It is not to be supposed that the framers of the constitution overlooked the evil, whatever terms they may have employed to protect the people against it.

The practice, however, in this State, has been uniformly adverse to such a position, and your committee regard the former precedents of this house upon that point as entitled to great consideration.

About the 10th of May, 1842, John Kimball went from Skowhegan into Forks plantation, having taken a farm there. His family remained at the former place until June 27 of that year, when he removed them to the latter place. It was held by this house that he was not a voter in Forks plantation. (Contested election report, Nichols and Bolster, House doc. No. 10, 1843.) The same principle was recognized in the case of Burr and Hilferty, in 1842, when the seat of Burr was declared vacant.

It will be difficult to distinguish between the case of Carter and that of Kimball.

Jurists have recognized the same principle:

"The intention to acquire a new domicil without the fact of removal, avails nothing." (Story conflict of laws, p. 46.)

"Home may be relinquished and abandoned, while the domicil of the party upon which many civil rights and duties depend, may in legal contemplation remain." (Me. R. 19: 300.)

The claimant to this seat, Mr. Carter, was understood by your committee as assuming the position, that if a man leaves his family in one town and takes up his personal residence in another with the intention of remaining, his residence commences in the latter when he arrives there. Such has been regarded to be the law in fixing the settlement of paupers in cases where the separation was final, as in case of a divorce; and had Mr. Carter, in November, 1847, abandoned his wife, forsaken his children, and deserted his home, with the determination of relinquishing them forever, perhaps he might have been in a situation to have established his residence in Portland, within the meaning of the court in the case before cited, of Green and Windham.

But this case finds that there was no sundering of the ties which

bound him in his domestic relations. He left Bridgton; he did not quit it.

The position, however, is not tenable. It was differently decided in the case alluded to, of Kimball, in 1843.

If there was no necessity in law of establishing the domicil of his family in Portland on or before the 11th day of June, 1848, then it still might have remained in Bridgton, and on a declaration from his own mouth that his residence was in the former, he might now represent it.

An important consideration as connected with a residence, is the consciousness of the representative of ultimate responsibility to the people who elect him, to whom he must return, and with whom he must again mingle. He should not only be so connected with them that their interests should be his, but that when the brief period of his delegated authority had closed, he should feel that he was to answer to his fellow-citizens, "face to face as a man talketh with his friend," for the manner in which he had discharged the trusts reposed in him.

Suppose, to carry out the position, that a man whose family resides in Madawaska, should take up his personal residence in a town on the borders of New Hampshire, and declaring that his intention was to remove his family there, should obtain an election and be admitted a member of this house. Suppose he betrays that constituency, and sacrifices their interest to the people with whom he really resides;-when he leaves this house he retires to his family in a distant corner of the State, defying the indignation of an injured people he will meet no more.

Is there not wanting here an important check upon his conduct? To concede the position to be well taken, is to admit that the constitution has given this house no power to protect the people against such an abuse.

The case upon which he relied to sustain this position, is Burnham and Rangly, reported in Woodbury and Minot, 1: 7,-and it deserves a careful consideration. The question at issue was the jurisdiction of the circuit court of the United States.

September 26, 1843, Burnham filed his bill on Rangly, the

respondent, and to give that court jurisdiction averred that he was a citizen of Maine. Rangly pleaded that he was not a citizen of Maine, but of Virginia.

This case finds that prior to 1842, Rangly had been a citizen of Maine, having a wife and two daughters there, and two sons in Virginia. In July, 1842, the respondent went to Virginia, purchased a tract of land and buildings near his sons, and returned to Maine to adjust his affairs and remove his family. In October of that year he sent to Virginia a part of his household furniture, took with him one of his daughters and removed to the plantation he had bought. He there purchased the usual accompaniments of similar establishments, fitted up his dwelling, improved his grounds, and in the spring of 1843 sent for his wife and daughter. They did not however then go.

He sold his house in Portland, in which his wife and daughter continued to live, and in September, 1843, returned to Maine to remove them. He then sold the balance of his furniture, and two days after the bill was brought against him, sailed with them for Virginia.

The fact is apparent that the respondent had two establishments, one in Virginia, where he owned a plantation, and one in Portland in Maine, occupying a house which he had sold some months before the bill was filed. In the one, was himself and one daughter; in the other, his wife and the other daughter-the family being equally divided. The court treated it as a case of divided domicil, and for the purposes of that suit the election was given to the res pondent in which State he would elect to fix his residence. The narginal note is perhaps the fairest synopsis of the law settled in this case:

"If the respondent owned land ir. Virginia which he was culti vating and residing on with one daughter, and intending to have his family reside on and did not intend to return to Maine, except to remove his wife and another daughter, he may be regarded as having his domicil in Virginia.

It is not necessary to such a domicil that the party have obtained a right to vote or hold office.

If a party has two places of residence, he may elect which shall

be his domicil; the residence of the wife is in subordination to that of the husband. A former domicil is presumed to continue till the party shows clearly a new one."

The court say that "leaving one's family behind and especially only a part of them, does not, under such circumstances, however different it might be under others, prevent the domicil from being changed. The court also intimate that where the residence of the wife is different from the husband, it may at times, have an influence on his, and refer to the opinion of the supreme judicial court of this state, above quoted, where our court have ruled that when a man's family is in one town and himself in another, he can vote only in that where his family reside." (Greenleaf R. 7: 501. This opinion was not overruled in Burnham vs. Rangly.)

No comment is necessary upon the case. It was a question of jurisdiction of that court only, not of residence, as giving municipal and political rights.

It is obvious upon the face of it, that the court did not intend to establish any different principles than those contained in the well settled law in this state, by its supreme judicial court, and by the paramount authority of the house of representatives. (See Cooper vs. Galbraith, Wash. R. 3: 554; Met. 5: 590; Met. 1: 250; Report of contested elections, 165; Mass. 13: 501; Mass. 11; Pick. 5: 372; Greenleaf 5: 143, and cases there cited.)

In examining the law settled in the case cited and as established by the precedents upon which, so far as your committee have been able to judge, this house has hitherto acted, they can but find, that when a man in this state having established his residence in one town and there supports and maintains his family, discharging the duties incident to the domestic relation, takes up his personal residence in another with the intention at some future day of removing them there, his legal residence continues in the former town until the day on which the family and establishment is broken up and removed.

They find further, that Henry Carter was, on the 11th day of June, 1848, and long before, a resident of Bridgton, in the county

of Cumberland, and remained a resident thereof until the 19th day of that month.

The record of the vote in relation to McCobb, is given in the former part of this report. The clerk of ward No. 5, in Portland, was seen, and testified that the one vote thrown for T. McCobb, was thrown in that ward. The ballot is hereunto annexed marked "A," on the record of said ward. The vote was originally printed thus:

Representatives.

Byron Greenough, | Harris C. Barnes,

James T. McCobb.

It will be perceived that the word James was torn off, and in deciding this question it is important to consider what were the intentions of the elector in mutilating the ballot. It was proved there was no citizen of Portland of the patronymic McCobb having a baptismal name with the initial T., except James T. McCobb. Your committee entertained no doubt that the name James T. McCobb was once borne upon this ballot. Did therefore, the elector intend to destroy the name of McCobb when he tore off that of Greenough-or did he intend only to remove the latter, injuring the former as little as possible in doing so?

It will be perceived that it would be somewhat difficult to remove the name of Greenough from the ballot by tearing it off, without destroying the James on the name below.

Of the intention of the elector, however, your committee do not intend to express any opinion, as all the facts are before the house on which it could be formed.

If the intention of the elector was to vote for James T. McCobb, this ballot may be so counted. (See report of committee on votes

for governor, made January 19, 1830.)

Your committee therefore submit the following resolves :

JAMES WALKER,

G. P. SEWALL,

ELIAS HAM,

ROBERT MARTIN.