66 thing that is able to rule him that ufeth it; " though this be nothing but an explication of the fame word by itself. § 2. Not much better is his explication of the term faith, which he tells us, in the common fenfe of man"kind is the fame with believing." He declared in 66 deed beforehand, p. 4. that he did not "intend to give 66 rigorous fchool-definitions of either this or the former "word;" and, to do him right, he hath not in the least fwerved from his intention. It were to be wished he had prefaced fome fuch thing to his demonstrations; for the reader will find, that they are not a whit more rigorous than his definitions: the latter of which doth very much resemble the countryman's way of defining, who, being afked by his neighbour what an invafion was, after fome study, told him very gravely, that "an invafion was 66 as if he fhould fay an invafion." In like manner Mr. S. tells us, that "faith (or, which is all one, be"lief) is the fame with believing;" which, in my apprehenfion, is but a country-definition, unless the interpofing of those folemn words, "in the common sense of mankind," may be thought to mend the matter. This puts me in mind of what Mr. S. fays in his transition, (as he calls it), where he gives the reader an account what feats he hath done in his book: "He will fee, (fays he, 66 p. 159.), I take my rife at the meaning of the words "rule and faith; this known, I establish my first prin"ciples in this present matter to be these, viz. A rule is 66 a rule; Faith is faith." This is the right self-evident method he talks fo much of, and his principles agree admirably well with his definitions. If he had but proceeded in the fame method, and added, That a rule of faith is a rule of faith; that oral tradition is oral tradition; and, That to fay oral tradition is the rule of faith, is as much as to fay, oral tradition is the rule of faith, the whole business had been concluded without any more ado; and I think no body would have gone about to confute him. 3. Rejecting then his way of definition, as inept and frivolous, and no ways tending to give a man a clearer notion of things; I fhall endeavour to explain a little better, if I can, the meaning of these terms. A A rule (when we fpeak of a rule of faith) is a metaphorical word, which, in its first and proper fenfe, being applied to material and fenfible things, is the measure according to which we judge of the ftraightness and crookedness of things; and from hence it is transferred by analogy to things moral or intellectual. A moral rule is the measure according to which we judge whether a thing be good or evil; and this kind of rule is that which is commonly called a law; and the agreement or difagreement of our actions to this rule, is, fuitably to the metaphor, called rectitude or obliquity. An intellectual rule is the measure according to which we judge whether a thing be true or falfe. And this is either general or more particular. Common notions, and the acknowledged principles of reafon, are that general rule according to which we judge whether a thing be true or false. The particular principles of every science are the more particular rules according to which we judge whether things in that fcience be true or falfe. So that the general notion of a rule is, that it is "a measure, by the agreement or difagreement to which we judge of all things of that kind to which it belongs." 66 $4. Faith, though both among facred and profane writers it be used many times more generally, for a perfuafion or affent of the mind to any thing wrought in us by any kind of argument; yet, as it is a term of art used by divines, it fignifies that particular kind of affent which is wrought in us by testimony or authority: fo that divine faith, which we are now speaking of, is an affent to a thing upon the teftimony or authority of God; or, which is all one, an affent to a truth upon divine revelation." 66 66 $5. A rule of faith is the measure according to which we judge what matters we are to affent to, as revealed to us by God, and what not. And, more particularly, the rule of Christian faith is the measure according to which we are to judge what we ought to affent to, as the doctrine revealed by Chrift to the world, and what not. § 6. So that this question, "What is the rule of Chri"stian faith?" fuppofeth a doctrine revealed by Christ to the world; and that that doctrine was intelligibly and entirely delivered by Chrift to his Apoftles, and fuffici ent ent confirmation given to it; that this doctrine was in the fame manner published to the world by the Apostles, who likewife gave fufficient evidence of the truth of it. All this is neceffarily fuppofed in the queftion: for it would be in vain to inquire, whether this or that be the rule of Christian faith, if fuch a thing as the Chriftian faith were not first fuppofed. When therefore we inquire, what is the rule of Christian faith? the meaning of that inquiry is, by what way and means the knowledge of Chrift's doctrine is conveyed certainly down to us, who live at the distance of fo many ages from the time of its firft delivery? for this being known, we have the rule of faith; that is, a measure by which we may judge what we are to affent to as the doctrine of Chrift, and what not. So that, when any question ariseth about any particular propofition, whether this be part of Chrift's doctrine, we may be able by this rule to refolve it. SECT. II. Mr. S.'s rule of faith. $1.THE next thing to be confidered is, his refolution of this question; by which we shall know what his opinion is concerning the rule of faith; for that being known, the controverfy between us will eafily be stated. 66 His opinion in general is, that oral or practical tradition, in oppofition to writing, or any other way that can be affigned, is the rule of faith. By oral or practical tradition, he means, p. 41. a delivery down from "hand to hand, by words, and a conftant courfe of fre66 quent and visible actions, conformable to those words, "of the fenfe and faith of forefathers." 2. Now, that I may bring the controverfy between us to a clear state, I am first to take a more particular view of his opinion concerning the rule of faith, that fo I may the better understand how much he attributes to oral tradition, and what to the scriptures, or written tradition and then I am to lay down the Protestant rule of faith, that fo it may appear how far we agree, and how far we differ. The fum of what he attributes to oral tradition, fo far as can be collected out of fo obfcure VOL. III. Y -and and confufed a difcourfe, may be reduced to these five heads. §3. 1, That the doctrine of Chriftian religion was delivered by Chrift to the Apostles, and by them published to the world; and that the age which first received it from the Apostles, delivered it as they received it without any change or corruption to their children, and they to theirs, and fo it went on folely by this way of oral tradition. This is the fum of his explication of tradition, difc. 5. §4. 2dly, That this way alone is not only fufficient to convey this doctrine down to all ages certainly, and without any alteration; but it is the only poffible way that can be imagined of conveying down a doctrine fecurely from one age to another. And this is the natural refult of his difcourfe about the properties of a rule of faith for if the true properties of a rule of faith do belong to oral tradition, then it is a fufficient means; and if those properties do folely and effentially appertain to it, and are incompatible to any thing else, as he endeavours to prove, then it is impoffible there fhould be any other way. $5. 3dly, That it is impoffible this means fhould fail, or mifs of its end; that is, the doctrine of Chrift being once put into this way of conveyance, it can neither ccafe to defcend, nor be at any time corrupted or changed in its defcent. This is that which his demonstrations pretend to prove. $6. 4thly, That the infallibility of oral tradition, or the impoffibility of its failing, is a first and self-evident principle. This he frequently afferts throughout his book. § 7. 5thly, That this way of oral tradition hath de fato in all ages been acknowledged by Chriftians, as the only way and means whereby the doctrine of Chriftianity hath been conveyed down to them. And this is that which he attempts to prove from the confent of authority. §8. As for the fcriptures, he grants them indeed to have been written by men divinely infpired, and to contain a divine doctrine, even the fame which is delivered by oral tradition. So he tells us, p. 117. "It is cer ❝ tain 66 66 "tain the Apostles taught the fame doctrine they writ.” But then he denies it to be of any ufe without oral tradition, because neither the letter nor fenfe of it can without that be afcertained. So he faith in his letter to Dr. Cafaubon, p. 337. "As for the fcriptures, (afcertain66 ing their letter and fenfe, which is done by tradition), "it is clear they are of incomparable value, not only "for the divine doctrine contained in them; but alfo "for many particular paffages, whofe fource or first at"teftation not being univerfal, nor their nature múch practical, might poffibly have been loft in their con-' veyance down by tradition." Where, though he gives the fcriptures very good words, it is to be undertood, provided they will be fubordinate, and acknowledge that they owe their fenfe, and their being intelligible and useful, to oral tradition: for if any man fhall prefume to fay, that this book hath any certain fenfe without oral tradition, or that God can write plainly and intelligibly, and that this book which he hath indited is fo written, and doth not depend upon tradition for its fense and interpretation; then the moft fcurrilous language is not bad enough for the fcriptures: then what are those facred writings, but "ink variously figured in a book?” (Append. 4. p. 319.); "unfenfed characters, waxen-na"tured words, not yet fenfed, nor having any certain "interpreter, but fit to be played upon diverfely by quirks "of wit; that is, apt to blunder and confound, but to "clear little or nothing?" (Ibid. p. 68.). Thefe, with many other difgraceful terms, he very liberally bestows upon the divine oracles: the confideration whereof, did it not minister too much horror, would afford fome comfort; for by this kind of rude ufage, fo familiar with him towards his adverfaries, one may reasonably conjecture, that he doth not reckon the fcriptures among his friends. $9. And whereas he faith, that "the fcriptures have preferved many particular paffages, which, because "their fource or first atteftation was not univerfal, nor "their nature much practical, might possibly have been "loft in their conveyance down by tradition;" this is impoffible, according to his hypothefis: for if neither the fcripture's letter, nor the certain sense of it, as to' Y 2 the |