councils, and to have been mainly instrumental in causing Canada to be held at the peace./

The arguments were ably met, however, in a subsequent pamphlet entitled, " An Examination of the Commercial Principles of the late Negotiation between Great Britain and France in 1761,” supposed likewise to have been written by Mr. Burke; and the style of its execution might well have justified such a conjecture, if there had not been other grounds for the belief. The same doctrines are advanced, as in the " Remarks." The writer puts forth his chief strength to confute the following pamphlet; and the estimation, in which he held the author of it, may be inferred from his manner of introducing the subject. After stating that he should confine his remarks to the writer of this performance, he adds as a reason, because, of all those, who had treated the opposite side of the question, "he is clearly the ablest, the most ingenious, the most dexterous, and the most perfectly acquainted with the fort and foible of the argument; and we may therefore conclude, that he has said every thing, and every thing in the best manner, that the cause could bear." This was high praise to come from an opponent, who, if he hoped to triumph, was fully aware of the arduous nature of his undertaking. In fact he failed; for he could not convince the public, nor the ministry, that Guadaloupe was better for England than Canada; nor could his zeal and eloquence avail to divert the negotiation from its first channel. — EDITOR.

I HAVE perused, with no small pleasure, the Letter addressed to Two Great Men, and the Remarks on that letter. It is not merely from the beauty, the force, and perspicuity of expression, or the general elegance of manner, conspicuous in both pamphlets, that my pleasure chiefly arises; it is rather from this, that I have lived to see subjects of the greatest importance to this nation publicly discussed without party views or party heat, with decency and politeness, and with no other warmth, than what a zeal for the honor and happiness of our King and country may inspire; and this by writers, whose understanding, however they

may differ from each other, appears not unequal to their candor and the uprightness of their intention.

But, as great abilities have not always the best information, there are, I apprehend, in the Remarks, some opinions not well founded, and some mistakes of so important a nature, as to render a few observations on them necessary for the better information of the public.

The author of the Letter, who must be every way best able to support his own sentiments, will, I hope, excuse me, if I seem officiously to interfere; when he considers, that the spirit of patriotism, like other qualities good and bad, is catching, and that his long silence, since the Remarks appeared, has made us despair of seeing the subject farther discussed by his masterly hand. The ingenious and candid Remarker, too, who must have been misled himself, before he employed his skill and address to mislead others, will certainly, since he declares he aims at no seduction, be disposed to excuse even the weakest effort to prevent it.

And surely, if the general opinions that possess the minds of the people may possibly be of consequence in public affairs, it must be fit to set those opinions right. If there is danger, as the Remarker supposes, that "extravagant expectations" may embarrass "a virtuous and able ministry," and "render the negotiation for peace a work of infinite difficulty,” * there is no less danger, that expectations too low, through want of proper information, may have a contrary effect; may make even a virtuous and able ministry less anxious, and less attentive to the obtaining points, in which the honor and interest of the nation

*Remarks, p. 6.

are essentially concerned; and the people less hearty in supporting such a ministry and its measures.

The people of this nation are indeed respectable, not for their numbers only, but for their understanding and their public spirit. They manifest the first by their universal approbation of the late prudent and vigorous measures, and the confidence they so justly repose in a wise and good prince, and an honest and able administration; the latter they have demonstrated by the immense supplies granted in Parliament unanimously, and paid through the whole kingdom with cheerfulness. And, since to this spirit and these supplies our "victories and successes "* have in great measure been owing, is it quite right, is it generous to say, with the Remarker, that the people "had no share in acquiring them?" The mere mob he cannot mean, even where he speaks of the madness of the people; for the madness of the mob must be too feeble and impotent, armed as the government of this country at present is, to "overrule," t even in the slightest instances, the virtue "and moderation" of a firm and steady ministry.

While the war continues, its final event is quite uncertain. The victorious of this year may be the vanquished of the next. It may therefore be too early to say, what advantages we ought absolutely to insist on, and make the sine quibus non of a peace. If the necessity of our affairs should oblige us to accept of terms less advantageous than our present successes seem to promise us, an intelligent people, as ours is, must see that necessity, and will acquiesce. But as a peace, when it is made, may be made hastily; and as the unhappy continuance of the war affords us time to con† Ibid. p. 7.

* Remarks, p. 7.

sider, among several advantages gained or to be gained, which of them may be most for our interest to retain, if some and not all may possibly be retained; I do not blame the public disquisition of these points, as premature or useless. Light often arises from a collision of opinions, as fire from flint and steel; and if we can obtain the benefit of the light, without danger from the heat sometimes produced by controversy, why should we discourage it?

Supposing then, that Heaven may still continue to bless his Majesty's arms, and that the event of this just war may put it in our power to retain some of our conquests at the making of a peace; let us consider,

1. The Security of a Dominion, a justifiable and prudent Ground upon which to demand Cessions from an Enemy.

Whether we are to confine ourselves to those possessions only, that were "the objects for which we began the war."* This the Remarker seems to think right, when the question relates to "Canada, properly so called; it having never been mentioned as one of those objects, in any of our memorials or declarations, or in any national or public act whatsoever." But the gentleman himself will probably agree, that if the cession of Canada would be a real advantage to us, we may demand it under his second head, as an "indemnification for the charges incurred" in recovering our just rights; otherwise, according to his own principles, the demand of Guadaloupe can have no foundation. That "our claims before the war were large enough for possession and for security too," though it seems a clear point with the ingenious Remarker, is, I own, not

• Remarks, p. 19.

† Ibid. p. 19.

so with me. I am rather of the contrary opinion, and shall presently give my reasons.

Ad

But first let me observe, that we did not make those claims because they were large enough for security, but because we could rightfully claim no more. vantages gained in the course of this war may increase the extent of our rights. Our claims before the war contained some security; but that is no reason why we should neglect acquiring more, when the demand of more is become reasonable. It may be reasonable in the case of America, to ask for the security recommended by the author of the Letter,* though it would be preposterous to do it in many cases. His proposed demand is founded on the little value of Canada to the French; the right we have to ask, and the power we may have to insist on an indemnification for our expenses; the difficulty the French themselves will be under of restraining their restless subjects in America from encroaching on our limits and disturbing our trade; and the difficulty on our part of preventing encroachments, that may possibly exist many years without coming to our knowledge.

But the Remarker "does not see why the arguments, employed concerning a security for a peaceable behaviour in Canada, would not be equally cogent for calling for the same security in Europe." + On a little farther reflection, he must, I think, be sensible, that the circumstances of the two cases are widely different. Here we are separated by the best and clearest of boundaries, the ocean, and we have people in or near every part of our territory. Any attempt to encroach upon us, by building a fort, even in the obscurest cor

* Page 30 of the Letter, and p. 21 of the Remarks. Remarks, p. 28.