ceed and give judgment, according as the right of the cause and matter in law shall appear to them, without regarding any imperfections, defects, or want of form in the judgment or course of proceeding, except that specially demurred to. IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, sitting for the County of Washington. This case came before the court from the 18] District of Columbia, *and was argued by Mr. Core for the plaintiffs in error, and by Mr. Key for the defendants. The case is fully stated in the following opinion of the court, delivered by Mr. Chief Justice TANEY: This case comes before the court upon a writ of error, directed to the judges of the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, sitting for the County of Washington. It is an action of ejectment brought by the Bank of the United States, to recover sundry lots of ground in the city of Washington. The declaration contains four demises, purporting to have been made for the same premises by different lessors. The jury found for the plaintiff upon one of the demises, but said nothing of the other three; and the judgment of the court is entered, in like manner, upon the particular demise on which the jury found for the plaintiff; and without taking any notice of the others. At the trial in the Circuit Court, it was admitted that David Burnes was seized in fee of the premises in controversy in his lifetime, and that he died seized thereof, intestate, leaving Marcia Burnes his only child and heiressat-law. The plaintiff in the court below, then offered in evidence the exemplification of a record from the Court of Chancery of Maryland, duly certified, by which it appeared that a certain Isaac Pollock, on the 17th of May, 1800. filed his bill in the said court, against Marcia Burnes, then an infant, in order to obtain the conveyance of a large number of lots, in the city of Washington, among which are the lots now in controversy; and claiming the same under a contract made with David Burnes in his lifetime, which had not been carried into execution by proper conveyances at the time of his death. It further appeared, by the said record from the court of Chancery, that after various proceedings in the case, the Chancellor, on the 1st of November, 1800, decreed, that upon the complainant's securing the purchase money to the satisfaction of the Chancellor, the infant defendant, Marcia Burnes, should, by William Mayne Duncanson, who had been appointed her guardian ad litem, convey the said lots to Pollock in fee. Afterwards, further proceedings having been had, the court. on the 26th of October, 1801, passed another decree, approving the security which Pollock offered (which was security on other real property), and directing that upon the complainant's executing mortgages for the said real property to the said Marcia, to secure the pay ment of the purchase money, she should make the conveyance by her guardian, as directed by the former decree. It is unnecessary to siste more in detail the proceedings in the Maryland court, because it is admitted that they were fully warranted by the laws of that State. The plaintiff in the Circuit Court offered also in evidence, together with this record, the deeds of mortgage executed by the said Pollock, pursuant to the aforesaid decree; and also a deed of conveyance for the said lots from Marcia Burnes to Pollock, executed by William Mayne Duncanson as her guardian. This deed is dated January 12th, 1802, after Con- [*19 gress had assumed the government of this district. The defendant in the Circuit Court objected to the admissibility and competency of all the evidence above stated; but the objection was overruled by the court, and this forms the first exception. In the further progress of the trial in the Circuit Court, various other deeds were offered in evidence on the part of the plaintiff, in order to show a title derived from Isaac Pollock; and among the deeds thus offered, was one from Walter Smith to Benjamin Stoddard, dated March 5, 1807, acknowledged before Richard Parrott and Thomas Corcoran. This acknowl edgment was dated District of Columbia, Washington County, to wit:" but it was not stated in the acknowledgment, nor did it appear by that instrument, that Parrott and Corcoran were justices of the peace for Washington County. In point of fact, however, they were such justices, and it is so admitted in the exception. The defendant objected to the admissibility of this deed; and this forms the substance of the second exception: for although other papers are mentioned as objected to at the time, the only point raised here is upon the acknowledgment of this deed. Upon the first exception the plaintiffs in error insist that the deed of conveyance from Marcia Burnes to Pollock, of the 12th of January, 1802, executed by her guardian as above mentioned, pursuant to the decree of the Maryland Court of Chancery, conveyed no title; that the sovereignty of Maryland over Washington County, in this district, having terminated on the 27th of February, 1801, when Congress assumed the jurisdiction, the decree of the State court could not be executed without filing an exemplification of the record, according to the 13th section of the act of Congress which provided for the government of the territory; and obtaining an order for the execution of the decree from the Chancery Court of this district. This objection cannot be sustained. The Act of Assembly of Maryland, of 1791 (ch. 45), which ceded the territory to the United States, provided, "That the jurisdiction of the laws of the State over the persons and property of individuals residing within the limits of the cession, should not cease or determine until Congress should by law provide for the gov ernment thereof under their jurisdiction." The United States accepted the cession made by this law of the State; and the conditions above mentioned, therefore, formed a part of the contract between the parties; and consequently the laws of Maryland, and the jurisdiction of its courts, continued in full force, until Congress took upon itself the government of the district: and as it was uncertain at what time the United States would assume the jurisdiction, it must have been foreseen, that whenever that event should happen many suits would be found pending and undetermined in the State courts. 44 It is argued that it should have been signed 'Marcia Burnes, by her guardian W. M. Duncanson," and in like manner acknowledged "as her act and deed." This is a case, where no question arises as to the manner of executing an authority given by private persons, as to which the case of the The Lessee of Clark v. Courtney (5 Peters's R., 319, 349, 350) may justly apply: But is the case where an authority is to be exercised under the decree of a court of chancery, and therefore, where a liberal construction may and ought to prevail. These two forms of signature and acknowledgment mean precisely the same thing; and as this deed substantially conforms in the manner of its execution to the directions contained in the decree, we consider it to be valid and effectual to convey the property therein mentioned. Upon the second exception, the plaintiff in error contends that the acknowledgment of the deed from Walter Smith to Benjamin Stoddart is defective, and the deed inoperative, because it does not appear in the certificate of acknowledgment indorsed upon the deed that the persons before whom it was made were at that time justices of the peace for Washington County; and he insists that this omission cannot be supplied by parol. It was certainly not the intention of the parties | knowledges it "to be *his act and deed, as [*21 to the cession that such suits should abate, and guardian as aforesaid, and thereby the act and 20*] *that individuals who had rightfully insti- deed of the said Marcia." tuted proceedings in the tribunals of the State, and incurred the expense and delays which are unavoidable in such cases, should immediately upon the assumption, of jurisdiction by the United States, be compelled to abandon the State courts, and to begin anew in the courts of the district. There could be no reason of policy or justice for adopting such a measure: and without stopping to inquire what, upon general principles of law. would be the effect of a cession of territory, upon suits then pending in the courts of the ceding sovereignty, it is evident that in this case, the State and the United States both intended that the suits then pending in the Maryland tribunals should be proceeded in until the rights of the parties should be finally decided; and that the judgments and decrees there made, should be as valid and conclusive as if the sovereignty had not been transferred. We have already stated the provisions of the act of Assembly of Maryland; and Congress in assuming the jurisdiction recognized the rights of the State courts, and by the 13th section of the Act of February 27th, 1801, placed judgments and decrees thereafter to be obtained in the State courts, in suits then pending, upon the same footing with judgments and decrees rendered before. In either case, upon filing an exemplification of the proceedings had in the State courts, it authorized process of execution from the District Court of the United States, in the same manner as if the judgment or decree had been there rendered. It makes no exception in regard to real property situated in the district, and the rights to such property then in litigation are placed on the same ground with rights to personal property and personal rights; and like them, are left to the final adjudication of the courts of the States. And although upon a strict and technical construction of the 13th section of the act of Congress before referred to, it may be doubted whether this decree falls within that description of judgments and decrees for which provision is there made; yet when the conditions upon which the cession was made by Maryland, and accepted by Congress, are considered, it is very clear, that if the guardian appointed by the State court had died or had refused to make the conveyance as ordered, the court of this district would, upon the application of Pollock, have been bound to appoint another person to execute the deed, and would not have been authorized to open again and re-examine the questions which had been decided in the Maryland court. And in such a case the conveyance to Pollock, by the infant heiress of Burnes, would have owed its validity altogether to the decree of the State tribunal; and the title of the garantee would have received no additional strength from the order of the District Court. We can, therefore, see no necessity for an order from that court, when the guardian appointed was willing to execute it, and did execute it, in obedience to the decree of the Maryland court. It This question depends upon the construction of the acts of assembly of Maryland which prescribe the mode in which deeds shall be acknowledged for the conveyance of real property; those acts of assembly having been adopted by Congress in the act assuming jurisdiction, together with the other laws of Maryland then in force. We perceive nothing in the Maryland acts of assembly which requires justices of the peace or other officers to describe in their certificates their official characters. is no doubt usual and proper to do so, because the statement in the certificate is prima facie evidence of the fact, where the instrument has been received and recorded by the proper authority. But such a statement is not made necessary by the Maryland statutes. And whenever it is established by proof that the acknowledgment was made before persons authorized to take it, it must be presumed to have been taken by them in their official capacity; and when their official characters are sufficiently shown by parol evidence, or by the admissions of the parties, we see no reason for requiring more where the acts of the Legislature have not prescribed it. On the contrary, the soundest principles of justice and policy would seem to demand that every reasonable intendment should be made to support the titles of the bona fide purchasers of real property; and this court is not disposed to impair their safety, by insisting upon matters of form, unless they were evidently required by the legislative authority. If the Maryland courts had given a contrary construction to these acts of Assembly, we should of course feel it to be our duty to follow their decision. But we do not find the An objection has also been taken to the point decided in any of the Maryland reports. manner in which this deed is signed and ac- In the case of Connelly v. Bowie (6 Harr. & knowledged. It is signed W. M. Duncan- *Johns., 141), the certificate of acknowl- [*22 son, guardian for Marcia Burnes;" and he ac-edgment did not state that the persons by whom it was taken were justices of the peace, and there was no evidence in the record to prove their official character. The deed was, there fore, clearly inadmissible; and it was so ruled by the Court of Appeals. But it does not fol low that the decision would have been the same if parol evidence had been given to prove their official character; and from the language of the court in that case, it may rather be inferred. that if other evidence had been offered, it would have been deemed admissible to supply the omission in the certificate indorsed on the deed. MR. SO State of Rhode Island, with the consent of the court, obtained at last term, had amended the bill filed in this case; and he moved the court for a rule on the State of Massachusetts to answer within a short time, so that the case might be disposed of during the term. R. SOUTHARD, for the complainants, submitted to the government of Massachusetts. It was a short time before the adjournment of the Legislature of the State that they were communicated to them. The subject will be again presented by the governor to the Legislature, at the session now held; and it is expected that some action upon it will take place. In the posture in which the case stood at the last term of this court, the Attorney General of the State of Massachusetts has not thought it proper to do anything. The movements of such bodies, as the defendants in this case, are slow. The objection made to the verdict and judg ment applies altogether to the form of the proceeding, and does not in any degree affect the merits of the controversy. The verdict and the judgment, it appears, are upon one of the demises only; and it is insisted that as the jury did not find all of the issues committed to them by the pleadings, the Circuit Court ought not to have entered a judgment for the plaintiff Mr. Webster stated, that although not auupon the issue found in his favor; but should thorized to appear in the case, he thought it have awarded a venire de noco: and that this ir proper to say that the opinions of the court deregularity in the proceedings may be taken ad-livered at the last term in this cause had been vantage of upon a writ of error. It is not necessary to examine whether this objection could be maintained upon the practice and decisions of the English courts in relation to the action of ejectment. For the Act of Congress of 1789 (ch. 20, sec. 32) expressly provides, among other things, that no judgment shall be reversed for any defect or want of form, but that the courts shall proceed and give judgment according as the right of the cause and matter in law shall appear to them, without regarding any imperfections, defects, or want of form in the judgment or course of proceeding, except those specially demurred to. Now, the demises laid in a declaration in ejectment are known to be fictitious and mere form; and if the appellant had taken this objection in the Circuit Court, in arrest of judgment, the plaintiff would undoubtedly have been permitted to strike these demises from the declaration, and thus obviate the objection. The omission of the plaintiff to do this was nothing more than an omission of a matter of form; and if, therefore, this proceeding in the Circuit Court should be held to be irregular, it is nothing more than an error of form; and as such, furnishes no ground for the reversal of the judgment. The judgment of the Circuit Court is therefore afirmed with costs. This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, holden in and for the County of Washington, and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs. Cited-1 McLean, 525. He Mr. Hazard had no objection to an allowance of time to the defendants to answer. had a strong impression that he had seen some proceedings of the Legislature of Massachu setts, at its last session in 1838, by which the direction of this case was left to the counsel employed by the State. He did not think that the slow movements of such bodies should be allowed, when other parties are concerned. He desired that a time for the filing of an answer, by the State of Massachusetts, should be definitely fixed. Mr. Chief Justice TANEY delivered the opinion of the court: A motion was made by the complainant on Saturday last for an order on the defendant to answer the amended bill of the complainant, on or before the 26th day of the present month of January. In deciding upon this motion it is necessary to refer to the orders of the court heretofore passed in this case, and to see what steps have been taken under them. At the last term leave was given to Rhode Island to withdraw the general replication filed in the case, and to amend the bill: the amend ment to be made on or before the first Monday of August *last. At the same term, up- [*24 on the motion of the counsel for Massachusetts, leave was granted to withdraw the plea which the defendant had filed, and also to strike out 23*] *THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND the appearance of Massachusetts to the suit. 0. THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS. Suit between States-practice as to amendment and time for filing answer. Nothing has since been done by the defendant under this leave, for reasons which have been stated at the bar. And as the appearance of Massachusetts has not yet been withdrawn, and as Rhode Island has a right to the usual orders to enable that State to proceed in the suit, the court in passing them must look to the condition of the case as it appears on the record, and consider Massachusetts as still in court, and as appearing in the case. When the motion was made at the last term to amend the bill, two documents which Rhode Island desired to introduce into the cause were filed with the motion; but the leave to amend was general, and not confined to the papers then filed. Nothing appears to have been done by the complainant until the second day of the present term, when the bill was amended by inserting in it the proper allegations, in relation to the two papers above mentioned; and adding also certain interrogatories in relation to sundry matters charged in the bill; which the complainant prays that the defendant may be required to answer. The amendment, therefore, was not made until the second day of the present term. The defendant could not have answered until it was made; and, consequently, is not in default for not answering. The question now is, what time ought to be given? From the character of the parties, and the nature of the controversy, we cannot, without committing great injustice, apply to this case the rules as to time, which govern courts of equity in suits between individuals. In the last mentioned cases, the material allegations in the bill are comparatively few in number, and rest in the personal knowledge of the individual who is to put in his answer. But a case like this, and one, too, of so many years standing, the parties, in the nature of things, must be incapable of acting with the promptness of an individual. Agents must be employed, and much time may be required to search for historical documents, and to arrange and collate them, for the purpose of presenting to the court the true grounds of the defense. It is impossible for the court to foresee what additional inquiries and explanations may be found necessary, in consequence of the new allegations and documents introduced into the bill; and the new interrogatories as to the verity of various papers stated in the bill, which the defendant is now called upon to answer. And as the court have received the amendment of the complainant at the present term, upon the leave granted at the last term, as herein before mentioned, we think that the same time should be given to the defendant to answer. Mr. Justice BALDWIN did not consider the State of Massachusetts before the court; after what had passed at the last term, not considering Massachusetts before the court, he had taken no part in the order now made by the court. S. C., 12 Pet., 657; 14 Pet., 210; 15 Pet., 233. *WILLIAM R. SMITH, Appellant, [*26 v. GUY RICHARDS, Appellee. Rescission of contract for sale of land because of fraudulent misrepresentation of vendor. A bill was filed in the Circuit Court of the Southern District of New York, praying that a contract for the purchase and sale of a portion of a tract of land in Goochland County, in the State of Virginia, The purchaser alleged fraudulent misrepresentaon which there was a gold mine, should be rescinded. tions as to the gold mine; and other arts of the seller, by which he was induced to make the purCourt of the Southern District of New York, by chase. The court affirmed the decree of the Circuit which the contract was ordered to be rescinded. It is an ancient and well established principle, that whenever suppressio veri, or suggestio falsi occur, and more especially both together, they afford sufficient ground to set aside any release or conveyance. know whether the representation which he makes The party selling property must be presumed to of it is true or false. If he knows it to be false, that is fraud of the most positive kind; but if he does not know it, then it can only be from gross neglirepresentations founded on a mistake resulting gence: and in contemplation of a court of equity, from such negligence is fraud. The purchaser confides in them upon the assumption that the sents it. And it is immaterial to the purchaser owner knows his own property, and truly reprewhether the misrepresentation proceeded from mistake or fraud. The injury to him is the same The misrepresentations of the seller of property, to whatever may have been the motives of the seller. authorize the rescinding a contract of sale by a court of equity, must be of something material, constituting an inducement or motive to purchase; and by which he has been misled to his injury. It must be in something in which the one party places a known trust and confidence in the other. but at a remote distance, which the seller knows Whenever a sale is made of property not present, the purchaser has not seen, but which he buys upon the representation of the seller, relying on its truth, then the representation in effect amounts to a warranty: at least the seller is bound to make good the representation. court will, therefore, pass the following order. ON appeal from the Circuit Court of the The bill heretofore filed by Rhode Island in this case, having been amended on the second day of the present term, it is ordered by the 25*] *court, that Massachusetts be allowed until the first Monday in August next to elect whether that State will withdraw its appearance, pursuant to the leave granted at January Term, 1838; and if the appearance of Massachusetts be withdrawn within the time above mentioned, that Rhode Island be, thereupon, at liberty to proceed ex-parte. And if the appearance of Massachusetts shall not be withdrawn within the time above mentioned, it is then ordered that the said State answer the amended bill of the complainant on or before the second day of January Term, 1840. The motion made by the complainant on Saturday, the 19th of the present month, is overruled. January 26, 1839. United States for the Southern District of New York. The case is fully stated in the opinion of the court. It was argued by Mr. Patton and Mr. Webster, with whom was Mr. Botts and Mr. Ogden, for the appellant; and by Mr. Berry and Mr. Crittenden for the appellee. In the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York, a bill was filed by Guy Richards, for the purpose of rescinding a contract made by the appellee with William R. Smith, for the purchase of a part of the Goochland gold mine in the State of Virginia, the contract being alleged to be fraudulent. It was agreed by the counsel for the parties, that a de cree should be entered in the Circuit Court, pro forma, against the complainant; and accordingly, on the 22d of April, 1837, a decree was entered, rescinding and annulling the contract in relation to the purchase of the Gooch land mine, ordering that it be given up to said Guy Richards; that the appellant Smith repay all moneys advanced by said Guy Richards upon said contract, and upon the promissory notes made by complainant and delivered to the defendant, so far as said notes had been paid by complainant, &c. From this decree an appeal has been prayed and allowed to this court. The counsel for the appellant insisted that the decree was erroneous and ought to be reversed, and the bill dismissed. 27*] mens were proper and fair samples of such mine, must be very abundant in gold, and of great intrinsic value. And it is clearly and conclusively shown that the said specimens were really and fairly taken from said mine, in a way and manner to ensure their being fair and proper samples of the mine; and that many other specimens had been taken from it by others before Smith was interested in or knew anything of said mine, of equal richness with the specimens forwarded to Nathaniel Richards by him. *7. Because, even if the proof should [*28 be considered as having established that the cuts, searches, examinations, and explorations made since the purchase by the complainants and others from the appellant, have demonstrated 1. Because the said complainant that the mine is not as valuable as the indicahas wholly failed to prove that the representations warranted Smith to believe, or even that tions and description of the Goochland mine the property is wholly worthless as a mine (and alleged in the bill to be unfair and untrue, are it is by no means admitted that such examinaother than fair, accurate, and just descriptions tions have been sufficiently extensive or well and representations; and that on the contrary conducted to justify such conclusions), yet that thereof, the proofs in the cause show that the the appellant is not responsible for such failrepresentations, declarations, and descriptions ure of the mine to realize the expectations made and given of said mine, so far as the same justly founded upon the indications of value are complained of in said bill, were and are and richness which existed at the time of, and true, just and faithful. before the sale; whether the disappointment has resulted from the veins giving out, being intercepted by rock, or whatever cause of the like kind. Such contingencies and disappointments are always to be hazarded in every kind of speculative adventure; and adventures in gold mining have never been, in any country, remarkable for exemption from them. And the appellant in this case did not undertake to insure against them by any act or expression. "3. Because, even if the court should be of On the contrary, it is proved that the comopinion that the estimates of the value and plainant and those who united with him in the richness of the mine and vein, expressed by purchase, were fully alive to the risks and hazthe appellant, were exaggerated and extrava-ards attendant upon all gold mining adventures gant, he is in no manner at law or in equity responsible for such exaggerated and unfounded statements as to the value and richness of said mine, and its veins or deposits of gold. 2. Because the opinions and estimates made by the appellant of the value of said mine and of its richness and great worth, and which are alleged in the bill to have been false, exaggerated, and deceptive, and made for the purpose of defrauding and deceiving the complainant, were not only his real, honest, and bona fide opinions, but were such as he was well warranted in entertaining and expressing. 4. Because, even if all the descriptions of said mine, and all the declarations made in regard to it by said complaint, as set forth in said bill as untrue, inaccurate and erroneous, were so in fact, it would not be competent, either at law or in equity, to rescind the contract which had been executed for the purchase and sale of the property, unless it had been proved that the appellant knew that such descriptions and declarations were inaccurate, erroneous, and false. "5. Because, so far from the plaintiff having succeeded in showing any such knowledge, the testimony clearly proves that the appellant did believe, and had just reason to believe that his descriptions of said mine, and representations of its value, were strictly and literally true, just, and accurate. and speculations; and were emphatically admonished of these hazards, when the appellant exonerated himself from responsibility for their occurrence, by the explicit declaration, made at the time of the contract, that he sold the mine for what it is, gold or snowballs.' "8. Because, the property being expressly sold with all faults (for what it is, gold or snowballs'), accordingly to the settled rules of law applicable to such a contract, the vendor cannot be made responsible for any defect in the quality of the thing sold, or for any misdescription, known or unknown to the said vend or; unless it also appear that he committed positive fraud, by resorting to some means of concealing the defects and misdescription, and by artifice and contrivance prevented the purchasers from discovering them." The counsel for the appellant, in support of the third point, "that even if the court should be of opinion that the estimates of the value and richness of the mine and vein, expressed 6. Because, it is distinctly and expressly by the appellant, were exaggerated and extravadmitted by the complainant, and proved by agant, he is in no manner at law or in equity the testimony, that certain specimens or wash- responsible for such exaggerated and unfounded ings of gold ore, forwarded by the appellant statements as to the value and richness of said Smith to Nathaniel Richards, and alleged to mine, and its veins or deposits of gold." The have been taken from said Goochland mine, following authorities were cited: Sugden Law and exhibited to him as fair samples of said of Vend., 2; Chandler v. Lopus, Cro. Jac., 4; 1 mine, were exceedingly rich in particles of Rolle's Abr., 801, (pl.) 16; Harvey v. Young, gold, and gave every indication that the mine Yelverton, 21, b., and notes to the American from which they were taken, if the said speci-edition; Fenton v. Browne, 10 Ves., 144; 1 |