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2. (Same.) It is no part of the usual business of a carrier of goods for freight, to receive the money for them at the place of delivery, and carry it back to the consignor: and where one of two carriers who were in copartnership, undertook to do so, without the knowledge or consent of his co-partner; held, that without proof of a special custom in that particular business, the other co-partner was not liable. Ib.

3. (Set-off of private debt.) Although one partner may discharge a debt due to the firm by a third person, by discounting it against a debt due by him individually to such person; yet his agreement to discount will not charge the firm with the balance of his private debt remaining due after such discount, nor enable his individual creditor to discount that balance against another debt due by him to the firm. Beckham & Eckles v. Peay, 2 Bailey, 133.

4. (Same.) On the dissolution of a copartnership, one of the two copartners was authorized, exclusively, to collect the debts due to the firm: Held, that an acknowledgement by the other copartner, made after the dissolution, that a debt to the firm had been settled before the dissolution, by discounting it against a debt due by himself individually to the debtor of the firm, did not discharge such debtor. Ib.

CORPORATION.

1. (Power to mortgage.) A corporation which, by its charter, is authorized to purchase in fee, or for any less estate, 'all such lands, tenements and hereditaments, and estate, real and personal, as shall be necessary and convenient for them in the prosecution of their works; and the same to sell and dispose of at their pleasure:' has power to mortgage its real estate to secure the payment of a debt. Gordon v. Preston, 1 Watts, 385.

2. (Acquiescence.) If a mortgage by a corporation be executed, not on a charter day, or day appointed by a by-law, but at a special meeting, convened without notice, written or verbal, to the directors who did not attend, it would be voidable by the corporation. But if no objection be made by the corporation, it will be deemed to have acquiesced in and ratified the proceeding. lb.

3. (Execution of Due.) A mortgage by a corporation, executed by the members of the board of directors present, and acknowledged by them, and the seal of the corporation affixed, is a good execution and acknowledgement. Ib.

COSTS.

1. (When money is paid into court.) If the defendant pays money into court and the plaintiff nevertheless proceeds to trial and a verdict is

given against him, he neither pays nor recovers costs up to the time when the money was paid into court. Williams v. Ingersoll, 12

Pick. 345.

2. (Of one summoned under the trustee process.) If one summoned under the trustee process appears at the first term and answers and charges himself as trustee, and is never afterwards examined or put to trouble or expenses, and the suit is continued and litigated between the principal parties, and terminates in a judgment in favor of the defendant, the trustee is entitled to his legal taxable costs for the first term only. Hoyt v. Sprague, 12 Pick. 407.

COURT OF CHANCERY.

1. (Acts done without an order being passed.) In Chancery, acts done bona fide, for the doing of which an order would on application have been passed as a matter of course, shall be regarded in the same light, as if emanating from an order previously obtained for that purpose. Lee and wife and Jordan v. Stone & McWilliams, 5 Gill & Johnson, 1.

2. (Action at Law on decree in Chancery.) An action at law will not lie to enforce a decree in Chancery, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Chancery Court. Jones v. Cox, 5 Gill & Johnson, 65. 3. (Laches.) Lapse of time may operate as a bar to a decree to account. In equity, laches and neglect are discountenanced; this tribunal only lends its power to reasonable diligence. Steiger's Adm'rs v. Hillen, 5 Gill & Johnson, 121.

4. (Damages for not assigning dower.) At law, a widow cannot recover damages against the alienee of her husband from his death, but only from the time of demand and refusal to pay her for, or assign her dower. The feoffee was not in default until that time. The same rule must prevail in equity under the same circumstances. Where she makes no demand before her death, her claim to rents and profits is gone. Ib.

COVENANT.

1. (A valid one.) A covenant made by a party, upon assigning the balance of his account with a third person, that the account,' as he believes,' is correctly stated, is a valid covenant; and if he knows at the time, that the statement of the account is incorrect, the covenant is broken. Dorr v. Fenno, 12 Pick. 521.

2. (Construction of covenant to uild a steam engine.) W. contracted with C. by an agreement under their seals, that he would furnish materials, and construct, and put up for C. a high pressure steam engine, of certain specified proportions and power,-'the whole to be finished, and delivered at the factory of C. and there properly

fitted up, and put into effective operation by and at the charge of W. within 90 days from the date of the agreement. In consideration whereof, C. agreed to pay W. for said engine, so as aforesaid to be constructed and put up, the sum of $3700, in the following proportions; $100 each week, as the work progressed, until the same should be finished and put up as aforesaid, when the sum of $1200, including the weekly advances, was to be paid; the residue of the consideration $2500 was to be paid in six, nine, and twelve months, from and after the said engine should have been put into full and effective operation, to the full extent and meaning of the said covenant.' C. agreed also, that he would provide and pay for the brick and stone work necessary for putting up the boilers of said engine, and likewise pay for the brick and stone work. W. further agreed to warrant and insure the faithful performance of the engine, for the term of twelve months from the time it should be put into operation as aforesaid. Held, that upon the true construction of this covenant, 1. That the parties contemplated the completion of the engine before the weekly payments would amount to the sum of $1200. 2. That the time limited for the completion of the engine was of the essence of the contract. 3. That W. was not entitled to recover the $2500 under the covenant, until he had complied with the stipulations of the contract, as well in relation to the time fixed on, as to other particulars. 4. That it was not necessary for C. to provide the brick and stone work for putting up the boilers, before the boilers would be in a state of readiness to be put up, of which fact, it was the duty of W. to inform C. in due time. Watchman & Bratt v. Crook et. al., 5 Gill & Johnson, 239. 3. (Quantum meruit for work done on special contract.) Where a covenant exists to do a particular piece of work, if after the work is done, though not pursuant to the contract, the party for whom it is done accepts it, it would seem to be right and proper that he should pay for it, what it is worth. Justice requires this, and the principles of the law do not forbid it. Ib.

DECLARATION.

1. (Bad count and general verdict.) A general verdict for the plaintiff in an action of slander is bad, when it is upon a declaration containing two counts, in one of which the words laid to have been spoken are actionable, and in the other not actionable. Ruth v. Kutz, 1 Watts, 489.

2. Such a verdict having been rendered in the circuit court, and a judgment upon the faultless count, the court in bank set aside the verdict and judgment, and directed a venire de novo to issue. Ibid.

DEED.

1. (Unintelligible.) Where a deed is so unintelligible in its terms, that its intent and meaning cannot be collected from its face, the situation of the parties and the circumstances of their transactions, must be resorted to for its construction. Collins v. Lemasters and Lee, 2 Bailey, 141.

2. (Condition precedent.) B. covenanted with T. to dig a canal, &c. and to keep the same open; and T. on his part covenanted that all suits against B. should cease and determine: Held, that the covenant to keep open, being without limitation of time, was independent, and not a condition precedent; and that upon the canal being dug, B. might compel T. to enter satisfaction on a judgment remaining cpen against him at the suit of T. Barksdale v. Toomer, 2 Bailey, 180.

3. (Retrospective law.) A husband and wife conveyed the estate of the wife by a deed defectively acknowledged, and after the death of the wife, the heirs at law brought an ejectment and recovered the land, and remained in possession of it for seventeen years, and until after the passage of the act of assembly, entitled 'an act for the better confirmation of the estates of persons holding or claiming under femes covert, and for establishing a mode in which husband and wife may hereafter convey their estates.' It was held: that this act cured the defect in the acknowledgement, so as to enable those who claimed under the deed, to bring an action of ejectment, and recover back the land. Mercer v. Watson, 1 Watts, 330. DEFENCE.

1. (Vendor and purchaser.) A purchaser of land, who has given his bond for the purchase money, may retain for incumbrances, or for defect of title, although he has no covenant against incumbrances; but if the incumbrance be removed after suit brought, the vendor may recover, but must pay costs up to the time when the incumbrance was removed, and notice of it to the purchaser. Withers v. Atkinson, 1 Watts, 236.

2. (Remedy over.) One who attends to the trial of a cause, not as a party, but upon notice by the defendant, because of a liability, the amount of which will be affected by the verdict and judgment, may give evidence to lessen or defeat a recovery; if he neglect to give such evidence, he will not be permitted afterwards to give it in an action directly against himself, by the defendant in the first suit. Mehaffy v. Lytle, 1 Watts, 314.

3. (By terre-tenant.) A terre-tenant having had an opportunity to defend his title against the lien of a judgment, and not having

availed himself of it, is concluded; and a purchaser at a sheriff's sale upon such judgment revived with notice to the terre-tenant, is entitled to recover the land in ejectment against him. Kiehner v. Dengler, 1 Watts, 424.

DEVISE.

1. (Fee simple.) A testator, having a son and two daughters, each of whom has children, and having also a minor son unmarried, devises as follows:-To the children of my son N. B., as well as to those who may hereafter be born, I give and bequeath the dwelling-house with the land, &c. which I value at 8500 dollars, and which house &c. shall remain for the occupancy and benefit of N. B. during his natural life.' He uses the same form of devise in regard to his daughters and their children. To the minor son he devises the reversion' of certain land at the decease of his wife. This land he estimates at 8000 dollars, but directs it to be valued at 6000 in the division of his estate, as the son will not probably receive possession for several years.'-'The remainder of my estate, consisting chiefly of stocks, cash, merchandise, and a wood lot which I value at 1000 dollars, to be equally divided among my children, first debiting them with the amount they or their children have received in real estate, according to my valuation in this instrument, so that when one has received more than another in real estate, the excess may be deducted from their proportion of the personal property. The woodlot or any other estate which I may not have disposed of, may be sold at the discretion of my executors.' The value put upon the real estate by the testator was the value of the fee simple. Held, that the children of N. B. took an estate in fee simple, subject to his estate for life. Baker v. Bridge, 12 Pick. 27. 2. (In lieu of dower.) A testator devises to his wife and daughter the

southerly half of his dwelling-house, and the north buttery in the house, during the wife's life; and to the wife, one half of his in-door movables, and one cow, which, or some other in the room of it, he orders his sons to keep free of expense to her, during her life; and to the wife and daughter, a heifer; and he directs his sons to be at one half of the expense of keeping the heifer for their mother. The real estate of the testator was appraised at $10,529, and the personal at $647; his debts amounted to $3000; one half of the in-door movables was worth $95; and the fee simple of the whole dwellinghouse, less than $1400. It was held, that this provision for the wife was intended to be in lieu of dower. Reed v. Dickerman, 12 Pick. 146.

3. (Power to sell.) The bequest of a general power of disposal, car

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