contradictions, of belief in the history of gods utterly distinct from the faith which guided

poets were con

cious

this con

The later the practice of men, of an immoral and impure theology with a condition of society trast. which it would be monstrous to regard as utterly and brutally depraved. Yet, in some way or other, this repulsive system, from which heathen poets and philosophers learnt gradually to shrink scarcely less than ourselves, had come into being, had been systematised into a scheme more or less coherent, and imposed upon the people as so much genuine history. What this origin and growth was, is (strange as it may appear) one of the most momentous questions which we may put to ourselves, for on its answer must depend our conclusions on the condition of human life during the infancy of mankind. If the fragmentary narratives which were gradually arranged into one

us how out of the darkness of their earlier thoughts they were led to feel that there was a Power, independent of all things, yet pervading all things, with which they had to do, and that this Power was righteous and good. But the Greek, who had this feeling and was conscious of it, would still speak of that Power as Zeus. Christianity itself has not banished from its language names which come from the myth-making ages. With the Greek a confusion of names could scarcely fail to produce confusion of thought; but the depth of his ignorance or the greatness of his perplexity is no proof that his partial knowledge of a Divine Law and a Personal God did not come directly from His Holy Spirit. Still less can it show that man in any age can attain to any such knowledge by his own reflective power.

gigantic system, were the work of a single age or of several generations who devoted themselves to their fabrication, then never has there been seen in the annals of mankind an impurity more loathsome, an appetite more thoroughly depraved, a moral sense more hopelessly blunted, than in those who framed the mythology of the Greeks. Of the answers which have been given to this question, it can be no light matter to determine which furnishes the most adequate solution.

signifi

Greek mythology.

The method which Mr. Grote, in his History of Greece,1 has adopted for the examination of Greek legend, appears rather to avoid the Historical difficulty than to grapple with it. There cance of is unquestionably much personification in their mythology: there is also undoubtedly a good deal of allegory; but neither allegory nor personification will furnish a real explanation of the whole. It may be true to say that Ouranos, Nux, Hupnos, and Oneiros, are persons in the Theogony of Hesiod, although it is probably erroneous to say that they are just as much persons as Zeus or Apollo; and the supposition is certainly inadmissible that these legends could all be traced by means of allegory into a coherent body of physical doctrine.' But there are beyond doubt

Vol. i. chaps. i. xvi.

2

2 Grote, History of Greece, vol. i. pp. 2, 3. See also Mure, Critical History of Greek Literature, vol. i. p. 104 &c.; Milman, History of Christianity, vol. i. p. 13 &c.

TALES

OF

THE GODS AND HEROES.

INTRODUCTION.

“Οσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν.

THE Mythology of the Greeks presents, at first

tion of

society in

the Greek heroic

age.

sight, as mysterious a problem as any that may perplex and bewilder even the soundest judgment. Their earliest extant literature Condiexhibits a state of society which has long since emerged from mere brutishness and barbarism. It has its fixed order and its recognised gradations, a system of law with judges to administer it, and a public opinion which sets itself against some faults and vices not amenable to legal penalties. It brings before us men who, if they retain, in their occasional ferocity, treachery, and malice, characteristics which belong to the savage, yet recognise the majesty of law and submit themselves to its government-who are obedient, yet not servile-who care for other

B

than mere brute forces, who recognise the value of wise words and prudent counsels, and in the right of uttering them give the earnest of a yet higher and more developed freedom. It shows to us men who, if they regard all as enemies till by an outward covenant they have been made their friends, yet own the sanctity of an oath, and acknowledge the duty of executing true judgment between man and man-who, if they are fierce in fight, yet abhor mutilation, torture, and unseemly insult, and are willing to recognise merit in an enemy not less readily than in a friend. Above all, it tells us of men who in their home life are honest and truthful, who make no

It cannot, of course, be maintained that this freedom was more than in its germ. The king has his Boulê or Council, where he listens to the chieftains whose judgment nevertheless he can override. There is also the Agora, where the people hear the determination at which their rulers have arrived, and in which justice is administered. The case of Thersites would imply a seanty right of opposition, while the complaints of Hesiod show that an unjust verdict could easily be obtained. But it was everything that a people should acknowledge Zeus to be the author of law,

δικασπόλοι θέμιστας

πρὸς Διὸς εἰρύαται,

...

Il. i. 238.

and allow the force of mind over matter even in their chieftains. Mr. Grote has brought out the imperfections of the Homeric society both in discussion and administration of justice (History of Greece, vol. ii. pp. 90-101). Mr. Gladstone presents the picture in a more favourable light (Homer and the Homeric Age, vol. ii. p. 122 &c.)