Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 263 U.S. CUDAHY PACKING COMPANY OF NEBRASKA v. PARRAMORE, AS WIDOW AND GUARDIAN, ETC., ET AL. ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH. No. 107. Argued November 14, 1923.-Decided December 10, 1923. 1. Agreeably to the principles sustaining state workmen's compensation laws as consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment, an employer may be required to compensate his employee for an injury of which his employment is a substantially contributory cause, though not the sole or proximate one. P. 422. 2. Whether an accident is so related to the employment that exaction of compensation may escape condemnation as clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, must depend upon the particular circumstances of the case. P. 424. 3. An employee, going to work at his employer's factory by the customary and only practicable way, was killed by a locomotive while crossing, on a public road, a railroad adjacent to the plant, a few minutes before the time when his day's service as a stationary engineer was to begin. Held, that imposition of liability on the employer for the benefit of the workman's dependents by a state compensation law, was constitutional. P. 426. 60 Utah, 161, affirmed. ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Utah affirming an award of workmen's compensation by the Utah Industrial Commission, Mr. George T. Buckingham, with whom Mr. Thomas Creigh, Mr. R. B. Webster and Mr. Stephen E. Hurley were on the brief, for plaintiff in error. There was no employment of deceased by plaintiff in error at the time of the accident. Death did not result from an industrial accident. In re McNicol, 215 Mass. 497; 28 R. C. L. pp. 804, 805; Bamberger Electric Ry. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 59 Utah, 257; Kowalck v. New York Consol. Ry. Co., 229 N. Y. 489; Re De Voe, 218 N. Y. 318; Tallon v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 232 N. Y. 410; 418 Argument for Plaintiff in Error. Clapp's Parking Station v. Industrial Accident Comm., 51 Cal. App. 624; Orsinie v. Torrance, 96 Conn. 352. The question to be determined is whether or not the statute as construed and applied is valid. DahnkeWalker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282; Merchants' National Bank v. Richmond, 256 U. S. 635. The contention that there is no evidence to support the action of the state court raises a purely legal question. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312; Merchants' National Bank v. Richmond, supra; Jones National Bank v. Yates, 240 U. S. 541. A finding upon undisputed facts is a finding of law, even though it may be styled a finding of fact. Bates & Rogers Co. v. Allen, 183 Ky. 815; Hochspeier v. Industrial Board, 278 Ill. 523; Glatzl v. Stumpp, 220 N. Y. 71; In re Fisher, 220 Mass. 581. A finding without evidence (as in this case) is beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission. It comes" under the Constitution's condemnation of all arbitrary exercise of power." Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88; Bamberger Electric Ry. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 59 Utah, 257; Clapp's Parking Station v. Industrial Accident Comm., 51 Cal. App. 624. In determining the legal effect of facts in evidence as a deprivation of plaintiff in error's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, "This Court must analyze the facts as averred and draw its own inferences as to their ultimate effect and is not bound by the conclusions of the State Supreme Court in this regard." Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312. Since the Commission was without jurisdiction, its award deprived plaintiff in error of its property without due process of law. Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227 U. S. 88. The restraints of the Fourteenth Amendment bind equally judges, legislatures, executive officers. Myles Salt Argument for Plaintiff in Error. 263 U.S. Co. v. Iberia Drainage District, 239 U. S. 478; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339; Schofield, Const. Law and Equity (1921) pp. 5, 9, 21. A judgment of a state court which deprives a person of property without due process amounts to a denial of a right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment "even if it be authorized by statute." Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage District, 239 U. S. 478; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34; Schofield, Const. Law and Equity, (1921), pp. 5-37. Irrespective of the validity of the statute, the action of the Utah court was arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, and contrary to law, and therefore it violates the Fourteenth Amendment. Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage District, 239 U. S. 478; Chicago, B. & Q. R. R. Co. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34; Prudential Insurance Co. v. Cheek, 259 U. S. 530; Schofield, Const. Law and Equity (1921), pp. 5-37; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78; Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339. This Court has uniformly upheld the constitutionality of Workmen's Compensation Acts, but solely on the principle that death or injury must be a part of the hazard of the industry. The Utah act as construed and applied extends far beyond this principle. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400; Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U. S. 152; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219; Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210; New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188. Mr. J. Robert Robinson, Assistant Attorney General of the State of Utah, with whom Mr. Harvey H. Cluff, Attorney General, Mr. William A. Hilton, Assistant Attorney 418 Opinion of the Court. General, and Mr. Frederick C. Loofbourow were on the brief, for defendants in error. MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court. This case arises under the provisions of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act, which provides for the payment of compensation for personal injury or death of an employee by accident "arising out of or in the course of his employment." Compiled Laws, Utah, 1917, § 3113, and amendment, Laws, Utah, 1919, c. 63. The Cudahy Packing Company, on August 9, 1921, and prior thereto, owned and operated a meat packing plant at a point about six miles north of Salt Lake City. Its employees generally resided in that city and in villages located north and south of the plant, only a few living in the immediate vicinity thereof. In going to and from the plant the workmen proceeded along a main highway running north and south and passing the plant at a distance of about half a mile to the east. From this point a public road runs west to and beyond the plant, crossed, before reaching the plant, by three lines of railroad, one of which, the Rio Grande Western, lies immediately adjacent to, and from which switches lead directly into, the plant. The only practicable way of ingress and egress for employees was along this road and across these railroad tracks, and that was the way customarily used. Joseph Parramore was, and for a considerable time had been, employed at the plant at a weekly salary as a stationary engineer. He lived at Salt Lake City. On the morning of August 9, 1921, he rode to the plant in the automobile of another employee, for the purpose of going to work. The automobile crossed over two of the railroad tracks and when upon that of the Rio Grande was struck by an engine and Parramore was instantly killed. This happened about seven minutes before the time when his Opinion of the Court. 263 U.S. service as an engineer was to begin. Upon these facts the Utah Industrial Commission awarded compensation to Parramore's dependents. The Supreme Court of the State, upon a review, affirmed the award and held that the accident was one within the terms of the statute. 60 Utah, 161. By this construction and application of the statute we are bound and the case must be considered as though the statute had, in specific terms, provided for liability upon the precise facts hereinbefore recited. Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U. S. 503, 510. The question saved in the state court and presented here is whether the statute, as thus construed and applied, is valid under the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants in error have submitted a motion to dismiss the writ of error on the ground that no federal question is involved, but it is clearly without substance, and is overruled. That the statute is constitutional upon its face is established by previous decisions of this Court (New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188; Hawkins v. Bleakly, Id. 210; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, Id. 219; Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400; Madera Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 262 U. S. 499) and the only inquiry we need make is whether it is constitutional as applied and enforced in respect of the facts of the instant case. See Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 288-289. It is settled by the decisions of this Court and by an overwhelming array of state decisions, that such statutes are not open to constitutional objection because they abrogate common law defenses or impose liability without fault. But the contention here, shortly stated, is that the accident was one which occurred off the premises of the employer on a public road, outside the hours of employment and while the employee was not engaged in any business of the em |