A contract entered into by the grain dealers of a particular locality, the real purpose of which is to establish in active force a secret combination which would stifle all competition, control the price of grain, cost of storage and of shipment, is in restraint of trade and void as against public policy.'

Where one producer or holder of an article of public use enters into a contract with another producer or holder, binding the latter to hold and keep out of the market his supply, the contract is against public policy and void.

An agreement to form a pool for the purchase of a commodity in common use, involving the controlling and withdrawal from the market of large quantities, is an unlawful combination which would not be enforced between the parties."

Upon the same principle in Clary v. Com. 4 Pa. 210, an indictment which charged a conspiracy which had for its purpose the circulation of certain false and forged bills, with the intent to cheat and defraud "the citizens of this commonwealth and others," was held good. So also in Com. v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329, a conspiracy to manufacture spurious indigo, and sell the same at public auction with intent to cheat and defraud such persons as should become purchasers, was held sufficient. *

4

The conviction in Rex v. Gill, 2 Barn. & Ald. 204, was for a conspiracy to cheat several individuals by name. The indictment was not under Statute 30 George II., for the particular false pretences were not stated showing them to be within the statute, as required, or under Statute 33 Henry VIII., against cheating by false privy tokens, etc."

It was ruled that when several persons have once agreed to cheat a particular individual of his money, although they may not at the time have fixed upon any particular means for that purpose,

'Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 346.

2 Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co. 68 N. Y. 558.

Arnot v. Pittston & E. Coal Co. 68 N. Y. 558; Knowlton v. Congress & E.
Spring Co. 57 N. Y. 518; Bell v. Leggett, 7 N. Y. 176; Keene v. Kent, 4
N. Y. S. R. 431.

See also People v. Arnold, 46 Mich. 268; Collins v. Com. 3 Serg. & R. 220;
Reg. v. Peck, 9 Ad. & El. 686; McKee v. State, 9 West. Rep. 838, 111 Ind.
378.

Rex v. Mason, 2 T. R. 586; East, Crim. Law, 837.

6 3 Chitty, Cr. Law, 999; Rex v. Munz, 2 Str. 1127.

the offense of conspiracy is complete, and that it was sufficient to state the act of conspiring and the object of the conspiracy in the indictment, without setting out the means by which it was intended to be accomplished; which, as Lord Mansfield said, in Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach, C. C. 274, "may be perfectly indifferent." The indictment was not sustained on the ground that it was a conspiracy to commit an indictable offense; for if it had not been for a conspiracy to cheat, but against an individual for the actual commission of the offense it would have been bad for the generality of the allegation. Rex v. Mawbry, 6 T. R. 619, for a conspiracy to prevent the course of justice, shows that all indictable offenses are not embraced by the Statute 33 Edward I., but that at common law a conspiracy to do anything which the law forbids is indictable.

In Rex v. Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434, the conspiracy was to place a girl by her own consent, in the hands of Delaval, for the purpose of prostitution. The act of seduction was not in itself an indictable offense, but it was the end, the immoral purpose of the conspiracy which gave it a criminal character. The law holds as criminal all conspiracies against public virtue and good morals, although the act by an individual would not be thus punishable. The influence of many, united to overcome the virtue of a woman, is recognized as more dangerous than the seductive arts of one. So a conspiracy to induce a young female, by false pretenses, to have illicit connection with a man.'

And in a recent case in Illinois, although seduction was not made criminal by statute, the conspiracy to accomplish it was held to be so at common law, and it was held unnecessary to show that the means used were either unlawful or criminal.'

So a conspiracy to induce a girl of 17, not shown to be chaste, to become a common prostitute, was held indictable. Reg. v. Howell, 1864, 4 Fost. & F. 160, Bramwell, B., ruling that any unlawfulness in the state of things to be accomplished by the conspiracy was sufficient to give it a criminal character, and since agreements for prostitution or claims for goods supplied for purposes of prostitution are illegal in the sense that they cannot be enforced, 1 Reg. v. Mears, 1851, 2 Den. C. C. 79; State v. Savoy, 48 Iowa, 562. • Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17. See Anderson v. Com. 5 Rand. 627.

prostitution itself is a sufficiently illegal state of things to render indictable a combination to bring it about.

So a conspiracy to accomplish the abduction of a minor and to procure adultery, was indictable.'

2

So for the procurement of a fraudulent marriage ceremony. Or to aid female infant to escape parental control to marry her. So it is criminal to conspire to do any act offensive to public decency, as preventing burial of body of pauper and removing it from workhouse for any improper or indecent purpose."

In 1 Hawk, P. C. 190, chap. 72, it is said, "there can be no doubt that all combinations whatsoever, wrongfully to prejudice a third person are highly criminal at common law."

Chitty says: "In a word, all confederacies wrongfully to prejudice another are misdemeanors at common law, whether the intention is to injure his person, his property, or his character."*

And 4 Bl. Com. 157 (Christian's ed., note 4) "every confederacy to injure individuals, or to do acts which are unlawful, or prejudicial to the community, is a conspiracy.

In 1 Tremain's P. C. 82, 83, there is a precedent of information against Turner and others, for a conspiracy to destroy the reputation of one George Green, and falsely to charge him with adultery with the wife of one of the conspirators, for the purpose of extorting money from him. In 1 Tremaine P. C. 86, against Record and others for a cheat practiced on Lady Dorothea Seymour in prevailing on her by means of a falsehood to advance large sums of money to them. In the same book, p. 91, against Wilcox and others for cheating by conspiracy one John Dulton of a quantity of cloth, under pretense of buying them. In page 94 against Taydler and others for a cheat by conspiracy in drawing an absolute conveyance to themselves of the estates of two women, and persuading him to execute it, pretending it was only in trust for the women. In Tremaine, P. C. 97, against Alibone

1 1682, Rex v. Grey (Lord), 2 How. St. Tr. 519 (9 How. St. Tr. 127).

2 State v. Murphy, 6 Ala. 765; Respublica v. Hevica, 2 Yeates, 114.

Rex v. Thorp, 5 Mod. 221; Reg. v. Blacket, 7 Mod. 39; Rex v. Sergeant, Ryan & M. N. P. 352; Mifflin v. Com. 5 Watts & S. 461.

4 Young's Case, 1780, cited in 1788, King v. Lynn, 2 T. R. 733. $3 Wilson's Works, 118; 1 Burn's Jus. 378.

3 Chit. Crim. Law 1139.

and others for cheating by conspiracy one Hillard in obtaining divers bonds from him for the payment of money to themselves and others, as a consideration for procuring a marriage between him and an indigent woman, whom they represented as being rich.

In neither of these could an indictment have been sustained for the same injury practiced by an individual, without the charge of conspiracy or combination, and as Tremaine gives the term, the reigns and the names of the respective parties, there can be little doubt that they are precedents of informations in adjudicated cases, and that they were held to be good, and they go far to show how the common law was understood in England in the reigns of Charles and James II. And the law of conspiracy as settled by the uniform tenor of the decisions of the courts in England has, except as to combinations of workmen, been recognized and adopted as the common law generally in this country. Under that law any combination to prejudice another unlawfully has been considered as constituting the offense of conspiracy. It is enough if the acts agreed to be done, although not criminal, are wrongful; that is, amount to a civil wrong. The offense has been held to consist in the conspiracy, and not in the acts committed for carrying it into effect; and the charge has been held sufficient when made in general terms describing an unlawful conspiracy to effect a bad purpose.'

§ 65. Conspiracy Defined. It would be exceedingly difficult and dangerous to attempt an exclusive definition of an offense, so ramified in its nature and character, and which derives its crimin

1Reg. v. Warburton, L. R. 1 C. C. 274.

Reg. v. Kenrick, 5 Q B. 49, Denman, Ch. J.; Reg. v. Selsby, 5 Cox, C. C. 495, note, Rolfe, B.; Reg. v. Harris, 1 Car. & M. 661, Tindal, Ch. J.; Hilton v. Eckersley, 6 El. & Bl. 47, Compton, J.; Rex v. Mawbery, 6 T. R. 619, Grove, J.; Rex v. Eccles, 1 Leach, C. C. 274, Lord Mansfield; Walsby v. Anley, 3 El. & El. 516, Hill, J.; Reg. v. Rowlands, 17 Q. B. 670, Campbell, Ch. J.; Reg. v. Druitt, 10 Cox, C. C. 592, Bramwell, J.; Reg. v. Bunn, 12 Cox, C. C. 316, Brett, J.; Springhead S. Co. v. Riley, L. R. 6 Eq. 551, Malins, J.; Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 15 Q. B. Div. 476, Coleridge, Ch. J.; Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111, 128, Shaw, Ch. J.; Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17, Calm, J.; Com. v. Carlisle, Journal Jurisp. 225, Gibson, Ch. J.; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1, Chapman, Ch. J.; Rex v. Ferguson, 2 Stark, N. P. 489; Rex v. Bykerdike, 1 M. & Rob. 179; People v. Fisher, 14 Wend. 9; State v. Donaldson, 32 N. J. L. 151; Snow v. Wheeler, 113 Mass. 186: State v. Stewart, 59 Vt. 273; State v. Noyes, 25 Vt. 415; State v. Burnham, 15 N. H. 396; Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co. 68 Pa. 173.

ality from its object and tendency; but in general terms a criminal conspiracy may be defined, as a combination to work out in concert or by concerted means, any criminal end or certain unlawful purposes, or to accomplish under such combination, any purpose, by criminal or unlawful means. The word " unlawful" is used to indicate that there are certain acts, possessing such inherent qualities, that a union among many persons to accomplish them, or use them as means to any end, will necessarily produce such evil results, that to prevent such combinations, the law holds those uniting guilty of criminal conspiracy, although the doing of any of the acts by an individual would not be punished as a crime. The influence of an act upon society determines whether it is criminal conspiracy to combine to accomplish it, and not whether the act itself is criminally punishable.

I believe every well considered case which attempts a general definition, will support this statement. Of course, when the question is as to what particular acts possess these attributes, some difference will be found among the authorities, for it may depend upon the local law to determine whether the purpose to be accomplished by the combination, or the concerted means of accomplishing it be unlawful or criminal.'

The course of decisions running through a space of over four hundred years from the reign of Edward III. to the 59 of George III., without a single conflicting adjudication, and the decided weight of subsequent authorities in England and America has seemed to settle certain questions at common law. Thus, a con

'Com. v. Judd, 2 Mass. 339; State v. Cardoza, 11 S. C. 195; Com. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; State v. Hewett, 31 Me. 396; State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386; State v. Mayberry, 48 Me. 218; State v. Burnham, 15 N. H. 396; State v. Rowley, 12 Conn. 112; Owens v. State, 16 Lea, 1; United States v. Johnon, 26 Fed. Rep. 682; United States v. Wooten, 29 Fed. Rep. 707; Spies v. People, 10 West. Rep. 701, 122 Ill. 1; Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 24; Com. v. Tibbetts, 2 Mass. 538; Com. v. Warren, 6 Mass. 74; People v. Mather, 4 Wend. 259; State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. (Ala.) 360; State v. Rickey, 9 N. J. L. 364; State v. Buchanan, 5 Harr. & J. 317; Collins v. Com. 3 Serg. & R. 220; Morgan v. Bliss, 2 Mass. 112; People v. Richards, 1 Mich. 216; Reg. v. Button, 11 Q. B. 929; Rex v. Gill, Barn. & Ald. 204; Reg. v. Best, 1 Salk. 174; United States v. Miller, 3 Hughes, 553; United States v. Donau, 11 Blatchf. 168; State v. Adams, 1 Houst. C. C. 361; State v. Bradley, 48 Conn. 549; State v. Jones, 13 Iowa, 269; State v. Sterling, 34 Iowa, 444; Com. v. Davis, 9 Mass. 415; Com. v. Wallace, 16 Gray, 223; State v. Pulle, 12 Minn. 164; State v. Christianbury. 44 N. C. 48: Com. v. McKissom, 8 Serg. & R. 420; Com. v. Corlies, 8 Phila. 450; Twitchell v. Com. 9 Pa. 211; People v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 124; State v. Potter, 28 Iowa, 554.