have been devised by the art of man. And, upon the authorities already adduced, it is manifest that the charter under which the defendants claim. if it authorized such erection, being a state enactment, which, in its operation, prescribes regulations for commerce conflicting with those of Congress, such charter is against the Constitution of the United States, and is absolutely void. And all considerations, as to the practicability of changing and adapting the structure and machinery of steamboats, so as to pass the bridge, are wholly unavailing to the defendants, for Congress, having regulated these vessels, appointed an inspector, prescribed their machinery, and the duties of officers and crew, and granted them a license to navigate the river, no individual nor state has any authority to require a change of such machinery, nor impose the performance of any duty, nor for a single moment direct or arrest their course; and hence it follows that as this is undertaken and accomplished by the Wheeling Bridge, it is an unlawful obstruction of navigation on the Ohio River. The injury resulting to the State of Pennsylvania from this unlawful obstruction is of the utmost magnitude. Occupying a central position resting eastward on the Atlantic, north on the Lakes, flanking on the Ohio, by it she is connected with the Gulf and the vast regions of the West and South. She thus enjoys a position for foreign and domestic commerce more favorable than any other in the Union. From the earliest period these advantages were cultivated, she became a navigating State; the energies and enterprise of her people were devoted to navigation and commerce. By her own canals connecting the lakes and the Atlantic with the Ohio, she possesses channels for water transportation, more important than can be possessed by any state on the continent. By steamboats navigating the Ohio she has intercourse with all the States lying west and south of her; and by the same highway, commerce with foreign nations, passing through the Gulf and the Mississippi, reaches her gates, to be transported eastward through the channels she has opened. Across this thoroughfare, within fifty miles of her border, the Wheeling Bridge | interposes its barrier. By it her communication with New Orleans, St. Louis, Cincinnati, and all the region west and south of her, is intercepted; and the commerce flowing between them and her public works is interrupted, exposed to danger, delay, and is at times wholly cut off. The admission by defendants, that obstruction of the Ohio River, from any cause, would injuriously affect her public works, is evidently true; and equally plain is it that such obstruction must injuriously affect every interest that a state can possess, or that she is 538] bound to cherish and defend. This injury may be considered in respect, 1st. To the persons and property of her citi zens. 2d. To her sovereignty and eminent domain. 3d. To her ports. 4th. To the revenue of her public works. (We must pass over the discussion of the first three of these points, and proceed to the last.) To the public works of Pennsylvania, the injury occasioned by this obstruction is deep and lasting. The products of the South and West, and of the Pacific coast, are brought in steam boats along the Ohio to the western end of her canals at Pittsburg, thence to be transported through them to Philadelphia, for an eastern and foreign market. Foreign merchandise and eastern manufacturers, received at Philadelphia, are transported by the same channel to Pittsburg, thence to be carried south and west, to their destination, in steamboats along the Ohio. If these vessels and their commerce are liable to be stopped within a short distance as they approach the canals, and subject to expense, delay, and danger, to reach them, the same consequences to ensue on their voyage departing, the value of these works must be destroyed. This result is confessed by the defendants to be a necessary consequence of obstruction to the Ohio River from any cause. "They have no doubt that the navigation of the Ohio River is important to the works above referred to, and that the value thereof would be affected injuriously, if from any cause the passage of steamboats from the City of Pittsburg, downwards, were obstructed or impeded." 2d Supplemental Answer, Record, p. 42. That the passage of steamboats to and from Pittsburg is obstructed and impeded by the Wheeling Bridge, has also been shown by the admissions already quoted. "Six boats, the owners of which refuse to remodel their chimneys so as to enable them, in case of a freshet, to pass under the bridge, belong to Pittsburg, the rival of Wheeling in commerce and manufactures." Supplemental Answer, Record, p. 44. "A few of the larger class of boats at such a stage (thirty feet) of water, will be compelled to lower their chimneys." Mem. to Virginia Legislature, Record, p. 56. It has been seen that the six boats referred to are the carriers, between Pittsburg and Cincinnati, of three fourths of the trade and travel transported by the Pennsylvania Canal. The large class spoken of are the carriers from New Orleans and St. Louis. Too large for the canal, these boats can reach Pittsburg and depart only on high water. Too large for the bridge, they can pass Wheeling only on low water. They are thus excluded from Pittsburg by a natural obstruction at Louisville, one portion of the year, and for the re- [*539 mainder by an artificial obstruction at Wheeling. To surmount both obstructions the same condition is imposed-"compelled to lower their chimneys." By their own confession, then, the defendants, with their cables stretched over the channel, produce the same result as if rocks were sunk in its bed. Between the Pennsylvania Canal and Louisville, a distance of seven hundred miles, no obstruction has hitherto existed. Between Pittsburg and Cincinnati, with which one half of her commerce is transacted, this artificial obstruction, equal to the Louisville falls, is placed within fifty miles of her borders, interposing between her ports and every other to which her commerce extends. Nay, more-to remove obstructions in the Ohio, Congress, at the solicitation of the Pennsylvania Legislature, has appropriated many millions of dollars (4 U. S. Stat. 32), and within twelve months before this bridge was commenced, one hundred und thirty thousand two hundred dollars were courts of equity have assumed jurisdiction to xpended for that purpose between Wheeling | administer that specific remedy. and Pittsburg. Col. Albert's Deposition, p. 126. Thus it appears that while Congress has been expending public money in improving navigation, the defendants have spent their own in obstructing it, with much more effectual purpose. From the admissions of the defendants as to the obstruction created by their bridge, and its injury to the property of Pennsylvania, attention may now be turned to the other evidence on the same subject. Report of the Board of Canal Commissioners. "The board fully concur in the views expressed by the collector as to the injurious effects which the construction of the bridge at Wheeling must necessarily produce upon the revenues of the Commonwealth, derived from the main line of her public works. If the representation be true that the bridge referred to prevents the passage of the large class of steamboats, which can only run in times of high water, then the State ought to take every legal step to procure the removal of the obstruction. It is unnecessary for the board to present to the senate any argument to prove that such an impediment to the free navigation of the Ohio will materially affect the interests of Pennsylvania." Record, p. 421. Report of the State Treasurer. "It becomes my duty to call your attention to the bridge lately constructed across the River Ohio at Wheeling; threatening, as it does, to interfere with the business and enterprise of Pittsburg, whose commercial prosperity is so 540*] essential to the productiveness of our main line of canal. Should the price of freights to and from Pittsburg, by the river, be enhanced in the smallest degree by destroying the competition between the large and small boats, it will result injuriously to the business of the canal, and prejudicial to the enterprise of a city whose manufacturing wealth and commerce are too valuable to the State to be jeopardized." State Treasurer's Annual Report, p. 12. "Annual receipts of main line, $1,238,720.05." Id. p. 50. The views thus expressed by the public officers of Pennsylvania and of the general government, are sustained by the knowledge and experience of business men. Mr. Stanton proceeded to comment on other testimony, and then contended that the bridge might have been constructed so as not to obstruct navigation. He then examined the value of the bridge as a means of transit from shore to shore, and afterwards the right of the State to sue in her corporate capacity, for injuries operating immediately upon the persons, property, and business of the citizens of Pennsylvania; and also for those which operate directly upon the State. The right to relief at her own suit being shown, its form remains to be mentioned Abatement by injunction is prayed. And for these reasons: Abatement is a remedy which the law allows persons injured by a nuisance to administer for their own relief; but to avoid strife and contention that thence might ensue, The grounds of equitable jurisdiction for abatement by injunction, are precisely those occupied herein by the State. "The ground," says Mr. Justice Story, "for this jurisdiction in cases of purpresture, as well as nuisance, undoubtedly is their ability to give a more complete and perfect remedy than is allowable at law, in order to prevent irreparable mischief, and also to suppress oppressive and vexatious litigation. In the first place they can interpose, as the courts of law cannot, to restrain and prevent such nuisances threatened or in progress, as well as those already existing. In the next place, by a perpetual injunction the remedy is made complete through all future time. Whereas an information or indictment new at the common law can dispose only of the existing nuisance, and for future acts prosecutions must be brought. In the next place, the remedial justice in equity may be chief is done; whereas at law nothing can be prompt and immediate before irreparable misdone except after trial and upon the award of judgment." 2 Story's Equity, 203; see, also, cases cited in the brief. for this remedial interposition of courts of Obstruction of water-courses are cases calling equity. 2 Story's Equity, 206. It needs no argument to show that [*541 the injury in question, as it is great in magnitude, is also most clearly within the class of what are known as irreparable injuries. In the first place, being an injury to trade, the full extent of injury cannot be measured in damages, any more than in cases of nuisance to health, it can be ascertained how many months or weeks or hours life may be shortened. In the second place, it is unceasing and without end. While the water flows and the bridge stands the injury continues. The mischief is not only irreparable, but the litigation to which it must lead would be vexatious in the last degree. The strife and contention that must follow, are also of the most serious character. It is the specific penalty prescribed by the charter, the terms upon which the defendants obtained permission to erect their bridge, the agreement entered into. That Virginia has since chosen for herself to waive that penalty, can make no difference as to the equities of other parties. This remedy is still in the charter: "If the bridge shall be so erected as to obstruct navigation, the said bridge may be treated as a public nuisance and abated accordingly." Charter of Wheeling Bridge. It is said that before injunction a trial at law should be awarded. But trials at law are awarded only where facts are contested; and cases of nuisance are excepted from the benefit even of this rule. "If the thing sought to be prohibited is in itself a nuisance, the court will interfere to stay irreparable mischief, without waiting the result of a trial." Shelford on Railways, 431. But what facts are here to be ascertained? The highway, the obstruction, the injury, are confessed on the record. The whole defense rests simply upon legal exceptions, leaving no fact to be tried. The Acts of Pennsylvania authorizing bridges within her own territory are urged in defense. To this it is sufficient to remark, that the equi table doctrine of set-off has never been applied | be consistent with her character to seek a to cases of nuisance. And if it were, the peaceful remedy, her Legislature, by unanimous bridges on the Alleghany and Monogahela are vote in both branches, adopted the following not a fair equivalent for the navigation of the resolutions, in obedience to which I now appear Ohio, Mississippi, and their branches, cut off before this court: by the Wheeling bridge. When complaint is made or injury shown from these bridges, then will be time to show their defense. With this case, and the matters here involved, they have nothing to do. The State is also charged with laches-stand ing by and witnessing without objection the defendants expend their money. This is a strange charge, when it is remembered that Pennsylvania met these defendants in Congress, and there urged her specific objections, resisted and defeated a bill for the erection of 542] the bridge that had been introduced by the member from Wheeling, before her remonstrance reached Washington. She could not follow them into the Legislature of Virginia. And if she had done so, her rights were sufficiently guarded by the 14th section of their charter. Its violation was not to be presumed. But when it became manifest that, in defiance of its provisions, the river was about to be obstructed, the law officer of the State, her Attorney-General, promptly appealed to this tribunal. What charge of laches could be more unfounded? Pending these proceedings, in the fancied belief that an advantage would be gained thereby, the work was hurried on to its completion. Warning was given, by the learned judge before whom the motion was made, that no equity would be thus gained, but that if found a nuisance the bridge must be abated. And this was made one of the grounds for then denying the motion. Judge Grier's Opinion. Abatement is the only remedy that can save the public works of Pennsylvania from irreparable injury. It is the condition upon which the defendants in their own wrong obstructed this highway, and it is the penalty pronounced by Virginia for infringing the rights of navigation. "Be it resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, in General Assembly *met [*543 That the free and uninterrupted navigation of the Ohio River as a common highway, is a right belonging to the citizens of Pennsylvania, which being essential to the prosperity of the State, it is the duty of the Commonwealth to assert and defend. "That the proceedings in behalf of said State, instituted by her Attorney-General in the Supreme Court of the United States, and now pending therein, against the Wheeling and Belmont Bridge Company, to abate the nuisance occasioned by their bridge lately erected across said river, be prosecuted to final judgment, decree and execution for abatement of said nuisance." Having thus presented my proposition in its various branches, I feel that it is not needful for me to urge upon this court the important considerations which necessarily arise from the case, considerations affecting not only life and property to an immeasurable extent, but vast commerce, essential state rights, and the peace of the confederacy. They will present themselves to the court with more force than 1 could urge them. I know not, sir, that it becomes me to say more in this behalf. This only I will add: In 1765 a distinguished son of Pennsylvania, Dr. Rittenhouse, first conceived the plan of her great works, connecting the waters of the Lakes and the Atlantic with the Ohio River. Seventy years elapsed before the resources of the State were equal to such an undertaking. But once commenced, it was accomplished. While all other works tending to the same object halted east of the Alleghanies, Pennsylvania forced her way through; thus opening a cheap, easy and secure water transportation from the Gulf and the Rocky Mountains to the Atlantic seaboard. But no sooner had this mighty work been completed, and its revenues commenced to replenish the exhausted treasury of the State, and a prosperous commerce to reimburse her citizens for their heavy taxation, than the flagitious scheme is undertaken to cut her off from the Ohio by a bridge at Wheeling, within fifty miles of her borders. These rights Pennsylvania might protect by abatement of this nuisance by her own act. But the Constitution established this tribunal as one of dignity, wherein a state might sue and obtain redress by due course of law. Its powers and duties are defined in No. 80 of the Federalist, and in the Constitution by terms of the most wide and general signification, extending to “all those cases which involve the peace of the confederacy, whether they relate to the When, to prevent so great a wrong, she apintercourse between the United States and for-peals to the Supreme Court; the work is hureign nations, or between the States them-ried on; and pending her application for an selves." Comment upon these terms from me would be superfluous. They embrace the very case now before the court, than which none can be conceived more directly or deeply involving the peace of the confederacy. It presents no question of abstract rights, but one of actual existing vested rights, essential to the existence of the State and the welfare of her people. Her rights of commerce extending between the several States; the right of navigation upon a public river; the use of a highway upon which the value of internal improvements, costing over forty millions of dollars, depends. Upon these considerations the State of Pennsylvania prosecutes this suit. Declaring it to injunction, iron cables are stretched across the channel of a navigable river, interrupting vessels arriving and departing from the ports of Pennsylvania. And before she can be heard in this tribunal, her vessels are stopped on a public highway, their cargo and passengers discharged at Wheeling, and Pennsylvania ports shut up. For less injuries than these, states have been heretofore prompt to redress their own wrongs, and have rushed swiftly to war. Even under our government, in *de- [*544 fense of commercial rights, supposed to be invaded by congressional enactment, the banner of disunion has been unfurled in the South. In the North and East, bordering states, asserting navigation privileges, have resorted to acts of retortion and confiscation, until at length civil war was ready to burst forth on their borders and range along their coasts. At a later day, the western States of Ohio and Michigan, on a mere boundary question, arrayed their military forces against each other, under command of their respective governors. And now, on a mere abstract question, state is seen arrayed against state, with threats and warlike aspect. To these, what a contrast and example does Pennsylvania this day present. Threatened in her dearest rights, she makes no appeal to force. When the foundations of this government were laid, and this tribunal established as its corner stone, Pennsylvania was there. She knew that the chief object of the Constitution was to substitute the law of reason for the law of force; and her abiding confidence in its efficacy for every exigency has never been shaken. Her commerce obstructed on a pub lic river, her ports shut up; she comes this day at the head of no armed squadrons, with no blustering enactments of state sovereignty, with no threatenings of disunion upon her lips. As becomes the keystone of the federal arch, she seeks first a peaceful remedy. She appears as an humble suitor before civil judges, sitting upon their judgment seat, surrounded by no armed janizaries, by no imperial guards; but in the exercise of their constitutional func tions clothed with an authority more potent, in her estimation, than an army with banners. She asks them to protect a right, deemed the most inestimable among all nations, belonging to her by the law of nature and of nations; guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of Congress, for the improvement of which millions of her treasure have been lavished, and upon which the welfare of her people depends. She asks them, by simple injunction, to prevent a local corporation from violating, under color of state authority, a right that a world in arms could not wrest from her. How far the wholesome influence of this example may depend upon the decree herein to be rendered, the learned members of this court, better than I am, are able to judge. The counsel for the defendants, in the brief which they filed, made the following points: The questions which arise in the cause may be classed under four distinct heads: I. Those which relate to the regularity of the proceedings in this cause. 545*] II. Those relating to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, in the case presented by record. III. Those of a political character, arising out of the alleged interference with the free navigation of the Ohio River, and the supposed regulation of commerce between the States, and preference of one port over another. IV. Those involving the law in regard to nuisances, and the principles on which a court of equity will interpose, by injunction, to grant relief. he had no power to do more than grant or refuse the injunction, and that the case has been improperly docketed. 2d. They will insist, that as the defendants have expressly denied under oath that this suit has been instituted by the State of Pennsylvania, but that it is in fact the suit of sundry citizens of Pittsburg who have undertaken to use the name of that State for the purpose of giving a colorable jurisdiction to this court over the case, without the authority first obtained of the legislature or executive of Pennsylvania; and as the plaintiffs have failed to produce any evidence to show that the proper authorities of Pennsylvania have authorized the institution of the suit, the court should either dismiss it or award a rule against plaintiff's attorney to show by what authority it has been instituted. Maxfield's Lessee v. Levy, 4 Dall. 330. 3d. The original bill being fatally defective was not amendable, the office of an amendment being not to make a new case, but to correct or improve a bill which contained grounds of equitable relief. McMahon v. Fawcett, 2 Rand. 537. II. Under this head defendants will insist, that if the suit has been regularly docketed and instituted by the direction of the proper authorities of the State of Pennsylvania, the bills of the plaintiff do not disclose a case properly cognizable in this court. They show no such interest on the part of the State of Pennsylvania in the matter in controversy as would make her a competent plaintiff in this court. She should show, on the face of her bill, a direct and immediate interest in the State of Pennsylvania, in her corporate capacity. A remote consequential injury will not do; injury to her citizens is not sufficient; they are com petent plaintiffs, and can seek their own re dress. 2d. The alleged injury to the public works of Pennsylvania, and through them to her revenues, is remote, contingent and speculative. The bridge is in another State, and not within fifty miles of any of her improvements. If it should prove detrimental to them by the great. er facilities which it might afford for crossing the river at Wheeling, and the induce- [*546 ments which it might hold out to trade and travel to seek that point, it would be a case of damnum absque injuria. 3d. The allegation of injury to the ship builders of Pennsylvania is obnoxious to the objections taken to the original bill; the injury is not to the State, but to her citizens, and it is indirect and consequential. 4th. If there be injury to the public, it is not to the Pennsylvania public, but to the great public of the Union. If it interferes with and regulates commerce, it is the commerce of the Union, and not of Pennsylvania; and the gov ernment of the Union alone can redress it by a proceeding in behalf of the United States, at the instance of her Attorney-General. monwealth v. Charlestown, 1 Pick. 184; see Mitford, Eq. Pl. 210; Story, Eq. Pl. secs. 503510; Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 Dall. 411; Bowne v. 1st. That the order made by Judge Grier, on Arbuckle, 4 Dall. 338 and note 2; New York v. the 1st day of August, 1849, was not war- Connecticut, 4 Dall. 3; United States v. Peters, ranted by practice in courts of equity. That' 5 Cranch, 115; McNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 9, opin I. Under this head the defendants will insist Com After the argument of the cause, the court passed the interlocutory order which is report. d in 9 How. 657. ion of Daniel, J., and cases reviewed by him; | Rand. 245; Hulme v. Shreve, 3 Green. Ch. Cases, Bank of Kentucky v. Wister, 2 Pet. 318; 116; Illingworth v. Manchester and Leeds R. R. Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal, 12 Pet. 91; ? Railw. Cases, 187; Attorney General v. EastUnited States Bank v. Planters' Bank of Geor ern Co. R. R. Co. 3 Railw. Cases, 337. gia, 9 Wheat. 904; Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dall. 382; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall 8; McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheat. 199; Fisher v. Cockrell, 5 Pet. 248; Reed v. Marsh. 13 Pet, 153; 1 Kent's Com. 344, and cases cited; Waring v. Clarke, 5 How. 468; Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Pet. 657; Spooner v. McCon nell, 1 McLean, 338, 359; Rogers v. Linn, 2 McLean, 126; 8 Cow. 146. III. The charter was granted for great pub lic objects, and intended to advance and fa cilitate commerce between the States, and the safe, speedy, and certain transmission of the mails between the eastern and western sections of the Union, and therefore commends itself to the favorable regard of the govern ment, to which is confided the power and the duty of regulating that species of commerce. The duty of the government of the United States is quite as imperative to protect and regulate the trade across, as up and down, the channels of navigable streams. The privilege of navigating the river is not paramount to, but only co-equal with, the privilege of crossing it. The bridge is not a regulator of commerce in any other sense than a railroad or a ferry would be. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 203; People v. Saratoga and Rens. Co. 15 Wend. 134; Thompson v. People, 23 Wend. 552; Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. R. 378; Norris v. Boston, and Smith v. Turner, 7 How. 283; Houston v. Moore, 5 Wheat. 48; Commonwealth v. New Bedford B. C. 1 Wood. & M. 423; Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 2 Peters, 250. 747] *IV. The case stated is not one for relief, even at law, and much less in equity by njunction: 1. The bridge is not a nuisance. The coming in of the report of the commissioner is mentioned in 11 How. 529, together with the order of court passed thereon. That report was a printed volume of more than seven hundred pages, accompanied by numer ous engravings, and including a great mass of evidence upon geographical, statistical and scientific points. It is very difficult to give an abstract of it, but the attempt must be made. "The questions referred to the commissioner to report upon, were the following, viz.: whether the suspension bridge, mentioned in the pleadings in this cause, erected over the Ohio River at the City of Wheeling, by the defendants, is or is not an obstruction to the free navigation of the Ohio River, at the place where such bridge is erected across the same, by vessels propelled by steam or sails, engaged, or which may be engaged, in the commerce or navigation of said river; and if it is such an obstruction, what change or alteration, [*548 if any, can be made, consistent with the continuance of the bridge across the said river, that will remove the obstruction to the free navigation by such vessels engaged in the commerce and navigation of such river; and also to report the proofs which should be produced before me by the respective parties; with power to appoint a clerk to assist in the execution of the order of reference; and also with power, if I should deem it necessary, to appoint a competent engineer, whose duty it should be, under my directions and instructions, as such commissioner, to take the measurement of said bridge, its appendages and appurtenances, and the localities connected therewith, and make a report to me upon the same." 2. The injury is not direct, inevitable and irreparable; on the contrary, by complainant's The report commenced with a general exown showing, it is renote, contingent and sus-amination of suspension bridges, with their ceptible of compensation in damages. adaptation to the passage of railroad cars. Upon this subject the commissioner expressed himself as follows: 3. Nor is it peculiar and exclusive, either to the citizens or to the State of Pennsylvania. 4. The course of Pennsylvania, in chartering and constructing bridges over navigable waters within her limits, and in remaining passive until the whole capital of the company had been expended, should induce the court, even if that case were in other respects a proper one for relief, to withhold its aid under the peculiar circumstances of this case. Story, Eq. sec. 959, a & b; Eden on Injunctions, 162; Bonaparte v. Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. 1 Bald. C. C. R. 218; Attorney-General v. Cleaver, 18 Vesey, 218, and authorities cited; Earl Ripon v. Hobart, 1 Coop. Select Cases, 333; Story, Eq. sec. 922925, and cases cited; Pierce v. Dart, 7 Cow. 609; Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146; Semple v. London & Birmingham R. R. Co. 1 Railw. Cases, 159; Butler v. Kent, 19 Johns. 223; Laws of Pennsylvania, 1846, 309; Palmer v. Cuyahoga County, 3 McLean, 226; Jones v. Royal Canal Co. 2 Molloy, 319; Williams v. The Earl of Jersey, 1 Craig & Phil. 96; Pelcher v. Hart, 1 Humph. Tenn. Rep. 524; Rex v. Russel, 13 Com. L. R. 254; Crenshaw v. State R. Co. 6 "My opinion, therefore, is, that if the Wheeling bridge, in its present form, is not permitted to stand, the idea that it can be so altered in its reconstruction as to adapt it to the purposes of ordinary railroad transit, should not be entertained, and should not be permitted to affect the decision of the question of the practicability of altering or reconstructing such bridge, so as to obtain a revenue therefrom, which might be of sufficient importance to the stockholders of the Bridge Company to induce them to contribute means to enable the corporation to rebuild the bridge." The report then contained an account of the commercial statistics of the Ohio River, with the velocity of its current, its floods, etc. The bridge was described as follows: "The length of the bridge is 980 feet between the faces of the two abutments; and 1,010 feet between the centers of the towers, at each end, which support the cables upon which the flooring of the bridge is suspended. The eastern towers, to the top of the saddles, are |