To Form A More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United States ConstitutionOxford University Press, 27.03.2003 - 416 Seiten Many important questions regarding the creation and adoption of the United States Constitution remain unresolved. Did slaveholdings or financial holdings significantly influence our Founding Fathers' stance on particular clauses or rules contained in the Constitution? Was there a division of support for the Constitution related to religious beliefs or ethnicity? Were founders from less commercial areas more likely to oppose the Constitution? To Form a More Perfect Union successfully answers these questions and offers an economic explanation for the behavior of our Founding Fathers during the nation's constitutional founding. In 1913, American historian Charles A. Beard controversially argued in his book An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States that the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution were less interested in furthering democratic principles than in advancing specific economic and financial interests. Beard's thesis eventually emerged as the standard historical interpretation and remained so until the 1950s. Since then, many constitutional and historical scholars have questioned an economic interpretation of the Constitution as being too narrow or too calculating, believing the great principles and political philosophies that motivated the Founding Fathers to be worthier subjects of study. In this meticulously researched reexamination of the drafting and ratification of our nation's Constitution, Robert McGuire argues that Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, George Mason and the other Founding Fathers did act as much for economic motives as for abstract ideals. To Form a More Perfect Union offers compelling evidence showing that the economic, financial, and other interests of the founders can account for the specific design and adoption of our Constitution. This is the first book to provide modern evidence that substantiates many of the overall conclusions found in Charles Beard's An Economic Interpretation while challenging and overturning other of Beard's specific findings. To Form a More Perfect Union presents an entirely new approach to the study of the shaping of the U.S. Constitution. Through the application of economic thinking and rigorous statistical techniques, as well as the processing of vast amounts of data on the economic interests and personal characteristics of the Founding Fathers, McGuire convincingly demonstrates that an economic interpretation of the Constitution is valid. Radically challenging the prevailing views of most historians, political scientists, and legal scholars, To Form a More Perfect Union provides a wealth of new findings about the Founding Fathers' constitutional choices and sheds new light on the motivations behind the design and adoption of the United States Constitution. |
Im Buch
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Seite 5
... Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787 who drafted the Constitution were motivated by self - interest , in a broad sense , in choosing its design . These framers of the Constitution can be viewed as rational individuals who were ...
... Philadelphia Constitutional Convention of 1787 who drafted the Constitution were motivated by self - interest , in a broad sense , in choosing its design . These framers of the Constitution can be viewed as rational individuals who were ...
Seite 6
... constitutional conventions . It does mean that holdings of financial securities , controlling for other influences , significantly affected the prob- ability of supporting some of the issues at the Philadelphia convention , particularly ...
... constitutional conventions . It does mean that holdings of financial securities , controlling for other influences , significantly affected the prob- ability of supporting some of the issues at the Philadelphia convention , particularly ...
Seite 7
... constitutional conventions . What it does mean is that slaveholdings , controlling for other influences , significantly decreased the probability of voting at the Philadelphia convention for issues that would have strength- ened the ...
... constitutional conventions . What it does mean is that slaveholdings , controlling for other influences , significantly decreased the probability of voting at the Philadelphia convention for issues that would have strength- ened the ...
Seite 11
... Philadelphia , the delegates to the ratifying conventions , and the geographical areas the delegates represented . Part I , consisting of chapters 3-5 , concerns the drafting of the Constitution at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention ...
... Philadelphia , the delegates to the ratifying conventions , and the geographical areas the delegates represented . Part I , consisting of chapters 3-5 , concerns the drafting of the Constitution at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention ...
Seite 12
... Philadelphia convention . Chapter 4 offers a further look at the choice of the specific issues at the Philadelphia convention , presenting the results of an alternative approach to estimating voting behavior on the selected issues that ...
... Philadelphia convention . Chapter 4 offers a further look at the choice of the specific issues at the Philadelphia convention , presenting the results of an alternative approach to estimating voting behavior on the selected issues that ...
Inhalt
15 | |
33 | |
The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 | 47 |
The Choice of Specific Clauses in the Constitution | 49 |
Another Look at the Choice of Specific Clauses | 94 |
The Choice of the Basic Design of the Constitution | 109 |
The Ratification of the Constitution 17871790 | 129 |
The Overall Ratification Vote in the Nation | 131 |
The Data and Their Sources | 239 |
Full and Parsimonious Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention | 254 |
PersonalInterest and ConstituentInterest Voting Models for the Philadelphia Convention | 266 |
Alternative Voting Model and Hypothesis Tests for Nationalism at the Philadelphia Convention | 272 |
Voting Models for Pooled Samples of the State Ratifying Conventions | 275 |
Voting Models for Massachusetts North Carolina and Virginia Ratifying Conventions | 296 |
Notes | 333 |
References | 363 |
The Ratification Vote within Individual State Conventions | 162 |
The Lessons of 1787 and Ratification | 207 |
Documents | 215 |
Index | 375 |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
To Form a More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United ... Robert Allen McGuire Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2003 |
To Form A More Perfect Union: A New Economic Interpretation of the United ... Robert A. McGuire Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2003 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
$1,000 public securities 05 level Alternative Model Specifications ancestry of citizens Articles of Confederation Beard ceteris paribus chapter Congress constituent interests constituent-interest Constitution Continental Congress Debtor Distance to navigable economic interpretation economic model employed English ancestry estimated effect Estimated Logistic Coefficients Explanatory Variables Farmer findings founders framers Hampshire instrumental variable issue logistic regression marginal effect Massachusetts McDonald measures Merchant Model Specifications Explanatory national government navigable water miles nomic North Carolina note to table Number of observations Number of slaves officeholder otherwise average delegate Owner public securities P-value paper money personal economic interests Philadelphia convention political predicted probability Private creditor private securities probability of voting public creditor Public funding credit public securities holdings ratification vote ratifying conventions reported in table sample sample means slaveholdings Slaveowner Slaves per 100 Statistically significant Value of public Virginia convention voted for ratification voting behavior voting model Western landowner William Worcester MA
Verweise auf dieses Buch
Hamilton Unbound: Finance and the Creation of the American Republic Robert E. Wright Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2002 |