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As the doctrine of the origin of ideas is the foundation on which the fuperftructure of every metaphyfical fyftem is reared, it is neceffary to beftow longer confideration on that part of our au thor's work, than can be devoted to the reft. To give a complete review of his opinions would be, in fact, to present a complete refutation of them, and compose a volume on the philofophy of the human mind.

Mr. Hume, in his Treatife, again divides our perceptions into fimple and complex, that is, into fingle perceptions and combinations of them, as they may be confidered feparately or in union. To this divifion he has recourse, in order to limit the general decifion, which he had formed, that our ideas and impreffions "are refembling," or refemble each other. "I obferve," fays he, "that many of our complex ideas never had impreffions that corresponded to them, and that many of our complex impreffions never are exactly copied in ideas. I can imagine to myself fuch a city as the New Jerufalem, whose pavement is gold and rubies, though I never faw any fuch. I have feen Paris, but fhall I affirm I can form fuch an idea of that. city, as will perfectly reprefent all its ftreets and houses in their real and juft proportions?"

This manner of ftating the propofition is extremely vague; for it implies, that Mr. Hume might have ideas without impreffions, the faint images of which he formerly reprefented to give

rife

rife exclufively to ideas, or rather to be themfelves ideas. According to cuftom, our author, in this paffage, confounds imagination and memory, two very different powers of the mind. The human faculties, although wifely adapted to all the poffible purposes of man, are limited in their extent and powers, and each has its peculiar province.

When a man lays his hand on a piece of marble, he becomes fenfible of its quality of hardness. Let this marble ceafe to be prefent to his sense of touch; let it no longer be an immediate object of perception, he can ftill form a notion of its hardness, ftill retain an idea of it, or, as fome philofophers would exprefs it, ftill form a juft conception of it. In like manner we acquire a knowledge of the various qualities of external objects by our fenfes; and in preferving or recalling that know. ledge, a procefs takes place fimilar to that mentioned in the cafe of the fenfe of touch. The mind has also a power of modifying its ideas. It can feparate the ideas of the different qualities of fubftances. It can divide them into parts. It can combine these with others in endless variety, and thus form new wholes. This power of creation, if the expreffion may be allowed, is styled the imagination. But however fantastic these combinations may be, fuch as elephants with wings, and the like creatures of a prolific and extravagant fancy, it cannot be faid that many of our complex ideas never had impreflions correfponding to them;" for all the fingle perceptions or ideas, which are the component

"

component parts of fuch complex ideas, must have

been originally excited by external have continued familiar to the mind.

objects, and Though Mr.

Hume, therefore, could form accurate ideas of the external objects prefent to his fenfes, it does not follow that he ought to have been able to form with precifion fo complex and vaft an idea as that of an immenfe city. In fact, the powers of his imagination as to comprizing at once and correctly the streets and pavements of the New Jerufalem were as much limited, as the powers of his conception or thofe of his memory respecting Paris. It is, therefore, equally erroneous, that many of our complex impreffions are never exactly copied in ideas.

After obferving that our complex impreffions and ideas, though greatly refembling, a e not exact copies of each other, Mr. Hume proceeds to inquire how the cafe ftands with our fimple perceptions in this refpect, and finishes with a very unexpected conclufion. "Thus," fays he, "we find, that all simple ideas and impreffions resemble each other, and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm, in general, that these two species of perception are exactly correfpondent:" an inference in open hoftility with the doctrine which he had just delivered.

As we have endeavoured to point out the very unphilosophical distinction he has introduced between impreffions and ideas, and, it is hoped, fhewn the fallacy of his ideal theory by faint images of impreffions,

preffions, it does not appear neceffary to pursue the inquiry, by investigating the principles of caufation which he advances, and his opinions refpecting the infinite divifibility of space and time, and the infinite divifibility of our ideas of space and time: difcordant inferences are the inevitable refult of an hypothefis effentially erroneous.

Without profecuting farther, therefore, the review of his Treatife, the tenets in which have been publicly disclaimed by the author, in fo far as they differ from thofe in his Enquiry, we shall confine our subsequent obfervations to this last performance. It does not profels to be, like the Treatife, a complete fyftem, but is rather a collection of effays on metaphysical subjects, poffeffing a connection with each other. The topics, however, on which it treats, are nearly the fame with thofe in the Treatife, but it is cleared from the falfe reafonings and contradictions of the latter; and while it difplays the vigour of his understanding, it also affords honourable evidence of his industry, and the progrefs of his mental improvement, during the time which elapfed between the appearance of these two publications.

The fubjects difcuffed in the Enquiry are the fol lowing:

Sec. I. Of the different Species of Philosophy.
II. Of the Origin of Ideas.
III. Of the Affociation of Ideas.

IV. Sceptical

IV. Sceptical Doubts concerning the Opera-
tions of the Understanding.

V. Sceptical Solution of thefe Doubts.
VI. Of Probability.

VII. Of the Idea of neceflary Connection.
VIII. Of Liberty and Neceflity.

IX. Of the Reafon of Animals.

X. Of Miracles.

XI. Of a particular Providence, and of a future
State.

XII. Of the academical or fceptical Philofophy.

Thefe effays are but little fufceptible of analysis: we fhall, however, endeavour to give a rapid ketch of them, interfperfed with a few remarks on peculiar or exceptionable opinions.

In his brief notice of the different fpecies of philofophy, Mr. Hume confiders man, first, as born for action, and as influenced in his measures by tafte and fentiment, purfuing one object, and avoiding another, according to the value which thefe objects feem to poffefs, or the light in which they prefent themselves; and, fecondly, as a reasonable rather than an active being. The first species may be referred to ethics, and the laft to pure metaphyfics. In the fecond Section, he adopts his former theory of the origin of ideas, which we have already condemned; and in the third, he difcuffes, with the astonishing brevity of a few lines, the important fubject of the affociation of ideas.

The

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