close to me whenever I required to communi- | placed, in a state of risk, all the objects of cate with them. the campaign. I did recommend and concur in the measure of allowing the French to evacuate Portugal with their arms and baggage; and here I must observe that it was particularly understood in the negociation of the armistice, that in the words, property of all descriptions," was to be included only military baggage and equipment; that this understanding was carried into execution by a separate article of the Convention, and that the commissioners for executing the Convention acted upon this principle. The enemy had collected their forces after the defeat of the 21st, and were about to resume the position of Cabeça de Montachique, from whence their retreat was open to other positions in front of Lisbon, and from thence across the Tagus into Alentejo. They had all the facilities in their power to make these movements, and when they would have reached Lisbon, the possession of that river by the forts and by the Russian fleet, and the great number of boats of which they would have had the use, would have enabled them to cross, in one body, covered by the citadel and the high grounds, and they would scarcely have lost their rear guard. In Alentejo they had provided ample supplies. On their arrival in that province, the French would have had to march, unmolested, by the finest road in Portugal, to Elvas, which is a fortress, at least of the second order among the fortresses of Europe; where they would have placed a part of their corps in garrison, and they would have sent the remainder across the Upper Tagus to Almeida. This place was already provisioned in some degree; and that part of their force which the French would have detached to Almeida, would have experienced no difficulty in relieving the distant blockade kept up by the Portuguese peasantry, and in throwing in such quantities of provisions as they would have required. Our operations would have been those of a superior army pressing upon an inferior on its retreat; but nothing which we could have done, would have cut off their retreat; the enemy must have been in Lisbon before us; the Tagus would have been the enemy's to the last moment of their passage; and after they would have crossed, the necessity of possessing ourselves of the forts on the river, and the Russian fleet, in the first instance, and the want of boats, which the enemy would have carried off, would have given them ample time to make all their arrangements in Alentejo before our troops could reach them. But in carrying on these operations, we should have been involved in many difficulties, and distresses, which might have again The communication with the shipping on the coast of Portugal, is at all times precarious, and becomes more so towards the end of August, and is at length quite impractica ble. In fact, many boats were swamped in the last week in August, vessels lost their anchors, and more than once the fleet was obliged to go to sea in danger. On the 22d of August there were eleven days bread in camp, for the original force which marched from Lavaos on the 9th and 10th of August; the troops which had landed on the 20th, had brought four days bread for themselves, and the supply for the whole might have been for eight or nine days, and no means could be procured of moving a larger quan tity; no bread whatever could be procured in the country; and in point of fact, I believe, that, excepting a few thousand rations of bread left behind by the French at Alcobaça, Caldas, and Torres Vedras, and which were giveu to the Portuguese troops, the country supplied not a single ration, from the time the troops landed, till I came away, on the 20th September. It was obvious then, that when Sir John Moore's corps should land at Marceira, and should nearly double the consumption of the army, without increasing the means of procuring and conveying its supply, there was a risk of its being in want. After we should have obliged the enemy to cross the Tagus, and we should have possessed ourselves of the forts on that river, and of the Russian fleet, and we should have crossed that river with the British army, we must have placed ourselves in a situation to invest Elvas for a blockade, or a regular siege. In either case, the army would have been exposed to the effects of a bad climate in the worst season of the year; and in the latter case, they would have had to move the means for the siege from Abrantes, beyond which place the Tagus would not have carried them to the scene of action, a distance of not less than sixty miles. After having performed this operation, the army would have been obliged to renew it, in order to obtain possession of Almeida. I am convinced that we should not have had possession of Elvas till late in December; and I think it more than probable, that we should have been glad to allow the French to evacuate Portugal in that month, instead of August, if we had persevered, after having sustained a loss of a great part of our army by sickness, and of three months of most valuable time with reference to further opera tions. I conceived that the objects of his Majesty, and of the Spanish nation were, that the British army should co-operate with the Spa nish armies. I believed that the only mode in which the operations of the Spanish corps could be brought to bear upon the same object, was by the influence which the co-operation of a British army would give to the government; and I believe that it was im portant to the Spanish nation, to have the co-operation of 30,000 British soldiers in Spain, to receive the assistance of 4000 Spanish soldiers, who were prisoners to the French, and of about 2000 who were employed in Portugal. I considered these objects to be so important, as to counterbalance the disadvantage of throwing 20,000 additional French troops, at no very remote period, upon the Pyrenees; that the Spanish nation would gain even upon a comparison of numbers, not less than 16,000 good troops..... It is true, as stated by Sir Hew Dalrymple, that there was a long, and the longest discussion upon the point relating to the Russians, but it related to a claim made by General Kellermann, that the Russian fleet should be allowed to depart from Lisbon, and that the British fleet should not be allowed to pursue them for a limited time. The commander of the forces, however, insisted that they have no more in the port of Lisbon than the rights of a neutral nation, and this point was yielded by General Keller mann.... The next point of importance was that relating to the length of time during which the suspension of hostilities should last; and Sir Hew Dalrymple admits, that I proposed to limit the duration of the suspension of hostilities to 48 hours only, whereas he preferred the proposal of General Kellermann, that the suspension should be unlimited in the first instance, and followed by a limited suspension of 48 hours, when either party should wish to put an end to it. This point was most important in a view to the state of our resources, to the state of the season, and to the tone in which the Convention should be negociated; and, above all, it was important in a view to the threats of the French, in respect to the Russians. If there was any foundation for those threats, which I acknowledged I imagined there was, and that they would have received assistance from the Russians, if the admiral refused his consent to the article respecting the Russian fleet, which I was sure he would do, it was most important, that if the negociations should then be broken off, and notice given of the conclusion of the suspension of hostilities, a period of forty-eight hours should not be allowed to the French to equip and prepare the Russians before we should begin our operations......... When the terms had been generally settled, General Kellermann was dictating the fair copy of the instrument to the officers who were writing it, and before he wrote or dies tated the title, he asked Sir Hew Dalrymple who was to sign it? and Sir Hew said "him self." General Kellermann then represented that he (Sir Hew) being commander in chief, ought not to sign an agreement with an inferior officer, and proposed that I should sign it. Sir Hew Dalrymple then came into and. ther room where I was, and told me, that General Kellermann had proposed that I should sign the instrument; and he asked me, whether I had any objections to doing so? My answer was, that I would sign any paper he wished me to sign. When it was drawn up, I read it over, and at the table gave it to Sir Hew Dalrymple to read, with an observation, that it was an extraordinary paper. He answered, that it did not contain any thing that had not been settled; and I then signed it. It is perfectly true, that I advised the principle of the arrangement, and I assisted the commander in chief in discussing the different points with General Kellermann, and that I gave him my opinion when he asked it, and when I thought it desirable to give it him. But I was not the negociator, and could not be, and was not so considered, the commander of the forces being present in the room, deciding upon all points, and taking part in all discussions. But this instrument about which so much has been said, and respecting which I have troubled the court so much at length, is in point of fact a dead letter; it was never ratified by any of the parties in whose name it was conducted, and no one article in it was ever carried into execution, excepting that by which hostilities were suspended." Sir Arthur states also that he differed from Gen. Sir H. Dalrymple on several points included in the Convention. He says, "My object was to get the Russians out of the hands of the French; and I did think that it was a matter of indifference what arrangements was made with them, or what became of the Russian fleet, provided it was not allowed to return to the Baltic-I was, and am still of opinion, that the best arrange. ment would have been to leave them in the port of Lisbon, on the ground of its neutrality; two events might have occurred, either of which would have placed them in our hands, and in the mean time, the officers and seamen would not have been seat back to Russia to co operate in the war against the Swedes. One of the events is the declaration of .. Russia against the Spaniards and Portuguese, the other the re-entry of the French into Portugal. But whatever may have been the nature of the terms to be granted to the Rus sians, it appeared to me the most important, that the French should have nothing to do with the negociations affecting their fleet. It always occurred to me, that one of the practical effects of the Convention with the French for the evacuation of Portugal, must have been to give to the Russians the benefit of the neutrality of the port of Lisbon. The Convention must have provided for the occupation of the forts of the Tagus by the British troops; and at this time the Portuguese flag would be hoisted. It would be impossible for the British admital to go in and attack the Russians, while the arrangement under the Convention should be in the course of execution; and while they would have continued in this state, the Russians would have time to claim, and the Portuguese to grant, the neutrality of the port; the question then must have been referred to the British government, and would have been discussed between them and the Portuguese. case. heavy loss, and to reflect on what censure would have attached to our generals, in that Sir Hew Dalrymple appears to have seen the affair in the same light. Accordingly, with intention to insure the deliverance of the Portuguese territory from the enemy, speedily, he overruled several propositions of Sir Arthur Wellesley's, which he suspected might prove choquant to the French commander. The opinion of the officers who composed the court of Inquiry, will close our epitome of the proceedings in Portugal. We trust that we are correct in expressing the most decided approbation of that prudence which has waited till after a complete investigation of circunstances once thought so degrading to the British, arms, by a court competent to the purpose; and which has acquiesced in the opinion given on the whole by that court, notwithstanding there are sundry particulars in the transaction, that certainly, will be deemed exceptionable by reflecting minds. Sir H. Dalrymple directed the giving to the French a circuit of two leagues round Lisbon, with a league of distance between their posts and ours; and to us the possession of all the forts on the right bank of the Tagus, inclu-joined the following Opinion. ding Belem. The Report which has been submitted to his Majesty is of very great length. It consists of 50 tolio pages. The whole substance of the evidence being therein stated, the Court sub But there is one article in the Convention, particularly disapproved of in this country, of which I approved. It relates to the Spanish prisoners, who were certainly, at the time of the Convention, completely and entirely in the power of the French. CCS, "On a consideration of all the circumstanas set forth in this Report, we most tumbly submit our opinion, that no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject; Because, however some of us may differ in our sentiments respecting the fitness of the Convention, in the relative situation of The court will observe, that the principle the two armies, it is our unanimous declaraupon which I thought that any Convention!tion, that unquestionable zeal and firmness ought to be made with the French, was, that they had the military possession of the country; and that their retreat was open to Elvas and Almeida; they had in their ower to do as they pleased with their Spanish prisoners; and I conceived that they had a fair claim to be allowed for them in the negociation. The exchange of the Frenchmen taken in Spain, not in military operations, for these Spaniards, appeared to me to be not an unreasonable arrangement; and it was one to which I had reason to believe the junta of Gallicia, at least, would not object." It is sufficiently well understood, that Sir Harry Burrard thought Sir Arthur Wellesley had undertaken a task beyond his powers, in attempting to expel the French from Lisbon, with his present army. Caution is as necessary to a commander as courage: and no imputation on the courage of Sir Harry is justifiable because he deemed the advantages then in possession of the French to be greater th. he could cope with. We are also to 'take into consideration, the possibility, that at some position favourable to the defenders, (and the country around Lisbon has many such) the Eritish army had sustained a appear throughout to have been exhibited by Lieutenant-Generals Sir Hew Dalrymple, Sir Harry Burrard, and Sir Arthur Wellesley, as well as that the order and gallantry of the rest of the officers and soldiers, on every occasion during this Expedition, have done honour to the troops, and reflected lustre on your Majesty's arms." On this Opinion being delivered to the Commander in Chief, his Royal Highness found it was not so explicit, on the Armistice and Convention, asthe words of his Majesty's Warrant appeared to enjoin; the Court was therefore ordered to re-assemble, and subjoin their Opinion.— i "Whether, under the relative situation of the two armies on the 22d of August, an armistice was advisable; and if so, whether the terms were such as ought to be agreed upon ? Also, "Whether under the relative situation of the two armies subsequent to the Armistice, and after the whole of the British force had been landed, a Convention was advisable; and if so, whether the terms were such as ought to be agreed upon ?" Upon these two questions being separately put to each Member of the Court, it appears, that Sir D. Dundas, Lord Heathfield, Gen. Craig, Earl Pembroke, Sir G. Nugent, and Lieut.-General Nichols, were for the Armistice; Earl Moira, against the Armistice. And upon the second question, it appears that Sir D. Dundas, Lord Heathfield, Gen. Craig, and Sir G. Nugent, were for the Convention-Earl Moira, Earl Pembroke, and Lieut.-General Nichols, against the Conven tion. The following are the reasons assigned by the latter officers for their dissent : Lieut. Gen. NICHOLS.-My reason for considering the Armistice as advisable on the 22d of August was, because the enemy had been able to retire after the battle of the 21st, and take up a strong defensive position. I think, considering the great increase of our force from the first suspension of hostility to the definitive signing of the Convention, added to the defeat the enemy had suffered, Sir H. Dalrymple was fully entitled to have insisted upon more favourable terins. mistice involved, and in fact established, the whole principle of the Convention, I cannot separate it from the latter. After commenting on "the critical and embarrassed situation of Junot," as admitted by Sir Hew Dalrymple, both before and after the battle of Vimiera, which left Junot without any real resource, and which induced him to propose the evacuation of Portugal the very morning after the battle-Earl Moira proceeds as follows:-" To the British Generals it was known, when the Armistice was granted, that 10,000 men under Sir John Moore, as well as the 3d and 42d regiments of foot, with the 18th dragoons, might be immediately reckoned upon; and although much advantage had not been drawn from the Portuguese troops, their support and the general violence of the country against the French, cannot be laid out of this calculation. The disparity of force and of circumstances was, then, such as could leave no doubt that the issue must be favourable to us. I do not omit advertence to the difficulties urged as Lieut. Gen. the Earl of PEMBROKE.-I possible to occur in furnishing the British approve of the Armistice, after a due consi- army with bread. But, putting aside the deration of the relative situations of the two obvious solution, that such a temporary priarmies on the evening of the 22d of August; vation is not ruinous to an army where cattle but I cannot fully approve of the whole of the can be procured in the country; this diffiConvention, after a due consideration of the culty cannot be well pleaded, if admission is relative situation of the two armies at that to be given to the speculation, that the time: because it does not appear to me that, heavy cannon necessary for battering forts St. in the progress of the negociation, sufficient Julien and Cascaes were to be got ashore in stress was laid upon the great advantages the bays of the Rock of Lisbon. The ques which had resulted, or were likely to result, tion then comes to this: whether the Con from the former successful operations of the vention did (as has been asserted) secure all British army in the field from the consider the objects which were proposed in the expeable reinforcements which had joined it, sub-dition? If it did not, it was not what his sequent to the comniencement of the negociation-from the cause in which the British army was engaged being the cause of Portugal, which gave good reason to reckon upon the goodwill, if not upon the active assistance, of the majority of the inhabitants; and also, from the unusual readiness, which, as it appears to me, was manifested by General Junot to enter into negociation, and by the French negociator to accede to terms as they were proposed, and to such construction as Lieut. Gen. Sir Hew Dalrymple put upon them in some instances, where they might have borne a difference of interpretation. I therefore think it probable, for the above reasons, that if less favourable terms to the French army had been insisted upon, they would have been acceded to. Majesty was entitled to expect from the rela tive situation of the two armies. I humbly conceive it to have been erroneous to regard the emancipation of Portugal from the French, as the sole or the principal object of the expedition. Upon whatever territory we contend with the French, it must be a prominent object in the struggle to destroy their resources, and to narrow their means of injuring us, or those whose cause we are supporting. This seems to have been so little considered in the Convention, that the terms appear to have extricated Junot's army from a situation of infinite distress, in which it was wholly out of play, and to have brought it, in a state of entire equipment, into immediate curs rency, in a quarter too where it must inter fere with our most urgent and interesting General Earl MOIRA-An Armistice concerns. Had it been impracticable to simply might not have been objectionable, reduce the French army to lay down its arms because Sir Hew Dalrymple, expecting hourly unconditionally, still an obligation not to the arrival of Sir John Moore's division, serve for a specified time, might have been might see more advantage for himself in a insisted upon, or Belleisle might have been short suspension of hostilities, than what the prescribed as the place at which they should French could draw from it; but as the Ar-be landed, in order to prevent the probability VOL V. [Lit. Pan. Feb. 1809.] 2 M "At the close of the Inquiry, the King, abstaining from any observations upon other parts of the Convention, repeats his disapprobation of those articles; His Majesty deeming it necessary that his sentiments should be clearly understood, as to the impropriety and danger of the unauthorised admission, into Military Conventions, of articles of such a description, which, especially when incautiously framed, may lead to the most injurious consequences. of their reinforcing (at least for a long time) Convention in which His Majesty's immedi the armies employed for the subjugation of ale interests were concerned, caused it to be Spain. Perhaps a stronger consideration than signified to Sir Hew Dalrymple, by His Mathe merit of those terms presents itself. Opi-jesty's Secretary of State, that His Majesty, nion relative to the British arms was of the nevertheless, felt himself compelled at once to highest importance, as it might influence the express his disapprobation of those articles, in confidence of the Spaniards, or invite the which stipulations were made, directly afnations groaning under the yoke of France, fecting the interests or feelings of the Spanish to appeal to this country, and co-operate and Portuguese nations. with it for their deliverance. The advantages ought, therefore, to have been more than usually great, which should be deemed sufficient to balance the objection of granting to a very inferior army, hopeless in circumstances, and broken in spirit, such terms as might argue, that notwithstanding its disparity in numbers, it was still formidable to its victors. No advantages seemed to have been gained that would not have equally followed from forcing the enemy to a more marked submission. The gain of time as to sending succours into Spain cannot be admitted as a plea, because it appears that no arrangements for the reception of our troops in Spain had been undertaken previous to the Convention; and this is without reasoning on subsequent facts. The Convention in Egypt, which has been advanced as a parallel case, appears to me inapplicable. No object beyond the dislodgement of the French from Egypt was there in question. In the present instance the operation of the Convention upon the affairs of Spain was a consideration of primary interest; and in that view the inevitable effect of some of the articles offers itself to my mind as liable to material objection. I trust that these reasons will vindicate me from the charge of presumption, in maintaining an opinion contradictory to that professed by so many most respectable officers; for, even if the reasons be essentially erroneous, if they are conclusive to my mind (as I must concientiously affirm them to be), it is a necessary consequence that I must disapprove the Convention."-December 27, 1808. The following are the terms in which His Majesty has expressed his disapprobation relative to the Convention of Cintra: "The King has taken into consideration the Report of the Board of Inquiry, together with the documents and opinion thereunto annexed. "While his Majesty adopts the unanimous opinion of the Board, that no further military proceeding is necessary to be had upon the transactions referred to in their investigation, His Majesty does not intend thereby to convey an expression of his Majesty's satisfaction at the terms and conditions of the Armistice and Convention. "When those instruments were first laid before His Majesty, the King, reserving for investigation those parts of the Definitive "His Majesty cannot forbear further to observe, that Lieut.-General Sir Hew Dalrymple's delaying to transmit for his information the Armistice concluded on 22d August, until the 4th September, when he, at the same time, transmitted the ratified Convention, was calculated to produce great public inconvenience, and that such inconvenience did in fact result therefrom." POETRY. ODE FOR THE NEW YEAR 1809. BY H. J. PYE, ESQ. P. L. Which was performed at St. James's Palace, Full-orb'd in equinoctial skies But when, by native fences barr'd On Gallia's hostile borders frown, While from the heights sublime the swain |