35TH CONG....1ST SESS. Increase of the Army-Mr. Davis. SENATE. has been changed. It is no longer a Territory of now excludes the rank and file from promotion in the Army. He said it is not as it was in the war of 1812. I wish to correct that error; for, in the wisdom of Congress upon the recommendation of the last Administration, the two Houses of the (last Congress, adopted a provision, for the first time in this Government, which made it quite easy for the Executive to provide for the certain promotion of a non-commissioned officer who proved himself worthy. For the first time, I say, since the organization of our Army, the last Congress did provide for conferring brevets on non-commissioned officers, and thus made them certain of egated power of the people-a doctrine almost INCREASE OF THE ARMY. SPEECH OF HON. JEFF'N DAVIS, In the Senate, February 10 and 11, 1858. The Senate having under consideration the bill to increase "That there shall be added to each of the regiments of dragoons, cavalry, infantry, and of mounted riflemen, two companies, to be organized in the same manner as the com panies now composing these arms respectively, and to receive the same pay and allowances, and to be entitled to the same provisions and benefits in every respect, as are anthorized by the existing laws; they shall be subject to the rules and articles of war, and the enlisted men are to be recruited in the same manner as other troops, with the same conditions and limitations" Mr. DAVIS said: Mr. PRESIDENT: The proposition before the provides for adding two companies to certain regi- Academy should be equal to all the vacancies which should occur within the ensuing year. The Senator, therefore, was mistaken in assuming that the door to promotion had been closed against the rank and file of the Army. Another Senator (the Senator from Georgia [Mr. TooмBS] I think it was) asserted that, for a great number of years, no such promotions had occurred. There the mistake was equally great; such promotions have been made from time to time. Mr. TOOMBS. The Senator is mistaken; I expressed no opinion on that point. Mr. DAVIS. It was not, then, the Senator from Georgia, but somebody else; but as I am making points, not on individuals, but on the merits of the question, it makes no difference who it was. Whoever it was, it is erroneous. Promotions of that kind have been made by nominations to the Senate, and confirmations by the Senate. Those who had een sergeants were also appointed to the grade of commissioned officers in the new regiments that were provided for three years ago; where no vacancies exist for an appointment, the recent law authorizes promotion by brevet; and never before, in the history of the Army, has the rank and file had so wide and open a door, during peace, to enter into the grade of commissioned officers as now. Nor is this opportunity for promotion rendered illusory and impracticable of attainment for the want of that high degree of education which the standard of West Point requires I think the organization, as I stated on a former of its graduates. A military examination is reoccasion, will be more complete, because it will quired, and is necessary to prevent the attainment of such promotion by favoritism only; but that give regiments divisible into three battalions of four companies each. It will give the power to di- examination requires only the elements of a comvide regiments without dividing battalions so as to mon school education; no more than is necessary for the proper discharge of a subaltern's duties. garrison three posts by each regiment, or, if you please, six posts, without reducing any post to a This proposition to increase the number of comsingle company; I will here say to Senators as panies is but widening that door which admits the a military question, that it is a very great disadrank and file to rise to the grade of commissioned vantage to troops to separate them into garrisons officers. It increases the number of commissioned consisting of a single company, and that that dis-officers who will serve in detached posts, thus relieving them from the danger and the toil of a responsibility which they cannot properly meet if reduced to the small number of two or three, to perform, not only their regular duties, but all the staff duties of a garrison. The next constitution submitted to the people was the consular constitution of 1802-only three years later-making Napoleon Bonaparte Consul for life, and conferring on lum the power of naming his successor and the Senate; in other words, a despotism. It was submitted to the vote of the people of France, and accepted by three million five hundred and sixty-eight thousand eight hundred and eighty-five against eight thousand three hundred and seventy-four. And from that time the unlimited sovereignty of the people has been the potent instrument by which the Napoleons have fastened upon France a despotism more grinding and debasing than that of the Autocrat of Russia. The fathers of our Republic proceeded on principles totally opposite. Adopting as a fundamental dogma that all political power springs from the people, they insisted, and incorporated it into their organic law, that this power should not be unlimited and absolute. They accordingly established our grand system of representative government, with its checks, balances, guarantees, and organic laws-the noblest political institution that adorns the pages of the history of civilization, and which experience has shown to be the only means of securing and diffusing among the people that broad, civil liberty which constitutes the distinguishing features of the American and British Governments. I say British Government; for the statesmen of 1776 founded our institutions, not upon Utopian theories, but upon those great fundamental principles of the common law inherited from our Saxon ancestors, which guarantied to English freemen the right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, with their judicial safeguards and protecting forms, as ivio-advantage is not to be overcome by multiplying Table and irrepealable by any power on earth. The convention in Kansas, having declared in their fundamental law that the right of property in slaves, already existing, shall not be interfered with, has only given a constitutional sanction to a principle as old as the foundations of free gov. ernment. And, sir, Congress is bound by the most solemn obligation that honor can impose, to admit her with this very clause in her constitution. Sir, we of the South demand the redemption of your pledge. The issue is boldly tendered, and we are ready to go before the great Areopagus of the American people upon it. And when the enemies of Kansas shall attempt to justify their opposition to her by invoking a principle which has deluged Europe in blood, only to sink her into more degraded despotism, we will justify her admission upon the principles which lie at the foundation of our Republic. We will call upon the people to stand true to the traditions of our ancestors and the practice of the Government when Washington was President, and the men of the Revolution ininistered at the altars of liberty. One word on the bill introduced into this House by a member from Massachusetts, [Mr. Banks,] calling another convention in Kansas for the purpose of framing a second constitution to be submitted to the people for acceptance or rejection. Mr. Chairman, Congress has no more right to call a convention of the people of Kansas than it has to call such a convention in New York. By the act of Congress, and the action of her people, the entire relation of Kansas to this Government the rank and file. You must have the number of That is one reason. Another is, that by increas- Here I would say to the Senator from Texas, that he was egregiously mistaken in his argument that a law had grown up by usage, which, for the benefit of the graduates of the Military Academy, *For the original report, see pages 643 and 667 Congres sional Globe. I hope, therefore, that the Senate, if they think that the addition of the thirty companies and the increase of the maximum of the strength of each company to ninety-six will give more troops than are required, will prefer rather to keep down the maximum, as it is now, to seventy-four, and give the additional companies. I believe it will create a more effective force than is to be obtained by increasing the maximum of the rank and file of the Army-a measure which will have really but little effect, on account of the power of the War Department to send out unattached recruits, and the company has been wasted below the maxithus bring them to the distant posts at a time when mum of seventy-four. If, then, the purpose of the Senate be to limit the size of the Army to any certain standard, it is suggested to them that they shall, in consideration of the great interest which is involved, strike from the bill the second section, taking the numerical strength away which that would confer, and leave the first section, which perfects our system and enables us to occupy the great number of posts we now have with our small Army, without reducing the number of commissioned officers at each post below that which will enable them efficiently to perform every duty. On account of the statements which have been made in relation to the strength of the Army, so greatly exaggerated beyond the reality, I have 35TH CONG....1ST SESS. thought it necessary to make an exact statement of what the Army is. It is now composed, including all arms of the service which go into the field, (not including engineer soldiers or ordnance soldiers,) of one hundred and ninety-eight companies, which, according to the fixed establishment of the Army, to be found in a table in the Army Register of this year, at page 41, gives a number of privates equal to nine thousand and sixty-six, supposing every company to be full up to the organization of the peace establishment; adding non-commissioned officers and musicians, you get the total of enlisted men eleven thousand eight hundred and thirty-eight. In 1850, on account of the necessity of troops on the frontier, Congress provided that at distant stations, and on the emigrant routes, the President should have authority to increase the privates in any company so employed to seventy-four; and this is the number which is taken from the Secretary of War's report. It is not the peace establishment; it is not the fixed establishment of the Army; but it is the increase authorized by Congress to be made in certain contingencies. The Army being now stationed almost entirely on the frontier, an authorized and actual strength is casually obtained as set forth in the report of the Secretary of War. If every company in the Army was on frontier duty, or in campaign, there would be a still higher possible number. It might in that contingency go up to about nineteen thousand. Mr. IVERSON. The Senator will allow me to interrupt him. I have an authentic statement from the Adjutant General's office, showing the present numerical distribution of the Army by military departments. The department of the cast, including forts and fortresses, has eight hundred and sixty-nine men; the department of Florida, three hundred and thirty-seven; Kansas, Nebraska, Minnesota, and Arkansas, three thousand six hundred and seventy-six; the department of Texas, two thousand and forty-nine; New Mexico, two thousand two hundred and forty; the department of the Pacific, two thousand five hundred and seventeen; the army of Utah, one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven; making the total of the Army of the United States at present only thirteen thousand five hundred and seventy-five. That is the whole Army at pres cnt. one, or at most two regiments had been in posi-post to perfect the plan of the Government for But, as already stated, our predecessors had a broader policy than merely protecting the frontier settlers. They had the policy of keeping our Army instructed in all that belongs to civilized war; training artillery, and other arms of service in that science of war which is not to be learned merely by campaign duty. The necessities for frontier service, outstripping the augmentations of the Army which have been made, have caused its whole disposable force to be thrown to the interior of our territory, and scarcely any are left to hold the great fortifications along the sea-board, and there to learn those lessons in artillery practice that would be so essential to us in war. We have no dragoons or cavalry in schools of instruction or practice. They are kept constantly on the frontier; and only so much as may be learned in winter cantonments, in long marches, and after hot pursuits of Indians in occa. sional encampments with jaded horses, can be taught the cavalry arm of the United States. It is not the increase of the Army, but the refusal to keep up those garrisons where military instruction may be perfected, which is the great departure from the policy of our fathers. | bringing these Indians to an agricultural condition, and to give them that protection which is essential for their future progress. This is all in addition to what is contained in the report of the Secretary of War. These reports, too, are further sustained by the report of the Commanding General and of the Adjutant General, and in cach of them it is shown, as I think, very conclusively, that the necessity exists for a force greater than we now have, and that economy is best to be promoted by increasing the regular army of the United States. Thus it is that in urging this measure I do not make it rest on the necessities of the expedition against Utah, nor the necessity of keeping troops in Kansas. I did not say, as sometimes represented, that no troops were necessary for Utali, or for Kansas. I assumed no such position, nor proposed an increase of troops for that purpose; because I believe if those difficulties were ended to-day the troops would be necessary; and that now they can be used in one or both of these places, only by withdrawing them from other purposes for which troops are required. I have not said that there is no necessity for the use of troops in either of those Territories, and decline now to enter into the question as to whether the campaign should have been commenced against the Mor mons or not. According to the report of the Secretary of War, we now have one hundred and thirty-eight I hope the anticipations of the President, that posts. According, also, to his report, we have in a contingency which he expects soon to occur, an exterior boundary of eleven thousand miles;|| troops will no longer be required in Kansas, may and of emigrant routes requiring military super-be realized; but, at the same time, it is due to canvision by the military force, we have six thou- dor to say that I do not entertain the hopes which sand seven hundred miles; giving a total of sev- the President expresses, having yet seen no evienteen thousand seven hundred miles. From this dence that the reign of terror in Kansas is to termaggregate is excluded the whole amount of our inate in any contingency now foreseen. It seems Indian frontier, being two lines, extending from more probable that the lawless are to continue our northern to our southern boundary, and the their aggressions; that men are to be intimidated whole amount of the reservations where, by the for political ends, their houses to be burned, and reports to the Secretary of the Interior, from his assassinations to occur all over the Territory, the agents in different parts of the country, it is made moment the strong arm of the Federal Govern apparent that the fulfillment of our obligations to ment is taken away. I cannot go to the extent the Indian tribes require the establishment of new of the Senator from Georgia, and refuse to give a posts. This may be taken as quite equal to the man to preserve peace. I cannot go to the extent amount stated in the report of the Secretary of which would declare that I prefer that civil war War; and then we have seventeen thousand seven should rage in the land, rather than to increase hundred miles stated, which may be considered the Army and maintain order by the presence of as about half the demand; and for which we may troops in the Territories of the United States. In possibly have, by posting them as stated, an army the first place, I should be willing to use troops of seventeen thousand five hundred men, or less anywhere to put down civil war and insurrection than one man to the mile; or if you include the within the United States, when a contingency, Indian frontier and the Indian reservations, less such as is contemplated by the law, arises. than one man to two miles. That is the Army the augmentation of which is considered so great as to become dangerous to the peace and liberty of the country! Taking the posts at merely the number we now have, one hundred and thirty-eight, the companies of the Army being one hundred and ninety-eight, it follows that you have not companies enough in the Army to establish two com Mr. DAVIS. That is in consequence of the wasting which occurred after the month of June, when the actual force was stated in the report of the Secretary of War, which has been so often read to the Senate. The actual number is a fluctuating number; and the only thing upon which any calculation can be made in relation to the broader question of the policy of the Government, is the fixed or legal establishment-not how many men may happen to be in the service to-day, or may be to-morrow, fluctuating under the sliding scale established by the act of 1850, but what it is proper to have for a permanent peace establish-panies at each post; and less than two never should ment. That should be determined by principles of statesmanship much broader than the mere question of how many men are necessary to chase down some Indian tribe. The policy of our mil. itary establishment was framed by men who stood upon a higher pedestal, and looked over a wider sphere. It was to carry out the policy proclaimed by Washington, "in peace prepare for war." It was enabling our Government to move step by step, and keep casy progress in military science with foreign nations with whom we might be involved in war. be the garrison of any post. It destroys discipline; The main argument in opposition to an increase of the Army, as I understand it, has been that there has been no showing of the necessity. I have, therefore, referred to what is to be drawn from the report of the Secretary of War, and the A certain portion of the Army was from the report of the Secretary of the Interior; and without beginning employed in the defense of our frontier wearying the Senate to read from it extensively, settlements, then an easy task. As that task in-will merely refer to a single passage at page 62 of creased in difficulty, the Army was increased, and the report of the Secretary of the Interior, where past attempts at reduction have proved unfortu- he reports the number of Indians three hundred nate. It has been very well established that the and twenty-five thousand, of whom three fourths war with the Sacs and Foxes, commonly known belong to the hostile and roving bands. Two hunas the Black Hawk war, which extended over dred and forty-three thousand five hundred of our two campaigns, resulted from the fact that we Indians belong to bands of that roving and hostile had not a sufficient number of troops in a posi-character which requires the interposition of milition to prevent the first acts of aggression. It has equally well been established in regard to that long and vastly expensive war in Florida, where, per capita, more money has been disbursed than one would deem it possible could have been fairly expended on a worthless Indian tribe; that if tary supervision. Where Indians of friendly tem- In the next place, I do not hold that the Territories occupy the same position as States. I do not admit, as I have never subscribed to the doctrine of squatter sovereignty, that the Government of the United States has no more power in a Territory than in a State. I hold that the Territories are dependencies of the Federal Union; they are in a condition of pupilage, to be governed by the States; the property of the States; and that if men, either foreign or native, should aggregate themselves upon a Territory of the United States, and raise the standard of rebellion against the Government, and in defiance of its laws, it is not only within the power, but it is the plain, palpable duty of the Government to put down such an insurrec tion, and to compel obedience. I am at a loss to understand how any one enter taining the doctrine that this Government has power to acquire territory, can at the same time deny that it has power to control it. If we may acquire a Territory with a population not comprehending our institutions, having no attachment to them, can we admit at the same time that we have no more right to use coercive measures within the limits of that Territory than in one of the equal States of the Union? It would be the Dead Sea fruit ashes on the lips of those who gathered it. The population might at once erect a government anti-republican, destructive of all the great principles that lie at the foundation of our Constitu tion. If we may acquire an island, or a Territory, or a subjugated State, the whole population of which were in á State of barbarism, or from education attached to monarchical government, will it be contended, after we had expended thousands of lives and millions of treasure, that the popula tion should be allowed to do what they please within their own limits, and the Government that dians, before their removal, harmless in their conhas acquired the Territory by conquest or by pur-tiguity to the whites. Not only this, but our popchase have no authority to exercise control, and preserve civil order among them? The use of troops in a Territory of the United States does not stand in the same relation to constitutional questions as the use of troops in a State of the Union. I deny, as emphatically as any one, the power of this Government to coerce a State. That is a question which was discussed in the convention that formed the Constitution, and which was so powerfully stated by Mr. Hamilton to be a proposition, not to form a Union and preserve the States, but to provide the means for the destruction of the States., A State may, through its Legislature or its Governor, invoke the aid of the Federal Government, and of the other States; but the Federal Government has no power to invade the limits of a State, there to attempt the coercion of its people. With this broad distinction I think the whole argument falls, except in the minds of those who ⚫ still insist that the inhabitants of a Territory have all the political rights of the people of a State. I belong not to that school. All ulation has poured over the mountains, and commenced extending from the Pacific as a front; our people have pressed the Indians back from the fertile valleys they inhabited, and from the soft climate where they were reared in proximity to the coast, and have driven them into the mountains-into a country so arid that a large portion of it can only be cultivated by irrigation. They have thus again reduced them to the chase for subsistence, and those Indians may well look on the valleys, and, like the Gaels in the Highlands, claim the right to redeem from the plain and the valley the means of subsistance as long as one sheaf of grain shall stand, or herd shall stray along the heritage from which they have been driven. These forays have been and are to be perpetrated, until a new state of things shall be brought into existence. During that period of transition, when the Indians may be gathered from these vast hunting grounds on reservations which they will and can cultivate, it will be necessary to preserve a military force sufficiently large to rule them by coercion; and this is the opinion of every intelligent sub-agent whose opinions I find recorded in the volume which contains the report of the Sec As a natural consequence of denying the right to use the troops as heretofore, it is said that in a period of profound peace, and of financial em-retary of the Interior. barrassment, the startling proposition is made to increase the military establishment of the United States! Peace, it is true, exists between our country and all foreign countries, and I hope long may continue; but, in the mean time, we are engaged in frequent hostilities with Indian tribes. around that vast territory which lies between the Pacific settlements and those of the Mississippi valley, is a constant succession of conflicts with roving bands. If this is our condition in profound peace, when but eight hundred and sixty-nine men, officers and enlisted soldiers, can be left to garrison all the great fortifications on our seaboard, what, I pray, would it be in war? That proportion was left during the war with Mexico; and is altogether inadequate for the purposes for which those fortifications were built. It is not a state of peace so far as the Army is concerned. The financial embarrassments of the country, the diminution of revenue because of a failure of the usual supply from duties on imports, constitutes no sufficient reason for not discharging any of the duties that belong to this Government. wish your great army of retainers and your numerous palaces for customs purposes were all disbanded, all evacuated, and that we would go back to that simple process of collecting money from the people themselves. Then would the people look to the mode in which it was expended. Proceeding to answer the objections in their order, the next was, that the Indians, by removal to the west of the Mississippi, had had their strength broken; that they had no power to resist us: and the next, in connection with it, was, that by the improvement of communication twentyfive thousand men had been made equal to what one hundred thousand were twenty-five years ago Is it true that the concentration of the Indians un the west side of the Mississippi has diminished their strength? Is not the reverse true? When they were separate tribes, living surrounded by an active, intelligent population, driven themselves, by the small amount of territory they inhabited, to agricultural pursuits, when they lived in towns and villages where they could always be found, when they were dependent on their crops, the destruction of which must always bring them immediately to submission, it was an easy matter to control them, compared with the condition in which they now exist. On a wide extent of territory, brought into contiguity with each other, no longer surrounded by white population, driven to the chase for subsistence, returning every year more and more to their roving and original habits, these people have not only been made stronger, but they have been made more disposed to hostility than they were in their former position. Again, by the acquisition of territory, and the extension of our settlements into territory long since acquired, we have been brought into contact with those tribes which, heretofore unacquainted with the white men, must go through the . same process which had rendered the eastern In These are facts on which the Senate might reach the conclusion that the recommendations of the President and the Secretary of War have not been made without some due consideration. These volumes have been but recently printed, and laid on the tables of Senators. trusted that as they progressed in the examination of them, many of those objections and doubts which were expressed two or three days ago would vanish. I believe the increase which is proposed by the committee to be the least which the present exigencies of the country will permit. If the Senate had indicated a purpose to adopt the recommendation of the Secretary of War, the committee were ready at any time to withdraw their bill and allow the Senate to pass the other; but on the vote it was made apparent that that was impossible; it was not within the view of the Senate, getting but eight votes, and some of them hostile to any increase of the military force, and therefore given for parliamentary advantage. SENATE. thirsty, as treacherous, as cowardly a race of men as are to be found on the globe. If our frontier inhabitants have sometimes committed aggressions on them, where is the frontier settlement that does not record the most cold-blooded and cowardly murders of women and children? Where is the frontier settlement that does not bring with its traditions, tales of torture at the stake of prisoners when powerless in the hands of a hostile savage band? Are these the high principles to which the Senator appeals? Are these the noble qualities that are to make the Indian af exception, and lift him at once out of barbarism to shine as an example of those qualities which man is to possess when the millennium shall come? In the mean time I rely, as everybody connected with the Indians, as every frontier inhabitant whose wife and children are exposed to be tomahawked by these Indians, relies, on force of some kind as the only means for giving that protection which the Government owes to its people. Thus we proceed to inquire what the character of the force should be; and, in this connection, the regular troops of the Army have been pronounced as ineffective. It is said they do not kill the Indians; but that the volunteers become excited, and do kill them. The Senator from Texas says, that if regular troops ever did pursue the Indians, they might become excited and possibly do the same thing. I am not to be put in the attitude of depreciating the volunteer force of the country; nor shall I engage in recrimination against the volunteers. My relation to the volunteers and the regular troops is the same. At one time or other, in the course of my life, they have both been my companions. My remembrance of both brings to mind many associations, the dearest of my life. I have seen all that adorns the American soldier in the ranks of both regulars and volunteers. Why should this unfriendly comparison be made between these forces? Shoulder to shoulder they stand upon the battle-field; together they bleed, even exchanging men from one kind of force to the other, when it is necessary. There, when the flag of their country required them to do their utmost in the presence of a hostile foe, these jealousies and depreciations of one by the other did not arise. They were left for the debate in the Senate, and for a time of piping peace, and for places remote from the battle-field where they fought for a common cause, inspired by common sacrifices, for a common country. I know that the Senator from Texas, [Mr. HousTON,] whose familiarity with Indian character I do not doubt, has proposed to us a remedy which every man's heart would respond to as much more But the Senator from Texas says, surely with desirable, if it were attainable. He proposes an entire sincerity, that he has not heard of any purIndian policy which is to substitute kindness, jus-suit of Indians by regular troops; that all that has tice, and generosity; from which one might suppose that the Government had pursued a different policy; but his remarks put it out of the question that he meant the Government had pursued any other policy than this, except through the regular Army. Now, sir, I believe that the argument of the Senator from Texas is somewhat answered by the argument of the Senator from Georgia, [Mr. TOOMBS.] The Senator from Georgia says that the regular Army is entirely harmless as against Indians; so that if the Senator from Texas thinks they are dangerous, I must refer him to his friend from Georgia, who assures him that the Army is quite harmless in relation to the Indians. He proposes to appeal to the high motives and the generous character of the Indians to remove the necessity for any military force. The efficacy of the theory is answered by those who speak from observation. In the first place, Indian agents do not seem to entertain that idea. In the next place, the officers of the Army, who are the frontier men, and know more of the Indians than anybody else, dissent; and much as the Senator himself has seen of Indian tribes, I should say he had not seen as many weeks of Indian service as every field officer of the frontier regiments of the Army has seen years. I do not think, therefore, his opinion is to outweigh, when put in opposition to that of the sub-agents of Indian affairs, and that of military officers who have served on the Indian frontier the greater part of their lives. been done, has been by volunteers. Well, sir, in the volume which has been laid upon his desk, the report of the Secretary of War, he will find some cases cited-not all, but some which have been cited because of their prominence. They have been cited to show that the Army as it now exists is not on a peace establishment; to show the constant active service on which it is engaged. Not only is it to be found in this volume, but it has been circulated over the country in general orders from the head-quarters of the Army as long ago as November 13th last. Not only that, but some of the brilliant acts of service, therein recited, occurred within the limits of the Senator's own State. Let me read some of these instances from the general order to which I have referred: "1. On the 17th of February, 1856, Captain James Oakes, with a part of his company C, second cavalry, from Fort Mason, Texas, after a pursuit of six days, and on the nint day from his post, overtook a party of seven or more Indian:, killed one and wounded several others; capturing all their Kuhn, severely wounded. The troops were exposed to very animals and other property; sergeant Reis and private cold and wet weather, and for more than seven days subsisted on two days' allowance of bread and coffee, such game as they could kill, and the flesh of horses they weru obliged to abandon." That sounds to me something like pursuit; and it was a pursuit of a party that invaded the Senator's own State. Again, the seventh case recited in this order is: "VII. On the 13th of April, 1856, a party of fifty-five I have no confidence in the high principles that Indians were overtaken on the head waters of the Nueces, are ascribed to the Indians. They have a certain by detachments from companies B and D, mounted rifle sort of morality-a certain sort of religion, if you men, and F, first artillery, from forts Melntosh and Duncan, Texas, under the command, respectively, of Captain may so call it; they are in some things good. Take Thomas Claiborne, junior, and Brevet-Captain George thein as a mass, they are as deceptive, as blood-Granger, mounted riflemen, and Scoond Lieutenant George 35TH CONG....1ST SESS. H. Elliot, first artillery. One Indian killed and four made prisoners, their camp and all their animals captured. The vigilance of the Indians, and the character of the country, which enabled them to discover pursuit at a great distance, prevented a more complete success. In this case, from the time of leaving their posts until the termination of the pursuit, the troops marebed three hundred and fifty miles in eight days. They suffered from want of water; and for four days, two in the pursuit and two after its termination, had no provisions but a small allowance of rice and coffee, accidentally obtained in crossing the El Paso road. "The mayor of Laredo, Señor Don Santos Benevidas, Mr. Edward Jordan, and some twenty-five other citizens of that place, participated in this pursuit, and are represented as having rendered valuable ervice." Again: XII. September, 1855. A detachment of troops from Fort Clark, Texas, commanded by Captain James Oakes, second cavalry, and composed of Captain Charles C. Gilbert and eighteen men of company B, first infantry; Second Lieutenant Henry W. Closson and twelve men of company I, first artillery; and Second Lieutenant James B. Wetherill and thirty men of company C, second cavalry, penetrated the country between Fort Clark and the mouth of the Pecos, western Texas, hitherto not visited by troops, and considered very difficult of access. The expedition was conducted with so much judgment and energy that, in the operations of a day, three parties of Indians were surprised between the Rio Grande and Pecos, near their junction. Four of the Indians killed and four wounded. Their animals and other property taken or destroyed.” The Senator from Texas knows Indians well enough to know the difficulty of surprising an Indian camp. He understands that men, ignorant of the frontier and its service, as he described the Army to be, would never surprise an Indian camp, and yet here is a gallant soldier who three times surprised Indians in one day. Then again: XIV. November 30th, 1855. A detachment composed of men of company G, first dragoons, and company C, mounted riflemen, in all twenty, commanded by Second Lieutenant Horacé Randal, first dragoons, followed a party of fifty warriors of the Gila Apaches, and after a chase of three hundred, and, in one day, of eighty, miles-going over mountains and plains of snow, the trail frequently obliterated, without water for three days and nights-overtook the enemy and attacked and drove them from the position of their own selection, recovering all the captured animals.” That sounds something like pursuit-a pursuit in which fortitude, skill, and all the knowledge that could enter into such service, were exempli fied in the highest degree, and that too by one of those very young men against whom so many of the Senator's remarks this morning were directed. Again: "XIX. April 4th, 1857. First Lieutenant Walter II. Jenifer, second cavalry, with thirteen men of Company B, of that regiment, after a search of thirteen days, and a march of nearly three hundred miles, came upon a fresh trail of Indiaus, near the head of the north fork of the Nueces river, Texas; and, as the trail led into a rocky country, almost impracticable for cavalry, he dismounted, left his horses with a guard, and continued the pursuit with only seven After a tedious march of four miles, he suddenly came upon a camp, occupied by from eighty to one hundred Indians. Approaching it, under cover, to within two hundred and filty yards, and he and his little party being discovered, they were attacked by all the warriors in the catup, and threatened, at the same time, by a party returning to it with horses. He repulsed the Indians, with a loss to them of two killed and one wounded. It being then night, he withdrew his men, rejoined his horses, and returned to the attack the next day; but, in the mean while, the Indians dispersed. For the last three days this detachment had no rations, having been out seventeen days.” I could go on with these instances. I have other cases marked which I might cite. There are twenty-five recited in this single order-one of them a case where the Indians were drawn up in position, and waited to receive an attack of cavalry, when they were gallantly attacked by Sumner, leading his men and charging in the same manner in which he charged the Mexican forces at Molina del Rey. He drove them from the field, and their safety arose simply from their ability, with their light horses, to cross a stream, the bed of which was composed of sand. Then the Senator, in the course of his remarks, tonly cruel. I have no disposition to shrink from (for I find that, as my opponents are pressed to a the responsibility of what I said; or if I did not change, I must change also,) took the ground that, say it, what I thought. I thought, and I now say, on one occasion, the Army had been effective; for, that if you bring men out with border animosities, said he, they had killed one hundred and thirty men who have had past injuries, who come with women and children; and the Senator from Maine grievances to redress, they will exceed the limits [Mr. HAMLIN] said dragoons had been raised, of justice; they will exceed the limits of humanity under the pretext of defending the frontier against and forbearance; they will kill without justifiable the Indians, and all he heard of their doings was cause. I have no disposition to cite cases, though their having killed some squaws and children. I it would be easy for me to do so. Voluntersdo not know what number he meant, whether the the word is used because others use it; militia is same one hundred and thirty or not; but he ex- the strict term-the militia are the people of the plained that he meant the same place. The report United States, and so are the soldiers of the regof General Harney, in reference to the action re- ular Army. They are all volunteers. Thank forferred to, is to be found in the second volume of tune we live under a Government where all, who the President's message and accompanying doc- enter the military service, do it voluntarily. Miliuments for last year, at page 49. He sets forth tia may be coerced by draft; the regular soldier the whole case; and, according to his report, and is always a volunteer; his is always a voluntary the accompanying reports of the officers who were enlistment; he is emphatically, under all circumserving under him, the number of killed was stances, the volunteer. But using the term in the eighty-six, and wounded, five-not one hundred sense in which it has been used, militia, if drawn and thirty women and children, but eighty-six from a distance, would be exactly like those enIndians were killed, and five wounded; about sev- listed in the regular service; the whole difference enty women and children captured, and fifty mules being the degree of discipline, and that disparity and ponies taken, besides an indefinite number constantly vanishing in the progress of a long camkilled and disabled. In a report made by Col-paign, bringing them at last to precisely the same onel Cooke, which I shall not weary the Senate by reading, he explains that the women dressed and armed so much like the men, as sometimes to be almost undistinguishable from them. They fired upon his men; and, in one instance, wounded a sergeant who had passed a woman because he perceived she was one. Then, again, the report of Lieutenant Warren, who was the topographical engineer accompanying the expedition, gives distinctly the whole circumstances and topography of the ground which caused the killing of, I think, seven women and three children. After the first attack, on the Blue Water, a part of the Indians escaped across the plains, and were pursued by the mounted troops. A part of them, being on a hill, had fled into a sort of a cave, where the rock hung down near to the ground, and furnished a loop-hole through which they fired upon the troops as they approached. This fire was returned by the troops. A cry was heard from the interior of, this cave, and one of the interpreters said there were women in it, and the officer who commanded them (and who, by the way, the Senator from Maine would have found, if he had inquired, was a worthy representative of his own State) immediately halted, told the interpreter to advance, and called on the women to come out. They did come out, surrendered, and were not hurt; and all who were killed were those who had been shot in the cave, where they could not be seen, and only then after the troops had been fired at from the cave. That, according to the history of the case, is the foundation of this charge of killing one hundred and thirty women and children. standard; being the same materiel at the start, and reaching the same result if they are carried through the same process. The whole of the cases which were referred to, and which have been somewhat warped in the argument, were those which resulted from border animosity and from partisan feeling. I think I said-and if I did not, I intended to say--that if the militia of California were called out against the Mormons, coming there with the hostility resulting from their contact with them, justifiable, if you please, but coming with that preconceived hostility, they would exercise a severity in their treatment of them which would not belong to men brought from a distance. That is my opinion. It is very likely, that if the appeal was made to the men themselves, they would say: "Yes, that is true, we do feel it; and we are likely to exercise it." I am sure I have never seen a body of militia in the field, called from the neighborhood of a settlement on which Indian depredations had been committed, which did not come with the spirit of extermination, and justify themselves by arguments drawn from what they had suffered. We have also had the argument presented to us, that the militia will always respond to the call of the country; that they always have been the effective force which has fought the battles of the country; and that they are the reliable strength of the country. Grant it. Who denies it? The militia have responded, and they always will respond, when there is occasion; but the militia never have been called out to hold frontier posts; and they will be found to be very restless troops if they should ever thus be employed. It would be at a great sacrifice of the other interests of the country, if the militia were so called out. useful in the ordinary avocations of life, detached from them and from their families, to perform the duty of private sentinels at a frontier post, would be such a waste of valuable material, that it would deserve to be called anything else than economy, even if it did not cost a dollar. Men The commander of that expedition, General Harney, might compare his knowledge of Indians and of Indian character favorably with the Senator from Texas, or anybody else. That stroke, which he gave the Indians on the Blue Water, was the most successful blow that was ever struck on that frontier for the preservation of its future peace: and if peace shall be enjoyed by the people of Nebraska,it will be attributable more to that one great movement of Harney's than to anything else which has ever happened there. Then, moving on, with that knowledge of Indian character, and that intrepidity and devotion to his duty which char-will be found in the American Journal of Mediacterize the man, he went forward, disregarding all difficulties, until he reached the Missouri river, and there held a council with the Indians, and formed with them an agreement, which stands in my judgment as a model for all treaties with Indian tribes. He there established among them an or The Senator, then, has done injustice; and if he will take this order, I will give it to him, that he may see how great is the injustice he has done to the Army in thus proclaiming to the country that they have rendered no part of that duty which de-ganization, which, if anything could be effective volves upon them for the protection of the frontier. If he will read the report of the Secretary of War, he will find that this is but one of the two orders that recite such deeds, illustrating the services which have been rendered by our gallant little band on the frontier, and answering the reflection which the Senator has, I am sure unconsciously, cast on those who are, mean time, encountering service more severe than it has often fallen to the lot of troops to bear: to preserve these restless people in order, would But, sir, in answer to some remarks which have But, sir, as to the relative efficiency of the two species of troops, I have some brief points to which I will refer; and the first is the "Vital Statistics" of Dr. Coolidge, a review of which work cal Science, for January last, and a table from the work alluded to, will be found at page 92 of the Journal. It is a table showing the proportion of the invalid and disabled troops in the different services. First, he takes the British army, giving a percentage of 0.65 per month; then the regular Army of the United States, giving a percentage of 0.53; and then the additional force raised in the war with Mexico, being regular troops, 0.52; then the volunteers, 1.25 per month. That is to say the men, who became diseased and disabled by the contingencies of the camp, were about double, in the volunteer forces, what they were in the regular army. Why was this? In the first place, the volunteers did not know how to take care of themselves; they did not know how to shelter themselves; they did not know how to 35TH CONG...1ST SESS. cook their provisions; and in the next place, their habits were suddenly changed, and this waste of life was the result of the sudden change before the animal economy had been accommodated to it. If you were to take an Osage and put him on a simple rice diet, you would as surely kill him as if you were to take a Hidoo and put him on a meat diet alone. Either of the two extremes would bring about the same result, and be destructive to the efficiency of the Army. Next I refer to the report of the Surgeon-General of the Army, of November 9, 1846, in which he says: "From the best information which has been received at this office, it is believed that the extent of sickness among the volunteers on the Rio Grande has been fourfold to that among the soldiers of the regular Army, with a corresponding excess of mortality in the ranks of the former. But this is not all; the presence of a numerous body of invalids seriou-ly embarrasses the service; for, besides consuming the subsistence and other stores required for the efficient men, they must have an additional number of surgeons and men to take care of them, and a guard to protect them, which necessarily lessens the disposable force, the available force, for active operations in the field.” These are the two statements on which I would rely as to the relative efficiency of the two species of troops; and these reasons apply with fourfold force to the circumstances of the expedition to Utah. They will be there further removed from civilization; they will be there more deprived of the comforts to which they have been before accustomed. The casualties resulting from the employment of militia in such a service as that, by their being disabled by disease, exposure, and the vicissitudes of the camp, will greatly exceed anything we have heretofore encountered in the cases from which these results have been drawn. There might, however, be circumstances which would justify us in meeting all these objections. If I believed, with the Senator from Texas, that the cavalry of the United States Army was necessarily wholly inefficient, a mere tax which never did and never would do anything, certainly I would say we must look out for some other character of troops; but some of the hard rides read to him to-day, some of the successful pursuits, defying all privations of food, cold, and thirst, should somewhat convince him that the Army may be effective for the purpose for which he proposes to employ a volunteer force. He says he wants troops; but he wants a different kind of troops than the Army can furnish; he wants men who are able to take care of their horses; men who know something about frontier service. Where will he find them out of the Army, comparable to our dragoons? Where will he find men who have so often encamped under the blue vault of heaven, and relied on grass to support their marching column, as in the Army of the United States? Where will he find men who know so much of the topography of the Country? If his objection be that the recruits are not sufficiently instructed, the remedy is to give us more force; not to require that every man, the instant he is enlisted, shall be thrown on to the frontier for immediate service; but give us enough troops to keep some in camps of instruction and in schools of practice, where they may be educated for those duties which the Senator, desires to have them perform. But he makes the argument of economy in that connection, and uses it in several other connections; and among others, the Senator from Georgia first asserts and the Senator from Texas indorses it, that Texas used to be better protected by four companies of rangers, than she is now by five regular regiments. To that there are two answers: First, there are not five regiments there; and second, if Texas ever was protected by four companies at the early period referred to, those four companies might have been quite adequate to protect the settlements which, at that time, were not equal to one twentieth, or perhaps one hundredth part of what they are now. Four companies were sufficient to protect a single ranch; they were more than sufficient to protect a single man: and they may have been sufficient to protect the whole amount of border settlements Texas then had. It is further to be remembered that the Indians then lived upon fertile valleys with abundance of Increase of the Army—Mr. Davis. game, and that the prosperity and progress, which to me is most gratifying, of the people of Texas, has now driven the Indians from the fertile plains into the arid region where but little game is to be found; and now, by necessity, they commit forays for plunder in order that they may obtain food, which is not to be found in the haunts to which they have been driven. Then, again, it is to be remembered that Texas did not occupy to the boundary of the Rio Grande. I contended in 1850 that that was her territory. I contended for it a great way up the stream; but nevertheless it is true that she did not maintain posts on the borders of that river overlooking the territories of Mexico. A portion of the force in Texas is to be accounted for by manning those posts which mark the boundary of the Rio Grande, and which Texas never occupied with a regular force. Now, sir, the question of economy is to be answered in several forms. As I understand the argument, the basis of it, and it was so stated by the Senator from Georgia, is, that the cost, whilst in the service, of a militiaman and of a regular is the same. He made some slighting remarks about the skill of regulars in making out accounts, to which I have no reply to make, but he said the pay and allowances were the same; overlooking the fact, that the more frequently you change the force the greater is cost. He has neglected the law which gives to the militiaman fifty cents a day for his own subsistence, and twenty-five cents for that of his horse, whilst he is going to and getting back, and twenty-five cents for the use of his horse while he is in service. It is a fact that we have been able to get very few volunteers otherwise than mounted. It has become steadily more and more so with each year. The late Adjutant General Jones used to say, that he recollected the time when the song was, that a man was to shoulder his musket and march away, but now it was to get upon a horse and ride away. His complaint was then that he could not get militia to serve on foot. He could not get militia in Florida to serve on foot. It was not so much that they required to ride, as that they would not serve for the poor pay given to the private soldier of the United States; they required the pay of mounted men, n, pay and allowances for their horses; and the indemnity for their horses, which always follows, in a heavy train, behind the allowance for permis sion to use the horse at all. SENATE. months the cost of a company of United States dragoons was $13,573, and for the mounted volunteers $22,575. That is the ratio to which the attention of the Senator from Georgia is called before he again assumes the position that the expense is the same. The Senator announced, in the course of his argument, that the cost per man of the Army, was $1.000 per annum; but the Senator from Maine, I think, says it is $1,500. The Senator from Louisiana [Mr. BENJAMIN] says it is $1,000; and thus it seems to be a question between the gentlemen whether it is $1,000 or $1,500. I am quite at a loss to know by what process of calculation they reach that result. Surely the Senator from Georgia, when he states the cost per man during the time Mr. Calhoun was Secretary of War, to be $273, has not based his calculation on any data which will lead him to decide that $1,000 is the cost of a man now. Whatever process of calcu lation is adopted, it must be different for the one case and the other to reach these results. It is utterly impossible to obtain them by any one process of calculation. Mr. TOOMBS. I can refer the Senator to my authority. In 1842, the Secretary of War, Mr. Spencer, of New York, I think, was called upon to compare the estimate of expenditures. He puts it at that amount on the same basis by dividing the expense by the number of men and officers. The report I stated from recollection was that it was $273. That is where my information is derived from. Mr. DAVIS. The report of 1820 is to be found in the American State Papers, volume 2, pages 46-7: and in it is stated the strength of the Army at different dates, and the annual expense per man, including officers; and this report states it to have been, in 1809, 1810, and 1811, $383 60; in 1820, $336 56, per man; and that the reduction of nearly fifty dollars has been ascribed, and I think with much justice, though I do not believe it is wholly due to that cause, to the increase of the Army which, in the mean time, had taken place. The Army had been increased on the peace establishment by six thousand men, and the expense per man had sunk nearly fifty dollars. Now, sir, I have had a calculation made on the present basis to ascertain what a regiment of infantry will cost; and I have asked that it shall be a regiment of infantry to be raised, including the whole expense for recruiting, the first years' cloth All these matters have been reduced to calcula-ing, all the camp and garrison equipage, so as to tion; we have had reports on them. It is hardly necessary to argue that the traveling allowances, the clothing which is on the ratio of the first year's services, and the pay for the use of the horses, constitute the items that make up the very great expense of the employment of volunteers. These have all been stated in tables, which have heretofore been prepared, presented, and published for the use of the Government. The Senator from Florida [Mr. MALLORY] this morning referred to the letter of Mr. Poinsett. That letter communicated a report of the Paymaster General, who went beyond the limits of the then Secretary of War. He refers to the disparity between the cost of the two forces as nearly six to one, because, he says, the horses that are employed are merely to carry the men from place to place, and really impede the march of the column. Then he goes on to state that "This enormous disparity in the expenses of the two forces is not owing to the extravagant allowances made to volunteers; for, except in the article of clothing, they are not better paid than regular troops, and altogether insuthciently compensated to reimburse them for the pecuniary sacrifices they make in leaving home and employment, to say nothing of the danger and hardships they encounter. It is caused principally by expenses for traveling to and from the place where the services of the volunteers and militia are required; to the hire, maintenance, and indemnity for horses; and to furnishing them a full supply of clothing as a bounty, without regard to length of service. The statements also show the expense of volunteers serving on foot, and of militia. The term of service of the latter never exceeds three months, unless specially provided for. between the expenses of regular and irregular troops in a "There is one comparison that would place the contrast much stronger light, if I had the data to enable ure to state it in tigures; and that is, the comparative loss and destruction of military stores and public property by the two forces." He presents his tabular statement in which he shows, on the basis of the companies, that for six bring it as nearly as possible into a fair comparison or parallelism with a volunteer force raised for the same time. It is the same table which was furnished to the Senator from Texas, but which could not have been in his possession when he made his remarks. The pay during twelve months of a maximum infantry regiment, eight hundred and seventy-eight strong, (that includes all the field and staff, and includes the additional men granted by the act of 1850,) including officers' subsistence, clothing for their servants, and forage for the horses of the field and staff, subsistence of the enlisted men at the price which has been estimated for the Utah expedition, clothing for the enlisted men, with camp and garrison equipage for the officers and men, make the total amount of maintaining for one year such a regiment, $293,784 39. If to this be added the maximum cost of raising such a regiment, $14,630, we shall have an aggregate of $308,414 39; and this divided by eight hundred and seventy-eight would give us the cost per man for the first year, $351 24. The cost of raising a regiment would of course be excluded from all subsequent calculations. The estimate for clothing would be greatly lessened the second year; and the estimate for camp and garrison equipage would disappear. We have had an estimate lately sent in to us, of $385,000 required by the pay department alone. for twenty companies of volunteers for six months. That would be equal to ten companies for twelve months; and taking it and compacing it with this estimate of a regiment for a year, adding the cost of rations, which is $77,015, it would give a total of $462,015, (including merely the cost of rations and the pay,) or $526 21 per man. It follows, then, that a regiment of volunteers would, for one year, cost $153,600 61 more than a regular rogi |