And, first, of injuring our neighbour by our "words." This may be done, we find, in three ways; by "evil-speaking, by lying, and by flandering." By "evil-fpeaking" is meant speaking ill of our neighbour; but upon a supposition, that this ill is the truth. In fome circumstances it is certainly right to fpeak ill of our neighbour; as when we are called upon in a court of justice to give our evidence; or, when we can fet any one right in his opinion of a person, in whom he is about to put an improper confidence. Nor can there be any harm in speaking of a bad action, which has been determined in a court of justice, or is otherwise be come notorious. But on the other hand, it is highly difallowable to fpeak wantonly of the characters of others from common fame; be cause, in a thousand instances, we find that stories, which have no better foundation, are misrepresented. They are perhaps only half-told-they have been heard through the medium of malice or envysome favourable circumstance hath been omitted-fome foreign circumstance hath been added-fome trifling circumftance hath been exaggerated-the motive, the provocation, or perhaps the reparation, hath been concealed-in short, the representation of the fact is, some way or other, totally different from the fact itself. But even, when we have the best evidence of a bad action, with all its circumftances before us, we surely indulge a very ill-natured pleasure in spreading the shame of an offending brother. We can do no good; and we may do harm: we may weaken his good refolutions by exposing him: we may harden him against the world. Perhaps it may be his first bad action. Perhaps nobody dy is privy to it but ourselves. Let us give him at least one trial. Let us not cast the first stone. Which of our lives could stand so strict a scrutiny? He only who is without fin himself can have any excuse for treating his brother with feverity. Let us next confider "lying;" which is an intention to deceive by falsehood in our words. To warn us against lying, we should do well to confider the folly, the meanness, and the wickedness of it. The folly of lying confists in its defeating its own purpose. A habit of lying is generally in the end detected; and, after detection, the lyar, instead of deceiving, will not even be believed when he happens to speak the truth. Nay, every fingle lyo is attended with such a variety of circum stances, which lead to a detection, that it is often discovered. The use generally made of a lye, is to cover a fault; but as the end is seldom answered, we only aggravate what we wish to conceal. In point even of prudence, an honest confeffion would serve us better. The meanness of lying arifes from the cowardice which it implies. We dare not boldly and nobly speak the truth; but have recourse to low fubterfuges, which always argue a fordid and difingenuous mind. Hence it is, that in the fashionable world, the word lyar is always confidered as a term of peculiar reproach. The wickedness of lying confifts in its perverting one of the greatest bleffings of God, the use of speech, in making that a mischief to mankind, which was intended for a benefit. Truth is the great bond of society. Falschood, of course, tends to its diffsolution. If one man may lye, why not another? And if there is no mutual trust among men, there is an end of all intercourse and dealing. An equivocation is nearly related to a lye. It is an intention to deceive under words of a double meaning, or words which, literally speaking, are true; and is equally criminal with the moft downright breach of truth. When St. Peter asked Sapphira (in the 5th chapter of the Acts) "whether her husband had fold the land for fo much?" She anfwered, he had: and literally the spoke the truth; for he had fold it for that fum, included in a larger. But having an intention to deceive, we find the apoftle confidered the equivocation as a lye. In short, it is the intention to deceive, which is criminal: the mode of deception, like the vehicle in which poison is conveyed, is of no consequence. A nod, or figs, may convey a lye as effectually as the most deceitful language. Under the head of lying may be mentioned a breach of promise. While a refolution remains in our own breasts, it is fubject to our own review: but when we make another perfon a party with us, an engagement is made; and every engagement, though only of the lightest kind, should be punctually observed. If we have added to this engagement a folemn promife, the obligation is so much the stronger: and he who does not think himself bound by fuch an obligation, has no pretensions to the character racter of an honest man. A breach of promife is ftill worse than a lye. A lye is fimply a breach of truth; but a breach of promife is a breach both of truth and truft. Forgetfulness is a weak excufe: it only shews how little we are affected by fo folemn an engagement. Should we forget to call for a fum of money, of which we were in want, at an appointed time? Or do we think a folemn promise of less value than a fum of money? Having confidered evil speaking and lying, let us next consider slandering. By slandering, we mean, injuring our neigh bour's character by falsehood. Here we fill rise higher in the fcale of injurious words. Slandering our neighbour is the greatest injury, which words can do him; and is, therefore, worse than either evilspeaking or lying. The mischief of this fin depends on the value of our characters. All men, unless they be past feeling, defire naturally to be thought well of by their fellow-creatures: a good character is one of the principal means of being serviceable either to ourselves or others; and among numbers, the very bread they eat depends upon it. What aggravated injury, therefore, do we bring upon every man, whose name we flander? And, what is still worse, the injury is irreparable. If you defraud a man; restore what you took, and the injury is repaired. But, if you flander him, it is not in your power to shut up all the ears, and all the mouths, to which your tale may have access. The evil spreads, like the winged feeds of fome noxious plants, which scatter mischief on a breath of air, and disperse it on every fide, and beyond prevention. Before we conclude this subject, it may just be mentioned, that a flander may be spread, as a lye may be told, in various ways. We may do it by an infinuation, as well as in a direct manner; we may spread it in a fecret; or propagate it under the colour of friendship. I may add also, that it is a species of flander, and often a very malignant one, to leffen the merits or exaggerate the failings of others; as it is likewife to omit defending a misrepresented character, or to let others bear the blame of our offenGilpin. ces. let us next consider injurious actions. On this head we are injoined to keep our hands from picking and stealing, and to be true and just in all our dealings." As to theft, it is a crime of so odious and vile a nature, that one would imagine no person, who hath had the leaft tincture of a virtuous education, even though driven to necessity, could be led into it.I shall not, therefore, enter into a dissuafive from this crime, but go on with the explanation of the other part of the injunction, and fee what it is to be true and just in all our dealings. Justice is even still more, if poflible, the support of society, than truth: inasmuch as a man may be more injurious by his actions, than by his words. It is for this reason, that the whole force of human law is bent to restrain injustice; and the happiness of every society will increase in pro. portion to this restraint, We very much err, however, if we fuppose, that every thing within the bounds of law is justice. The law was intended only for bad men; and it is impossible to make the meshes of it so strait, but that many very great enormities will escape. The well-meaning man, therefore, knowing that the law was not made for him, confults a better guide his own confcience, informed by religion. And, indeed, the great difference between the good and the bad man consists in this: the good man will do nothing, but what his confcience will allow; the bad man will do any thing which the law cannot reach. It would, indeed, be endless to describe the various ways, in which a man may be dishonest within the limits of law. They are as various as our intercourse with mankind. Some of the most obvious of them I shall cursorily mention. In matters of commerce the knave has many opportunities. The different qualities of the fame commodity-the different modes of adulteration-the specious arts of vending-the frequent ignorance in purchafing; and a variety of other circumstances, open an endless field to the ingenuity of fraud. The honeft fair dealer, in the mean time, has only one rule, which is, that all arts, however common in bufinefs, which are intended to deceive, are utterly unlawful. It may be added, upon this head, that if any one, confcious of having been a tranfgreffor, is defirous of repairing his fault, restitution is by all means Q3 neceflary necessary: till that be done, he continues in a course of injustice. Again, in matters of contract, a man has many opportunities of being dishoneft within the bounds of law. He may be strict in observing the letter of an agreement, when the equitable meaning requires a laxer interpretation: or, he can take the laxer interpretation, when it serves his purpose; and at the loop-hole of fome ambiguous expression exclude the literal meaning, though it be undoubtedly the true one. The same iniquity appears in with-holding from another his just right; or in put ting him to expence in recovering it. The movements of the law are flow; and in many cafes cannot be otherwise; but he who takes the advantage of this to injure his neighbour, proves himself an undoubted knave. It is a species of the same kind of injustice to withhold a debt, when we have ability to pay; or to run into debt, when we have not that ability. The former can proceed only from a bad disposition; the latter, from fuffering our defires to exceed our station. Some are excused, on this head, as men of generous principles, which they cannot confine. But what is their generofity? They assist one man by injuring another. And what good arifes to society from hence ? Such persons cannot act on principle; and we need not hefitate to rank them with those, who run into debt to gratify their own selfish inclinations. One man defires the elegancies of life; another defires what he thinks an equal good, the reputation of generofity. Oppreffion is another species of injuftice; by which, in a thousand ways, under the cover of law, we may take the advantage of the superiority of our power, either to crush an inferior, or humble him to our defigns. Ingratitude is another. A loan, we know, claims a legal return. And is the obligation lefs, if, instead of a loan, you receive a kindness? The law, indeed, says nothing on this point of immorality, but an honeft confcience will be very loud in the condemnation of it. The next precept is, " to bear no malice nor hatred in our hearts." The malice and hatred of our hearts arife, in the first place, from injurious treatment; and furely no man, when he is injured, can at first help feeling that he is so. But Christianity requires, that we should fubdue these feelings, as foon as possible; " and not fuffer the fun to go down upon our wrath." Various are the passages of scripture, which inculcate the forgiveness of injuries. Indeed, no point is more laboured than this; and with reafon, because no temper is more productive of evil, both to ourselves and others, than a malicious one. The sensations of a mind burning with revenge are beyond defcription; and as we are at these seasons very unable to judge cooly, and of course liable to carry our resentment too far, the confequence is, that, in our rage, we may do a thousand things, which can never be atoned for, and of which we may repent as long as we live. Befides, one act draws on another; and retaliation keeps the quarrel alive. The gospel, therefore, ever gracious and kind to man, in all its precepts enjoins us to check all those violent emotions, and to leave our cause in the hands of God. Vengeance is mine, I will repay, faith the Lord;" and he who, in oppofition to this precept, takes vengeance into his own hands, and cherishes the malice and hatred of his heart, may affure himself that he has not yet learned to be a Chriftian. These precepts, perhaps, may not entirely agree with modern principles of honour: but let the man of honour fee to that. The maxims of the world cannot change the truth of the gofpel. Nay, even in recovering our just right, or in pursuing a criminal to justice, we should take care that it be not done in the spirit of retaliation and revenge. If these be our motives, though we make the law our inftrument, we are equally guilty. But befides injurious treatment, the malice and hatred of our hearts have often another fource, and that is envy: and thus in the litany; "envy, malice, and hatred," are all joined together with great proprie We may be unjust alfo in our resent-ty. The emotions of envy are generally ment; by carrying it beyond what reason and religion prescribe. But it would be endless to describe the various ways, in which injustice difcovers itselr. In truth, almost every omiflion of duty may be refsolved into injustice. cooler, and less violent, than those which arife from the resentment of injury; so that envy is feldom so mifchievous in its effects as revenge: but with regard to ourselves, it is altogether as bad, and full as deftructive of the spirit of chriftianity. What is 4 the religion of that man, who instead of thanking Heaven for the bleffings he receives, is fretting himself continually with a difagreeable comparison between himself and fome other? He cannot enjoy what he has, because another has more wealth, a fairer fame, or perhaps more merit, than himself. He is miferable, because others are happy. But to omit the wickedness of envy, how abfard and foolish is it, in a world where we must neceffarily expect much real mifery, to be perniciously inventive in producing it! Betides, what ignorance! We see only the glaring outside of things. Under all that envied glare, many unseen distresses may lurk, from which our station may be free: for our merciful Creator seems to have bestowed happiness, as far as station is concerned, with great equality among all his creatures. In conclufion, therefore, let it be the great object of our attention, and the fubject of our prayers, to rid our minds of all this curied intrusion of evil thoughtswhether they proceed from malice, or from an envious temper. Let all our malicious thoughts foften into charity and benevolence; and let us "forgive one another, as God, for Christ's fake, has for given us." As for our envious thoughts, as far as they relate to externals, let them fubfide in humility, acquiefcence, and submillion to the will of God. And when we are tempted to envy the good qualities of others, let us spurn so base a conception, and change it into a generous emulationinto an endeavour to raise ourselves to an equality with our rival, not to depress him to a level with us. Gilpin. §167. Duties to ourselves. Thus far the duties we have confidered come most properly under the head of those which we owe to our neighbour; what follows, relates rather to ourselves. On this head, we are instructed " to keep our bodies in temperance, foberness, and chaftity." Though our fouls should be our great concern, yet, as they are nearly connected with our bodies, and as the impurity of the * one contaminates the other, a great degree of moral attention is, of course, due to our bodies alfo. As our first station is in this world, to which our bodies particularly belong, they are formed with such appetites as are requisite to our commodious living in it; and the rule given us is, " to use the world fo as not to abuse it." St. Paul, by a beautiful allufion, calls our bodies the "tem-" ples of the Holy Ghost:" by which he means to impress us with a strong idea of their dignity; and to deter us from debafing, by low pleasures, what should be the feat of so much purity. To youth these cautions are above measure neceffary, because their passions and appetites are ftrong; their reason and judgment weak. They are prone to pleafure, and void of reflection. How, therefore, these young adventurers in life may best steer their course, and use this finful world fo as not to abuse it, is a confideration well worth their attention. Let us then see under what regulations their appetites should be restrained. By keeping our bodies in temperance is meant avoiding excess in eating, with regard both to the quantity and quality of our food. We should neither eat more than our stomachs can well bear; nor be nice and delicate in our eating. To preferve the body in health is the end of eating; and they who regulate themselves merely by this end, who eat without choice or distinction, paying no regard to the pleasure of eating, obferve perhaps the best rule of temperance. They go rather indeed beyond temperance, and may be called abstemious. A man may be temperate, and yet allow himself a little more indulgence. Great care, however, is here neceffary; and the more, as perhaps no precise rule can be affixed, after we have paffed the first great limit, and let the palate loose among variety * Our own difcretion must be our guide, which should be conftantly kept awake by confidering the many bad confequences which attend a breach of temperance.Young men, in the full vigour of health, do not confider these things; but as age comes on, and different maladies begin to HOR. appear. appear, they may perhaps repent they did not a little earlier practise the rules of temperance. In a moral and religious light, the consequences of intemperance are still worse. To enjoy a comfortable meal, when it comes before us, is allowable: but he who fuffers his mind to dwell upon the pleasures of eating, and makes them the employment of his thoughts, has at least opened one fource of mental corruption. *. After all, he who would most perfectly enjoy the pleasures of the table, such as they are, must look for them within the rules of temperance. The palate, accuftomed to satiety, hath loft its tone; and the greatest fensualists have been brought to confefs, that the coarfest fare, with an appetite kept in order by temperance, affords a more delicious repast, than the most luxurious meal without it. As temperance relates chiefly to eating, soberness or fobriety relates properly to drinking. And here the fame observations recur. The stricteft, and perhaps the best rule, is merely to fatisfy the end of drinking. But if a little more indulgence be taken, it ought to be taken with the greatest circumspection. With regard to youth indeed, I should be inclined to great strictness on this head. In eating, if they eat of proper and simple food, they cannot easily err. Their grow ing limbs, and strong exercise, require larger supplies than full-grown bodies, which must be kept in order by a more rigid temperance. But if more indulgence be allowed them in eating, less, furely, should in drinking. With strong liquors of every kind they have nothing to do; and if they should totally abstain on this head, it were so much the better. The languor which attends age †, requires perhaps, now and then, some aids; but the fpirits of youth want no recruits: a little reft is fufficient. As to the bad consequences derived from exceffive drinking, befides filling the blood with bloated and vicious humours, and debauching the purity of the mind, as in the cafe of intemperate eating, it is attended with this peculiar evil, the loss of our fenfes. Hence follow frequent incon veniences and mortifications. We expose our follies-we betray our fecrets-we are often impofed upon-we quarrel with our friends-we lay ourselves open to our enemies; and, in short, make ourselves the objects of contempt, and the topics of ridicule to all our acquaintance.-Nor is it only the act of intoxication which deprives us of our reason during the prevalence of it; the habit of drunkenness soon befots and impairs the understanding, and renders us at all times less fit for the offices of life. We are next injoined " to keep our bodies in chastity." " Flee youthful lufts," says the apostle, " which war against the foul." And there is furely nothing which carries on a war against the foul more fuccessfully. Wherever we have a catalogue in fcripture (and we have many fuch catalogues) of those sins which in a peculiar manner debauch the mind, these youthful lusts have always, under some denomination, a place among them. To keep ourselves free from all contagion of this kind, let us endeavour to preserve a purity in our thoughts our words and our ac tions. First, let us preserve a purity in our thoughts. These dark recesses, which the eye of the world cannot reach, are the receptacles of these youthful lufts. Here they find their first encouragement. The entrance of such impure ideas perhaps we cannot always prevent. We may always however prevent cherishing them; we may always prevent their making an impreffion upon us: the devil may be cast out as foon as discovered. Let us always keep in mind, that even into these dark abodes the eye of Heaven can penetrate: that every thought of our hearts is open to that God, before whom we must one day stand; and that however secretly we may indulge these impure ideas, at the great day of account they will certainly appear in an awful detail against us. Let us remember again, that if our bodies be the temples of the Holy Ghost, our minds are the very fanctuaries of those temples: and if there be any weight in the apostle's argument against polluting Corpus onuftum + HOR. Sat, Ibide Que |