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the authority of some European monarch, and for about two centuries was governed by the laws, and disposed of by the will of the mother country. They were mere dependent colonies, having no rights except by the gift of their sovereigns, and, indeed, were held to be owned as the rightful property of those sovereigns, and liable as property to be assigned by one to another, or captured in war from one by another, at will, like any other absolute possession. They were simple appendages of the political system of Europe, liable at any time, without any will or agency of their own, to be involved in the calamities and responsibilities of war, for objects in which they had no interest, and then to have the war ended by treaty in which their welfare received no consideration. Without having any voice in the matter, they could be transferred to new masters, or used in any other way as mere counters in the settlement of dynastic quarrels, or make-weights in the re-adjustment of the European “Bal-* ance of Power.”

The Declaration of Independence was the first breath of independent national life on this continent. The United States assumed at once the rark and the responsibilities of a real nation among nations, having the right to govern itself, to make war and peace, and to determine its own policy in relation to other nations, according to its own judgment of its own interests and duties. This new nation was not in Europe, was not subject to the liabilities of the European governments, not interested in the rise and fall of European dyrasties, not concerned for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, not subject to the calculations and complications of European statesmanship. It was a new sensation, an unsolved problem, to meet face to face an American nation, civilized, Christian, responsible, and respectable, demanding a place among the family of nations, as one of them, and yet separate and aloof from all the machinations of diplomacy, and unconcerned in any of the anxieties of state-craft. No wonder that kings and court were at a loss and uneasy with such an anomaly. From that day no art or effort has been left untried. to bring the United States into their circle, as a new subject for their tricks and maneuvers.

The philosophical student of history, who looks deeply into

the springs and currents of national sympathy and antipathy, will be struck with admiration at the completeness of our separation from European politics, so that no friendships ensnared us, no professions seduced us, no fears intimidated us, to swerve from our isolated position. From a century of dependence, we rose by a leap to independence. We had a war with France and a war with England, to prove that we were independent, and to show that we dared and were able to assert and enjoy our rights, as an independent power, unconnected with the political fortunes of European nations. And we began to be understood in Europe. The result was well stated by Mr. Richard Rush, who was our Minister to England from 1817 to 1825. In the second series of his "Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London," he says:

"Let me here give brief expression to a feeling I often had during my mission; one which is common, I suppose, to every minister of the United States abroad. It is, his feeling of entire independence of the combinations and movements going on among other powers. Properly improved, this makes his personal situation agreeable, as well with the court where he may be residing, as with the entire diplomatic corps. For his country, he has only to be just and fear not. The smaller Powers cannot have this calm assurance; and the representatives of the Great Powers naturally respect the office of American Minister, from a knowledge of the resources and growing power of the nation that sends him; and also (some of them) from dreaming of contingencies which may make the friendship of the United States desirable, though their maxim be, ‘Peace and commerce with all nations, entangling alliance with none.' One of the members of the corps who witnessed the salutations passing between Lord Castlereagh and myself, said to me a few minutes afterwards, 'How happy you must feel in these times when none of us know what is to happen in Europe!—you belong to us (meaning the corps), yet you are independent.'" pp. 357-8.

Such was the practical estimate formed by diplomatists of the actual situation of the United States among the nations of Europe, as observed by one of the most calm and cautious of our statesmen, with ample experience. We were among them, but not of them; concerned in all that concerned them, on the ground of common humanity and equal civilization; liable to be affected in our interests by all their movements, which we were therefore obliged to comprehend and to watch; but not forming a part of their "system," to be dictated to by their will, to be assigned our place by their arbitrament, or to be disposed of in accordance with their varying interests or arbitrary caprices. We can ap

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preciate the air of satisfaction, not to say pride, with which this experience was recorded and published. It was gratifying to the highest feelings of patriotism. To realize the importance of the facts thus elicited, it is necessary to consider briefly the nature of the European Political System, of which our able representative was so glad that we were not a member.

The Political System of Europe, as it existed at the time of Mr. Rush's residence in England, was the result of the political history of Europe for three centuries, beginning with the reign of Charles the Fifth, and ending with the Congress of Vienna. It was the product of its wars, treaties, dynastic changes, and advancing intelligence and civilization. In all these changes, one dominant idea has been kept always in view by European statesmen, as more important than any family interests or any changes of dynasty or form of government. This paramount object of regard, this central point of guidance, this first meridian of all political reckonings, is oftenest designated by the name of the Balance of Power." Personal ambitions and family interests, war and peace, have been made subordinate to this. The most elaborate treatises on public affairs have had for their object the elucidation of this subject, in its various bearings and consequences. To understand this subject, in its infinite complications and implications, and to be able to steer among them all a successful course of administration of affairs, made a man a statesman. Of this whole complex system of relations, obligations, and liabilities, the Balance of Power was so much the central principle, that the phrase is customarily used by writers to denote the whole Political System, including all other elements as subordinate.

Vattel's definition of a Balance of Power-" Such a disposition of things as that no one potentate or state shall be able absolutely to predominate and prescribe to others"-expresses rather the ostensible and praiseworthy object which ought to be aimed at, than the secret motives by which governments are commonly actuated, or the results actually attained by this great political system. The circle of nations who recognize this system are supposed to maintain an understanding among themselves, that no one among them can interfere with the essential rights of an

other among them, without exposing itself to the censure of the rest, and then to the danger of a counter interference and coalition for the redress of the wrong. Also, that no one nation ought to acquire such surpassing power as to be able to defy this censure, or to domineer at pleasure over any or all of the rest. The coalitions to curb the grasping ambition of Charles the Fifth, of Louis the Fourteenth, and of Napoleon Bonaparte, are instances of gigantic struggle and vast combination of strength for the preservation of the Balance of Power. The occasions, methods, and limitations, of this system have become a complex science, taxing the powers of the profoundest scholars. Its application to the ever varying exigencies created by the ambition of kings, the profligacy of their ministers, and the constantly shifting conditions of nations, has taxed to the utmost the sagacity of the wisest statesmen. It is a problem in history, which we shall not now attempt to solve, whether this theory of the Balance of Power, or the entire Political System of which it commonly stands as the exponent, has been a blessing to mankind or a curse; whether it has prevented more wars than it has caused, or has mitigated rather than aggravated the severities of war; whether it has improved or injured the cause of liberty, and advanced or retarded the progress of civilization. There are not wanting able and weighty opinions on either side of the question.

After the overthrow of Napoleon, the Congress of Vienna assumed the restoration of this great political system, and placed its control and conservation under the care of the Five Great Powers, as they were termed-Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, as a sort of Executive Committee, whose united determinations were to bind all the rest. The British Government, indeed, on technical grounds and for domestic reasons, declined to become in form a party to the so-called Holy Alliance. But it participated fully in all the negotiations, and approved all the arrangements then made, and has at all times maintained and relied upon the adjustments then agreed upon. Its recent letter of remonstrance on behalf of Poland, is based upon the obligations of the treaty of Vienna. The practical administration of the machinery so artistically arranged at Vienna, it must be confessed, has partaken quite largely of the ordinary

irregularities of human institutions. A man setting himself down to study that arrangement and anticipate its results in forty years' operation, would hardly bring out the actual state of things now existing in Europe. How it works in practice, we may learn, at least in part, from an eminent living writer, whose work is just now exciting great attention in the highest circles of Europe.

Mr. Kinglake devotes the second chapter of his History of the Crimean Campaign to a delineation of the Public Law, of Europe, which he terms the Supreme Usage, and which he treats from the English point of view, in a very original as well as very English manner. The opening paragraphs are as follows:

"The Supreme Law or Usage which forms the safeguard of Europe is not in a state so perfect and symmetrical that the elucidation of it'will bring any ease or comfort to a mind accustomed to crave for well-defined rules of conduct. It is a rough and wild-grown system, and its observance can only be enforced by opinion, and by the belief that it truly coincides with the interests of every power which is called upon to obey it; but practically, it has been made to achieve a fair portion of that security which sanguine men might hope to see resulting from the adoption of an international code. Perhaps under a system ideally formed for the safety of nations and for the peace of the world, a wrong done to one state would be instantly treated as a wrong done to all. But in the actual state of the world there is no such bond between nations. It is true that the law of nations does not stint the right of executing justice, and that any Power may either remonstrate against a wrong done to another state, great or small, or may endeavor, if so it chooses, to prevent or redress the wrong by force of arms; but the duties of states in this respect are very far from being co-extensive with their rights.

"In Europe, all states except the Five Great Powers are exempt from the duty of watching over the general safety; and even a state which is one of the five great Powers is not practically under an obligation to sustain the cause of justice unless its perception of the wrong is re-enforced by a sense of its own interests. Moreover, no state, unless it be combating for its very life, can be expected to engage in a war without a fair prospect of success. But when the three circumstances are present-when a wrong is being done against any state, great or small, when that wrong in its present or ulterior consequences happens to be injurious to one of the five great Powers, and finally, when the great Power so injured is competent to wage war with fair hopes, then Europe is accustomed to expect that the great Power which is sustaining the hurt will be enlivened by the smart of the wound, and for its own sake, as well as for the public weal, will be ready to come forward in arms, or to labor for the formation of such leagues as may be needed for upholding the cause of justice. If a power fails in this duty to itself and to Europe, it gradually becomes lowered in the opinion of mankind, and happily there is no historic lesson more true than that which teaches all rulers

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