Liberalism and to Socialism. Even if Socialists desire that the State shall formally own and control the land, the taxation and rating of land values are necessary first steps in that direction. Even if the Socialists wish to nationalise all trade and all industry, the nationalisation and the municipalisation of natural monopolies are first steps in that direction. Why, then, as sensible men, cannot Liberals and Socialists alike agree to differ about the later stages of the journey, and unite upon the practical policy of "first steps first"? In We cannot but believe that ere long all the truly democratic, all the earnestly progressive, all the saner elements in No Need for the Liberal party and in the Socialist party will a "Class see the wisdom of adopting this course; and that War." the impracticable, senseless "class war," Liberalparty-smashing intransigents will be left to their own devices. There is, in truth, no need whatever for a "class war" in this country. Not even for a "war" against the landed classes. every class, happily, there are to be found men who rise superior to the bias and to the selfish interest of their class, and who, against the selfish interest of their class, advocate what they believe to be good for the nation as a whole. Such men are to be found even in the landlord class; and of this Lord Carrington (the present Minister of Agriculture) is a notable example. We war against landlordism, not against the landlords as a class. We are convinced, indeed, that if a man of such sterling character as, for instance, the Duke of Devonshire, who refused to follow Mr. Chamberlain in his advocacy of the taxation of food, though he himself, as an agricultural landlord, stood to gain largely by such a policy-we are convinced that if such a man had the imagination, the historical knowledge, and the economic insight to see things as they really are; if he could see how unjust and how disastrous to our nation is the landlord system by which he personally profits; that it drives our people from the soil to herd in the slums; that it is destructive alike of the physical, the mental, and the moral fibre of our race; that to the extent that landlordism secures to him wealth that he has not earned, it inevitably deprives others of wealth that they have earned; that to the extent that he receives without producing, others must produce without receiving; that every hundred thousand pounds of land value received by himself and his class means so many men, women, and children crowded into the slums, and toiling in the sweating dens long hours for starvation wages, means so many men driven by want into vagrancy and crime, so many women driven by hunger to sell themselves on the streets for bread, means so many children done to death by slow starvation, and so many more stunted in physique and rendered degenerate in mind and in morals by sheer privation—we are convinced, we repeat, that if his grace of Devonshire could realise the truth of all this, could see things as they really are, he would become one of the most earnest advocates of the taxation of land values, and that he would, to the utmost of his power, use his immense wealth and influence to right the wrong that he-a victim of circumstances as truly as the sufferers we have mentioned-has for so long unthinkingly profited by. VOL. 166.-No. 5. 2 L ARMAMENTS AND PEACE. "It is in the interest of peace that I urge the Government to put no pressure on their naval advisers to modify their opinions, and that I earnestly request that, whatever be the changes which they desire to introduce into the army and navy, they will not make those changes of a kind which will weaken the forces which undoubtedly in the past have conduced to peace. -Mr. BALFOUR, Debate on the Navy Estimates, July 27. "Let them not forget that the naval peace which England had enjoyed for the past fifty years was entirely owing to the recognised invincibility of our naval supremacy, and the day they imperilled this supremacy our era of peace would be doomed to early extinction."-Mr. LEE, Debate on the Navy Estimates. "This phrase about peace being secured by diminished armaments might sound well in some ears, but the fact remained that a strong British navy was the best safeguard we could have for European peace."-Earl CAWDOR, in the House of Lords, July 30. "I hold that the growth of armaments is a great danger to the peace of the world."-Sir HENRY CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN, in the Albert Hall, December 21, 1905. THE foregoing extracts from recent speeches of statesmen all bear on the same subject the relation of armaments to peace. The first three, all the utterances of men who had a large measure of responsibility in the military policy of the late Government, are examples of the doctrine that the way to secure peace is to prepare for war. The other, from our Premier, expresses a view in direct opposition to this doctrine. Thus there exists among the men who share from time to time in the guidance of the State, as among those whom they represent, not merely a difference, but a complete opposition of opinion on one of the most important questions of State policy. It is clear that one or the other of these opinions is erroneous; that when the policy based on the erroneous opinion is applied the State is misguided; and that, by being periodically subject to the control of each, our State policy must be one of constant reversals. That there is a call for the investigation of the subject is evident. The end sought-the avoidance of war-is one of such importance that to allow the matter to stand as it is, instead of endeavouring to sift the error from the truth, so that we may fix on a policy with some degree of confidence in its soundness, could not be characterised as other than sheer mental torpor. Sarely we desire the guidance of our national policy to be not utterly nnintelligent. And it is not the importance of the end alone that necessitates such an inquiry. One policy calls for more and more expenditure, while the other checks expenditure; and our outlay for this purpose has reached such a pitch that any possibility of finding relief ought to have very serious attention. The purpose is to avoid war. we are told by one section, is to paring for war tend to prevent war? promulgate this doctrine don't give the rationale, so we must seek it. The best way to attain this end, What is the exact meaning of this doctrine? The phrase which expresses it proves on examination to be of a very indefinite nature. We are to " prepare for war." If we were quite unprepared for war-if we were without army and navy, these words would have a definite meaning; the meaning would be that we ought to have an armed force; but as we are already prepared for war it is evident that the words are not used in the literal sense. What the supporters of this doctrine mean is that we ought to have further preparation for war. But how much further? To this question they have given no answer. They do not fix any degree of preparedness as the point we must reach to attain the greatest security of peace. Their cry is ever for more, and more, and more. If we are to give any clear meaning to this doctrine then, what can it be but this: the more we prepare for war, the more likely are we to avoid it ; and since we value peace very highly, we cannot devote too much of our time to making engines of destruction and exercising ourselves in the use of them. The more, the better. How will increase of armaments tend to preserve peace? To take a somewhat lawless community, to exemplify the working of the theory, among whom fighting is not uncommon: would an increased arming of the turbulent elements commend itself to a man of sense as a means of making fighting less frequent and less disastrous? To have more and better weapons would not make them less disposed to fight; it would only facilitate the expression of their fighting disposition, and thus cause them to fight oftener. Is the case of the nations different from this? Would an increased arming of the nations tend more to preserve peace among the nations than an increased arming of individuals would tend to prevent fighting between individuals? It is difficult to see it. It is This, however, is not what the upholders of the prepare-for-war doctrine mean, as a little study of their words makes clear. not a general increase of armaments that they desire-that would not be to the purpose at all-but an increase of our own armaments only. Their aim is to have our nation so much more strongly armed than the others that they dare not attack us. It seems questionable whether some do mean this; whether they have anything more in their minds than a vague idea that the more strongly we are armed the greater is our security, in that we are better able to repel attack. But where is the logic in this? Increase of power to repel attack is not synonymous with prevention of war; nor does it, in itself, even tend toward it. It is evidently assumed that just in proportion as we increase our armaments, so do we lessen the likelihood of being attacked. But the assumption is not warranted it is not necessarily so. If the increase be such as to secure a very marked advantage over possible attackers, it will in some degree lessen the risk of attack, but not otherwise. It is difficult to find the least logical ground for supporters of the prepare-for-war doctrine who do not go all the way for absolute supremacy. In that position there is logic. Nations don't usually enter war without comparing their strength with their opponents', and unless they think they have a fair chance of success; therefore, if we can attain a position of great advantage in size of armaments, other nations will be more cautious of making war against us. It appears to be good reasoning; but it is, after all, a conditional deduction there are variable factors in the situation which may quite upset the reckoning. A nation's power to succeed in war cannot be exactly measured by the number of its men in arms and battleships: the possession of certain qualities of mind may more than counterbalance a great disadvantage in size of armaments. How often has it happened that a nation which relied on its superior numerical strength has been defeated! Have we not a very modern instance of the great and arrogant being brought low? All men know this, and though we may gain a position of very considerable advantage in size of armaments, the difference between the resources of our own and other nations is not such that the others could not, if they determined on it, place themselves in a position to cope with The knowledge that their opponents have superior strength makes a people cautious of entering war, and thus delays hostility, but they husband their strength and watch for favourable opportunity; and it is very uncertain that the consideration of a nation of their opponents, superior strength would cause wars to be much less frequent. us. Then, if such a position of advantage be gained, can it be kept? We succeeded some years ago in establishing a naval supremacy. The result has been-what a study of the situation would lead one to expect to give a great and general stimulus to increase of naval forces. The fact is, the nations will not be satisfied to have one people dominant, and thus in a position to dictate to them; and naturally they have endeavoured to balance our navy by increasing theirs. As we increase our force further to maintain |