ssertions in the motions to dismiss that the indenture or covenant which is the basis of the bill, is " void " in that it contrary to and forbidden by the Fifth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. This contention is entirely acking in substance or color of merit. The Fifth Amendnent "is a limitation only upon the powers of the General Government," Talton v. Mayes, 163 U. S. 376, 382, and is not directed against the action of individuals. The Thirteenth Amendment denouncing slavery and involunary servitude, that is, a condition of enforced compulsory service of one to another, does not in other matters proect the individual rights of persons of the negro race. Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1, 16, 18. And the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment "have reference to state action exclusively, and not to any action of private individuals." Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 318; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 639. "It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subjectmatter of the Amendment." Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3, 11. It is obvious that none of these Amendments prohibited private individuals from entering into contracts respecting the control and disposition of their own property; and there is no color whatever for the contention that they rendered the indenture void. And, plainly. the claim urged in this Court that they were to be looked to, in connection with the provisions of the Revised Statutes and the decisions of the courts, in determining the contention, earnestly pressed, that the indenture is void as being "against public policy," does not involve a constitutional question within the meaning of the Code provision.

The claim that the defendants drew in question the construction" of §§ 1977, 1978 and 1979 of the Revised Statutes, is equally unsubstantial. The only question raised as to these statutes under the pleadings was the

assertion in the motion interposed by the defendant C tis, that the indenture is void in that it is forbidden by laws enacted in aid and under the sanction of the T teenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Assuming t this contention drew in question the "construction" of these statutes, as distinguished from their "application" it is obvious, upon their face, that while they provi inter alia, that all persons and citizens shall have equi right with white citizens to make contracts and acquir property, they, like the Constitutional Amendment under whose sanction they were enacted, do not in any manner prohibit or invalidate contracts entered into by priva individuals in respect to the control and disposition c their own property. There is no color for the contentior that they rendered the indenture void; nor was it claime in this Court that they had, in and of themselves, ary such effect.

We therefore conclude that neither the constitutional nor statutory questions relied on as grounds for the appes to this Court have any substantial quality or color c merit, or afford any jurisdictional basis for the appeal.

And, while it was further urged in this Court that the decrees of the courts below in themselves deprived the defendants of their liberty and property without de process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, this contention likewise cannot serve as a jurisdictional basis for the appeal. Assuming that such a contention, if of a substantial character, might have constituted ground for an appeal under paragraph 3 of the Code provision, it was not raised by the petition for the appeal or by any assignment of error, either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court; and it likewise is lacking in substance. The defendants were given a full hearing ir both courts; they were not denied any constitutional er statutory right; and there is no semblance of ground for any contention that the decrees were so plainly arbitrary

I contrary to law as to be acts of mere spoliation. See Imar Jockey Club v. Missouri, supra, 335. Mere error a court, if any there be, in a judgment entered after a 1 hearing, does not constitute a denial of due process law. Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 112; nes v. Buffalo Creek Coal Co., 245 U. S. 328, 329. It results that, in the absence of any substantial contutional or statutory question giving us jurisdiction of is appeal under the provisions of § 250 of the Judicial ode, we cannot determine upon the merits the contenons earnestly pressed by the defendants in this court at the indenture is not only void because contrary to ublic policy, but is also of such a discriminatory charcter that a court of equity will not lend its aid by enorcing the specific performance of the covenant. These re questions involving a consideration of rules not expressed in any constitutional or statutory provision, but laimed to be a part of the common or general law in orce in the District of Columbia; and, plainly, they may ot be reviewed under this appeal unless jurisdiction of he case is otherwise acquired.

Hence, without a consideration of these questions, the appeal must be, and is

Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

UNITED STATES v. ZERBEY ET AL.

ON CERTIFICATE FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT of appealS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT.

No. 790. Argued March 3, 1926.-Decided May 24, 1926.

A surety bond, required by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under § 6, Tit. II of the Prohibition Act, in connection with a permit issued to the obligor to sell wines and distilled spirits for other than beverage purposes, and conditioned "that if the said

GONG LUM ET AL. v. RICE ET AL.

(275 U.S. 78 (1927))

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPP. No. 29. Submitted October 12, 1927.-Decided November 21, 13

A child of Chinese blood, born in, and a citizen of, the United State is not denied the equal protection of the laws by being classed by the State among the colored races who are assigned to public schoo separate from those provided for the whites, when equal faci for education are afforded to both classes. P. 85.

139 Miss. 760, affirmed.

ERROR to a judgment of the Supreme Court of Missis sippi, reversing a judgment awarding the writ of mandamus. The writ was applied for in the interest di Martha Lum, a child of Chinese blood, born in the United States, and was directed to the trustees of a high school district and the State Superintendant of Education, commanding them to cease discriminating against her and t admit her to the privileges of the high school specified. which was assigned to white children exclusively.

Messrs. J. N. Flowers, Earl Brewer, and Edward C. Brewer for plaintiff in error.

The white, or Caucasian, race, which makes the laws and construes and enforces them, thinks that in order to protect itself against the infusion of the blood of other races its children must be kept in schools from which other races are excluded. The classification is made for the exclusive benefit of the law-making race. The basic assumption is that if the children of two races associate daily in the school room the two races will at last intermix; that the purity of each is jeopardized by the mingling of the children in the school room; that such association among children means social intercourse and social equality. This danger, the white race, by its laws, seeks to divert from itself. It levies the taxes on all alike to

port a public school system, but in the organization of system it creates its own exclusive schools for its chilen, and other schools for the children of all other races attend together.

If there is danger in the association, it is a danger from ich one race is entitled to protection just the same as other. The white race may not legally expose the llow race to a danger that the dominant race recogzes and, by the same laws, guards itself against. The ite race creates for itself a privilege that it denies to her races; exposes the children of other races to risks and ngers to which it would not expose its own children. his is discrimination. Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 549; trauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303.

Color may reasonably be used as a basis for classificaon only in so far as it indicates a particular race. Race ay reasonably be used as a basis. "Colored " describes mly one race, and that is the negro. State v. Treadway, 26 La. 52; Lehew v. Brummell, supra; Plessy v. Feruson, 163 U. S. 537; Berea College v. Kentucky, 133 Ky. 09; West Chester R. R. v. Miles, 55 Pa. St. 209; Tucker . Blease, 97 S. C. 303.

Messrs. Rush H. Knox, Attorney General of Missisippi, and E. C. Sharp for defendants in error.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE TAFT delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was a petition for mandamus filed in the state Circuit Court of Mississippi for the First Judicial District of Bolivar County.

Gong Lum is a resident of Mississippi, resides in the Rosedale Consolidated High School District, and is the father of Martha Lum. He is engaged in the mercantile business. Neither he nor she was connected with the consular service or any other service of the government of China, or any other government, at the time of her birth.