I INTRODUCTION UNDER the American system of State government it is the function of the legislature to declare what the law shall be and for the courts to declare what it is. The lawmaking body determines what the law shall be at the time of enactment: the judiciary determines what the law is when application is made to some particular case. As the legislative department has developed a body of rules to govern its procedure in declaring what the law shall be, so the judicial department has developed a body of rules which govern its action in declaring what the law is namely, rules of interpretation and construction. (See the writer's paper on Methods of Statute Law-making in this volume, pp. 170, 171.) To be sure the legislature has to a limited extent prescribed rules for the interpretation and construction of its enactments; but these statutory regulations are for the most part simply codifications of the rules developed by the courts themselves and therefore add little to the body of fundamental principles employed by the judiciary in the application of statutes to particular cases. The primary reasons for the development of the rules of construction and interpretation are the deficiencies of human language. A statute expressed in the best possible language would still meet with some difficulties in its practical application- questions of meaning in some unforeseen cases would necessarily arise in its administration. No one can completely convey his ideas to an 28 433 other either by written or spoken language- some of the finer shades of meaning are lost in every attempt to communicate thought. Much of the criticism of modern legislation and legislative methods fails to take into account the difficult task set for a legislative assembly. The principal purpose of statute law-making is to adapt the political, economic, and social institutions of the State to the changing conditions of the time. In fulfilling this purpose the legislature finds difficulty not only in determining policies, but also in attempting to give actual expression to the legislative will after some action has been determined upon. The legislature is expected to maintain accuracy, precision, and consistency in the language of its enactments; but it is not easy to maintain standards when every measure is subject to alteration and modification in the course of its passage. The present-day system of enacting statutes seeks to bestow upon every measure during the period of its consideration all the creative brain-power available in the legislative halls. This encourages the presentation of opposing views and results in the conflict of ideas. Finally, the legislature is expected to incorporate the composite judgment of fifty or a hundred men into a statute which will be harmonious in its subject-matter and concise and coherent in its expression. The problem is a serious one. No country has ever completely solved it. Perhaps many of the defects in modern legislation and legislative methods are inherent in any system of law-making by a representative assembly. At least no one can question the statement that "much modern legislation is crude, hasty, unwise. Much of it proceeds from an imperfect conception of what is needed and what is practicable." Be this as it may, citizens, law-makers, and public officials are all working to eliminate as many of these defects as possible and to reduce to a minimum those which can not be eliminated altogether. One of the ways in which some of the defects in expression can be minimized is for draftsmen and legislators to take into consideration the general rules of construction and interpretation by which the courts are guided in applying their statutes to individual cases. A great deal has been written on the interpretation and construction of statutes; but much of this literature is not especially helpful to the draftsman or legislator in forming a general conception of the rules used by the courts in interpreting and construing statutes. Books and treatises like Beal's Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation, Maxwell's On the Interpretation of Statutes, Lewis's Sutherland Statutory Construction, and Black's Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of Laws although of great value to the courts and lawyers because they are primarily concerned with particular civil disputes, commercial transactions, the disposition of property and criminal cases - are, for the most part, too bulky and detailed in their treatment to give the lawmaker a general understanding of the principal rules of interpretation and construction. - This paper will attempt to present in a brief and general way some of the principal rules of interpretation and construction which, it is believed, ought to be known by draftsmen and which, it is hoped, will be of practical value to members of the General Assembly. A glance at the notes and references at the close of the paper will disclose the fact that this discussion is based almost exclusively upon the statutes and court decisions of the State of Iowa. |