think that this country should have gone to war in the event of the invasion of Spain. He (sir Franeis Burdett) could not think, that, at the outset of these negotiations, it was at all incumbent on a British minister to let France into the secret as to what this country might or might not do. War or peace should have been left to depend on the acts of the parties. But, when pains were taken to tell France, that, whatever she might do, she had nothing to fear, it was impossible to believe in the sincerity of the desire of our ministers to prevent the aggression on Spain. If they had been sincere in a different sense-sincere well-wishers to the Bourbon scheme of aggres sion, and sincere enemies of the interests of Spain-if they had been accomplices and not dupes he could not see what conduct they could have adopted more unfavourable to Spain, and more likely to forward the unjust views of the Bourbons, than such a proceeding. The notes of the French ministers all appeared to be written in a confidential way, as if they were addressed to persons who in their heart wished well to their designs; as if, indeed, there was something in this country, under the shape of public opinion, which the ministers could not conveniently defy, so that the force of this country could not well be applied to aid them, but as if it could not be doubted that the good-will of our government went along with them in the whole of the transactions.

It was said, that France never could effect the conquest of Spain -that there were in that country millions of men who defied invasion. If this was the case, what became of the argument, that war would be dangerous and ruinous ?

Why, if we could have entered on a war with such allies, and in a cause so certain of success, what an opportunity had we lost of elevating our character, and of taking that high ground which we ought to hold in the estimation of Europe? But the truth was, that, if the French government had known, or even apprehended, that a war with England was the necessary consequence of a war with Spain, the Bourbons would never, have embarked in the unjust contest.

That a war with France would be Inconvenient at the present moment, there was no doubt. There could be as little doubt, that every man whom he addressed, would be desirous, if possible, to avoid it. But there was such a thing as national honour-a thing even more precious than national immediate interests; and England was sacrificing her honour as a nation, if she consented to remain at peace, when the proper course for her was war. It might be said, perhaps, that England was in a situation requiring repose, which made it necessary for her to consult her domestic arrangements, and to prefer immediate to more remote advantage. But if this was so, why not say so openly? Then there was no compromise of characterno honesty lost. But it was poor to see men standing forward and vaunting their strength, affecting to say

"We are what we have been, and we can maintain the honours which were won for us by our fathers;" and yet shrinking (in a cause, too, from which least of all they ought to shrink) the moment their boasted powers were in danger of being put to the proof. If England had taken part in the war, she would not have been opposed

war

to France. She would have been opposed only to the bigotted house of Bourbon, who, if they succeeded in their counter-revolutionary enterprise, would carry the principle of that enterprise back into their own country, making the evil eventually recoil upon France, which they had compelled France, to become the instrument of inflicting upon Spain. There was nothing, therefore, (the hon. bart. continued) to have made a with France, under existing circumstances, formidable. He believed he must admit, that a majority of the House was in favour of peace of "peace, come what may;" he too was for peace, as far as that peace could be consistent with the honour and safety of England, but to barter honour and future security for the chance of present quiet was a course, to his thinking, not more cowardly than impolitic. To the whole conduct of the negotiations, therefore, he stood decidedly opposed. He did not see at all, that ministers were bound to let France at once into the secret of what was to be the course of England. But, if it was right for England to speak out, he would state what it was that England ought to have said She ought to have said to the Bourbons" We wish you well: We have been your benefactors: We wish you to remain safe where you are: for it is impossible for you to commit violations of the law of nations and of the peace of Europe, without, in the end, compelling England to become your adversary." All this might have been said-all, that he thought for the honour of England, ought to have been said, in the most friendly way; and, having been so said, it could scarcely have failed to have had its effect. If France had early

seen and known, that England would take that line of conduct, Europe would now have been at peace instead of being at war. If ministers had been sincere, even their friends must admit that they had, from whatever cause been, in the last degree, unsuccessful. But he gave them no credit for sincerity in their efforts. He looked to the whole course of the published negotiations: and far from seeing the cause of the oppressed taken up by his majesty's ministers, he saw nothing but a constant participation in the views, of the oppressor. As far as there was any exhibition of friendship towards the oppressed party, if that friendship had not been treacherous, it had assuredly been most woefully deficient in discretion and sound sense. The hon. baronet, after observing that with respect to the immediate questions before the House, he was quite as well pleased (excepting only one or two words): with the spirit of the amendment as with that of the original motion, declared that he considered the interests of Spain and of England to have been most unjustifiably compromised, throughout the late negotiations: and he apprehended no other result, if the contest between Spain and France should be prolonged, but that England would eventually be compelled to enter into the contest, under disadvantages which would not have attached to her in its commencement.

On the third night of the debate, after several members on both, sides of the House had spoken (among whom Mr. H. Twiss distinguished himself by a speech in support of the Amendment, which was not very patiently listened to, but which exposed with great: acuteness and dexterity of argu

ment the inconsistences of the views that were advocated by the opponents of ministers). Mr. Canning, being loudly called for from every part of the House, rose at a quarter before 11 o'clock, and commenced the long-expected justification of himself and his colleagues. "We could not" said the right hon. Secretary, "take a single step in the late negotiations, till we had determined what direction ought to be given to those negotiations, so far as the question of peace or war was concerned. We determined that it was our duty, in the first instance, to endeavour to preserve peace, if possible, for all the world: next, to endeavour to preserve peace between the nations whose pacific relations appeared most particularly exposed to hazard; and, failing in this, to preserve at all events peace for this country; but a peace consistent with the good faith, the interests, and the honour of the nation."

This decision, he admitted, was a fit subject of examination: for undoubtedly the conduct of the government was liable to a twofold trial. But, in entering on an inquiry as to the merits or demerits of the negotiations, it was necessary to set out with assuming, for the time, that peace was the object which we ought to have pursued.

"In reviewing, then," said Mr. Canning" the course of these negotiations, as directed to maintain, first, the peace of Europe; secondly, the peace between France and Spain; and lastly, peace for this country,-they divide themselves naturally into three heads:-first, the negotiations at Verona; secondly, those with France; and thirdly, those with Spain."

: At, Verona, he contended we were completely successful." In

proof of this," said he," my first wit ness is the duke Mathieu de Montmorency; who states, in his offi cial note* of the 26th of December, that the measures conceived and proposed at Verona, 'would have been completely successful, if England had thought herself at liberty to concur in them.' Such was the opinion entertained by the plenipotentiary of France of his failure at Verona, and of the cause of that failure.-What was the opinion of Spain? The voucher for that opinion is the despatch from sir William A'Court, of the 7th of January,t in which he describes the comfort and relief that were felt by the Spanish government, when they learnt that the congress at Verona had broken up, with no other result than the bruta fulmina of the three despatches from the courts in alliance with France.

"Whatever might grow out of a separate conflict between Spain and France (though matter for grave consideration) was less to be dreaded, than that all the great powers of the continent should have been arrayed together against Spain; and although the first object, in point of importance, indeed, was to keep the peace altogether, to prevent any war against Spain-the first, in point of time, was, to prevent a general war;-to change the question from a question between the allies on one side, and Spain on the other, to a question between nation and nation. This, whatever the result might be, would reduce the quarrel to the size of ordinary events, and bring it within the scope of ordinary diplomacy. The inmediate object of England, therefore,

• See Papers, Class A, No. 11. + See Papers, Class B, No. 14.

was, to hinder the impress of a joint character, from being affixed to the war-if war there must be, with Spain ;-to take care that the war should not grow out of an assumed jurisdiction of the congress;-to keep within reasonable bounds that predominating areopagitical spirit, which the memorandum of the British cabinet, of May 1820, describes as · beyond the sphere of the original conception, and understood principles of the alliance,' -an alliance never intended as a union for the government of the world, or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other states. And this, I say, was accomplished.

"With respect to Verona, then, what remains of accusation against the government? It has been charged, not so much that the object of the government was amiss, as that the negotiations were conducted in too low a tone. But the case was obviously one in which a high tone might have frustrated the object; and, besides, as a tone of reproach and invective was unnecessary, it would have been misplaced. There are others, who think, that with a view of conciliating the great powers, we should have addressed them as tyrants and despots, who were trampling on the rights and liberties of mankind. I doubt whether it is wise even in this House, to indulge in such a strain of rhetoric ;-to call wretches' and barbarians,' and a hundred other hard names, powers, with whom, after all, if the map of Europe cannot be altogether cancelled, we must, even according to the admission of the most anti-continental politicians, maintain some international intercourse. But be the language of good sense or good taste in this House

what it may, clear I am, that, in diplomatic correspondence, no minister would be justified in risking the friendship of foreign countries, and the peace of his own, by coarse reproach and galling invective; and that even while we are pleading for the independence of nations, it is expedient to respect the independence of those with whom we plead. We differ widely from our continental allies on one great principle, it is true; nor do we, nor ought we to disguise that difference; nor to omit any occasion of practically upholding our own opinion: but every consideration, whether of policy or of justice, combines with the recollection of the counsels which we have shared, and of the deeds which we have achieved in concert and companionship, to induce us to argue our differences of opinion, however freely, with temper; and to enforce them, however firmly, without insult.

"It had been asked why we sent plenipotentiary to the congress at all?Originally it was not intended to send a British plenipotentiary to Verona. The congress at Verona was originally convened solely for the consideration of the affairs of Italy, with which England had declined to interfere two years before. England was therefore not to participate in those proceedings; and all that required her participation was to be arranged in a previous congress at Vienna. But circumstances had delayed the duke of Wellington's departure from England, so that he did not reach Vienna till many weeks after the time appointed. The sovereigns had waited to the last hour consistent with their Italian arrangements. The option was given to our plenipotentiary to meet them

on their return to Vienna; but it was thought, upon the whole, more convenient to avoid further delay; and the Duke of Wellington there fore proceeded to Verona."

Another question had been asked, why Spain was not invited to send her ambassador to the congress, Mr. Canning contended, that England was not the power, that should have taken any preliminary steps to that end, as we did not wish the affairs of Spain to be brought into discussion at all; and, secondly, if Spain had been so called upon, the ambassador would have been sent either as from the king of Spain, or as from the cortes. On the first supposition, the effect could not have been favourable; and, on the latter, it was equally certain it would have led to such a declaration from the alliance, as we wished to prevent.

The result of the congress as to Spain, was simply the discontinuance of diplomatic intercourse with that power, on the part of Austria, Russia, and Prussia ;-a step neither necessarily nor probably leading to war; perhaps (in some views) rather diminishing the risk of it; a step which had been taken by the same monarchies towards Portugal two years before, without leading to any ulterior consequences. Its result, as to France, was a promise of countenance and support from the allies in three specified hypothetical cases;-1st, of an attack made by Spain on France; 2nd, of any outrage on the person of the king or royal family of Spain; 3rdly, of any attempt to change the dynasty of that kingdom.

Mr. Canning then proceeded to justify our conduct in the negotiations at Paris. He observed, that, having succeeded in preventing a

joint operation against Spain, we might have rested satisfied with that success, and trusted, for the rest, to the reflexions of France herself on the hazards of the project in her contemplation; and he owned that we did hesitate, whether we should not adopt that more selfish and cautious policy. But there were circumstances attending the return of the duke of Wellington to Paris, which directed the decision another way. His grace found, on his arrival in that capital, that M. de Villèle had sent back to Verona the drafts of the despatches of the three continental allies to their ministers at Madrid, which M. de Montmorency had brought with him from the congress ;- had sent them back for re-consideration;-whether with a view to obtain a change in their context, or to prevent their being forwarded to their destination at all, did not appear. At the same time, it was notorious, that a change was likely to occur in the cabinet of the Tuilleries, which did in fact take place shortly afterwards, by the retirement of M. de Montmorency, the adviser of war against Spain. And, in the third place, it was precisely at the moment of the duke of Wellington's return to Paris that we received a direct and pressing overture from the Spanish government, which placed us in the alternative of either affording our good offices to Spain, or of refusing them.

Add to this, that the question had assumed a different shape; it was reduced from a contest between Spain and a self-constituted corporate power, to one between kingdom and kingdom. Accordingly, although at Verona a discouraging answer had been given to a proposal of mediation, our plenipotentiary,