real knowledge; because intending things no farther than they agree with thofe his ideas, he is fure what he knows concerning thofe figures, when they have barely an ideal existence in his mind, will hold true of them alfo, when they have a real existence in matter; his confideration being barely of those figures, which are the fame, wherever or however they exist.

$7. And of Moral.

AND hence it follows, that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as mathematics: For certainty being but the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, and demonftration nothing but the perception of fuch agreement, by the intervention of other ideas or mediums, our moral ideas, as well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and fo adequate and complete ideas, all the agreement or difagreement which we fhall find in them, will produce real knowledge, as well as in mathematical figures.

§ 8. Exiflence not required to make it real. FOR the attaining of knowledge and certainty, it is requifite that we have determined ideas; and to make our knowledge real, it is requifite that the ideas anfwer their archetypes. Nor let it be wondered, that I place the certainty of our knowledge in the confideration of our ideas, with fo little care and regard (as it may feem) to the real exiftence of things; fince most of thofe difcourfes, which take up the thoughts, and engage the difputes of those who pretend to make it their bufinefs to inquire after truth and certainty, will, I prefume, upon examination, be found to be generel propofitions and notions in which existence is not at all concerned. All the difcourfes of the mathematicians about the fquaring of a circle, conic fections, or any other part of mathematics, concern not the existence of any of thofe figures; but their demonftrations, which depend on their ideas, are the fame, whether there be any fquare or circle exifting in the world or no. In the fame manner, the truth and certainty of moral difcourfes abstracts from the lives.

of men, and the existence of thofe virtues in the world whereof they treat. Nor are Tully's Offices lefs true, because there is nobody in the world that exa&ly practises his rules, and lives up to that pattern of a virtuous man which he has given us, and which exifted no where, when he writ, but in idea. If it be true in fpeculation, i. e. in idea, that murder deferves death, it will also be true in reality of any action that exifts conformable to that idea of murder. As for other actions, the truth of that propofition concerns them not. And thus it is of all other fpecies of things, which have no other effence but those ideas which are in the minds of men.

$9.

Nor will it be lefs true or certain, because moral Ideas are of our own making and naming. BUT it will here be faid, that if moral knowledge be placed in the contemplation of our own moral ideas, and those, as other modes, be of our own making, what strange notions will there be of justice and temperance? What confufion of virtues and vices, if every one may make what ideas of them he pleases? No confufion nor diforder in the things themfelves, nor the reasonings about them; no more than (in mathematics) there would be a disturbance in the demonstration, or a change in the properties of figures, and their relations one to another, if a man fhould make a triangle with four corners, or a trapezium with four right angles; that is, in plain English, change the names of the figures, and call that by one name, which mathematicians call ordinarily by another. For let a man make to himself the idea of a figure with three angles, whereof one is a right one, and call it, if he pleafe, equilaterum or trapez um, or any thing elfe, the properties of, and demonftrations about that idea will be the fame, as if he called it a rectangular triangle. I confefs, the change of the name, by the impropriety of speech, will at firft disturb him, who knows not what idea it lands for; but as foon as the figure is drawn, the confequences and demonftration are plain and clear. Juft the fame is it in moral

knowledge, let a man have the idea of taking from others, without their confent, what their honeft induftry has poffeffed them of, and call this juftice, if he please. He that takes the name here without the idea put to it will be mistaken, by joining another idea of his own to that name; but ftrip the idea of that name, or take it fuch as it is in the fpeaker's mind, and the fame things will agree to it, as if you called it injuftice. Indeed wrong names in moral difcourfes breed ufually more diforder, because they are not fo eafily rectified as in mathematics, where the figure once drawn and feen, makes the name useless and of no force; for what need of a fign, when the thing fignified is present and in view? But in moral names, that cannot be fo easily and fhortly done, because of the many decompofitions that go to the making up the complex ideas of thofe modes. But yet for all this, mifcalling of any of thofe ideas, contrary to the ufual fignification of the words of that language, hinders not but that we may have certain and demonftrative knowledge of their feveral agreements and disagreements, if we will carefully, as in mathematics, keep to the fame precife ideas, and trace them in their several relations one to another, without being led away by their names. If we but feparate the idea under confideration from the fign that ftands for it, our knowledge goes equally on in the difcovery of real truth and certainty, whatever founds

we make use of.

§ 10. Mifnaming disturbs not the Certainty of the

Knowledge.

ONE thing more we are to take notice of, that where God, or any other law-maker hath defined any moral names, there they have made the effence of that fpecies to which that name belongs; and there it is not fafe to apply or use them otherwife; but in other cafes, it is bare impropriety of speech to apply them contrary to the common ufage of the country. But yet even this too disturbs not the certainty of that knowledge, which is ftill to be had by a due contem plation, and comparing of thofe even nick-named ideas.

11. Ideas of Subftances have their Archetypes without us.

THIRDLY, There is another fort of complex ideas, which being referred to archetypes without us, may differ from them, and fo our knowledge about them may come short of being real. Such are our ideas of fubftances, which confifting of a collection of fimple ideas, fuppofed taken from the works of nature, may yet vary from them by having more or different ideas united in them, than are to be found united in things themselves; from whence it comes to pafs, that they may, and often do fail of being exactly conformable to things themselves.

12. So far as they agree with those, fo far our Knowledge concerning them is real.

I SAY then, that to have ideas of fubftances, which, by being conformable to things, may afford us real knowledge, it is not enough, as in modes, to put together fuch ideas as have no inconfiftence, though they did never before so exift; v. g. the ideas of facrilege or perjury, &c. were as real and true ideas before, as after the existence of any such fact. But our ideas of fubftances being fuppofed copies, and referred to archetypes without us, muft itill be taken from fomething that does or has exifted; they must not confist of ideas put together at the pleasure of our thoughts, without any real pattern they were taken from, though we can perceive no inconfiftence in fuch a combination. The reason whereof is, because we, knowing not what real conftitution it is of fubftances whereon our fimple ideas depend, and which really is the cause of the strict union of fome of them one with another, and the exclufion of others; there are very few of them that we can be fure are or are not inconfiftent in nature, any farther than experience and fenfible obfervation reach. Herein therefore is founded the reality of our knowledge concerning fubftances, that all our complex ideas of them must be such, and fuch only, as are made up of fuch fimple ones as have been difcovered to coexist in nature. And our ideas being thus true,

though not perhaps very exact copies, are yet the fubjects of real (as far as we have any) knowledge of them; which (as has been already fhown) will not be found to reach very far; but fo far as it does, it will still be real knowledge. Whatever ideas we have, the agree ment we find they have with others, will still be knowledge. If thofe ideas be abftract, it will be general knowledge; but to make it real concerning fubftances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things. Whatever fimple ideas have been found to co-exist in any fubftance, thefe we may with confidence join together again, and fo make abstract ideas of subftances; for whatever have once had an union in nature, may be united again.

13. In our inquiries about Subftances, we must confider Ideas, and not confine our Thoughts to Names or Species fuppofed fet out by Names. THS, if we rightly confider, and confine not our thoughts and abftract ideas to names, as if there were, or could be no other forts of things than what known names had already determined, and as it were fet out, we should think of things with greater freedom and lefs confufion than perhaps we do. It would poffibly be thought a bold paradox, if not a very dangerous falfehood, if I should say, that fome changelings, who have lived forty years together without any appearance of reason, are fomething between a man and a beat; which prejudice is founded upon nothing else but a falfe fuppofition, that these two names, man and beaft, ftand for diftinct fpecies, fo fet out by real ef fences, that there can come no other fpecies between them; whereas, if we will abftract from those names, and the fuppofition of fuch specific effences made by nature, wherein all things of the fame denominations did exactly and equally partake; if we would not fancy that there were a certain number of thefe effences, wherein all things, as in moulds, were cast and formed, we should find that the idea of the fhape, motion, and life of a man without reafon, is as much a distinct idea, and makes as much a diftinct fort of things from