the moment he arrived at Paris, offered that mediation. Nor was there any inconsistency here; for there was a wide difference between negotiation with that alliance which had assumed to itself a character which we had denied by the memorandum of the late lord Londonderry, and a negotiation between kingdom and kingdom. It had been represented, that the refusal of our mediation by France was a blow which we ought not to have submitted to; but he must beg it to be distinctly understood, that the refusal of our mediation was no affront, and that to accept our good offices, after the refusal of mediation, was no humiliation. True it was, that our good offices were ineffectual. Our failure had been ascribed by some to the intrigues of Russia; but Mr. Canning's conviction was, that the war was forced on the French government by the violence of a political party in France; that at one time the French government hoped to avert it; and that, up to the latest period, some members of that cabinet would gladly have availed themselves of the smallest loophole, through which the Spanish government would have enabled them to find a retreat. "But we, forsooth," said he, are condemned as dupes, because our opponents gratuitously ascribe to France one settled, systematic, and invariable line of policy;-because it is assumed, that from the beginning France had but one purpose in view; and that she merely amused the British cabinet from time to time with pretences which we ought to have had the sagacity to detect. If so, the French government had made singular sacrifices to appearance. M. de Montmorency was sent to Verona; he ne

gociated with the allies; he brought home a result so satisfactory to France, that he was made a duke for his services. He had enjoyed his new title but a few days, when he quitted his office. On this occasion I admit that I was a dupe-I believe all the world were dupes with me-for all understood this change of ministers to be indicative of a change in the counsels of the French cabinet-a change from war to peace. For eight and forty hours I certainly was under that delusion; but I soon found that it was only a change, not of the question of war, but of the character of that question: a change, as it was somewhat quaintly termed-from European to French. The duke M. de Montmorency, finding himself unable to carry into effect the system of policy which he had engaged, at the congress, to support in the cabinet at Paris, in order to testify the sincerity of his engagement, promptly and most honourably resigned. But this event, honourable as it is to the duke de Montmorency, completely disproves the charge of dupery brought against us. That man is not a dupe, who, not foreseeing the vacillations of others, is not prepared to meet them; but he who is misled by false pretences put forward for the purpose of misleading him. Before a man can be said to be duped, there must have been some settled purpose concealed from him, and not discovered by him; but here there was a variation of purpose, a variation too, which, so far from considering it then, or now, as an evil, we then hailed and still consider as a good. It was no dupery on our part to acquiesce in a change of counsel on the part of the French cabinet, which proved the

Spain. Accordingly, there was no instance in which Spain had been desired to yield any part of her institutions, in which it was not simultaneously held out to her, that France, on that condition, would withdraw her Army of Observation. England did not pretend to say, which of the parties was right, or which wrong, but she saw that war was the inevitable consequence of perseverance; and, if concession were made on the one side, she undertook to procure it on the other. "I do not pretend," said Mr. Canning, "to decide, whether the number of legislative chambers in Spain should be one, two, or three. In God's name let them try what experiment in political science they will, provided we are not affected by the trial. All that Great Britain has done on this occasion, has been, not to disturb the course of political experiment, but to endeavour to avert the calamity of war. Good God! when it is remembered how many evils are compressed into that little word "war"-is it possible for any man to hesitate in urging every expedient that could avert it, without sacrificing the honour of the party to which his advice was tendered? Most earnestly do I wish that the duke of Wellington had succeeded: but great is the consolation that, according to the best accounts from Spain, his counsels have not been misunderstood there, however they have been misrepresented here. I believe that I might with truth go further, and say, that there are those in Spain, who now repent the rigid course pursued, and who are beginning to ask each otherwhy they held out so pertinaciously against suggestions at once SO harmless and so reasonable? My

wish was, that Spain should be saved; that she should be saved, before the extremity of evil had come upon her-even by the making of those concessions, which, in the heat of national pride, she refused. Under any circumstances, however, I have still another consolation-the consolation of knowing, that never from the commencement of these negotiations, has Spain been allowed by the British government to lie under the delusion that her refusal of all modifications would induce England to join her in the war. The very earliest communication made to Spain forbade her to entertain any such reliance. She was told at the beginning, as she was told in the end, that neutrality was our determined policy.

"France, on the contrary, was never assured of the neutrality of England, till my despatch of the 31st of March was communicated to the French ministry at Paris. The speech of the king of France, on the opening of the chambers, excited not only strong feelings of disapprobation by the principles which it avowed, but serious apprehensions for the future, from the designs which it appeared to disclose. I have no difficulty in saying, that the speech, delivered from the British throne at the commencement of the present session, did, as originally drawn, contain an avowal of our intention to preserve neutrality; but, upon the arrival of the king of France's speech, the paragraph containing that avowal was withdrawn: and I plainly told the French Chargé d'Affaires, that such an intimation had been intended, but that it was withdrawn, in consequence of the speech of the king, his master. Was this truckling to France ?

"It was not, however, on account of Spain that the pledge of neutrality was withdrawn: it was withdrawn upon principles of general policy on the part of this country-because there was that in the king of France's speech, which appeared to carry France and England back to their position in older times, when France, as regarded the affairs of Spain, had been the successful rival of England. Under such circumstances, it behoved the English ministers to be upon their guard. We were upon our guard. Could we prove our caution more than by withholding that assurance, which would at once have set France at ease? We did withhold that assurance. But it was one thing to withhold the declaration of neutrality, and another to vary the purpose.

"Spain, then, I repeat, has never been misled by the British government. But I fear, nevertheless, that a notion was in some way or other created at Madrid, that if Spain would but hold out resolutely, the government of England would be forced by the popular voice in this country, to take part in her favour. I infer no blame against any one; but I do firmly believe that such a notion was propagated in Spain, and that it had great share in producing the peremptory refusal of any modification of the constitution of 1812."

Such was the tenor and the essence of Mr. Canning's justification of our conduct in the negotiations, in reference to its fitness to accomplish the end which we had in view the preservation of peace. He then proceeded to the consideration of the second questionhow far ministers had judged correctly in resolving to abstain from

war; and he showed that peace was the policy prescribed to them, 1st, by the situation of Spain; 2ndly, by the situation of France; 3rdly, by the situation of Portugal; 4thly, by the situation of the Alliance; 5thly, by the peculiar situation of England; and lastly by the general state of the world.—The civil discussions among the Spaniards themselves the danger of again lighting up revolutionary flames in France-the assurances, which we had received, that the independence of Portugal would be respected, and the conditions of our treaties with that ancient ally, which bound us to assist her only in case of an unprovoked attack upon her territory-the circumstance that France did not at present receive, and was not, according to the resolutions adopted at Verona, entitled to ask for, the assistance of the allies, in which respect a material change might be produced in the aspect of affairs, if the British government took a decided part in support of the Spaniards. the necessity of not exposing the resources of the country, now in a course of rapid re-production, to any sudden check, until we had turned the corner of our difficulties, and assured ourselves of means and strength, not only to begin the conflict, but to keep it up, if necessary, for an indefinite length of time, and on an adequate scale (and what an adequate scale might be, could be gathered from this, that, during the two years and a half prior to the conclusion of the campaign of 1814, the expense incurred in Spain and Portugal was about 33 millions sterling)-the essential neutral station of England in the political system of Europe, neutral not only as between contending

parties, but as between the conflicting principles of unlimited monarchy on the one hand, and unlimited democracy on the other: -these were the topics on which Mr. Canning insisted, to show that peace was the path pointed out to us by our own most important interests and those of the world.

"By remaining at peace ourselves," said Mr. Canning, "we best secure Portugal; by remaining at peace, we take the best chance of circumscribing the range, and shortening the duration of the war, which we could not prevent from breaking out between France and Spain; by remaining at peace, we shall best enable ourselves to take an effectual and decisive part in any contest into which we may be hereafter forced against our will.

"So far, then, as the interests and honour of Great Britain are concerned, those interests and that honour have been scrupulously maintained. Great Britain has come out of the negotiations, claiming all the respect that is due to her; and, in a tone not to be mistaken, enforcing all her rights. It is true that her policy has not been violent or precipitate. She has not sprung forth armed, from the impulse of a sudden indignation; she has looked before and after; she has reflected on all the circumstances which beset, and on all the consequences which may follow, so awful a decision as war; and instead of descending into the arena as a party in a quarrel not her own, she has assumed the attitude and the attributes of justice, holding high the balance, and grasping, but not unsheathing, the sword."

Mr. Canning concluded, by examining the paragraphs of the pro

posed address, and showing that it was not only unwarranted by the facts of the case, but was inconsistent with itself and with the principles expressed by its supporters. "It is affirmed," said he," that we are now on the eve of war, the peace which we have maintained being insecure. If we are on the eve of war, will not this be the first time that a British House of Parliament has approached the throne, on such an occasion, without even a conditional pledge of support?-If war is a matter even of possible contemplation, it surely becomes this House either to concur in an address for the removal of the ministers who have needlessly incurred that danger; or, as the amendment moved by the hon. member for Yorkshire proposes, to tender to his majesty a cordial assurance, that this House will stand by his majesty in sustaining the dignity of his Crown, and the rights and interests of his people. I trust, therefore, Sir, that by rejecting this most incorrect and inadequate address-as unworthy of the House as it is of the occasion;-an address contradictory in some parts to itself; in more, to the established facts of the case; and in all, to the ascertained sense of the country-and by adopting, in its room, the amendment moved by the hon. member for Yorkshire, and seconded by the hon. member for London-the House will stamp the policy, which the king's ministers have pursuedfeebly perhaps-perhaps erroneously-but at all events from pure motives; in the sincerity of their hearts; and as conducive, in their judgment, to the tranquillity, welfare, and happiness, not of this country only, but of the world—with that highest of all sanctions, the deliberate ap