A CHAPTER OF THE MEXICAN WAR

Many years have passed away since the principal events to which this chapter relates became matters of record. The witnesses to such of the facts as have found no place in formal history are either dead or almost forgotten. Even the manuscript which I am about to transcribe is yellow with age, and suggests, what the reader may, perhaps, approve—that it were well to "let the dead past bury its dead." Possibly this suggestion springs from the recollection that when these lines were first written, and submitted to criticism, the friendly critic, while recognizing their truthful accuracy, advised their suppression, as likely to provoke hostility, or possibly wound the sensibilities of friends or patrons. Yet the purpose to contribute one short chapter to the history of the past, though delayed, was not abandoned; and delay has given opportunity for revision, in the light of those events by which conflicting interests and rival policies have been finally determined. Again, while the chief personage to whom this paper refers was living, there might be apparent indelicacy in assuming to herald his claims to honor; and now that others have passed away, one should not be unmindful of the words "de mortuis nil nisi bonum." But, because justice to the wronged may seem to imply the reproach of others, should justice be withheld? Under such a rule, biography would be only another name for eulogy, and history impossible. What follows may not, perhaps, require further preface or apology. Whatever of interest it may possess is due to the writer's accidental knowledge of the motives and restraints of the chief actors in the historical drama of the Mexican war. It is but a reproduction of what was fully written out some twenty years ago from the notes and memoranda of an A. D. C.

It was my fortune, in early life, to become acquainted with General Scott. In the winter of 1846-7, I joined him at Brazos Santiago, and, for a time, made one of his military family. Much of his correspondence passed under my eyes; and what I write became known to me as the copyist of his letters, and the witness of whatever else is here recorded, beyond what has before been published.

I am not professing to write the history of our war with Mexico, nor to discuss the merits of its cause; but reference to both is necessary to the induction of matters pertaining to my subject.

About the year 1820, sundry adventurers, for the most part Americans,

changed their nationality to colonize the Mexican Territory of Texas. The Mexican government had desired the settlement of Texas as a safeguard against the incursions of hostile Indians, and the possible encroachments of her more powerful neighbors. To that end she had made liberal grants of land to American colonists professing the Catholic religion, as that was the only religion of both State and people; in fact, a condition of Mexican citizenship. Yet few of the American colonists, under these grants, were even nominal Catholics, unless the occupation of lands, under the conditions imposed, be accepted as their confession of faith. Remote from the central government of the country, and alien to its traditions, there was little, besides considerations of self-interest, to bind the colony of Texas to the States of Mexico.

It is well known that from the year 1820, when she revolted against Spain, down to a very recent period, the condition of Mexico was that of chronic revolution. Extraordinary exactions by successive revolutionary leaders became necessary for their success and support, but oppressive to the people compelled to endure them. From these and kindred causes the Texan colonists were led to declare their independence; and, aided by recruits unlawfully enlisted in the United States, they were able to confirm their declaration by force of arms. How far they were justified by the oppressive wrongs of their Mexican rulers is not here discussed. I only advert to the facts of their revolution, their recognition as an independent nation by the principal maritime powers of the world, and their subsequent annexation, by formal treaty, to the United States.

Texas claimed the Rio Grande as its western boundary; while Mexico declared that her territory extended eastward to the River Nueces, and attempted to enforce her sovereignty over the vast territory between these rivers. To repel a threatened invasion of this territory, the United States had, during the winter of 1845-6, assembled a considerable body of troops at Corpus Christi on the Texan coast. Early in the following spring, this force advanced to the Brazos Santiago, and established an intrenched camp at Point Isabel. Actual war began with the battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma, on the 8th and 9th of May, 1846. The close of that year found the American forces, under General Taylor, in possession of the Brazos and the line of the Rio Grande to Monterey and Saltillo. But, as far as conquering a peace was concerned, the battles, won with much credit to the bravery of the General and his little army, might as well have been fought upon the islands of the sea.

The Chief of the War Department, in all but the name, the head of the administration, became restive under fruitless victories. The éclat of

Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, served to silence opposition while the shouts of victory lasted; but, barren of results, could scarce survive their echo. Something more than victories must be gained to save the party from disgrace. Their ablest statesman was alive to this necessity, and his measures proved his shrewdness equal to its exigence. How they were taken, is what we have to tell.

Some years after the Mexican war ended, and its recriminations had become dead issues-long after the conquered peace was found to consist of California, New Mexico, and Democratic succession in the Presidency-I chanced to meet this astute statesman, in Florida, under circumstances of unrestraint. Knowing my quondam relations to General Scott, he seemed more than willing to discuss the recent war and its events. Since then, I have sometimes witnessed what soldiers call making history; but how the history-makers were managed from behind the scenes I might sometimes guess, but never had been told. After the lapse of years I will not pretend to recall precise words and phrases, though they seem stereotyped in memory; but my memoranda are so complete that I hazard no claim to accuracy in their reproduction. What may have been the motive for the revelation, beyond the pleasure which old soldiers take "to fight their battles o'er again," I now, as then, but guess.

"Scott," said he, "thought I opposed his going to command the army in Mexico; but, in fact, I sent him there. It required some management; but I was satisfied that while General Taylor was brave enough, and had been successful in fighting the Mexicans, he was not equal to directing the more extended operations which the war demanded. I told the President that some one of more ability must be sent to conduct the war in Mexico, or his administration would be disgraced. In short, that Scott must take command of the army in the field. The President opposed me: it would never do; it would end in making him President!' I replied that failure in prosecuting the war would ruin the administration and the party; for the country would be sure to ascribe our discomfiture to jealously of the General-in-Chief. If anything could make him President, that would unquestionably do it. But then, Benton would disapprove; and if he opposed us in the Senate we were almost powerless! No, it would never do.' After much discussion, the President yielded-but very reluctantly -and subject to the assent of Colonel Benton. On suggesting the matter to Benton, it was again met by the same objection-'it would destroy the party, and raise Scott to the Presidency.' 'Well,' said I, 'we have no other resource. We cannot set him aside for a younger man. Public opinion would condemn the injustice. But I think we need not have much

fear of the result which you apprehend. Let him go to Mexico and get affairs in train, and before the war is ended we can easily take the wind out of his sails-he is sure to give us the opportunity. We might send out a lieutenant-general to supersede him. You are a military man-how would you like to go yourself?' 'Oh,' he had no ambition in that direction.' But the bait was taken."

As the Secretary paused, I ventured to ask if he had not intended to make Colonel Benton a lieutenant-general.

To this he answered, "No!"

"But," I rejoined, " a bill to create the grade of lieutenant-general was introduced in Congress, and, as was supposed, with the purpose of appointing Colonel Benton."

"Oh, yes," said he, "we had to introduce the bill-but I took good care that it should never get through Congress!" How far this care would have been effective, unaided by the earnest protest of others, it is now impossible to know. The essential change in the provisions of the bill, before its passage, enabled the Administration to offer Colonel Benton only the rank of major-general, which would have placed him in subordination to General Scott. It was therefore declined, and the demolition of the political aspirations of the Commanding General was left to the chapter of subsequent

events.

Between Scott and Benton, though of opposite parties, the political manager could find little ground of choice. Both, as partisans and politicians, were alike impracticable. In fact, the passage of the bill as first proposed would have been almost as great an embarrassment as the war itself. But the Secretary was an expert in the game of politics. He neither exaggerated nor ignored the powers of other men; but, knowing how to utilize them, he made their force his own. It was a happy conception to gain credit with the people, by increasing their territory-extending the area of freedom-and redressing the national wrongs, while getting rid of troublesome aspirants to popular favor. So Colonel Benton strengthened the administration in the Senate, awaiting what never came; and General Scott was ordered to assume command of the army in Mexico, to “ Conquer a peace."

The Commanding General reached the Brazos about the 1st of January, and awaited the arrival of troops and transports, ordnance and other material of war, which came so tardily as to provoke his impatience and distrust. He had started for the seat of war, in full assurance of prompt and vigorous support, only to find his measures thwarted by disappointments and delay. To those cognizant of the correspondence between the General and the War

Department, the lack of mutual confidence became but too apparent. While one party chafed under imposed restraints, the other was worried by conflicting fears. Protracted and unsuccessful war would entail disgrace, while rapid and brilliant conquests might dangerously exalt their author in popular esteem. Hence, while censuring the inaction of generals in the field, Festina lente seemed to be the chosen motto of the War Department. The government at Washington, as well as some of the military commanders in the field, seemed to regard the war as waged in the interests of the reigning party. In war, justified by the pretense of vindicating the national honor and redressing public wrongs, the South might think to gain a wider field for negro slavery. Adventurers, both North and South-all to whom any change was gain-were fain to believe that through California and New Mexico lay that easy road to fortune which is ever the dream of indolence and unthrift. Then, war once declared, to fight the enemy was patriotism; and they who made the war must needs be patriots! The charms of conquest would strengthen their hold of power. To gain it, and ignore the conqueror, was, then, the problem to be solved. It was a game of War and Politics, in which the stakes were patronage and the Presidency. To this extent all parties saw alike; but where the game ended-when the stakes were won-was quite another question, which the able manager at Washington proposed and answered before a move was made.

The right or wrong of playing with the selfish aspirations of political friend or foe, to attain a necessary or rightful end, I leave for others to decide. That the able statesman believed the war was just-demanded by the bad faith and aggressive acts of Mexico-is hardly to be doubted. That finding himself embarrassed, in the administration of the War Department, by the jealousies of political opponents and the rivalries of friends, he gave opportunity to accusations of bad faith, is well known; but it always seemed that, while loyal to his political party, he foresaw, rather than devised, the means of thwarting the ulterior designs of both. Still, there was abundant evidence that the administration intended, from the commencement of the campaign, that General Scott should not bring the war to a close. Some persons in the confidence of the President and the War Department were under the impression that the better organization of the army in the field, and the capture of Vera Cruz, would terminate the service of the Commanding General in Mexico. The extraordinary delay of transports for troops, and of vessels bringing surf-boats for landing them, and of other vessels bringing the necessary material for the reduction of Vera Cruz, threatened, indeed, to make the capture of that city and its fortress the end of the campaign. Though troops destined for the expedition were assembled