A testator devised certain lands in Lower Canada to the respondent, with a proviso that the devisee should not in any manner incumber, affect, mortgage, sell or exchange or otherwise alienate the lands until after twenty years from the death of the testator. There was no substitution of the devise in the event of alienation:--Held, that such a proviso being by the law of Canada a "défense d'aliéner pure et simple," amounted merely to advice by the person making the prohibition, and was not legally binding on the devisee.

The present appeal was brought to decide the right to certain lands and tenements of the respondent which were taken in execution by the sheriff, under a writ of fieri facias issued upon the appellant's judgment, under the following circumstances.

The respondent, on the 29th of November, 1856, confessed judgment in favour of the appellant for the sum of 1,8847. 18s. 3d., together with interest thereon from that date until payment and costs, and the judgment was duly entered and registered on the 15th of December, 1856.

On the 6th of April, 1859, a writ of fieri facias was issued against the respondent for the sum of 1,8921. 148. 5d., being the amount of principal, interest and costs due upon the said judgment, under which execution the net sum of 105l. 15s. 4d. was levied and paid to the appellant.

On the 23rd of November, 1860, a writ of alias fieri facias was issued against the respondent to recover the sum of 1,7821. 98. 9d., being the balance then due on the said judgment, and under that writ the sheriff seized certain lands and tenements of the respondent.

On the 1st of April, 1861, the respondent filed an opposition afin d'annuler

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this seizure, alleging that the property had come to him under the will of his father, and that a clause in the said will expressly ordered that the testator's children should not in any manner incumber, affect, mortgage, sell, exchange or otherwise alienate the immovables being in their respective lots under the said will, until after twenty years from the death of the testator; that the testator had died in the year 1855, and that the lands and houses therefore could not be alienated by the respondent, and were therefore not liable to seizure.

The clause in question was as follows: "Je veux et j'ordonne expressément que mes dits enfants ne puissent en aucune manière engager, affecter, hypothéquer, vendre, échanger ou autrement aliéner les biens immeubles étant dans leurs lots respectifs d'après les deux partages que j'en ai faits comme ci-dessus qu'après vingt ans, à compter du jour de mon décès, sous peine de nullité de tous actes qu'ils feront contraires à mon intention, à l'exception toutefois de l'emplacement situé en la paroisse de St.-Roch de Québec, sur le niveau nord de la rue des Fossés, et décrit en le présent testament, dont le détenteur et possesseur pourra disposer en toute propriété quand et comme bon lui semblera du jour de mon décès."

On the 17th of December, 1861, the appellant filed a défense au fonds en droit, and an exception péremptoire to the said opposition.

The défense au fonds en droit was first argued; and on the 5th of May, 1862, the Judge of the superior Court, Mr. Justice Taschereau, gave judgment in the appellant's favour, on the ground that the clause in the testator's will prohibiting alienations was void according to Canadian law, and dismissed the opposition with costs.

From this judgment the respondent appealed to the Court of Queen's Bench, which Court, on the 16th of March, 1863, reversed the decision of the superior Court, on the ground that the restriction being limited to twenty years was valid (Mr. Justice Duval and Mr. Justice Meredith dissenting), and remitted the record to the superior Court.

Mr. Justice Meredith assigned, for his judgment, the following reasons: "The

principal question to be decided in this cause is, as to the effect to be given to a testamentary disposition made subject to a provision to the following effect: Avec défense d'engager, affecter, hypothéquer, vendre, échanger, ou autrement aliéner les dits biens immeubles qu'après vingt ans, à compter du jour du décès du testateur, sous peine de nullité de tous actes qu'ils feront contraires à la dite intention du testateur.'

"Property held by the appellant under the foregoing provision has been seized; an opposition founded on it was filed by the appellant in the Court below; and it is from a judgment of the superior Court dismissing the opposition so filed that the present case comes before us.

"On the part of the respondent it is contended that a simple défense d'aliéner does not create a substitution, and is not in any respect binding in law, and therefore that notwithstanding such a prohibition the donee or legatee may make a valid alienation of the property to which it refers. In support of this view the respondent has referred to Ricard, who says:-"Les Lois ont résolu par une décision générale que lorsque la prohibition est pure et simple et sans cause qu'elle ne produit aucun effet, et que non-seulement les héritiers ab intestat du testateur, ni de celui à qui les défenses ont été faites, n'ont droit de prétendre aucun fidei-commis en leur faveur, mais aussi que l'institué ou le légataire ne laisse pas, nonobstant la prohibition, d'avoir la liberté d'aliéner" (1). The opinion of Henrys on this subject is to the same effect. His words are as follows:-" Done, s'il y a quelque distinction à faire c'est entre la prohibition d'aliéner pure et simple et la prohibition d'aliéner faite en faveur de quelqu'un. La première n'opère rien et le testateur n'ayant pas passé plus avant, elle ne passe que pour un simple conseil; mais au contraire si le testateur, en prohibant à ses héritiers et successeurs d'aliéner les biens qu'il leur a délaissés, déclare que c'est afin qu'ils soient conservés à ceux qu'il désigne: par exemple, à ses descendants, ou à ceux de sa famille, en ce cas la prohibition d'aliéner emporte un fidei-commis, et c'est la même chose que si les descen

(1) 2 Ricard, des Donations, p. 322, Traité de Substitutions, titre III. ch. 7, partie 1, No. 329.

dants ou ceux de sa famille avaient été substitués à l'héritier; il faut donc que la prohibition soit faite en faveur de quelqu'un, pour empêcher que l'héritier ne puisse pas vendre. C'est la disposition du droit en la loi 38, § 4, et de la loi 93 ff. De légat. 3, mais plus expresse en la loi Filius familias 114, § Divi, 14 ff. De légat. 1, où le jurisconsulte dit que les Empereurs avaient décidé qu'il ne suffisait pas de prohiber l'aliénation, mais qu'il fallait encore exprimer la cause et déclarer la personne en faveur de laquelle on recherchait cette précaution; qu'autrement nisi inveniatur persona cujus respectu hoc a testatore dispositum sit, nullius esse momenti scripturam quasi nudum præceptum reliquerit (2).”

"Pothier also says:- La simple défense d'aliéner, lorsque le testateur n'a pas témoigné en faveur de qui il faisait cette défense, ne passe, à la vérité, que pour un simple avis nudum præceptum, auquel celui à qui la défense est faite peut impunément ne pas déférer (3).”

"According to the foregoing authorities a défense d'aliéner is to be considered pure et simple unless it be stipulated in the interest either of the party making the donation or legacy or of some third person; and a défense d'aliéner pure et simple as above defined is to be deemed merely advice on the part of the person making the prohibition and not binding upon the person to whom it is addressed. The reason upon which as I believe the above rules are founded being that in the case of a défense d'aliéner pure et simple there is no person

(2) 3 Henrys, p. 219, liv. 5, ch. 4, quest. 49,

P. 2.

(3) 5 Pothier, des Substitutions, p. 518. See also 6 Toullier, p. 521, No. 488. 6 Nouveau Denisart, p. 74. See also the case of Fafard and Bélanger, 4 Lower Canada Reports, p. 215, and more particularly the remarks of Mr. Justice Caron in that case: "Je considère cette défense d'aliéner obligatoire parce qu'elle comporte la condition de transmettre ses biens aux héritiers du côté et ligne; il en serait autrement si la défense était pure et simple. 2 Bourjon, p. 164, tit. 5, c. 5, s. 7, Nos. 53, 54. 1 Despeisses, p. 19, part 1, tit. 1, s. 2. Dictionnaire des Arrêts (Brillon), p. 156, verbo Aliénation, Nos. 25 et 37. 2 Despeisses, p. 138, part 1, tit. 2, des Substitutions, s. 6, art. 2, No. 32. Rousseau de Lacombe (Ed. 1769), p. 674, verbo Substitution, s. 1. Dist. 2, No. 5; Merlin Rep. (Ed. 1828), pp. 152, 153, verbo Substitution, Fid. 8. 8, No. 5. Poujol, Traité des Donations (Ed. 1836), p. 90.

interested except the donee or legatee, and that a provision which cannot be enforced except at the will and by the party intended to be bound by it cannot in law be held legal and binding.

"The appellants on their part have drawn our attention to the opinion of Troplong and Demolombe as shewing that a défense d'aliéner, when made the condition of a legacy may in certain cases be unobjectionable, and in such cases ought to be enforced by the Courts."

"Troplong, in the passage cited in the factum of the appellant, says: "Que dironsnous de la clause portant défense d'aliéner par vente, échange ou engagement pendant un certain temps? Les opinions sont partagées, mais je ne vois rien qui vicie cette condition, qui souvent est imposée par le testateur pour des bonnes raisons de prévoyance, de convenance, d'économie domestique. Le donateur en donnant un immeuble à une personne de sa famille, peut cependant éprouver le regret de le voir de son vivant sortir des mains de celui qu'il considère comme un autre lui-même, il lui impose alors l'obligation de ne pas aliéner de son vivant. Dans d'autres circonstances le testateur peut craindre que le légataire ne soit trop pressé de jouir et qu'il n'abuse du droit de propriété dont il le gratifie; pour l'accoutumer à être propriétaire pour l'affectionner à sa propriété, il lui impose la condition de la garder pendant cinq ans. Ne sont-ce pas là des mesures sages et prudentes? Pourquoi les repousser avec une sévérité sans règle? La prohibition d'aliéner n'est censée contraire à la liberté qu'autant qu'elle est absolue; c'est alors qu'elle est considérée comme non écrite (4).'

"And Demolombe expresses his opinion as to this point in nearly the same words.

"In considering the above observations of Troplong and the opinion of Demolombe to the same effect, it is necessary to bear in mind that a very wide difference exists between the law of France and our own law as to the subject under consideration. The article 896. of the Code Civil declares: 'Les substitutions sont prohibées. Toute disposition par laquelle le donataire, l'héritier institué, ou le légataire, sera chargé

(4) 1 Troplong, Donations et Testaments, No. 271. 1 Grenier, Donations, p. 188.

de conserver et de rendre à un tiers sera nulle même à l'égard du donataire, de l'héritier institué ou du légataire (5).'

"These provisions being altogether at variance with our own law on the subject, it is plain that the observations of Troplong and Demolombe must be read by us with great caution; and bearing this in mind, it appears to me that all that Troplong and Demolombe are to be understood as saying in the passages relied on by the appellant, is simply that a prohibition to alienate in a donation or will, if made for a short time and from reasonable motives, is not absolutely null even under the provisions of the Code Civil. Those learned writers shew that such a provision can be enforced if made in the interest of the donee or legatee, or of a third party, and that if accompanied by a penal clause the penalty may be enforced in the event of a violation of the prohibition to alienate. But I am not aware that there is anything in the writings either of Troplong or of Demolombe tending to establish that a prohibition to alienate, when made exclusively in the interest of the donee or legatee, can be enforced by the donee or legatee against his own acts and to the prejudice of his own creditors.

"In the present case the appellant relies on a défense d'aliéner, in which, in so far as regards the property in question, no person but himself is interested; and the object of his opposition is to prevent the sale of the property in question for the satisfaction of a judgment rendered against himself to enforce the payment of a debt which, it may be observed, to the extent of above 1,100., appears to have been contracted after the death of the testator whose will contains the prohibition d'aliéner relied on by the appellant. There is not, I repeat, so far as I know, anything in the works of Troplong or of Demolombe to justify the pretensions of the opposant. On the contrary, Demolombe says, 'Il nous paraîtrait impossible d'admettre le donataire ou le légataire qui aurait consenti l'aliénation à se prévaloir ensuite contre les tiers auxquels il aurait concédé des droits, de la défense d'aliéner qui aurait été imposé et qu'il aurait lui-même enfreinte; car il ne se peut pas qu'il évince ceux-là même auxquels il doit garantie.'

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(5) 18 Demolombe, p. 328, No. 303.

"Troplong, also, in his Traité du Contrat de Mariage, No. 3060 et seq., maintains the same doctrine.

"The foregoing observations I think suffice to prove that the opinions of Troplong and Demolombe are not in reality opposed to the authorities from our own law upon which the judgment of the superior Court is based; but in order to remove any doubt as to the point, I shall cite one further passage from the works of each of those authors."

"Troplong puts the question, 'La prohibition d'aliéner forme-t-elle une substitution?' And he then continues: 'Il faut répondre négativement à cette question; car cette prohibition ajoutée à une substitution est nulle en loi et ne forme qu'un précepte, un nudum præceptum, qui ne lie point, qui ne donne d'action à personne et dont on peut dire avec Papinien qu'il a été donné obtentu consilii (6).'

"And Demolombe says: 'On paraît avoir de tout temps reconnu que la défense ou prohibition d'aliéner ne constitue qu'un simple précepte, non obligatoire, nudum præceptum, lorsqu'elle est pure et simple, c'est à dire, lorsqu'elle n'est pas faite en faveur d'une personne qui est appelée à en profiter, nisi inveniatur persona cujus respectu hoc a testatore dispositum est.' L. 114, s. 14, art. de Leg. Trevenot, Nos. 129, 130. CoinDelisle, art. 896, No. 32 (7)."

"It has, however, been said, and will, I believe, be maintained, that the authorities relied on by the respondent have no bearing upon the present case, because they relate to prohibitions to alienate in connexion with the doctrine of substitutions, and not (it is said) to prohibitions to alienate unconnected with a substitution such as the case before us presents. The answer, I believe, to this objection is, that the two subjects are so closely connected as to make it impossible to treat of them separately. A défense d'aliéner, if made in favour of a third person, is (as has already been observed) in effect a substitution, and is therefore in law obligatory. Whereas, if the défense d'aliéner is not made in favour of a third person, it is not a substitution. In one very important point of view, there(6) Troplong, Donations et Testaments, Nos. 135, page 198. (7) 18 Demolombe, No. 147, p. 172.

fore, in order to ascertain whether a défense d'aliéner is or is not valid, it is necessary to inquire whether it does or does not amount to a substitution."

"This probably is one of the reasons which have caused the two subjects to be considered together by the most eminent French jurists, who, I may observe, were not likely to treat as closely connected questions really independent of each other.

"There is another view which may be taken of this case, and which was strongly pressed upon our consideration by the learned counsel for the respondent."

"The testator in the will under consideration, without assigning any cause or reason for the défense d'aliéner which it contains, has extended it to all his legatees and over the whole of his property for a period of twenty years; and it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondent, and I think with reason, that if such a clause is good for a period of twenty years, there are no grounds for saying that it could not be legally good for forty years or for the lifetime of the legatee."

Now, the policy of our law is and ought to be that property over which a man has full control should be subject to the payment of his just debts, whereas the effect of the provision in question, if it be valid, is to enable legatees to hold property over which they have in reality unlimited control free from the payment of their debts, and this, irrespective of the nature of the debt sought to be enforced or of the extent of the property held subject to such condition.

It has, therefore, been further contended by the respondent, that the provision of the will upon which the appellant rests his claim ought to be held null on the ground of public policy.

It may, however, be answered, that a testator may, by an express provision to that effect, bequeath property so as to be free from seizure for the debts of the legatee, and that property left expressly pour aliments (as the authors say) is not liable to be brought to sale for the debts of the legatee.

"But admitting for the sake of argument, and subject probably to certain limitations, that the law sanctions the two descriptions of bequests just mentioned when expressly made, still it is not the less true that

bequests tending to prevent the alienation of property and to enable the party holding it either to pay his debts or not, just as it may please him, are not entitled to favourable consideration; and I think that in giving effect to such clauses we ought not to go beyond the limits established by the authorities, or to add by reasoning from analogy to the number of exceptional cases which on special grounds are already sanctioned by law; and this I think we practically would do were we to give effect to the testamentary provisions relied on by the appellant."

"But although I think the point just adverted to ought not to be passed wholly unnoticed, I wish it to be understood that the ground upon which I would deem it my duty to confirm the judgment of the Court below is that, in my opinion, it is a wellestablished rule of law that a défense d'aliéner pure et simple, such as that contained in the will before us, is inoperative."

"This rule, which, having its foundation in the Roman law, appears to have been acted upon for centuries in France, has been transmitted to us as law by jurists such as Ricard, Henrys, and Pothier, and is not controverted, so far as I know, by any writer upon the ancient or modern law of France."

"I therefore think that the learned Judge of the superior Court was justified in taking that rule as his guide, and that his judgment, which purports to be founded upon it, and is in all respects in accordance with it, ought to be confirmed."

The appellant applied for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, but leave was refused, on the ground that the proceeding was interlocutory.

On the 16th of October, 1863, the appellant, by leave of the Court, filed a défense au fonds en fait, and also an amended exception perpétuelle, which alleged that by a contract of marriage made between Joseph Guillet, dit Tourangeau the elder, and Judith Kenmer, dit Laflamme, it was agreed that there should be between them a community of goods according to the custom of Paris; that the lands and tenements in question formed part of the possessions so held in common by them; that the said Judith Kenmer, dit Laflamme, died before her husband, and by her will left her share of the