then would have been the time. But to have done so would have been in direct contravention of Act. XV. of the treaty of 9th March: by which the British Government disclaimed "any interference in the internal administration of the Lahore States." The Sikh chiefs were left to themselves to form a Government as they chose; a British force being moreover given them to enable them to do so. The result was natural. There was no great Sirdar whose rank entitled him to the post, nor any inferior one whose ability could raise him to it. Dewan Dinanath, the only man about the court whose talents were equal to the emergency was looked down on as a Mútsuddi, even by those who could not cope with him either in argument or influence. The favourite of the Rani therefore had no difficulty in resuming, during peaceful British occupation, the position which he had had the address to achieve in more dangerous times; and he seems to have performed from the first all the functions of Vizier, though a reference to the Delhi Gazette will shew that he was not actually invested with the Vizarut, by the Queen, till five or six months after he is said to have had that distinction conferred on him by the British Government!

We have been led into this long digression for the sake of history to relieve Lord Hardinge and the political authorities from the unmerited odium of having connived at the intrigues of the Rani and the Vizier; and we hope that we have made it sufficiently plain that they had no voice in the matter; and would have been equally bound to recognise and carry on business with the Court jester if the Sikh Sirdars had thought him wiser than themselves; or the "slave girl Mungla," if they had wished for the future to have a Petticoat Government in the Punjab.

Let us now return to the narrative. We have seen that on the 3d September, 1846, there were still hopes of an establishment of an independant Government at Lahore; but in the same letter occurs the following passage :-"I do not apprehend that Sheikh Imam-úd-din will push his resistance any further after the order he has received from Lahore, and 6 from Lieut. Col. Lawrence.

6

The two forces of the Maharajah Golab Singh and the Sheikh, being in presence of each other, may by accident come to blows; but the interests of the two chiefs are opposed to such a contingency, and by a letter recently received by Lieut. Col. Lawrence from the Maharajah Golab Singh, it is evident 'he does not seem to expect a collision." This refers to the transfer of the province of Kashmir to Maharajah Golab

Singh, agreed upon on the 16th of March 1846, but not yet fulfilled by the Sikh Government. The whole story is told by the Governor-General in letter No. 3, of the collection before us:

(Extract.)

No. 3.

The Governor-General to the Secret Committee.

Simla, September 19, 1846. (No. 40.)

"In the letters from Lahore of Mr. J. Lawrence, the delay and suspicious conduct of Sheik Imamooddeen, the Governor of Cashmere on the part of the Lahore Government, are adverted to, and the measures taken by the Durbar to procure the departure of the Sheik from Cashmere, are described.

I forward dispatches of the Governor-General's Agent, reporting the ultimate failure of Sheik Imamooddeen, to quit Cashmere at the promised time, and the occurrence of a collision between the troops of the Sheik and those of Maharajah Golab Sing, in which the latter were worsted, with the death of the Vizier Luckput Rae, and the dispersion of the Maharajah's force.

The details of this affair, as far as they are known, and the previous conduct of the Sheik Imamooddeen, are so fully given in the enclosures of this dispatch, and the other papers referred to, that it is not necessary for me to describe them in this place. It is of more importance to consider the motives which may have induced Sheik Imamooddeen to put himself thus actively in opposition to the British Government and Maharajah Golab Sing, and to the reiterated orders of the Lahore Durbar; the consequences which may probably result from this affair; and the measures which may be most expedient to adopt in reference to it.

From the first, Maharajah Golab Sing has expressed no apprehension about his obtaining the occupation of Cashmere. At Umritsir, after the completion of the Treaty, he urged that the Durbar should take measures for putting him into possession of the other districts made over to him, and the Hazareh; but he said that Sheik Moheeooddeen and he were on an understanding with each other, and that his possession of Cashmere would be accomplished without difficulty. Early in April, Moheeooddeen died, and his son, Sheik Imamooddeen, the former Governor of the Julunder, succeeded him. Maharajah Golab Sing stated that this would make no difference in his affairs, for that Sheik Imamooddeen was, equally with his father, in his (Golab Sing's) interest.

Accordingly, Maharajah Golab Sing sent a few regiments with Vizier Luckput Rae, to take possession of the district. These regiments arrived at the same time as Lord Elphinstone and Mr. C. Hardinge, and were forthwith put in possession of the Hurree Purbut, the principal fort at the capital; this was on the 21st of April last.

Maharajah Golab Sing would appear to have, at this time, entered into negotiation with Sheik Imamooddeen, to put his troops into the neighbouring districts, and to hold the Government of Cashmere under him.

Sheik Imamooddeen states that, at the requisition of Maharajah Golab Sing, he did put his troops into those districts, and that he has a claim against the Maharajah for their expenses.

What may have been the real nature of the negotiations between the Sheik and the Maharajah, it is impossible for us to know at present; but it appears that they ended in no satisfactory result. The Maharajah soon

required the departure of Sheik Imamooddeen from Cashmere, and sent small reinforcements under Vizier Rutnoo to the support of Luckput Rae. At the same time, Maharajah Golab Sing seems to have made some demands upon Sheik Imamooddeen, which the latter resisted; and the Sheik, under pretext of collecting balances of revenue, and requiring a receipt and acquittance from Vizier Luckput Rae, delayed from week to week his departure from Cashmere.

The Lahore Durbar, who had been continually pressed upon the subject of making over the transferred districts, Cashmere included, to the Maharajah, were directed to cause the immediate removal of Sheik Imamooddeen.

When the Sheik still delayed his return to Lahore, the Durbar sent a special and pressing order by the hands of Dewan Hakim Rae and Vakeel Sohun Lall, peremptorily directing him to make over the district to the Maharajah, and to repair to Lahore, where his accounts would be adjusted.

These persons appear to have made unnecessary delay on the road, and to have only reached Rajourie when the outbreak occurred, which is described, as far as its details are known, in the inclosures of this despatch.

On the news of the open rebellion of Sheik Imamooddeen reaching Lahore, the Durbar sent off Sirdar Utter Sing Man, with other officers, to bring the Sheik away.

The result of the Sirdar's mission cannot yet be known: but it is not probable, in the present posture of affairs, that it has been successful. Deeply interested as the Lahore Durbar are in the fulfilment of all the provisions of the Treaty, it can scarcely be supposed that they have instigated or countenanced the Sheik's proceedings; and yet there is a strong impression on the minds of all the British officers on the spot, that Sheik Imamooddeen has all along had the sympathies, if not the covert connivance, of Rajah Lal Sing, and other influential parties at Lahore.

The above is a summary of the proceedings and orders for the transfer of Cashmere, from the Lahore Government to the Jummoo Maharajah.

The political connexion between Maharajah Golab Sing and the Sheiks Moheeooddeen and Imamooddeen, is of old standing, and has been long notorious as of the closest description.

Moheeooddeen, the father, began life as a shoe-maker; he was a man of no family, character or influence; but, being possessed of those talents for intrigue and self-aggrandisement, which were more likely to stand him in stead, in such a Government and society as that of the Sikhs in the Punjaub, he contrived, with the assistance of the Dogras, and more particularly of Golab Sing, to raise himself from poverty and obscurity to a state of some eminence and of vast wealth.

About seven years ago, under the auspices, and by the instrumentality, of the Maharajah, Sheik Moheeooddeen was appointed to the Government of the Cashmere district, and his son, Imamooddeen, to that of the Julunder Doab.

Sheik Moheeooddeen was to have accounted to the Durbar for twenty lacs of Cashmere rupees per annum, of which six lacs were to be allowed him for the maintenance of troops, and the balance, fourteen lacs, was to be paid into the Lahore treasury.

The Sheik's payments at Lahore are stated not to have exceeded six lacs per annum since he assumed the Government, and part of which has been remitted in shawl goods. No accounts have been rendered during the whole seven years.

The same statement of short payments, and failure to render any account of seven years' collections is equally applicable to Sheik Imamooddeen, in respect to the Julunder Doab.

H H

The Sheiks are known to have sent across the Sutledj upwards of a crore of rupees, in specie, shortly before the late invasion of our territories by the Sikh army.

What may have been the inducement of Sheik Imamooddeen to take the course he is now pursuing, it is not easy to conjecture. He had immense wealth in money and a jagheer at Jullunder, which we had upheld, yielding nearly a lac per annum. He cannot expect to maintain himself in Cashmere, against Maharajah Golab Sing and the Sikh and British Governments.

The Sheik was doubtless placed in a position of much difficulty in regard to securing the whole of his ill-gotten wealth. He is believed still to have much in Cashmere: the locality of which, and all the circumstances under which it was obtained, are doubtless well known to the Maharajah, who was bent on appropriating it, if possible. After the transfer of the province, its removal became difficult.

Again, the Sikh Government summoned him to Lahore, and spoke of an adjustment of accounts. The Sheik well knew that he had rendered no account for seven years; that his spoliation was notorious; and that the Durbar were aware of his full ability to pay a large sum as balance of arrears, which their exigencies would induce them the more rigorously to demand. This was doubtless a dilemma; but the mode which he has adopted to avoid it is a desperate one. His money in Cashmere will be soon exhausted by the large force he is said to be collecting. His jagheer in our provinces will be confiscated, and his property attached; and the result of his enterprise, though it may cause trouble, and is much to be regretted, cannot be doubtful.

The Lahore Durbar are bound by the IVth Article of the Treaty of Lahore, to put us, or our representative, in possession of the Province of Cashmere. This they have not done, and their officer is now in open rebellion in the district.

In the present state of our information, I cannot tell precisely what measures it may be necessary ultimately to take. You will perceive that I sent Colonel Lawrence's Assistant, Lieutenant Edwardes, to Jummoo, to make Maharajah Golab Sing exert himself, and to urge him to advance at once with his disposable force to Cashmere. I have called on the Lahore Government to place at the disposal of the Maharajah such of their regiments and generals, as he himself may select to accompany him; and Brigadier Wheeler has been warned to be ready to advance with a portion of the Julunder force to Bissowlee and Jummoo, to support Maharajah Golab Sing's rear, and, should he wish it, to hold his territory for him during his absence.

I shall be well satisfied if by these means the revolt of the Sheik may be put down, and the occupation by Maharajah Golab Sing accomplished. Any delay in the commencement of operations will be inexpedient. The Mahomedan Hill Rajabs in the neighbourhood of Cashmere, appear to have already joined the Sheik; the Hazarehs will doubtless follow the example, and there is much disposition to revolt in all the western districts.

The season of the year is somewhat in favor of the rebels making a protracted resistance, as, towards the end of November, most of the passes into Cashmere are closed, and the troops proceeding there will not be able to return till after the winter.

In a few days, our information will be more full, and I shall be the better able to concert measures adapted to the circumstances. I shall not move British troops to Cashmere if I can avoid it.

It is worthy of remark, that Sheik Imamooddeen has caused the Sheik

emissaries, Dewan Hakim Rae and Vakeel Sohun Lal, to be treated with all consideration and respect at Rajourie, whence they last wrote; while he has proclaimed that Maharajah Duleep Sing is the Sovereign of Cashmere, and himself the Rajah's subadar; (which looks as if he were doubtful of those about him supporting his independence ;) while, on the day at the close of which the attack on Maharajah Golab Sing's force took place, it is said to have been industriously circulated at the Bazaar of Cashmere, that the British troops had been attacked and defeated at Lahore, and the young Maharajah killed.

All the British officers who had gone to visit Cashmere had left the valley before the outbreak occurred, excepting Captains Broome and Nicolson, who were on the borders, and, on hearing of the affair, proceeded into the Maharajah's territory."

From this candid statement of the pros and cons, we learn, that the Governor-General "could not suppose," that " deeply interested as the Lahore Durbar were in the fulfilment of all the provisions of the treaty-they had instigated, or countenanced the Sheikh's proceedings;" although "there was a strong impression on the minds of all the British officers on the spot that Sheikh Imam-úd-dín had all along the sympathies, if not the covert connivance of Rajah Lal Singh, and other influential parties at Lahore." He contented himself therefore with calling on Maharajah Dhulíp Singh to fulfill his contract, and put Maharajah Golab Singh in possession of Kashmír, at the point of the sword; himself evincing his determination to enforce the treaty, by advancing a strong body of British troops into the Punjab. A political officer was at the same time sent up to Jammú to excite the dormant energies of the Maharajah, who seemed stupified at the outbreak, and perhaps may have even doubted our good faith.

These vigorous measures had the desired effect of shewing not only to Golab Singh, but also to the Sheikh in Kashmír and the Vizier in Lahore, that no difficulties which could be created by hostile combinations, or intrigues, would be allowed to stand in the way of carrying out the treaty. The very first fruits were the revelation of Rajah Lal Singh's treachery. Natives have the courage to plan any villainy; but they break down in the execution from inability to combine and remain true to each other. No sooner did Púrun Chund, the Sheikh's Vakíl, find the British were in earnest, and about to take the field, than with admirable decision he chose his side, and determined to save his master by throwing Lal Singh overboard. He confessed to Lieut. Edwardes on the road to Jammú that Sheikh Imam-úd-din was never more faithful to his own Government than now when he seemed to be a rebel: and promised to put that officer in