between the states, but a fundamental law given themselves by the people collectively :-the chapter upon the right of the Supreme Court of the Union to expound the constitution :— the inquiry into the right of Congress to make use of the tariff for the protection of industry (which question, however, the author has not expressly decided):-the discussion of the President's right of appointment, &c. According to his

political confession of faith, the author belongs to the federal party, as is manifest from his decision of all the principal controverted questions, and particularly of the question just mentioned, in which the whole field is narrowed down to a single point, whether the present constitution is a compact between the individual states, which is to be interpreted strictissime, and confers upon the Union those powers only, which are granted in express words, or whether it is a form of government, which the sovereign people of the whole republic have given themselves, and which consequently rests upon their own foundation, and must possess the means necessary to the upholding and carrying out of their regulations, even although these means are only impliedly given. The author defends, in a masterly style and upon every opportunity, the certainly very just principle, that the support of a powerful federal government, fully corresponding to the purposes of the people, as expressed in their constitution, is the condition of all order, freedom, law, and even of existence. He describes, with power and eloquence, the calamitous and shameful period of the confederation, the whole troubles of which confessedly arose out of a want of an adequate common power. All this is done in a very commendable spirit and style, and without any admixture of party feeling, though, as it must and ought to be, with a steady adherence to a determined political conviction. Against Jefferson, however, the author is hard and bitter, upon every opportunity. We have wondered, that the author, with his decided views, has hesitated to declare his opinion expressly, upon some subjects of full and present practical importance,as, for instance, the constitutionality of a national bank,—the right of congress to regulate the tariff with a view to the pro

tection of domestic manufactures, or to make internal improvements, (so called)-in other words, upon matters of national policy. In all these cases, the author's opinion, which is favorable to the powers of congress, is only suffered to gleam through the discussion. Why is this so?' The only criticism, which one could rightfully make upon this explanatory part of the commentary, namely, the perhaps too great copiousness with which the author presents us with the opinions of others, we cannot persuade ourselves to mention as a fault, because this very copiousness is in the highest degree acceptable to the European reader, to whom the writings quoted cannot of course be accessible. The historical part of the commentary is of somewhat less value, for the reason, that the continued history of the dogma and of the external events connected with it, which is manifestly requisite in so extended a work, is in a great degree wanting; and this is not only to be complained of, as a fault in the method, but is very much to be lamented, as leaving a gap in the information. The author's extraordinary knowledge of the sources would have made it easy for him to supply this want, and the room might easily have been obtained by compressing the somewhat too discursive argumentation, without further enlarging the work. The author should have borne in mind, that nothing is more effectual, in bringing political parties to their senses, than a history of what they have wished, spoken, prophesied, and undertaken. He applies historical reminiscences of this kind, by way of refutation, against the democratical party, not unfrequently ;—why not always and without any polemical purpose?—In regard, lastly, to the general views and conclusions of the author, we cannot, as we have already remarked, consider them of much importance. We look for the cause, not only in the fact,

1 The American reader will understand at once, what, perhaps, did not occur to the German critic, that the judicial station of Mr. Justice Story rendered it proper for him to abstain from expressing any decisive opinion upon questions which might arise before him as a judge; as is the case with those mentioned in the text. ED. JUR.

2 The German critic here seems to refer to the occasional remarks of the

the

that the talent of the author generally inclines him more to analysis than to synthesis, but especially also in the fact, that he seems to be entirely deficient in a knowledge of the political literature of continental Europe, and particularly in that of Germany; and, secondly, that he is, for the most part, too entirely American. So long as he keeps within the circle of the institutions and circumstances, by which he is surrounded, he is wholly in his element; he sees in them a pure product =of the modern intellectual views of governinent; and with this view he is so thoroughly penetrated, that his reasoning is perfectly homogeneous to his subject, and even on that account peculiarly excellent: but, by reason of the exclusive constitutionality of his thought, if we may be permitted to use that expression, it is so much the more difficult for him, to abandon that and to assume a more general point of view, from which to survey the various experiments which men have made, in order to adapt the purposes and forms of government to their wants, or, in other words, to their habits of life. He gives himself very little trouble, indeed, to obtain such a view, and to apply the result to his subject, but contents himself with occasionally throwing in an isolated and unorganic remark. Inasmuch, however, as the public law of a particular nation can be made clear only by a comparison of the points wherein it is similar or dissimilar to that of other states, this too narrow view of the great whole, of which the law of the United States is only a part, and of which the institutions of Athens, Rome, Austria and France are also but parts, must be regarded as a defect.

If we bring together the individual characteristic features of the work in question, it will be seen, that, although it does not come up to all the demands of science, and even leaves unsatisfied a want by no means inconsiderable; yet we have in it as perfect and excellent a commentary upon the North American

author on the science of government, and not to his general views and conclusions with reference to the particular subject in hand, to wit, the constitution of the United States. A more extended application of this criticism would scarcely be consistent with the general tenor of the article. ED. JUR.

public law as can be produced by deep and profound reflection, acute logic, extensive knowledge of the national condition and writings, and just political views; and, consequently, that the author has, in a great degree, removed the difficulties above-mentioned in the way of the acquisition of an accurate knowledge of the American public law. Professor Story, by his talented and diligent labors, has, without doubt, done a great service, not only to his countrymen, but also, and in a still higher degree, to the European publicists, among whom his work will receive an honorable fame, as readily awarded as it will be enduring.

This is not the place nor have we room, to lay before our readers, with any degree of completeness, the various considerations, suggested by the perusal of so copious and extended a work: neither would it be desired of us to point out all the individual points, in regard to which a repeated and careful perusal has failed to bring us to agree with the author in opinion; still, it may be permitted us to make a few short general remarks, arising from our acquaintance with the public law of the United States.

[The remainder of the article comprises an examination of several topics relating to our constitution, conducted with great ability and learning. We may, perhaps, present it to our readers in some future number.]

DIGEST OF RECENT DECISIONS.

Principal cases in

9 PETERS'S REPORTS of Cases in the Supreme Court of the United States.

4 PAIGE'S REPORTS of Cases in the Court of Chancery of New York. 1 and 2 STEWART'S REPORTS of Cases in the Supreme Court of Alabama.

ABATEMENT.

(When plea of will be disregarded.) Where a plea in abatement, and a demurrer thereto, appear in the record, and afterwards, an issue on the plea of not guilty, the plea in abatement will be disregarded. Robertson v. Lee and wife, 1 Stewart, 141. ACCEPTOR.

(What is an acceptance.) On a question whether a letter contains an acceptance of an order, although it contain the words, ' I shall accept,' if from the whole letter it appear that no acceptance was intended, it will be construed as a refusal. Musgrove v. Hudson, 2 Stewart, 464. ACCORD AND SATISFACTION.

1. (What is.) It is a good plea in bar, that the plaintiff, pending suit, accepted a writing as an accord and satisfaction from a third person, with condition to dismiss his suit. Webster and Smith v. Wyser et al. 1 Stewart, 184.

2. (Something valuable must be given.) A mere acknowledgment of satisfaction will not sustain the plea of accord and satisfaction, there must be something valuable given. Logan v. Austin, 1 Stewart, 476. ACTION.

1. (By one partner against another.) One partner can maintain an action at law against his copartner, for an excess paid by him on a joint purchase. Bumpass v. Webb, 1 Stewart, 19.

2. (Merger of civil action in felony.) A civil action for damages does not lie where a felony was committed, unless the defendant be acquitted of the felony. Morgan v. Rhodes, 1 Stewart, 70.