presumed to know the law. Indeed, the Supreme Court has said that "the legislature is presumed to have had former statutes before it,' and to know fully their scope and purpose in passing a subsequent statute."'67

The courts will, however, endeavor to trace the history of the legislation on the subject and determine what has been the uniform and consistent purpose of the legislature, or it will attempt to discover how the General Assembly has altered or modified its policies with reference to the subject-matter involved from time to time.68 This aid of the courts, however, is not enough to warrant a draftsman in disregarding the municipal law of his own State in framing a proposed law.

With Reference to the Law of other Jurisdictions.— Not only will the courts consider the entire body of law in operation in their own State in construing a statute, but under some conditions they will consult the law of other jurisdictions. Indeed, it is well settled in Iowa that if the General Assembly adopts a statute from another State which has received judicial construction in that State, the courts will presume that the legislature knew and approved of such construction.69 This rule, however, is subject to the limitation that the construction and interpretation of a foreign jurisdiction must be consistent with the spirit and policy of the law of Iowa. In regard to this rule the Supreme Court has said:

The limitation that the construction by another state, of a statute of that state enacted here, will be followed only when consistent with the spirit and policy of our laws, is eminently proper. For otherwise we could not avail ourselves of the legislative wisdom of other states, without introducing along with it incongruous and inharmonious judicial construction.70

III

SPECIAL FEATURES OF INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION

In the preceding pages the general principles of statutory interpretation and construction have been briefly presented. There are, however, some special features of interpretation and construction which seem worthy of independent treatment. These special features do not involve any additional principles of interpretation and construction, but only show the application of general principles to particular acts or provisions.

INTERPRETATION OF PROVISOS, EXCEPTIONS, AND SAVING CLAUSES

According to the adjudicated cases in some jurisdictions a proviso usually introduces a condition or limitation upon the operation of a statute. Sometimes it makes special provision for cases excepted from the general scope of the enactment. An exception generally excepts persons, things, or cases from the operation of the law which would otherwise be included in it. Saving clauses, for the most part, exempt existing rights or causes of action which would otherwise be destroyed. Provisos are generally placed at the end of the section or act and are introduced by the word "provided". Exceptions are usually incorporated in the body of the act or section. They are frequently introduced by the word "except". Saving clauses are for the most part placed near the end of the act and are often introduced by such words as

"nothing in this act shall be held". Nevertheless, the character of one of these sections does not necessarily depend upon the word or words introducing it. Indeed, the courts sometimes find it difficult to ascertain whether a limitation clause is a proviso, an exception, or a saving clause. In many instances they make no distinction. This seems to be the situation in Iowa, where only a few decisions have been rendered by the Supreme Court.

The early cases laid down the rule that a "proviso" will always be construed by the courts as not enlarging, but rather as explaining, qualifying, and restraining the clause to which it refers.71 In the last important case decided upon this point - the case of Campbell v. Jackman Brothers which was decided in 1908 and involved the validity of the "Mulct Law"- the Supreme Court said in speaking without apparent distinction between these three types of exceptions:

The effect of any sweeping, general statutory provision which is followed by or coupled with an express exception naturally and necessarily depends upon the nature and extent of the exception, and, if this be of such character as to emasculate the principal clause or render any of its terms meaningless, the courts are nevertheless required to give effect to such exception, whatever they may think of the candor or want of candor which controlled the phraseology of the law. Shakespeare has said there is "much virtue in 'If,' and, had that great man lived to witness the course of prohibitory legislation in Iowa, he would doubtless accord equal potency to "except". The office of an exception in the statute is, generally speaking, to take or exclude from the operation of the statute certain things or subjects which would otherwise be included therein, and, where the exception is clearly expressed and is within the constitutional power of the Legislature, those who question its justice, wisdom or policy must seek the remedy at the hands of the Legislature itself. As already

stated the court is without power in the premises except to give effect to the statute as it stands.72

In Iowa then it appears that the same rule of interpretation and construction will be applied to all three of these forms of making exceptions, namely, that they are limiting or qualifying clauses or sections. If this is true many of the complications arising in some of the States will be avoided. (For further discussion of this complication see the writer's paper on the Methods of Statute Law-making in Iowa, pp. 201, 202; and for a discussion of the use of the proviso, saving clause, and exception in Iowa see Mr. Van der Zee's paper on the Form and Language of Statutes in Iowa in this volume, pp. 366–373.)

INTERPRETATION OF MANDATORY AND DIRECTORY STATUTES

AND PROVISIONS

The rules which the courts of Iowa will apply to directory or mandatory provisions do not differ from those which they will apply to acts in general, that is, there are no new principles involved in this connection: it is all a question of intention. So the legislator need only remember that the question as to whether a statute is to be construed as directory or mandatory does not depend upon the form of the statute, but upon the intention of the legislature to be determined from "a consideration of the entire act, its nature, its object, and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other",73

It is a general rule, however, that statutes directing the mode of procedure of a public officer as to time or method are directory. There are a large number of these statutory regulations guiding the conduct of public officers which do not curtail their power or right to act in

some other manner. This is especially true of requirements designed to secure order, system, and dispatch in proceedings, and by the disregard of which the rights of parties interested can not be affected. Provisions of this type will not usually be construed by the courts as being mandatory, unless accompanied by negative words which import that the acts are not to be done in any other manner or at any other time. If, however, the requirements were intended to protect the citizen and prevent a sacrifice of his property, and a disregard of these requirements might and generally would be injurious, such provisions are mandatory and not directory.74

In applying these rules, moreover, the court will sometimes go to the extreme of holding "may" to mean "shall" or "must". But such a construction will not be given if inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the text of the statute.75 (For a further discussion of mandatory and directory statutes see Mr. Van der Zee's paper on the Form and Language of Statutes in Iowa in this volume, pp. 379–381.)

LIBERAL AND STRICT INTERPRETATION

It is a well settled principle of the common law of interpretation and construction that acts in derogation of the Common Law itself will be strictly construed, but the Code of 1897 provides that "the rule of the common law, that statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed, has no application to this code. Its provisions and all proceedings under it shall be liberally construed with a view to promote its objects and assist the parties in obtaining justice.''76

In applying this section the Supreme Court has decided that the Common Law rule of interpretation and