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island, which was nearly destitute of military protection, was a place of refuge to the helpless portion of the population, and contained many women and children, whose health was giving way for lack of proper sustenance and shelter. From Galveston, President Burnet proceeded to the camp of General Houston, at San Jacinto, where he arrived on the 1st of May. In a letter to the Secretary of War, dated the 3rd of May, certain propositions had been recommended to the Executive by the General as the basis of an arrangement with Santa Anna, the most of which were embraced in a treaty of which the following is a copy. ARTICLES of an AGREEMENT made between his Excel
lency the General-in-Chief of the Army of Operations, President of the Mexican Republic, Don Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, for one party, and his Excellency the President of the Republic of Texas, Mr.
David G. Burnet, for the other party. Art. 1st. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna agrees not to take up arms, nor to influence their being taken up, against the people of Texas, during the actual strife of independence.
ART. 2d. Hostilities shall immediately cease, by sea and land, between the Mexican and Texan troops.
Art. 3d. The Mexican troops shall evacuate the territory of Texas, passing to the other side of the Rio Grande del Norte.
ART. 4th. The Mexican army, in its retreat, shall not make use of the property of any person without their consent and just indemnification, taking articles only necessary for their subsistence, when the owners should not be pre. sent; and sending to the general of the Texan army, or to the commissioners for the arrangement of such matters, advice of the value of the property consumed, the place
where taken, and the name of the owner, should it be known.
Art. 5th. That all private property, including cattle, horses, negro slaves, or persons contracted, of whatsoever denomination, which may have been taken by a part of the Mexican army, or which should have taken refuge in said army from the commencement of the last invasion, shall be returned to the commander of the Texan forces, or to the persons that should be named by the government of Texas in order to receive it.
ART. 6th. The troops of both belligerent armies shall not be placed in contact, and for this end the Texan general shall take care that between the two encampments a distance shall intervene of five leagues at least.
Art. 7th. The Mexican army shall not delay any more in their march than is necessary to take off their hospitals, trains, &c., and pass the rivers, considering as an infraction of this agreement the delay, which, without just motives, should be noted.
Art. 8th. This agreement shall be forwarded by speedy express to Vicente Filisola, general of division, and to General T. J. Rusk, commander of the army of Texas, that they may remain bound as far as appertains to them, and being mutually agreed, may arrange the speedy and due execution of the stipulations.
Art. 9th. That all the Texan prisoners at this time in the power of the Mexican army, or in that of any of the authorities of the government of Mexico, be immediately placed at liberty, and passports given to them, so that they may return to their homes; it being the duty on the part of the government of Texas also to place at liberty a corresponding number of Mexican prisoners, of the same rank and station, and to treat the remainder of said Mexican prisoners who may remain in the power of the government of Texas with all due humanity, charging the government of Mexico for the expenses caused in their behalf, when any extra convenience should be afforded them.
ART. 10th. General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna shall be sent to Vera Cruz as soon as may be thought proper.
And for its fulfilment and consequent effects, the contracting parties sign it by duplicate in the port of Velasco, on the 14th of May, 1836.
ANTONIO LOPEZ DE SANTA ANNA.
P. W. GRAYSON, Attorney-General. This Treaty was presented to Filisola, and ratified by him on the 26th of May, it being further agreed that Texan Commissioners should accompany the Mexican army, and superintend the execution of the stipulations its commander was called upon to fulfil. A secret treaty, also signed on the 14th of May, by President Burnet and Santa Anna, stipulated that the latter should arrange for the favourable reception by the Mexican cabinet of a mission from Texas,—that a treaty of amity and commerce should be established between the two Republics,-. that the Texan territory was not to extend beyond the Rio Grande,—and that the immediate embarkation of Santa Anna for Vera Cruz should be
provided for-his “prompt return being indispensable for the purpose of effecting his engagements.”
Instructions were forwarded by the Supreme Government of Mexico to Filisola, through the Secretary of War and Marine, to negotiate for the liberation of the President Commander-in-Chief, to secure Bexar and the western ports, and to “save the remainder of the army by concentrating it at a convenient place for receiving provisions.” Authority was given to the General “ to form that movement, enemy.” The
to propose exchanges, and to preserve, for this purpose, and because humanity required it, the lives of the prisoners made and that might be made from the
The government relied upon his Excellency's prudence for neither compromising the safety of the President, nor the honour of the nation. By retreating to the Rio Grande, Filisola had secured the safety of Santa Anna; he professed to have been always opposed to the execution of the prisoners, and now the captured Mexicans were six-fold more numerous than the Texans in his
Bexar he deemed untenable, and he therefore recalled from it General Andrade and the garrison, destroyed the cannon he was unable to remove, and dismantled the fortification of the Alamo.
The campaign of 1836 terminated with the battle of San Jacinto, which sealed the independence of the republic. Even had the Mexicans been victorious in that engagement, it was Filisola's opinion that the condition of the army would have been very little improved. Had the whole force crossed the Brazos, it would have had three large rivers in its rear, unguarded by any detachment, while the camp was burdened with the sick, for whom there was neither medical aid nor food--the habitations and means of subsistence, provided by the industry of the Colonists, having been reduced to ashes by their own hands. Their cattle furnished the only article of sustenance, and the last remnant of these was eaten up by the retreating Mexicans.
Houston's plan of the campaign, although it bore hard upon the Colonists, ensured ultimate success. Had he fallen back as far as Nacogdoches, which he seems to have, at one time, contemplated, the settlers would have placed their women and children and movable property beyond the frontier, and then have joined his standard, to the amount of four or five thousand men. The volunteers from the United States, of whom several hundred arrived at Galveston soon after the battle of San Jacinto, would have fallen upon
the Mexican rear, and prevented the escape of a single man, even had Santa Anna's troops been in an efficient state. The vessels in the Texan service commanded the coast, and could have landed troops at any point. In a renewal of the war, the Mexicans would have had to encounter more formidable obstacles, and to incur a heavier expense than before. All the country beyond the river Trinity would have been a battle-field, where every requisite for the maintenance of an army was to be created. Hunger, the rifle, and exposure to the vicissitudes of the climate were sure ultimately to annihilate the largest army that Mexico could bring into the field; and the result of a prolonged contest must have been, to draw from the north, to the debatable territory, a swarm of adventurers, combining in an extraordinary degree all the qualifications for military life, and who, after assisting Texas in its struggle for independence, would probably have marched for the “city of Montezuma.” To Mexicans and Europeans this might seem an idle and impracticable project, but the class of men who would dare to undertake it are not likely to miscalculate their means of success in any enterprise. The warlike character of the population on the south-western frontier of the United States I have already noticed, and their