5. (Ground to impeach a verdict.) If the jury being questioned by the Court as to the principles upon which they proceeded in finding their verdict, state a fact which is irrelevant to the inquiries put to them, the Court is not bound to receive it, and their answers are not competent evidence for the purpose of impeaching the verdict on the ground of their misconduct. Dorr v. Fenno, 12 Pick. 521.

6. (The same.) If the jury, in order to ascertain the damages, agree that each juror shall set down the sum which he thinks the plaintiff ought to recover, and dividing the aggregate by twelve, they return the quotient as their verdict, this is not a ground for impeaching the verdict, provided there was no previous agreement to be bound by such result. lb.

7. (Separation of.) A jury should not be suffered, whilst charged with the trial of a cause, to disperse, and intermix with the parties, or their friends, if it be practicable to prevent it: but if the protracted duration of the trial, or any other circumstance, renders it necessary, in the opinion of the presiding judge, that there should be a recess, it is within his sound discretion to adjourn the cause from day to day, during the progress of the trial, and to permit the jury to separate in the interval, even in the case of an indictment for a capital felony. State v. Anderson, 2 Bailey, 565.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

1. (Action of debt by assignee of lessor against assignes of lessee.) An action of debt for rent reserved by an indenture of lease, may be maintained by the assignee of the lessor against the assignee of the lessee; and evidence to show that the annual value of the leased premises is less than the rent reserved, is inadmissible. Howland v. Coffin, 12 Pick. 125.

2. (Taxes.) In 1780, R. demised to L. a tract of land for ninety-nine years, at a certain annual rent, and covenanted to renew the lease upon the payment of a year's rent, as a fine for other ninety-nine years, to commence from the expiration of the first term, and also, that L. should quietly enjoy the premises upon payment of the rent. The lease reserved the usual right to re-enter for non-payment of rent, but contained no agreement in relation to the payment of taxes. In an action of covenant brought upon this lease in 1828, it was Held, that the taxes assessed upon, and chargeable against the demised premises, were due from, and payable by the lessee, or his assigns, and that he could not set-off a payment of taxes, against a claim for rent. Hughes v. Young, 5 Gill & Johnson, 67.

LARCENY.

(Of growing corn in S. Carolina.) Under the contract of 1826, growsubject of larceny, although not previously State v. Stephenson, 2 Bailey, 334.

ing in a field is the severed from the soil. LEGACY. (When payable.) A legacy to a child vested, but not charged on land, and payable with interest, by the terms of the will, at twentyone, shall nevertheless be paid presently at the death of the child, should that event happen before the time of payment originally appointed. But where it is presumed from the circumstances and the condition of the estate, that the postponement was intended for the benefit of others, the time of payment will not be hastened by the death of the legatee. Nor will the payment be hastened by his death in any case when the legacy is charged upon land. Jacobs v. Bull, 1 Watts, 370.

LEVY.

(Property of sheriff in goods levied on.) A levy on the goods of the defendant in an execution vests only a qualified property in the sheriff. The general right of property remains in the defendant, and a sale made by him, to be effectuated on the removal of the sheriff's right of property, is valid; and will be binding on the purchaser, although the mode of completing the contract is by purchase at the sheriff's sale, and delivery of the sheriff's title. Bates v. Moore, 2 Bailey, 614.

LICENSE.

1. (General parol license.) A general parol license by the owner of land, to cut and carry away wood growing thereon, (if available at all,) must be acted on within a reasonable time, and must be considered as applying to the wood as substantially in the state of growth in which it is at the time of giving the license. Gilmore v. Wilbur, 12 Pick. 120.

2. (Retrospective.) The grant of a license to retail spirituous liquors from a day past, is a release of the penalties for retailing without license subsequent to that day, although prior to the taking out of the license. City Council v. Corleis, 2 Bailey, 186.

LIEN.

1. (By judgment.) An execution issued and levied upon land preserves the lien of the judgment as to the land levied only; if no scire facias be issued within five years, the lien as to all other lands is gone. Brown v. Campbell, 1 Watts, 41. 2. (Same.) A confession of judgment, 'sum to be liquidated by attorney,' operates as a lien upon the defendant's real estate, although not afterwards liquidated. Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 1 Watts, 54.

A judgment in the name of the treasurer, for the use of the commonwealth, is substantially a judgment of the commonwealth, so as to exempt it from the operation of a statute, limiting the period for which a judgment shall continue a lien. Ib.

The lien of a judgment in favor of the commonwealth is not lost by lapse of time. Ib.

3. (By levy of treasurer's warrant.) A lien is a necessary and inseparable incident of seizure in execution by the principles of the common law. A treasurer's warrant, therefore, against a delinquent collector of taxes, levied on his real estate, creates a lien thereon, which will have priority to subsequently entered judgments, and a sale of the estate upon such proceeding will vest in the purchaser a good title. Stauffer v. The Commissioners, 1 Watts, 300. 4. (By judgment.) A judgment against the husband of an heir at law

is a lien against his life estate; and upon a sale made by the admin istrator of the ancestor of the whole estate, by virtue of the intestate laws, such judgment creditor is entitled to be paid the amount of his judgment, when the proceeds due and payable to such husband are sufficient for that purpose. Beard v. Deitz, 1 Watts, 309. LIMITATION.

1. (New Promise.) There must be an acknowledgment of an existing debt within six years, to prevent the operation of the statute of limitations. Lyon v. Marclay, 1 Watts, 271.

2. (Trust.) Cases of trust, not to be reached or affected in equity by the statute of limitations, are those technical and continuing trusts, which are not at all cognizable at law, but fall within the proper, peculiar, and exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity: it must be a direct trust, belonging exclusively to the jurisdiction of a court of equity, and the question must arise between the trustee and cestui que trust. Ib.

3. (Secret fraud.) Against a right of action, dependent on the existence of a secret fraud, the statute of limitations runs but from the period of discovery. Pennock v. Freeman, 1 Watts, 401.

4. (Presumption of grant or satisfaction.) The presumption of law that a debt has been paid, or a right of way has been granted, or a bond or mortgage or legacy has been satisfied, are those deductions from the existence of a fact, to which a legal effect is attached beyond their nature and operation. They are either conclusive, and may be made by the court, or inconclusive and can only be found by a jury. It is not so much a presumption that the money has been paid, or a right of way granted, as it is the substitution of an arti

ficial rule in the place of evidence or belief, after a delay which may have been destructive of the evidence on which a belief might be justly founded. Summerville v. Holliday, 1 Watts, 507. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS.

(New promise.) In an action of assumpsit, under the plea of limitations, the plaintiff proved, that the defendant, an administrator, in answer to a demand for payment, said, 'he thought the debt had been paid, and he thought he could produce the receipts; if he could not produce the receipts, and it was correct, it should be paid.' Held, that it was imcumbent on the plaintiff to prove the debt before he could avail himself of the promise. Kent v. Wilkinson, 5 Gill & Johnson, 497.

LIMITATION OF ESTATES.

(After fee simple conditional.) A remainder cannot be limited upon a fee simple conditional at common law; and all devises over, limited to take effect upon the natural efflux or determination of that estate, are void, as executory devises, for remoteness. For this reason, wherever there are devises over, a fee simple conditional at common law will not be implied, if the will is susceptible of any other construction, which will effectuate the intention of the testator. Bedon v. Bedon, 2 Bailey, 231.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

1. (When it begins to run.) Where parties have accommodated a previously existing controversy, and one of them has given the other his notes for a balance admitted to be due, he cannot afterwards, upon payment of the notes, maintain an action for money had and received, on an alleged fraud in making the settlement: His remedy is by action of deceit; and the statute of limitations runs against it from the date of the settlement, and not the payment of the notes. Motley v. Montgomery, 2 Bailey, 11.

2. (Runs from demand.) Where a demand on the defendant, or other collateral thing, is requisite to give the plaintiff a right of action, the statute of limitations does not commence to run until demand made, or thing done. Wright v. Hamilton, 2 Bailey, 51.

3. (On judgment of court, not of record.) A judgment in the Court of a justice for the trial of causes small and mean is within the operation of the statute of limitations. It is not matter of record. Griffin v. Heaton, 2 Bailey, 58.

4. (New promise.) An express promise by defendant, to pay when he had collected money which was due to him, is sufficient to revive a debt already barred by the statute of limitations; and an action on the promise lies presently. Grist v. Newman, 2 Bailey, 92.

5. (Depends on the lex fori.) The limitation of actions is of the lex fori, not of the lex loci contractus: and therefore, to an action in the courts of S. Carolina, on a contract made in another State, the statute of limitations of S. Carolina is a bar, although the action would not be barred by the statute of limitations of the State in which the contract was made. Levy v. Boas, 2 Bailey, 217.

6. (Acknowledgement.) A slight acknowledgement will arrest the operation of the statute of limitations, where the statutory bar is not complete; but to revive a debt already barred, there must be either an express promise to pay, or an unequivocal admission, that the debt is still due and payable, unaccompanied by any expression, declaration, or qualification, indicative of an intention not to pay.— Young v. Monpoey, 2 Bailey, 278.

7. (Same.) The defendant was indorser of a promissory note, and payment being demanded of him, after it was barred by the statute of limitations, he replied, that he had not been served with notice of protest, and, therefore, had nothing to do with it; but if he had been legally notified, he would have paid it long ago. Held insufficient to revive the debt; and that proof that there had been regular demand and notice to fix the liability of the defendant as indorser, made no difference. lb.

8. (Same.) An offer to pay a very inconsiderable portion of a debt barred by the statute of limitations, in order to get the evidence of the debt out of the hands of the creditor, with no distinct admission by the debtor of his liability for the whole, or any part, and no express promise to pay, is insufficient to remove the bar of the statute, or revive the debt. Cohen & Nesbit v. Aubin, 2 Bailey, 283. 9. (Declarations to third persons.) By an intestate, in his life time, that he intended to remunerate the plaintiff for certain services by a legacy, are not sufficient to revive the legal demand for those services, after it had been barred by the statute of limitations. Trammel v. Salmon, 2 Bailey, 308.

10. (Promise not to plead statute.) A promise not to plead the statute of limitations, made after the debt was actually barred, is sufficient to take the case out of the statute, although it indicate an intention to resist payment on other grounds; and may, it seems, be given in evidence in an action for the original debt, under a general replication that the action did accrue within four years. Lowry v. Dubose, 2 Bailey, 425.

11. (When it begins to run.) The vendor of a slave promised to return the purchase money, if the purchaser should discover, that the vendor knew the slave to be unsound, at the time of the sale. Held,