."* Thus, again, Washington, with felicitous expression, points a paragraph at the "chimney-corner heroes."†

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At this period the effective force under Washington had dwindled to four thousand men. A separate division, of nearly equal strength, which he had entrusted to General Lee, was now, in like

* Life and Correspondence of Reed, vol. i. p. 231.

† Writings, vol. iii. p. 286.

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CHAP. manner, slowly pursuing its march from the Hudson to the Delaware. Letter after letter after express was sent by Washington to Lee, directing that officer to join him with all speed; but Lee, ever self-willed and perverse, paid no attention to these orders. He was busied in writing letters to find fault with the Commander-in-Chief, when one evening, with the ink scarcely dry upon his paper, he was surprised and made prisoner by a party of dragoons under Colonel Harcourt- the same who in later life succeeded to the Harcourt Earldom, and the military rank of Field Marshal. Thus does Washington, in confidence, relate the transaction to his brother:-"The captivity of "General Lee is an additional misfortune, and the more vexatious as it was by his own folly and imprudence, and without a view to effect any good, that he was taken. As he went to lodge "three miles out of his own camp, and within twenty of the enemy, a rascally Tory rode in the 'night to give notice of it to the enemy, who sent a party of Light Horse, that seized him and car"ried him off with every mark of triumph and indignity."

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The Congress at this juncture, like most other public assemblies, seemed but slightly affected by the dangers which as yet were not close upon them. On the 11th of December they passed some Resolutions contradicting, as false and mali

* Letter, December 18. 1776.

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cious, a report that they intended to remove from CHAP. Philadelphia. They declared that they had a higher opinion of the good people of these States than to suppose such a measure requisite, and that they would not leave the city of Philadelphia "unless the last necessity shall direct it." These Resolutions were transmitted by the President to Washington, with a request that he would publish them to the army in General Orders. Washington, in reply, excused himself from complying with that suggestion. In thus declining it, he showed his usual sagacity and foresight. For, on the very next day after the first Resolutions the Congress underwent a sudden revulsion of opinion, and did not scruple to disperse in all haste, to meet again on the 20th of the same month, not at Philadelphia, but at Baltimore.

Under all these circumstances, Philadelphia would have fallen an easy prey to the British but for the exertions of Washington, who, on crossing the Delaware, took the utmost pains to collect all the boats upon the river, and remove them from the Jersey side. Moreover, it had formed no part of General Howe's expectations (as is plain from his own despatches) to carry the war beyond the Delaware during this campaign. His recent successes induced him, though slowly, to extend his schemes. But instead of transporting or constructing boats, he resolved to wait until the winter ice

*Despatch to Lord George Germaine, November 30. 1776.

VOL. VI.

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CHAP. should be formed upon the river; and meanwhile, remaining at New York, he allowed or directed Lord Cornwallis to "stand at ease," dispersing his troops in quarters through the Jerseys. Thus was some respite obtained by the harassed and dispirited remnant of the American army.-Oh for one hour of Clive!

During this much needed interval of leisure the American General gathered new strength. He was joined by levies from several quarters, by four regiments from the Northern army, and by the Philadelphia town and county Militia, which with great spirit had at once marched to his assistance. He could also for the future rely on the ready cooperation of the separate division, lately under Lee's command, and now under Sullivan's. Nevertheless his prospects, as against the British army's, whenever that should move, were most cheerless and forlorn. To his brother, writing on the 18th of December, he thus describes them :

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My dear Sir;-if every nerve be not strained to "recruit the new army with all possible expedi "tion, I think the game is pretty nearly up. This "is owing, in a great measure, to the insidious "arts of the enemy, and disaffection of the Colo"nies above mentioned, but principally to the "ruinous policy of short enlistments, and placing "too great a dependence on the Militia, the evil consequences of which were foretold fifteen "months ago with a spirit almost prophetic."

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It so chanced, that at this very juncture Wash

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ington received a visit in his camp from Benedict CHAP. Arnold, who, it is said, first suggested to him the idea of attempting to recross the Delaware and surprise some part of the King's troops.* But whoever may have the earliest devised this scheme, the merit of its details and execution belongs entirely to Washington. In front of him, at Trenton and at Bordentown, the barriers of the Jerseys, lay two bodies of Hessians, under Colonel Rahl and Count Donop. Both from their ignorance of the language, and from the hatred that the people bore them, these foreigners were least likely to obtain intelligence of his movements or designs. Moreover, by strange carelessness on the part of the British chiefs, the posts that were on this occasion the most exposed had been left the weakest manned, and undefended by a single entrenchment or redoubt. Under these circumstances, Washington fixed on Trenton as the point of his attack. For the time he selected the night of Christmas, trusting that, after all the feasting and carousing of that day, the slumber of the Hessians might be soundest, and their discipline more than ever relaxed. Two days before he wrote to the Adjutant-General, imparting his

"From private information" to Mr. Adolphus (Hist. vol. ii. p. 440.). The same idea appears to have occurred at nearly the same time to several persons. On the 22nd, Reed inquires of Washington; "Will it not be possible, my dear "General, for your troops to make a diversion or something 66 more, at or about Trenton?"

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