cal terminos ad proband. a moneth would suffice, though they dwelled never so fer from the court within this royalm; they take now by cross suffraunce of each an other of theym a quarter of a year commonly for ech of the same three termes. Which were enough and too moche, though the parties dwelled in Paris. Which delayes though they be nothing profitable, ne commodious for the poore sutors, be both profitable to the said proctors; by reason that the causes are kept thereby the longer in their handes. And also commodious by reason, that they, being greatly occupied, shuld have the longer time to do their busynes in.

And for like consideracion the said proctors do omitte commonly in every matier a certayn othe ungeven, called Juramentum Calumpniæ, which is the best provision ordeyned in al the said lawe of civile and canon, for the restrainct of unlawful sutes and prolixe processes. Theffect wherof is this. Both the parties being in sute, or their proctors, shal by the same oath swear, first the plaintiff, that he believeth himself to have a just cause to sue; and the defendant, a just cause to defend. Secondariely, that neyther of theym shall use any unlawful delayes, whereby justice may de deferred or letted. Thirdely, that eyther of theym, whan they shalbe asked by the juge, shall answer truly to every thing, that is asked of theym according to their belief. Fourthly, that there is nor shalbe nothing geven, ne promised, to the judge, or any other officer, but only the fees and duty permitted by the law. And fifthly, that neyther of them shal use, ne procure, any false witnes wittingly in the matier.

Which othe yf it were geven in every matier, as it shuld be, there shulde not be so many wrongful causes attempted and kept in the said courts, nor so many delayes, used in the same. But because that neither of bothe that standes with the proufitt of the said proctors, by common assent and crosse sufferaunce of eche another of theym, they omitte the same moost commonly not only ungeven, but also not spoken of. And yf they saye, that they doo so, because that ofte accustuming of othes maketh men to sett lesse by an othe; trueth it is that it doth so. And therefore the said othe ought to be chiefly commended. For the geving of the same but ones in any matier shuld excuse theym from geving of many other oaths that they geve in euery matier. For it alone conteyneth th'effect of div's other othes requisite. And where one shuld serve for all, better it were for advoyding of too ofte swering, that the same alone shuld be given, and al other omitted, than that it alone shuld be lefft, that al the other doth supplye.

Also, the said statute of ten proctors may be occasion, that the same shuld wax haulte, arrogant, negligent, and lothe to take payne, and excessive in taking, by reason that they shuld be so fewe. As we see experiently in al other faculties or mysteries, where fewest occupiers be of the same there be they moost dangerous, and hardest to be goten to do their facultie, and moost excessive in taking for the same : as scarsitie or raritie of any thing else maketh the same deir. For whan there be few of a faculty, they know than that be they never so excessive in taking, or negligent in their doing, they shalbe occupied

wel ynough whan men can have no other choice but of a fewe, that be al alike agreyd upon the price of every thing; as they maye soone doo, whan they be but a fewe. Where yf they were many, all shuld be contrary.

Moreover, the said statute of tenne proctors may be occasion, that justice shuld not indifferently procede in the said courts for lack of lauful defense. As if the juges of the said courts, or any of theym, be affectionate in any matier depending before theym (as it may be that the juges there shal not be allweys of such integritie as they be of, that be there nowe,) the said proctors dare not be retained of his part, that the juge doth not favor: or if they be retayned, they dare not purpose their client's best interest and remedye, yf the same do any thing offend the said juges affection. By reason that the said proctors be removeable from their proctors offices at the said juges plesure, and the same made so beneficiall unto theym by reason of the said statute.

Than, whan the said proctors shalbe in suche fear of the said juges, to speak in matiers of instance, where the juge doth bear but a light affection to another man: moch more will they be so in cases of office, where the juge is partie hymself, and hath his owne matier in hand. And no mervail, if they dare not speak in such. For it hathe not ben seldom seen, and harde there, that it hath ben spoken unto such proctors, as hath spoken any thing constantly, or frely, in their clients causes, by the juges aforesaid, Non es amicus curic: and that they were threttened of expulsion from their offices, and put to silence. Yet no lawe forbedeth the contrary, but that every man shuld have his lawful defense, yea, agenst the juge himself.

But if there were many proctors in the said courts, the juges could not so lightly keep them al in such subjection and feare of theym. Nor than the said proctors shuld not have so great cause to fere theym so moche, seeing their offices shuld not be so beneficiall unto theym than. And lesse shuld they yet fear to purpose their clients right duely, if it were ordeined, that the same proctors shuld not be removeable from their offices, at the said juges plesure, (as heretofor they were; and now are) but only for certain greate offences proved afore indifferent juges, to be committed by theym after their admission. And by reason, that the said proctors be so abondoned unto the said juges, where men had most nede of trusty counsaillors, there they be most destitute of the same, as when the juge is not indifferent. For the partialitie of a juge is more to be feared, than the manifest malice of an adversarie. For the tone hurteth prively, and is able to execute his malice: and the tother doth apertly all that he goeth about. And a man may provide for thadvoyding of the intent. And he is not so able to execute his purpose as the tother is. And though partialitie of any juge is to be greatly feared, yet most of all in the courts spirituall: where al depends upon the juges hands, and that one man's commonly. For which partialitie the remedie of appeal was first invented. Which remedy, like as it was at the first most holsomely provided for the avoyding of thiniquity of partiall juges; so it is nowe moost wickedly abused for the main

tenance of yll doers in their wrongful causes and avoyding of due execution of justice, by reason that they be infinite: specially, after the canon lawe. For by civile, there is but appellacion permitted; and that not without penaltie on him that shal than appeal without cause: and that is more reasonable.

For like as it is daungerous to abide one mans jugement, so it is unreasonable that a man shall not abide the jugements of never so many. And therfor it were veray expedient, that the same appeals were restrained somewhat. For of theym it is cheffly long, that matiers be in maner infinite in the said courts. And that maye be the better doon, by reason that there be two legats within this royalme. Which were so appoynted, because that they might determyne al matiers spiritual within this royalme, without moche recorse to Rome, being so ferr from this contrey.

To the foresaid inconveniences may come also, through the said statute, this abuse abuse following: that is to wete, if there be a mightier or a richer man, that do sue a porer man in the said courts; the richer man maye the sooner, by reason that there be so fewe proctors, retain the moost partye and best lerned of theym. And thother proctors, by reason that they shal be than so welthy through their great occuping, which they shall have, whan they be so fewe, wil rather sett more by the same great mans favor, than the poore mans fee. And therfore wil other refuse to be retayned of the poor mans parte; or whan they be retayned they wilbe slacke in doing their duetie, for fear of displeasing the same greate man. Where yf there were many proctors, their offices would not be excessive gaynefull, but that they wold set as moche by their fees, as by any mans pleasure lightly.

Also, the said statute is a greate discorage to young [men] to leve their studie in the lawe. For by the same the reward of studie is taken away, and possest by a few. And the fewer that be promoted for their lerning, the fewer wil study to atteigne the

same.

And to this, it maye be occasion, that the said proctors be not so well lerned, nor so diligent, whan they are so fewe, as they wold be, if they were many. For whan there is choyse ynough of theym, they that are best lerned, and moost diligent shalbe allwayes moost reassorted. And than shall they studie every man to excelle other in lerning and diligence, whan they see suche cheffly reassorted unto. And so no man wil labour than to be a proctor, onlesse he be well lerned, seeing that learned men shuld only have al the moost reassort. And they that be unlerned will aweye, and provide theym livings elsewhere, whan they see theymself nothing frequented with causes.

Furthermore, the said statute is playne contrary to their owne lawe of civile and canon. For by the same it is permitted for every man to be proctor for other; but only a fewe, which are specially and justly excepted by the same, as a woman, a child, a madde man, and such other. And by the said statute it is prohibited, that no man shal procure, in the said court for other, but only a fewe, that are specially admitted therto, and that within a precise and incompetent nombre.

The said law doth except and repell very few; and that of theym that are not mete to procure; and the said statute doth yet admitt fewer, and that of theym that are sufficiently qualified to procure. So that white and black can be no more contrary together, than the said law and statute be either to other.

And though any man wold rather preferre the said law before the said statute, yf he did but only consider, how that the law is made so long ago by the concord and discrete opinions of so many greate and wise clerkes and holy men, and afterward approved by continuall usage of divers countries, and long succession of tyme, and experiently known to be holsomely ordeined for the comen wele. And of the tother side, how that the said statute is but lately made by the procurement of a few private pesons for their singular advantage; approved by no tract of time to be profitable for the comen wele; but experiently knowen to be contrary. Yet besides that, yf al that were sett aparte, the lawe is grounded upon bettre reason, than the said statute is. For seing a proctor representeth him that he is proctor for, and maye make or marr his clients matier by one word speaking well or yll; and that thoffice of a proctor was first invented for men, that might or wolde not intend to their own busynes theymself; it were more consonant with reason, that a man were suffred to take to his proctor such as he lusteth, and may best trust unto of his matier, than be driven to commit the order of his cause, being maye fortune of great weight, to suche a one as he never knew, ne saw bifore. For whan a man is at his to choyse him what proctor he luste best, yf his matier do decaye through the defaulte of his proctor, than, he can blame no man but hymself. For that that he wold not take better hede, to whome he shuld have committed his matier unto. And whan a man is compelled to take one that he knows not, yf his matier do than decaye, he maye putt the blame therof to that statute, that constrayned him to take suche a proctor.

Neverthelesse though the tone of bothe those weyes, that is the same that is taken by the said lawe, be moche better than the tother; yet the meane weye betwene bothe (as of al other extremes) were best. That is to saye, that nother every man onlerned, or unexpert, shuld foorthwith be admitted to procure for every man in the said courtes, lest of that there shuld be no good ordre, but a confuse tumulte there : nor yet that there shuld be so fewe admitted therunto, that they were not able, ne sufficient, for the due exercise of causes there depending. But moost reasonable and highely expedient for the common wele it is, that it were enacted by thauctorite of this present Parliament, that there shuld be as many of suche as were sufficiently lerned, and exercised in thexperience and practise of the said courtes, admitted to procure there, as shuld be seen sufficient to my said lorde of Cant. grace, or other presidents of the said courtes, for the due exercise and expedicion of causes there depending; as it was used there heretofore, till the obteigning of the said statute, without prefixion of any precise nombre, which for no cause maye be exceded. For howe can any precise nombre of proctors be prefixed, whan the nombre of causes can never be appoynted? For causes doth growe and decrease, as the nature of seasons and men doth requiere.

And therfore it were more expedient, that there were mo proctors than shuld suffice admitted, than fewer. For better it were, that some of theym shuld lacke causes, than causes shuld want theym. And that suche ones, so admitted, shuld not be removeable from the same their offices at the said juges, or any other mans, pleasure, as they were here. tofor: but only for certain grete offences proved to be committed by theym after their admission, and judged so to be of indifferent juges, chosen to examyne the same by the consent of the proctors, that shalbe accused therof. And bicause that the proctors aforesaid are all sworne [at the] tyme of their admission, that they shall never after be agenst the liberties, jurisdiction and prerogatives of the said courtes; but shal mayntene and defend the same to their power: and that there may be in the said courts other whiles such causes depending, as shuld appertaigne to the kings graces determinacion by his royall prerogative, or suche other as may be there attempted ageinst the juges or presidents of the said courtes: it were highly expedient as wel for the conservation and soliciting of the kings interest there, as for the faithfull and bolde assistence of proctors there to the kings subjects, that were called thether at the instance of the said juges, or their fautors, or any other person; that, like as his grace hath, in other his courtes temporall, his solicitors and attorneys, he shuld also have in the said courtes two proctors, or moo admitted by his grace and his counsaill, which shuld be only sworne to promote and sollicite his graces interest there, and to advertise the same of any thing, that shuld appertaigne to his Gs. prerogative, and to defende suche of the kings subjects, as shall desire their assistance, boldely and without feare or affection of the said juges. And that the same proctors so admitted be not removeable from the same their offices by any man, but the kings grace or his counsaill.

Which so enacted and establyshed shuld be the readyest meane, that the foresaid abuses, with divers others here not rehersed, caused through the occasion of the said statute, shuld be utterly taken aweye, and justice more plainly and spedyly procede in the said courtes, than heretofore hath been seen to doo. And the kings subjects called thether from all parts of England shuld have plenty of counsaill, faithfull assistance in their matiers, and spedy processe in the same. Which ought to be tendered affectantly of every man, that regardeth the encrease of the common wele, and true execution of justice.

No. XIX.

The Archbishop to the L. Crumwel giving him some account of his Visitation of his Diocess.*

THESE shalbe to advertise your Lp. that syns my last comyng frome London into Kent, I have found the people of my dioces very obstinately given to observe and kepe with solempnitie the hali dayes lately abrogated. Whereapon I have punished divers of the offenders; and to divers I have given gentle monition to amend. But inasmuche as by examination I have perceyved, that the people were partly animated

* [Cotton Libr.] Cleopatra, E. v. p. 292.