the passes in the mountains. General Washington, by written instructions, directed this officer

particularly to guard the defiles in the woods, and to render the approach of the enemy through them as difficult as possible." This order was not fully executed. It appears, that General Sullivan was not apprised of the march of the British detachment from Flatbush to Flatland, on the evening of the 26th, and a guard on the Jamaica road did not seasonably discover the approach of the enemy to give information. General Howe, in his official letter, mentioned that an American patroling party was taken on this read; and General Washington in a letter to a friend wrote, "This misfortune happened, in a great measure, by two detachments of our people, who were posted in two roads leading through a wood to intercept the enemy in their march, suffering a surprize, and making a precipitate retreat."

It should also be recollected, that the plans of the Commander in Chief were laid in the expectation of a much larger force, than in event he realised. The regiments were not completed; and he was absolutely destitute of cavalry. There was not a single company of horse on Long Island to watch the motions of the enemy, and give information of their movements. This furnishes some apology for the ignorance of the commanding officer respecting the manoeuvre of the enemy.

The defeat of the 27th made a most unfavour

able impression upon the army. A great proportion of the troops lost their confidence in their officers and in themselves. Before this unfortu

nate event, they met the enemy in the spirit of freemen fighting for their highest interests, and under the persuasion, that their thorough use of arms rendered them equal to the disciplined battalions which they were to oppose. But, on this occasion, by evolutions which they did not comprehend, they found themselves encompassed with difficulties from which their utmost exertions could not extricate, and involved in dangers from which their bravery could not deliver them; and entertaining an high opinion of the adroitness of the enemy, in every movement, they apprehended

a fatal snare.

These melancholy facts were thus narrated by General Washington, in his letter to Congress. "Our situation is truly distressing. The check our detachment sustained on the 27th ultimo, has dispirited too great a proportion of our troops, and filled their minds with apprehension and despair. The militia, instead of calling forth their utmost efforts to a brave and manly opposition, in order to repair our losses, are dismayed, intractable, and impatient to return. Great numbers of them have gone off-in some instantes, almost by whole regiments, by half ones, and by companies at a time. This circumstance of itself, indepcndent of others, when fronted by a well appointed enemy, superior in number to our whole collected force, would be sufficiently disagreeable. But when their example has infected another part of the army; when their want of discipline, and refusal of almost every kind of restraint and government, have produced a like conduct, but too

common to the whole, and an entire disregard of that order and subordination necessary to the well doing of an army, and which had been inculcated before, as well as the nature of our military establishment would admit of, our condition is still more alarming; and with the deepest concern I am obliged to confess my want of confidence in the generality of the troops."

The British General being in possession of Long Island, prepared to attack New York. The body of the fleet lay at anchor near Governor's Island; but particular ships passed up the East river, without sustaining injury from the American batteries; others, sailing round Long Island into the Sound, passed up to the higher part of York Island. By these movements, the situation of the American army became critical. It was uncertain whether the attack would be made upon the lines, or whether General Howe would land his troops above King's-bridge, and inclose the Americans. To guard against the danger which threatened him, the Commander. in Chief ordered the stores, that were not of present necessity, to be removed above King's-bridge, and assembled a council to determine upon the expediency of retreating from the city. [SEPT. 7.] The majority of his general officers voted against the immediate evacuation of New York. The plan recommended was to station the army in the best manner, to defend the points menaced with attack, that the enemy might waste the residue of the season in the struggle to possess the island. The belief that Congress desired that New York should be

maintained to extremity, probably had influence on this council. In communicating the adopted plan to that body, General Washington clearly indicated an opinion, that an immediate evacuation of New York was expedient. Speaking of the enemy, he observed,

"It is now extremely obvious, from all intelligence, from their movements, and every other circumstance, that having landed their whole army on Long Island, (except about four thousand on Staten Island) they mean to inclose us on the Island of New York, by taking post in our rear, while the shipping effectually secure the front; and thus, either by cutting off our communication with the country, oblige us to fight them on their own terms, or surrender at discretion; or, by a brilliant stroke, endeavour to cut this army in pieces, and secure the collection of arms and stores, which they well know we shall not be able soon to replace.

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Having, therefore, their system unfolded to us, it became on important consideration, how it would be most successfully opposed. On every side there is a choice of difficulties; and every measure, on our part (however painful the reflection be from experience) to be formed with some apprehension that all our troops will not do heir duty. In deliberating on this great question, it was impossible to forget, that history, our own experience, the advice of our ablest friends in Europe, the fears of the enemy, and even the declarations of Congress, demonstrate, that on our side, the war should be defensive-(it has ever

been called a war of posts.) that we should on all occasions avoid a general action, nor put any thing to the risk, unless compelled by a necessity into which we ought never to be drawn.

"It was concluded to arrange the army under three divisions; five thousand to remain for the defence of the city; nine thousand to King's-bridge and its dependencies, as well to possess and secure those posts, as to be ready to attack the enemy who are moving eastward on Long Island, if they should attempt to land on this side; the remainder to occupy the intermediate space, and support either; that the sick should be immediately removed to Orange-town, and barracks prepared at King's-bridge, with all possible expedition, to cover the troops.

"There were some general officers, in whose judgment and opinion much confidence is to be reposed, that were for a total and immediate removal from the city, urging the great danger of one part of the army being cut off before the other can support it, the extremities being at least sixteen miles apart; that our army, when collected, is inferior to the enemy; that they can move with their whole force to any point of attack, and consequently must succeed by weight of numbers, if they have only a part to oppose them; that, by removing from hence, we deprive the enemy of the advantage of their ships, which will make at least one half of the force to attack the town; that we should keep the enemy at bay, put nothing to the hazard, but at all events, keep the army together, which may be recruited another year; that the