that observing men cannot deny, but the remedy cannot be found in secret conspiracies nor in the boycott.'

Indeed the essential and criminal idea of "boycotting" is a confederation, generally secret, of many persons whose intent is to injure another by preventing any and all persons from doing business with him through fear of incurring the displeasure, persecution, and vengeance of the conspirators."

Trade conspiracy frequently contemplates boycotting as a means to the end sought, that is the coercion of the party conspired against. The word is not easily defined. It is frequently spoken of as passive, merely,-a let-alone policy, a withdrawal of all business relations, intercourse, and fellowship. If that is its only meaning, the individual withdrawal of patronage, it will be difficult to find anything in it criminal. We may gather some idea of its real meaning, however, by a reference to the circumstances under which the word originated. Those circumstances are thus narrated by Mr. Justin H. McCarthy, an Irish writer of learning and ability, who will be recognized as good authority. In his work entitled "England under Gladstone," he says: "The strike was supported by a form of action, or rather inaction, which soon became historical. Captain Boycott was an Englishman, an agent of Lord Earne, and a farmer of Lough Mask, in the wild and beautiful district of Connemara. In his capacity as agent he had served notices upon Lord Earne's tenants, and the tenants suddenly retaliated in the most unexpected way by, in the language of schools and society, sending Captain Boycott to Coventry in a very thorough manner. The population of the region for miles around resolved not to have anything to do with him, and, as far as they could prevent it, not to allow anyone else to have anything to do with him. His life appeared to be in danger; he had to claim police protection. His servants fled from him as servants flee from their masters in some plaguestricken Italian city. The awful sentence of excommunication could hardly have rendered him more helplessly alone for a time; no one would work for him; no one would supply him with food. 'State v. Stewart, 4 New Eng. Rep. 378, 59 Vt. 273.

2 Crump v. Com. 84 Va. 927; Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 476; Reg. v. Parnell, 14 Cox, C. C. 508; State v. Glidden, 3 New Eng. Rep. 849, 55 Coun. 46.

He and his wife had to work in their own fields themselves, in most unpleasant imitation of Theocritan shepherds and shepherdesses, and play out their grim eclogue in their deserted fields, with the shadows of the armed constabulary ever at their heels. The Orangemen of the north heard of Captain Boycott and his sufferings, and the way in which he was holding his ground, and they organized assistance and sent him down armed laborers from Ulster. To prevent civil war, the authorities had to send a force of soldiers and police to Lough Mask, and Captain Boycott's harvests were brought in, and his potatoes dug, by the armed Ulster laborers, guarded always by the little army.'

But whenever courts of law have made use of the term "boycotting," they have applied it to some phase of conspiracy; as a combination and agreement among defendants, owners of steamers, with intent to injure plaintiffs and prevent them from obtaining cargoes for their steamers between ports, agreeing to refuse, and refusing, to accept cargoes from shippers, except upon terms that shippers could not ship by plaintiff's steamers, and threatening to stop shipment of homeward cargoes altogether, which threats they carry into effect."

The agreement with keepers of particular boarding-houses not to ship sailors at the offices of certain notaries is a conspiracy, it is boycotting.'

To incite persons to prevent others from taking or occupying farms from which others have been evicted for nonpayment of rent is an offense at common law. A combination to prevent persons buying goods taken in execution is an offense at common law, and is a crime, if the means to carry out these incitements were those commonly known as boycotting.*

Every man has the right to employ his talents, industry, and capital as he pleases, free from the dictation of others; and if two or more persons combine to coerce his choice in this behalf, it is a criminal conspiracy, whether the means employed are actual violence or a species of intimidation that works upon the mind." 'State v. Glidden, 3 New Eng. Rep. 849, 55 Conn. 46. 'Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 15, Q. B. D. 476. Emanual's Case, 6 City Hall Rec. 33.

Reg. v. Parnell, 14 Cox, C. C. 508.

State v. Stewart, 4 New Eng. Rep. 378, 59 Vt. 273.

§ 78. Indictments for Conspiracy.-Generally the conspiracy is indictable as a common law offense, when such offenses are recognized as existing at common law.'

A conspiracy to commit an abortion is not a felony at common law."

In states where common law crimes are recognized, the legislation on the subject of conspiracy does not usually abolish the common law offense. The venue where any act in giving effect. to the conspiracy was performed by any member of the confederation, may be the place selected for bringing the indictment. against all the parties concerned in the conspiracy.*

In stating the object of a conspiracy in an indictment, the same certainty and strictness are not required as in the case of an indictment for the offense conspired to be committed.”

A general allegation that two or more person conspired to effect an object criminal in itself-as to commit a misdemeanor or felonyis sufficient, even although the indictment omit all charges of the particular means to be used, and the cases are now equally uniform in holding that if the agreement or combination be to do an act or to effect an object not criminal, by the use of unlawful means, a general charge of a conspiracy to effect the object is not sufficient, and the charge of such a conspiracy must be accompanied with a particular statement of the means by which the object of the conspiracy was to be effected, so that these means may appear to be criminal, or the indictment will be bad."

It is only necessary to set forth the specific means intended to be employed, when the act to be done is itself lawful, but the

'State v. Norton, 23 N. J. L. 33; Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; State v. Pulle, 12 Minn. 164.

Scott v. Eldridge (Mass.) 12 L. R. A. 379; Com. v. Demain, Brightly, 441; Reg. v. Banks, 12 Cox, C. C. 393; State v. Jackson (Tenn.) 12 L. R. A. 370, note.

State v. Norton, 23 N. J. L. 33.

4Com. v. Corlies, 3 Brewst. 575; Rex v. Ferguson, 2 Stark. 489.

United States v. Stevens, 44 Fed. Rep. 132. See also Com. v. Meserve, 154 Mass. 64; Moschell v. State (N. J.) June 4, 1891; United States v. Lancaster, 10 L. R. A. 317, 44 Fed. Rep. 885.

State v. Keach, 40 Vt. 113; State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa, 143; People v. Petheram, 7 West. Rep. 392, 64 Mich. 252; People v. Clark, 10 Mich. 310. State v. Stewart, 4 New Eng. Rep. 378, 59 Vt. 273.

combination is to do it in an unlawful manner.

The allegation

of the means intended to be used only then becomes important in order to show the criminal or unlawful purpose.'

When the act contemplated is unlawful in itself, the means intended to accomplish it need not be alleged.'

To wrongfully injure the person of another is at least a misdemeanor and conspiracy, for that purpose is sufficiently charged without means intended being stated.'

In charging a conspiracy to seduce a girl, it is not necessary to show the means intended to be used were unlawful or criminal.*

The court may direct that a bill of particulars be given, when the indictment is not sufficiently specific in its terms, but not to include the particular acts, nor the locality or date.

When the criminality of a conspiracy consists in an unlawful agreement of two or more persons to compass or promote some criminal or illegal purpose, that purpose must be fully and clearly stated in the indictment; and if the criminality of the offense which is intended to be charged, consists in the agreement to compass or promote some purpose not of itself criminal or unlawful, by the use of fraud, force, falsehood, or other criminal or unlawful means, such intended use of fraud, force, falsehood or other criminal or unlawful means must be set out in the indictment."

Lambert v. People, 9 Cow. 578, decided simply that the frame

'People v. Richards, 1 Mich. 216: State v. Crowley, 41 Wis. 271; People v. Barkelow, 37 Mich. 455; Com. v. Eastman, 1 Cush. 190; State v. Jones, 13 Iowa, 269; State v. Potter, 28 Iowa, 554; State v. Stewart, 4 New Eng. Rep. 378, 59 Vt. 273.

People v. Clark, 10 Mich. 310; State v. Bray, 107 N. C. 822; United_States v. Gardner, 42 Fed. Rep. 829; Sydserf v. Reg, 11 Q. B. 245; Reg. v. Heymann, L. R. 8 Q. B. 102; Latham v. Reg, 9 Cox, Cr. Cas. 516. But in Montana the means must be stated. Territory v. Carland, 6 Mont. 14. And in Texas the acquisition of the property, under an indictment for swindling must be alleged. Cannon v. State (Tex. App.) 15 S. W. 117. State v. Ormiston, 66 Iowa, 143.

4Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17.

Reg. v. Kenrick, 5 Q. B. 49; Reg. v. Brown, 8 Cox, C. C. 69; Reg. v. Rycroft, 6 Cox, C. C. 76; Reg. v. Hamilton, 7 Car. & P. 443; State v. Bartlett, 30 Me. 132; Com. v. McKisson, 8 Serg. & R. 420; State v. Buchanan, 5 Harr. & J. 317: People v. Richards, 1 Mich. 216; Com. v. Warren, 6 Mass. 72; Reg. v. Esdaile, 1 Fost. & F. 213.

*Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; 1 East, P. C. 461; 1 Stark. Crim. Pl. (2d ed.) 156; Op. Spencer Sen. 9, Co. 586; Cole v. People, 84 Ill. 216; Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17; People v. Petheram, 7 West. Rep. 392, 64 Mich. 252; Com. v. Shedd, 7 Cush. 515.

of the indictment was defective in not specifying the means by which the conspiracy was to be effected.'

When the means used are unlawful under the statute, and the purpose is unlawful at common law, the words of the statute may be used without setting forth their meaning, and it is unnecessary to state specifically the kind of threats, or methods of intimidation used.

Where the charge is that the defendants "unlawfully, fraudulently and deceitfully did conspire, combine, confederate and agree together to cheat and defraud" it is sufficient."

The doing of an overt act must be charged, though the particular act is not set out, nor actual injury alleged, and except when the conspiracy is to cheat a particular set of persons or the public generally, the names of the persons intended to be imposed upon must be stated if known.3

In Reg. v. Rowlands, 17 Q. B. 671, the indictment charged a conspiracy to force workmen to quit the employment of certain persons by the use of threats and intimidation. The Statute of 6 Geo. IV., chap. 129, § 3, forbids the use of such means, and the court said: "It is objected that some counts do not disclose the nature of the molestation or intimidation by which the conspiracy was to take effect, but it is quite unnecessary." The words of the Legislature are used."

The words used in the statute have a meaning stamped upon them by the Act itself, and it must be taken that they are used in the indictment in the same sense, and they are not employed as describing the substantive offense for which the indictment is preferred, as that offense consists in the conspiracy, when that is a common law offense. If the conspiracy is to commit an offensewhich is indictable it is sufficient to state the offense to be com

'State v. Norton, 23 N. J. L. 33.

2 Sydserf v. Reg. 11 Q. B. 245.

McKee v. State, 9 West. Rep. 838, 111 Ind. 378; Rex v. De Berenger, 8 Maule & S. 67; Wood v. State, 1 Cent. Rep. 441, 47 N. J. L. 461; Com. v. Fuller, 132 Mass. 563; Com. v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329; Com. v. Andrews, 132 Mass. 263; Miller v. State, 79 Ind. 198.

'See Com. v. Dyer, 128 Mass. 70; State v. Cook, 38 Vt. 437; State v. Stewart, 4 New Eng. Rep. 378, 59 Vt. 273; State v. Jones, 33 Vt. 443; Reg. v. Rowlands, 17 Q. B. 671.