blood like water, in a contest in opposition to an assertion which those less sagacious, and not so well schooled in the principles of civil liberty, would have regarded as barren phraseology, or mere parade of words. They saw in the claim of the British Parliament, a seminal principle of mischief, the germ of unjust power; they detected it, dragged it forth from underneath its plausible disguises, struck at it; nor did it elude either their steady eye, or their well-directed blow, till they had extirpated and destroyed it, to the smallest fibre. On this question of principle, while actual suffering was yet afar off, they raised their flag against a power, to which, for purposes of foreign conquest and subjugation, Rome, in the height of her glory, is not to be compared a power which has dotted over the surface of the whole globe with her possessions and military posts, whose morning drum-beat, following the sun, and keeping company with the hours, circles the earth daily with one continuous and unbroken strain of the martial airs of England. The necessity of holding strictly to the principle upon which free governments are constructed, and to the precise lines which fix the partitions of power between different branches, is as plain, if not as cogent, as that of resisting, as our fathers did, the strides of the parent country upon the rights of the colonies; because, whether the power which exceeds its just limits be foreign or domestic, whether it be the encroachment of all branches on the rights of the people, or that of one branch on the rights of others, in either case the balanced and well-adjusted machinery of free government is disturbed, and, if the derangement go on, the whole system must fall. But the case before us is not a case of merely theoretic infringement; nor is it one of trifling importance. Far otherwise. It respects one of the highest and most important of all the powers of Government; that is to say, the custody and control of the public money. The act of removing the deposits, which I now consider as the President's act, and which his friends on this floor defend as his act, took the national purse from beneath the security and guardianship of the law, and disposed of its contents, in parcels, in such places of deposit as he chose to select. At this very moment, every dollar of the public treasure is subject, so far as respects its custody and safe keeping, to his unlimited control. We know not where it is to-day; still less do we know where it may be to-morrow. But, Mr. President, this is not all. There is another part of the case, which has not been so much discussed, but which appears to me to be still more indefensible in its character. It is something which may well teach us the tendency of power to move forward, with accelerated pace, if it be allowed to take the first step. The Bank of the United States, in addition to the services rendered to the treasury, gave for its charter, and for the use of the public deposits, a bonus, or outright sum of one million and a half of dollars. This sum was paid by the Bank into the treasury, soon after the commencement of its charter. In the act which passed both Houses for renewing the charter, in 1832, it was provided that the Bank, for the same consideration, should pay two hundred thousand dollars a year, during the period for which it was proposed to renew it. A similar provision is in the bill which I asked leave to introduce some weeks ago. Now, Sir, this shows that the custody of the deposits is a benefit, for which a bank may well afford to pay a large annual sum. The banks which now hold the deposits pay nothing to the public; they give no bonus, they pay no annuity. But this loss of so much money is not the worst part of the case, nor that which ought most to alarm us. Although they pay nothing to the public, they do pay, nevertheless, such sums, and for such uses, as may be agreed upon between themselves and the Executive Government. We are officially informed that an officer is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to inspect or superintend these selected banks; and this officer is compensated by a salary fixed by the Executive, agreed to by the banks, and paid by them. I ask, Sir, if there can be a more irregular, or a more illegal transaction than this? Whose money is it, out of which this salary is paid? Is it not money justly due to the United States, and paid, because it is so due, for the advantage of holding the deposits? If a dollar is received on that account, is not its only true destination into the general treasury of the Government? And who has authority, without law, to create an office, to fix a salary, and to pay that salary out of this money? Here is an inspector, or supervisor of the deposit banks. But what law has provided for such an officer? What commission has he received? Who concurred in his appointment? What oath does he take? How is he to be punished, or impeached, if he colludes with any of these banks to embezzle the public money, or defraud the Government? The value of the use of this public money to the deposit banks is probably two hundred thousand dollars a year; or, if less than that, it is yet, certainly, a very great sum. May the President appoint whatever officers he pleases, with whatever duties he pleases, and pay them as much as he pleases out of these moneys thus paid by the banks, for the sake of having the deposits? Mr. President, the Executive claim of power is exactly this, that the President may keep the money of the public in whatever banks he chooses, on whatever terms he chooses, and to apply the sums which these banks are willing to pay for its use to whatever purposes he chooses. These sums are not to come into the general treasury. They are to be appropriated before they get there; before witnessed, and which it cannot long bear. But it is not a condition for despair. Nothing will ruin the country, if the people themselves will undertake its safety; and nothing can save it, if they leave that safety in any hands but their own. Would to God, Sir, that I could draw around me all these twelve millions of people; would to God, that I could speak audibly to every independent elector in the whole land. I would not say to them, vainly and arrogantly, that their safety and happiness required the adoption of any measure recommended by me. But I would say to them, with the sincerest conviction that ever animated man's heart, that their safety and happiness do require their own prompt and patriotic attention to the public concerns, their own honest devotion to the welfare of the State. I would say to them, that neither this measure, nor any measure, can be adopted, except by the cogent and persisting action of popular opinion. I would say to them, that the public revenues cannot be restored to their accustomed custody; that they cannot be again placed under the control of Congress; that the violation of law cannot be redressed, but by manifestations, not to be mistaken, of public sentiment. I would say to them, that the Constitution and the laws, their own rights and their own happiness, all depend on themselves; and if they esteem these of any value; if they were not too dearly bought by the blood of their fathers; if they be an inheritance, fit to be transmitted to their posterity,-I would beseech them—I would beseech them, to come now to their salvation. [The following is the bill which Mr. WEBSTER asked leave to introduce.] A Bill to continue, for the term of six years, the act entitled "An Act to incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States." Be it enacted, &c. That the act entitled "An Act to incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States," approved on the tenth day of April, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixteen, shall continue in full force and effect for the term of six years, from and after the period therein limited for its expiration, to wit, the third day of March, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six; and that all the rights, interests, properties, powers, and privileges, secured by the same act, with all the rules, conditions, restrictions, and duties, therein prescribed and imposed, be and remain after the said third day of March, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, during the said six years, as if the said limitation in the said act had not been made: Provided, nevertheless, That so much of the said act as declares that no other bank shall be established by any future law of the United States, during the continuance of the corporation thereby created, shall not be continued by this act; but that it shall be lawful for Congress, whenever it shall see fit, to establish any other bank, to come into existence and operation at any time, on or after the fourth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six. Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That all public moneys accruing to the United States, and becoming payable from and after the passage of this act, in places where the said Bank or any of its Offices is established, shall be deposited in the Bank of the United States and its Offices as heretofore: Provided, That, at any time after this act shall have been accepted, Congress may, by law or joint resolution, cause such moneys to be withdrawn and removed to any other custody or place of deposit. Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That, in consideration of the benefits and privileges conferred by this act, the said Bank shall pay to the United States the annuity or yearly sum of two hundred thousand dollars; which said sum shall be paid, by the said Bank, on the fourth day of March, in each and every year, during the said term of six years. Sec. 4. And be it further enacted, That Congress may provide, by law, that the said Bank shall be restrained, at any time after the third day of March, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, from making, issuing, or keeping in circulation, any notes or bills of said Bank, or any of its Offices, of a less sum or denomination then twenty dollars. Sec. 5. And be it further enacted, That, at any time or times within the last three years of the existence of said corporation, as continued by this act, it shall be lawful for the president and directors to divide among the several stockholders thereof such portions of the capital stock of said corporation as they may have withdrawn from active use, and may judge proper so to divide. Sec. 6. And be it further enacted, That so much of any act or acts of Congress, heretofore passed and now in force, supplementary to, or in any wise connected with, the said original act of incorporation, approved on the tenth day of April, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixteen, as is not inconsistent with this act, shall be continued in full force and effect during the said six years, after the third day of March, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six. Sec. 7. And be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the president and directors of the said Bank, on or before the first day of the next session of Congress, to signify to the President of the United States their acceptance, on behalf of the Bank of the United States, of the terms and conditions in this act contained; and if they shall fail to do so on or before the day above mentioned, then this act shall cease to be in force. SPEECH ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST, DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF MR. PRESIDENT: I feel, Sir, the magnitude of this question. We are coming to a vote which cannot fail to produce important effects on the character of the Senate and the character of the Government. Unhappily, Sir, the Senate finds itself involved in a controversy with the President of the United States; a man who has rendered most distinguished services to his country, has hitherto possessed a degree of popular favor perhaps never excelled, and whose honesty of motive, and integrity of purpose, are still maintained by those who admit that his administration has fallen into lamentable errors. On some of the interesting questions, in regard to which the President and Senate hold opposite opinions, the more popular branch of the Legislature concurs with the Executive. It is not to be concealed that the Senate is engaged against imposing odds. It can sustain itself only by its own prudence and the justice of its cause. It has no patronage by which to secure friends; it can raise up no advocates through the dispensation of favors, for it has no favors to dispense. Its very constitution, as a body whose members are elected for a long term, is capable of being rendered obnoxious, and is daily made the subject of opprobrious remark. It is already denounced as independent of the people, and aristocratic. Nor is it, like the other House, powerful in its numbers; not being, like that, so large as that its members come constantly in direct and sympathetic contact with the whole people. Under these disadvantages, Sir, which, we may be assured, will be pressed and urged to the utmost length, there is but one course for us. The Senate must stand on its rendered reasons. It must put forth the grounds of its proceedings, and it must then rely on the intelligence and patriotism of the people to carry it through the contest. As an individual member of the Senate, it gives me great pain to be engaged in such a conflict with the Executive Government. The occurrences of the last session are fresh in all our recollections; and, having felt it to be my duty, at that time, to give my |