mitted, in words that will describe it as a conclusion of law. The means need not be particularly set out.'

If an act in its natural characteristics and quality is unlawful, knowledge of its wrongful character is presumed, and no averment of such knowledge is required in the indictment. But it is otherwise when the act only becomes illegal or wrongful by the presence of accidental or fortuitous features not usually attendant upon the doing of the particular thing. Thus in State v. Carpenter, 54 Vt. 551, the respondent was presumed to know that it was unlawful for him to assault an individual. But when the act was enlarged to the offense of impeding an officer in the discharge of his duty, it took on a character so abnormal that knowledge of this artificial quality of his act by the respondent must be alleged in order to lay a basis for the charge of a guilty intent.*

Where a statute provides for the definition and punishment of a felonious conspiracy, and for an additional punishment for any overt act of a criminal nature, which is committed in pursuance of the conspiracy, the whole being one transaction, the description, in an indictment for the conspiracy of the crime as an entirety, is necessary and proper, although such description requires the setting out of the facts constituting the separate crime.'

The offense of conspiracy may be complete without the commission of the overt act which the conspirators agreed to commit.* But of course no civil action will lie for simply conspiring to do an unlawful act, as the act itself and resulting injury to plaintiff are the very grounds of action."

6

Unless the statute requires that the overt act should be charged if it has been committed, it is unnecessary to do so. But it must be so alleged if the statute requires it.'

'State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa, 143; Thomas v. People, 113 Ill. 531; State v. Noyes, 25 Vt. 415; State v. Bartlett, 30 Me. 132; State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386; Hazen v. Com. 23 Pa. 355; People v. Bush, 4 Hill, 133.

'State v. Stewart, 4 New Eng. Rep. 378, 59 Vt. 273.

8 United States v. Lancaster, 10 L. R. A. 317, 44 Fed. Rep. 885.

*Com. v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329; Com. v. Warren, 6 Mass. 74; State v. Noyes, 25 Vt. 415; State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa, 143; State v. Buchanan, 5 Harr. & J. 317.

Kimball v. Harman, 34 Md. 407; McHenry v. Sneer, 56 Iowa, 649.

"State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa, 143; Com. v. Wallace, 16 Gray, 222; Bowen v. Matheson, 14 Allen, 503.

'State v. Norton, 23 N. J. L. 33; State v. Noyes, 25 Vt. 415; Collins v. Com. 3 Serg. & R. 220; Com. v. Corlies, 8 Phila. 450.

It may, indeed, be alleged in aggravation of the offense and given in evidence to prove the conspiracy.' Though the offense of conspiracy, even when the overt act is committed, is complete before the commission of the overt act, in the sense that nothing more is necessary to complete the crime, yet the conspiracy must be deemed to continue until the overt act is committed; and it is a renewal of the conspiracy."

And in every case that can be adduced of conspiracy the offense depends upon the unlawful agreement and not on the act which follows it; the latter is but the evidence of the former. The offense is therefore complete when the confederacy is made.*

A conspiracy is a substantive offense and punishable at common law, though nothing be done in execution of it; and all the authorities agree that the conspiracy is the gist of the offense.*

Under a statute declaring it a "criminal conspiracy to unlawfully and maliciously obstruct and impede the business of corporations," the indictment need not set forth that the defendants did more than conspire to do the acts."

From all which it results that every conspiracy to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act for an illegal, fraudulent, malicious, or corrupt purpose, or for a purpose which has a tendency to prejudice the public in general, is at common law an indictable offense, though nothing be done in execution of it, and no matter by what means the conspiracy was intended to be effected, which means may be perfectly indifferent, and form no ingredient of the crime, and therefore need not be stated in the indictment."

'State v. Mayberry, 48 Me. 218.

2 Com. v. Corlies, Brewst. 575.

State v. Chapin, 17 Ark. 561; Com. v. White, 123 Mass. 430; Johns v. State, 19 Md. 421; State v. Hamilton, 13 Nev. 386.

4Rex v. Spragg, 2 Burr. 993; Rex v. Rispal, 3 Burr. 1321; State v. Buchanan, 5 Harr. & J. 317; Collins v. Com. 3 Serg. & R. 220; Com. v. Judd, 2 Mass. 337; Com. v. Tibbetts, 2 Mass. 538; Com. v. Warren, 6 Mass. 74; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 259; State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 360; State v. Rickey, 9 N. J. L. 364; Com. v. M'Kisson, 8 Serg. & R. 420.

"Book of Assises Ct. 44; The Poulterers Case (1611) 9 Rep. 55, Moore, 814; Rex v. Edwards (1725) 1 Strange, 707, 1 Sess. Cas. 836, 8 Mod. 320; Rer v. Eccles (1783) 1 Leach, C. C. 274; Rex v. De Berenger, 3 Maule & S. 68; Rex v. Gill (1818) 2 Barn. & Ald. 204.

Rex v. Journeyman Tailors, 8 Mod. 11.

"People v. Petheram, 7 West. Rep. 502, 64 Mich. 252.

*Rex v. Eccles (1783) 1 Leach, C. C. 274; Rex v. Gill (1818) 2 Barn. & Ald.

In punishing a conspiracy, not carried into execution, the law does not punish a mere unexecuted intention. It is the act of conspiring, not the mere intention to do this. Until the conspiracy is formed, it is mere individual intent and not punishable. But when it is formed, each individual intent has been united in one common purpose, and a new element of danger to social order has sprung into existence; an element whose essense is union, and which in turn is met by the united force of the civil and criminal law. The individual must rely on individual effort to protect himself from individual falsehood, fraud and malice, and when he fails he may resort to the civil law to redress his civil wrongs, but against concerted fraud, falsehood and malice the law interposes to avert the intended blow, and arrests the conspirators before the consummation of the proposed purpose. The act of conspiring is like that of unlawful assembling. The act of assembling to do an unlawful act is a crime, though no other act but the meeting together for such purpose is shown.

The intention of any number of men acting separately, so long as they do nothing, is not a crime of which the law will take cognizance; but when several men form the intent and come together, and agree to carry it into execution, the conspiracy as generally defined by statute is completely formed. The combination then becomes dangerous and subversive of the rights of others, and the law declares it a crime.' The least degree of consent or collusion between parties to an illegal transaction makes the act of one the act of the others.' But a mere presence on the occasion of the conspiracy is not sufficient to make one guilty. One must incite, procure, or encourage the act;' but if one join the conspiracy after it is formed, he becomes a co-conspirator, and the acts of others become his acts by adoption. But that two conspired to do an act so that a third person would commit a felony, does not sufficiently charge that the purpose of conspiring to do the act was to induce the third party to commit it."

'State v. Glidden, 3 New Eng. Rep. 849, 55 Conn. 46.

'State v. Anderson, 92 N. C. 732.

Evans v. People, 90 Ill. 384; People v. Stevens, 68 Cal. 113. 4 United States v. Johnson, 26 Fed. Rep. 682.

'Com. v. Barnes, 132 Mass. 242.

The consummated conspiracy should be so alleged when the facts will sustain the charge, and not the mere conspiracy to commit the offense.'

The charge of conspiracy cannot be aided by averment of acts done by one or more of the conspirators where the conspiracy itself is not sufficiently charged.'

But there need not be a detailed statement of the connection between the act alleged to be done and the conspiracy itself.” The charge that a conspiracy existed to obstruct justice by divers false pretenses and devices, is sufficient where it is followed by an allegation that defendants have prevented the trial of the cause.*

All are charged as principals in a statutory conspiracy unless otherwise charged as guilty in a less degree."

Where the counts in an indictment cover the same identical acts, the divers felonies charged, or misdemeanors and felonies may be joined, and where it appears that but one transaction forms the basis of the different counts, the intent is manifest that but one crime is charged.' While reference will not be tolerated from one count to another, but the offense must be fully stated in each; yet a verdict has been held to cure this defect."

If it is intended to charge several illegal acts, the facts as to each may be stated in separate counts." The indictment may charge the conspiracy as the substantive offense, or the conspiracy

'Reg. v. Boulton, 12 Cox, C. C. 87; State v. Clary, 64 Me. 369; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23 L. ed. 588; Reg. v. Selsby, 5 Cox, C. C. 495, note; United States v. Gardner, 42 Fed. Rep. 829.

2

United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199, 27 L. ed. 698; United States v. Watson, 17 Fed. Rep. 145.

United States v. Donau, 11 Blatchf. 168.

4Schwab v. Mabley, 47 Mich. 572. See also United States v. Gardner, 42 Fed. Rep. 829.

United States v. Bayer, 13 Nat. Bankr. Reg. 88, 400; Com. v. Gannett, 1 Allen, 7; Thornton v. State, 25 Ga. 303.

State v. Stewart, 4 New Eng. Rep. 378, 59 Vt. 273.

Leslie v. Com. 82 Ky. 250; State v. Glidden, 3 New Eng. Rep. 849, 55 Conn.

46.

State v. Norton, 23 N. J. L. 33.

'Reg. v. Aspinall, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 730.

10 State v. Kennedy, 63 Iowa, 197.

may be charged in counts which are joined with counts for the substantive crime.'

79. Evidence in Conspiracy.-Conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense, and cannot, either under common law or under statute, be committed by one alone; but the proof must show that two or more persons were engaged in the offense."

3

An action for a conspiracy will not therefore lie against a husband and wife alone, as they are in law one person. Although if a man and woman marry in the name of another for the purpose of raising a specious title to the estate of the person whose name is assumed, it is a conspiracy.*

As soon as the union of wills for the unlawful purpose is perfected, the offense under the usual statutory definition of the crime of conspiracy is complete. This joint assent of minds may be established by facts and circumstances, and by even slight evidence of collusion, or by circumstantial evidence. Evidence of a conspiracy between two persons to commit an assault upon another is not essential to the conviction of one who does not strike the blow, when he was present prepared to assist, and did in fact interfere by jumping upon the assailed person and seizing him, so that it required two men to pull him off.*

An agreement, to constitute a conspiracy, need not be expressed in words, but may be gathered from the conduct of the parties.

The agreement itself is an act in advancement of the intent of each.'

1Burk v. State, 2 Harr. & J. 426; State v. Gaffney, 1 Rice, L. 431; State v. Boise, 1 McMill. L. 190; State v. Montague, 2 McCord, L. 257; Harman v. Com. 12 Serg. & R. 69; State v. Coleman, 5 Port. (Ala.) 32.

24 Bl. Com. 137: Pollard v. Evans, 2 Show. 50; Evans v. People, 90 Ill. 384; State v. Christianbury, 44 N. C. 48; Com. v. Manson, 2 Ashm. 31; Com. v. Irwin, 8 Phila. 380.

United States v. Logan, 45 Fed. Rep. 872; Spies v. People, 10 West. Rep. 701, 122 Ill. 1; State v. Wolcott, 21 Conn. 281; Riehl v. Evansville Foundry Asso. 1 West. Rep. 885, 104 Ind. 70; Kelley v. People, 55 N. Y. 566; McDowell v. Rissell, 37 Pa. 164; Evans v. Matson, 56 Pa. 54; Crary v. Sprague, 12 Wend. 41; Archer v. State, 4 West. Rep. 726, 106 Ind. 426; Rex v. Cope, 1 Strange, 144; Rex v. Parsons, 1 W. Bl. 392.

'Mulcahy v. Reg. L. R. 3 H. L. 306, Ir. Q. B. 1 Ir. R. C. L. 13; United States v. Stevens, 44 Fed. Rep. 132.