To Form A More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States ConstitutionOxford University Press, 27.03.2003 - 416 Seiten Many important questions regarding the creation and adoption of the United States Constitution remain unresolved. Did slaveholdings or financial holdings significantly influence our Founding Fathers' stance on particular clauses or rules contained in the Constitution? Was there a division of support for the Constitution related to religious beliefs or ethnicity? Were founders from less commercial areas more likely to oppose the Constitution? To Form a More Perfect Union successfully answers these questions and offers an economic explanation for the behavior of our Founding Fathers during the nation's constitutional founding. In 1913, American historian Charles A. Beard controversially argued in his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution were less interested in furthering democratic principles than in advancing specific economic and financial interests. Beard's thesis eventually emerged as the standard historical interpretation and remained so until the 1950s. Since then, many constitutional and historical scholars have questioned an economic interpretation of the Constitution as being too narrow or too calculating, believing the great principles and political philosophies that motivated the Founding Fathers to be worthier subjects of study. In this meticulously researched reexamination of the drafting and ratification of our nation's Constitution, Robert McGuire argues that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, George Mason and the other Founding Fathers did act as much for economic motives as for abstract ideals. To Form a More Perfect Union offers compelling evidence showing that the economic, financial, and other interests of the founders can account for the specific design and adoption of our Constitution. This is the first book to provide modern evidence that substantiates many of the overall conclusions found in Charles Beard's An Economic Interpretation while challenging and overturning other of Beard's specific findings. To Form a More Perfect Union presents an entirely new approach to the study of the shaping of the U.S. Constitution. Through the application of economic thinking and rigorous statistical techniques, as well as the processing of vast amounts of data on the economic interests and personal characteristics of the Founding Fathers, McGuire convincingly demonstrates that an economic interpretation of the Constitution is valid. Radically challenging the prevailing views of most historians, political scientists, and legal scholars, To Form a More Perfect Union provides a wealth of new findings about the Founding Fathers' constitutional choices and sheds new light on the motivations behind the design and adoption of the United States Constitution. |
Im Buch
Ergebnisse 1-5 von 46
Seite 4
... wealth of new quantitative findings ( more than half those reported in the book ) about the behavior of our Founding Fathers . Because this reexamination of the framing and adoption of the Constitution so seriously challenges the ...
... wealth of new quantitative findings ( more than half those reported in the book ) about the behavior of our Founding Fathers . Because this reexamination of the framing and adoption of the Constitution so seriously challenges the ...
Seite 5
... wealth or represent their primary livelihood . 4. Counter to the view popular among political scientists and legal scholars , and formalized by constitutional political economists , even when the framers were deciding on the general ...
... wealth or represent their primary livelihood . 4. Counter to the view popular among political scientists and legal scholars , and formalized by constitutional political economists , even when the framers were deciding on the general ...
Seite 8
... wealth or the wealth of those they represented as a result of creating the Constitution . Of course the founders were not . Others question an economic interpretation because they question whether the founders were really involved in a ...
... wealth or the wealth of those they represented as a result of creating the Constitution . Of course the founders were not . Others question an economic interpretation because they question whether the founders were really involved in a ...
Seite 16
... wealth in personal pro- perty , had much in common with northern merchants and financiers and should be included as supporters of the Constitution . According to Beard ( pp . 31-51 ) , support for his argument could be found in the ...
... wealth in personal pro- perty , had much in common with northern merchants and financiers and should be included as supporters of the Constitution . According to Beard ( pp . 31-51 ) , support for his argument could be found in the ...
Seite 18
... wealthy were strong supporters of the Constitution , and that those without personal property generally opposed the ... wealth , economic interests , and votes of the framers at the Philadelphia conven- tion and of the delegates to the ...
... wealthy were strong supporters of the Constitution , and that those without personal property generally opposed the ... wealth , economic interests , and votes of the framers at the Philadelphia conven- tion and of the delegates to the ...
Inhalt
15 | |
33 | |
The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 | 47 |
The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution | 49 |
Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses | 94 |
The Choice of the Basic Design of the Constitution | 109 |
The Ratification of the Constitution 17871790 | 129 |
The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation | 131 |
The Data and Their Sources | 239 |
Full and Parsimonious Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention | 254 |
PersonalInterest and ConstituentInterest Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention | 266 |
Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia Convention | 272 |
Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying Conventions | 275 |
Voting Models for Massachusetts North Carolina and Virginia Ratifying Conventions | 296 |
Notes | 333 |
References | 363 |
The Ratification Vote within Individual State Conventions | 162 |
The Lessons of 1787 and Ratification | 207 |
Documents | 215 |
Index | 375 |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United ... Robert Allen McGuire Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2003 |
To Form A More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United ... Robert A. McGuire Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2003 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
$1,000 public securities 05 level Alternative Model Specifications ancestry of citizens Articles of Confederation Beard ceteris paribus chapter Congress constituent interests constituent-interest Constitution Continental Congress Debtor Distance to navigable economic interpretation economic model employed English ancestry estimated effect Estimated Logistic Coefficients Explanatory Variables Farmer findings founders framers Hampshire instrumental variable issue logistic regression marginal effect Massachusetts McDonald measures Merchant Model Specifications Explanatory national government navigable water miles nomic North Carolina note to table Number of observations Number of slaves officeholder otherwise average delegate Owner public securities P-value paper money personal economic interests Philadelphia convention political predicted probability Private creditor private securities probability of voting public creditor Public funding credit public securities holdings ratification vote ratifying conventions reported in table sample sample means slaveholdings Slaveowner Slaves per 100 Statistically significant Value of public Virginia convention voted for ratification voting behavior voting model Western landowner William Worcester MA
Verweise auf dieses Buch
Hamilton Unbound: Finance and the Creation of the American Republic Robert E. Wright Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2002 |