regarded them and never will. On mere Legislative Compromises I look with horror. They are the apples of Hippomenes cast behind him in the race. Our only safety is in equality of POWER. We must divide the territory so as forever to retain that equality in the Senate at least, and in doing so we should count Delaware with the North. She is no Southern or Slave State. I would infinitely prefer disunion to anything the least short of this and I would rather have it I believe anyhow for fear of future Clays, Bentons, Houstons and Bells. If the North will not consent to this [division of territory] I think we should not have another word to say, but kick them out of the Capitol and set it on fire. We must act now and decisively. We will be in a clear minority when California comes in, and in twenty or thirty years there will be ten more free States West of the Mississippi and ten more North of the St. Lawrence and the Lakes. England would gladly surrender Canada to us now, if she had a decent pretext that would serve her pride. Long before the North gets this vast accession of strength she will ride over us rough shod, proclaim freedom or something equivalent to it to our Slaves, and reduce us to the condition of Hayti.... Do write me as fully as you can. I think the Atlantic and Gulf States are by an immense majority ready for anything, and less patient than their leaders. Six months has produced an immense change and it is going on rapidly. If the leaders will only lead, neither they nor we have anything to fear. Yours Sincerely, J. H. Hammond The six months following Hammond's letter saw another "immense change" in the South. The tide of disunion sentiment, which was at its full in the early summer of 1850, began to recede. The death of President Taylor in July and the passage of the compromise measures in September gave the Union men of the South a basis on which to make a final appeal for harmony. Although Governor Quitman of Mississippi and Governor Seabrook of South Carolina were still in favor of a policy of defiance and separation,1 the other states of the South accepted the compromise. Georgia led the way with her great trio of Unionist congressmen - Toombs, Cobb, and Stephens and the "Georgia Platform" adopted by a vote of 237 to 19, in December, 1850, was quite generally indorsed by the slaveholding states. .. To the end, therefore that the position of this State may be clearly apprehended by her confederates of the South and of the North, and that she may be blameless of all future consequences, Be it resolved by the people of Georgia in Convention assembled, First: That we hold the American Union secondary in importance only to the rights and principles which it was designed to perpetuate... Secondly: That if the thirteen original parties to the contract bordering on the Atlantic, in the narrow belt, while their separate interests were in embryo, their peculiar tendencies scarcely developed, their revolutionary trials and triumphs still green in memory, found Union impossible without compromise, the thirty-one of this day may well yield somewhat, in the conflict of opinion and policy, to preserve that Union which has extended the sway of republican government over a vast wilderness, to another ocean, and proportionally advanced civilization and national greatness. Thirdly That in this spirit, the State of Georgia has maturely considered the action of Congress embracing a series of measures [the compromise acts of September, 1850]... and while she does not wholly approve, will abide by it as a permanent adjustment of this sectional controversy. . . . 1 South Carolina went far. Her governor (Seabrook), in his message of November 26, asserted the right of secession, and declared that the time had arrived "to resume the exercise of the powers of selfprotection.” The legislature recommended the convocation of a meeting of delegates of the Southern states, with full powers to act on the question of secession, provided for a state convention to assemble at the governor's call for the same purpose, and appropriated $350,000 for the defense of the state (December 20, 1850. Compare the events of December 20, 1860). Fifthly: That it is the deliberate opinion of this Convention that upon the faithful execution of the Fugitive Slave Law by the proper authorities depends the preservation of our much loved Union. Ostend Man [373] The following remarkably impudent document, advising 82. The the virtual robbery of Cuba from Spain, is a joint report ifesto, Octosent to our State Department by three United States minis- ber 18, 1854 ters at European courts. The ministers had been appointed by President Pierce, with an eye to facilitating the acquisition of Cuba and so extending the slave area of the South.1 They were for England, James Buchanan, who as Secretary of State under Polk had offered Spain $100,000,000 for the island; for Spain, Pierre Soulé, who believed in simply taking Cuba by force; and, for France, John Y. Mason, whose only very determined political conviction was hatred for the abolitionists. Our Secretary of State, Marcy, disowned the preposterous language of the Manifesto, and instructed its chief author, Soulé, that there should be no attempt to coerce Spain to part with Cuba. Soulé's resignation closed the incident. SIR: Aix-la-Chapelle, Oct. 18, 1854 The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the President in several confidential despatches you have addressed to us, respectively, to that effect, have met in conference, first at Ostend in Belgium, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle in Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof. There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments between us, which we are most happy to inform 1 Buchanan had written to President-elect Pierce in December, 1852: "Should you desire to acquire Cuba, the choice of suitable ministers to Spain, Naples, England, and France will be very important."Curtis, Life of James Buchanan, Vol. II, p. 73. you has resulted in a cordial coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects committed to our consideration. We have arrived at the conclusion, and are thoroughly convinced, that an immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any price for which it can be obtained, not exceeding the sum of $ The natural and main outlet to the products of this entire population [the Mississippi valley], the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and Pacific States, can never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of a distant power in whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests. Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries. Its immediate acquisition by our government is of paramount importance, and we cannot doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by its inhabitants. The intercourse which its proximity to our coasts begets and encourages between them and the citizens of the United States, has, in the progress of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes that they look now upon each other as if they were one people and had but one destiny. Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this island exceedingly dangerous to the United States. The system of immigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers, threaten an insurrection at every moment which may result in direful consequences to the American people. Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm.1 . . . 1 The fear of the emancipation of the negroes in Cuba and their rising in force against the whites to make a "black republic," as in Haiti, was ever before the minds of the slaveholder in the Southern states. Soulé in a speech in January, 1853, had quoted Lord Palmerston, the British foreign secretary, that "if the negro population of Cuba were rendered free, that fact would create a most powerful element of Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity [of the offer for Cuba] for developing her resources, and removing her financial embarrassments, it may never return again. Cuba in its palmiest days, never yielded her exchequer, after deducting the expenses of its government, a clear annual income of more than a million and a half of dollars. . . . Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one percent. on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its acquisition. But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba, without remuneration. . . . We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to execute the neutrality laws; but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt against the oppression which they suffer, no human power could prevent citizens of the United States and liberal minded men of other countries from rushing to their assistance. Besides, the present is an age of adventure, in which daring and restless spirits abound in every portion of the world. It is not improbable, then, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a successful revolution; and in that event she will lose both the island and the price which we are now willing to pay for it; a price far beyond what was ever paid by one people to another for any province.... But if Spain, dead to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the American government under such circumstances? Self-preservation is the first law of nature with States as well as with individuals. . . . The United States have never acquired a foot of territory except by fair purchase or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of the people of that independent State, who desired to blend their destinies with our own. . . . Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. . . . resistance to any scheme for annexing Cuba to the United States, where slavery exists."- Congressional Globe, 32d Congress, 2d session, Vol. XXVII, p. 118. |