6. (Same.) If in a reasonable time after notice of capture, the insured fails to abandon, he loses the privilege of doing so, and cannot recover for a total loss on any abandonment for that cause subsequently made.

Ib.

7. (Same.) In recovering for a total loss founded upon an abandonment, the insured must prove as the basis of his action, the cause assigned in the notice of abandonment. Ib.

8. (Risks covered.) An order for insurance against all risks for account of whom it may concern, covers belligerent as well as neutral risks; and an endorsement upon such an order, stating, although our advices give us no reason to believe that there will be any articles contraband of war on board, still as we wish to be covered against all possible risk, we request your re-consideration of the within, including articles contraband of war,' does not alter the character of the original application, nor constitute a warranty or representation of neutrality. lb.

9. (Concealment.) Facts of universal notoriety in the commercial world, at the time of effecting an insurance upon a particular voyage, which relate to the course of trade upon such voyage, which form a part of the public history of that time, are lights, against which a court of justice cannot shut its eyes, and of which the law imputes knowledge to underwriters. Ib.

10. (Same.) Where an order for insurance is against all risks, or all possible risks for account of whom it may concern, upon a certain defined voyage, the insured is not bound to communicate or disclose at the time of effecting such insurance without inquiry from the underwriter, the particular circumstances connected with the voyage, which show that it is in fact a belligerent risk, as the transportation of hostile stores, troops, &c. Ib.

11. (Same.) The obligation to disclose facts to an underwriter, is limited to such facts as would vary the risk or nature of the contract; no communication need be made of what is necessarily implied by the contract.

Ib.

12. (Abandonment.) The English rule, that the right to recover for a total loss is not made absolute by the state of the facts on which the abandonment is founded, continuing to exist at the date of the abandonment, but is dependent on subsequent events, does not prevail bere. Ib.

13. (Same.) The right to recover of the assurer for a total loss is complete, if the loss, which is the basis of an abandonment, continues at the time of the abandonment, and of this consummate right or privilege, the assured cannot without default be deprived, but by his

consent expressed or implied. It may be waived like other privileges. Ib.

14. (Recreation of abandonment.) If after capture and abandonment, but before condemnation, a ship be ransomed by the captain, or retaken by the crew, or be recovered and delivered to the owners who claim and use her as their own, they possess her under no new title or right of property; and this constitutes a waiver or surrender of the abandonment. Ib.

15. (Condemnation changes title.) But where a condemnation takes place, the assured, apart from all statutory regulation on the subject, is divested of all property in the ship; and in it, if purchased by themselves or their agents, they acquire a new and independent title, to which their subsequent acts of ownership are imputable, and not to their original proprietary rights. And this new title against all the world save the underwriters, is incontrovertible; and it is conclusive against them, if they consented to its acquisition, or have waived the right to impeach it. Ib.

16. (Purchase by the master.) So where the insured vessel was captured and condemned, and purchased by the master, who drew upon his owners for the amount, and information of these facts was communicated to the underwriters at the time of making a claim for a total loss, and the underwriters did not claim the purchase, but contested their liability upon the ground of not having seen the protest of the captain; it was Held, that they had waived their right to consider the purchase as made for their account, and could not at the trial insist that the insured had only suffered a partial loss, but were liable for a total loss. lb.

17. (Preliminary proof.) Where notice was given to underwriters of a claim for the condemnation of the insured vessel, and they at first demanded the captain's protest, and after some correspondence the underwriters notified the insured that 'they did not consider themselves answerable for the claim,' this was held, to be a waiver of all objection to the preliminary proofs offered by the assured. b. INTEREST.

1. (On an unliquidated sum due from the time of service of the writ.) In an action to recover a quantum meruit for the plaintiff's services in the part-performance of a special contract, he is not entitled to interest on the unliquidated sum due to him, from the time of making a special demand before action brought, but only from the time of the service of the writ. Semble. Brewer v. Tyringham, 12 Pick.

547.

2. (After sum payable.) Where the amount of plaintiff's demand is

liquidated in writing, and a day appointed for payment, the jury have no discretion to refuse interest on the debt from that day. Wistar Siter & Price v. Robinson, 2 Bailey, 274.

3. (From demand.) A due bill payable on demand bears interest only from demand made, and not from the date, unless so expressed, although specified to be for a loan of money on the day of the date. Schmidt v. Limehouse, 2 Bailey, 276.

4. (Acknowledgment.) The plaintiffs, who were merchants, transmitted to the defendant their account against him, including certain charges for interest; the defendant acknowledged receipt of the account, remitted to them a sum of money more than sufficient to discharge the principal, and subsequently promised payment of the balance of the account. Held, that the plaintiffs were intitled to recover the balance, without reference to their original right to charge interest. Furman & Smith v. Peay, 2 Bailey, 394.

5. (Beyond penalty.) Interest beyond the penalty of a bond may be recovered in a court of law in the shape of damages. Boyd v. Boyd, 1 Watts, 365.

6. (On purchase money recovered back.) The possession of land is equivalent to the interest upon the purchase money; and in an action to recover back purchase money paid for land, interest is recoverable from the time of eviction, when that eviction proceeds from a prior incumbrance, and not paramount title. Culp v. Fisher, 1 Watts, 494.

JOINT ÍNTERESTS AND LIABILITIES.

1. (Note in the singular signed by two.) Joint action on a promissory note, beginning 'I promise,' but signed by both defendants: Held, that the note was joint and several; and nonsuit refused. Barnet v. Skinner and Bobo, 2 Bailey, 88.

2. (Parol evidence to contradict note.) One who is bound jointly, and severally, cannot aver by pleading, that he is only a surety. Semble.— Pickett v. Land, 2 Bailey, 608.

JUDGE.

(Authority as in an order.) Although a judge cannot rescind an order made by his predecessor, yet when upon a change of circumstances an application is made to him to enlarge or enforce it, he has jurisdiction over the subject matter to refuse his aid in carrying it into effect. Bordeaux v. Cave, 2 Bailey, 6.

JUDGMENT.

1. (Final.) A judgment in the usual form was confessed, subject to the following terms: 'Judgment was rendered in the cause, upon,

&c., for the damages laid in the declaration and costs,-to be released on payment of such sunt as M. shall say is due, and costs. To bind a proportion of assets to be ascertained by M.' Held, that this was a final judgment; that to make it absolute, so far as regarded the amount due, no farther action of the court was necessary. The filing of M.'s certificate thereof, was all that was required for that purpose. Turner v. Plowden, 5 Gill & Johnson, 52.

2. (Extinguishment.) The claim upon which this judgment was founded, was thereby extinguished, and could not afterwards be available, either as a substantive cause of action, or by way of setoff. Ib.

3. (Against defendant.) In an action of debt against two or more, a confession of judgment by one defendant, accepted by the plaintiff, operates as a release of all the other defendants, against whom no judgment can afterwards be obtained in that action or any other upon the same evidence of debt; and whether that evidence of debt be a joint, or a joint and several obligation, does not alter the rule. Beltzhoover v. The Commonwealth, 1 Watts, 126.

4. (Collateral.) A mortgage or judgment may be given to secure a creditor for a debt due, for responsibilities which are contingent, or for future advances. Stewart v. Stocker, 1 Watts, 135.

5. (Satisfaction.) A bond given by executors, conditioned for the faithful discharge of their duties, in pursuance of an order of the orphan's court, was sued by one legatee in the name of the commonwealth for his own use, and a judgment was obtained by award of arbitrators for the amount of the penalty, with the right to take out execution for the amount of his damages; these damages were paid by the defendant, and the legatee entered satisfaction on the judgment. Held, that such satisfaction extended only to the interest of that legatee, and a scire facias may be issued upon the judgment to enable any other of the legatees to recover their legacy; and a legatee whose legacy did not become due until after the date of the judgment may also maintain a scire facias upon it. Arrison v. The Commonwealth, 1 Watts, 374.

Such a judgment is final and not interlocutory, and is a lien upon all the lands of the defendant in the county where it is rendered; but its lien is limited to five years by force of the act of 1798. lb.

Another legatee having sued the same bond and obtained judgment for the penalty with the right to take out execution for the amount of his legacy: it was held, that although the first suit, if it had been pleaded, would have been a bar to the second; yet the circumstance, of its having been paid, and satisfaction entered upon

the record, did not in any way affect the judgment in the first suit, or the right of any legatee or party in interest to maintain a scire facias upon it. lb.

JURISDICTION.

1. (Of State Courts.) The State Courts have jurisdiction to punish the uttering and publishing counterfeit bills and notes of the Bank of the United States, as well as of all other counterfeits of the currency of the State. Such jurisdiction is inherent in the State for the protection of its citizens against a spurious currency; and is not ousted, either by the clause in the 8th sec. 1st art. Con. U. S. conferring upon the general government the power to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States;' or by any implied power in the general government, to protect the bank of its own creation. Questionable, whether, if Congress were to pass laws incompatible with the exercise of the State jurisdiction, the latter would then be suspended: but the acts of Congress in relation to counterfeiting the coin, and the notes of the bank, having expressly saved the jurisdiction of the States, the question does not now arise. State v. Tutt, 2 Bailey, 44.

2. (Judgment on, where conclusive.) The judgment of a Court of limited jurisdiction, in favor of its jurisdiction, is not conclusive. Harvey v. Huggins, 2 Bailey, 252.

JURY.

1. (Cannot be polled.) A prisoner on trial for a capital, or other crime, has no right to have the jury polled. Commonwealth v. Roby, 12 Pick. 496.

2. (What irregularity sufficient o set aside a verdict.) Where there has been an irregularity, or misconduct, on the part of jurors, which might affect their impartiality, or disqualify them for the proper exercise of their reason and judgment, their verdict should be set aside, but in other cases, the proper mode of correcting the irregularity is, by animadversion upon the conduct of the jurors, or, of the officers having them in charge. lb.

3. (Refreshments to a jury that had retired with a capital cause.) Where the jury in a capital trial had retired with the cause, and one of the constables having them in charge, and a stranger, carried reasonable refreshments into their room, but no conversation respecting the cause took place between those persons and the jury, it was held, that the prisoner, who was convicted, was not entitled to a new trial. Ib.

4. (Cider may be furnished-not spirituous liquors.) The Court permit cider to be furnished to a jury, but not spirituous liquors. Ib.