right to ask it, and that he does it not merely to serve the purposes of a dangerous ambition.

Canada, in the hands of Britain, will endanger the kingdom of France as little as any other cession; and from its situation and circumstances cannot be hurtful to any other state. Rather, if peace be an advantage, this cession may be such to all Europe. The present war teaches us, that disputes arising in America may be an occasion of embroiling nations, who have no concerns there. If the French remain in Canada and Louisiana, fix the boundaries as you will between us and them, we must border on each other for more than fifteen hundred miles. The people that inhabit the frontiers are generally the refuse of both nations, often of the worst morals and the least discretion; remote from the eye, the prudence, and the restraint of government. Injuries are therefore frequently, in some part or other of so long a frontier, committed on both sides, resentment provoked, the colonies are first engaged, and then the mother countries. And two great nations can scarce be at war in Europe, but some other prince or state thinks it a convenient opportunity to revive some ancient claim, seize some advantage, obtain some territory, or enlarge some power at the expense of a neighbour. The flames of war, once kindled, often spread far and wide, and the mischief is infinite. Happy it proved to both nations, that the Dutch were prevailed on finally to cede the New Netherlands (now the province of New York) to us at the peace of 1674; a peace that has ever since continued between us, but must have been frequently disturbed, if they had retained the possession of that country, bordering several hundred miles on our colonies of Pennsylvania westward, Connecticut and the Massachusetts eastward. Nor is it to be wondered at,

that people of different language, religion, and manners, should in those remote parts engage in frequent quarrels; when we find, that even the people of our own colonies have frequently been so exasperated against each other, in their disputes about boundaries, as to proceed to open violence and bloodshed.

2. Erecting Forts in the back Settlements, almost in no Instance a sufficient Security against the Indians and the French; but the Possession of Canada implies every Security, and ought to be had, while in our Power.

But the Remarker thinks we shall be sufficiently secure in America, if we "raise English forts at such passes as may at once make us respectable to the French and to the Indian nations."* The security desirable in America may be considered as of three kinds. 1. A security of possession, that the French shall not drive us out of the country. 2. A security of our planters from the inroads of savages, and the murders committed by them. 3. A security that the British nation shall not be obliged, on every new war, to repeat the immense expense occasioned by this, to defend its possessions in America.

Forts in the most important passes may, I acknowledge, be of use to obtain the first kind of security; but, as those situations are far advanced beyond the inhabitants, the expense of maintaining and supplying the garrisons will be very great, even in time of full peace, and immense on every interruption of it; as it is easy for skulking parties of the enemy, in such long roads through the woods, to intercept and cut off our convoys, unless guarded continually by great bodies. of men.

* Remarks, p. 25.

The second kind of security will not be obtained by such forts, unless they were connected by a wall like that of China, from one end of our settlements to the other. If the Indians, when at war, marched like the Europeans, with great armies, heavy cannon, baggage, and carriages; the passes through which alone such armies could penetrate our country, or receive their supplies, being secured, all might be sufficiently secure. But the case is widely different; they go to war, as they call it, in small parties; from fifty men down to five. Their hunting life has made them acquainted with the whole country, and scarce any part of it is impracticable to such a party. They can travel through the woods even by night, and know how to conceal their tracks. They pass easily between your forts undiscovered; and privately approach the settlements of your frontier inhabitants. They need no convoys of provisions to follow them; for whether they are shifting from place to place in the woods, or lying in wait for an opportunity to strike a blow, every thicket and every stream furnishes so small a number with sufficient subsistence. When they have surprised separately, and murdered and scalped a dozen families, they are gone with inconceivable expedition through unknown ways; and it is very rare that pursuers have any chance of coming up with them.* In short, long

* "Although the Indians live scattered, as a hunter's life requires, they may be collected together from almost any distance; as they can find their subsistence from their gun in their travelling. But, let the number of the Indians be what it will, they are not formidable merely on account of their numbers; there are many other circumstances that give them a great advantage over the English. The English inhabitants, though numerous, are extended over a large tract of land, five hundred leagues in length on the sea shore; and, although some of their trading towns are thick settled, their settlements in the country towns must be at a distance from each other; besides that in a new country, where lands are cheap, people are fond of acquiring large tracts to themselves; and

experience has taught our planters, that they cannot rely upon forts as a security against Indians; the inhabitants of Hackney might as well rely upon the tower of London, to secure them against highwaymen and housebreakers.

As to the third kind of security, that we shall not, in a few years, have all we have done to do over again in America, and be obliged to employ the same number of troops and ships, at the same immense expense, to defend our possessions there, while we are in proportion

therefore, in the out settlements, they must be more remote; and, as the people that move out are generally poor, they sit down either where they can easiest procure land, or soonest raise a subsistence. Add to this, that the English have fixed, settled habitations, the easiest and shortest passage to which the Indians, by constantly hunting in the woods, are perfectly well acquainted with; whereas the English know little or nothing of the Indian country, or of the passages through the woods that lead to it. The Indian way of making war is by sudden attack upon exposed places; and as soon as they have done mischief they retire, and either go home by the same or some different route, as they think safest, or go to some other place at a distance, to renew their stroke. If a sufficient party should happily be ready to pursue them, it is a great chance, whether in a country consisting of woods and swamps, which the English are not acquainted with, the enemy do not lie in ambush for them in some convenient place, and from thence destroy them. If this should not be the case, but the English should pursue them, as soon as they have gained the rivers, by means of their canoes (to the use of which they are brought up from their infancy) they presently get out of their reach. Further, if a body of men were to march into their country, to the place where they are settled, they can, upon the least notice, without great disadvantage, quit their present habitations, and betake themselves to new ones."-CLARKE'S Observations, p. 13.

"It has been already remarked, that the tribes of the Indians, living upon the lakes and rivers that run upon the back of the English settlements in North America, are very numerous, and can furnish a great number of fighting men, all perfectly well acquainted with the use of arms as soon as capable of carrying them, as they get the whole of their subsistence from hunting; and that this army, large as it may be, can be maintained by the French without any expense. From their numbers, their situation, and the rivers that run into the English settlements, it is easy to conceive, that they can at any time make an attack upon, and constantly annoy, as many of the exposed English settlements as they

weakened here; such forts, I think, cannot prevent this. During a peace, it is not to be doubted the French, who are adroit at fortifying, will likewise erect forts in the most advantageous places of the country we leave them; which will make it more difficult than ever to be reduced in case of another war. We know, by experience of this war, how extremely difficult it is to march an army through the American woods, with its necessary cannon and stores, sufficient to reduce a very slight fort. The accounts at the treasury will tell you what amazing sums we have necessarily spent in the expeditions against two very trifling forts, Duquesne and Crown Point. While the French retain their influence over the Indians, they can easily keep our longextended frontier in continual alarm, by a very few of those people; and, with a small number of regulars and militia, in such a country, we find they can keep an army of ours in full employ for several years. We therefore shall not need to be told by our colonies, that, if we leave Canada, however circumscribed, to the French, "we have done nothing ";* we shall soon be made sensible ourselves of this truth, and to our cost.

please, and those at any distance from each other. The effects of such incursions have been too severely felt by many of the British colonies, not to be very well known. The entire breaking up places, that had been for a considerable time settled at a great expense both of labor and money; burning the houses, destroying the flock, killing and making prisoners great numbers of the inhabitants, with all the cruel usage they meet with in their captivity, is only a part of the scene. All other places, that are exposed, are kept in continual terror; the lands lie waste and uncultivated, from the danger that attends those that shall presume to work upon them; besides the immense charge the governments must be at in a very uneffectual manner to defend their extended frontiers; and all this from the influence the French have had over, but comparatively, a few of the Indians. To the same or greater evils still will every one of the colonies be exposed, whenever the same influence shall be extended to the whole body of them."— Ibid. p. 20.

* Remarks, p. 26.