The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent ModelPrinceton University Press, 27.12.2009 - 440 Seiten Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. |
Inhalt
1 | |
7 | |
2 The Rent ExtractionEfficiency TradeOff | 28 |
3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection | 82 |
The Basic TradeOffs | 145 |
5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard | 187 |
6 Nonverifiability | 240 |
7 Mixed Models | 265 |
8 Dynamics under Full Commitment | 303 |
9 Limits and Extensions | 347 |
399 | |
Author Index | 413 |
417 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model Jean-Jacques Laffont,David Martimort Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2009 |
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-agent Model Jean-Jacques Laffont,David Martimort Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2002 |
The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model Jean-Jacques Laffont,David Martimort Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2002 |